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ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the doctrine of mind-body identity in Baruch Spinoza
to discover if there is something in his metaphysical doctrine that is analogous to the way
that Thomas Aquinas views the nature of the relationship between mind and body in
human beings. The argument put forth in this work is that Aquinas’s hylomorphism, in
which the human soul is the form of the human person, both bodily and mentally, is
echoed in Spinoza’s doctrine of the conatus. No dependence upon Aquinas is implied in
this comparative study, but merely the argument that the ways that Spinoza and Aquinas
conceive of the mind-body relationship specifically, and human existence more broadly,
have some very interesting parallels that have not been observed sufficiently by other
interpretation of their work. Furthermore, it is a part of the purpose of this dissertation to
suggest that the ways that Spinoza and Aquinas analyze the nature of human existence in
the universe, especially organic existence, can provide helpful insights that could enrich
contemporary philosophy as it tries to work, in conjunction with modern science, to
understand the way that mind and body are present in human beings.
The study is divided into six chapters which provide the following steps in the
argument. The first chapter introduces the problems related to the subject of mind and
body in both Spinoza and Aquinas, establishing the parameters of the research. Chapter
two looks at the Aristotelian background of hylomorphism and argues that it is still a
philosophically respectable theory. Aquinas’s further development of the doctrine of
hylomorphism beyond Aristotle’s own foundational theory is the focus of the third
chapter. Chapter four turns to Aquinas’s discussion of the nature of mind and body

iv

identity. The next chapter deals substantively with Spinoza’s doctrine and in a
preliminary way points to the affinity he has with Aquinas’s doctrine. Chapter six points
explicitly to their similarities and shows how each of them argued for the immortality of
the human “soul.” In this chapter, suggestions are made as to how Spinoza and Aquinas
can be dialogue partners in contemporary philosophy of mind.
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Chapter 1
On Being Rationally Alive:
Why Compare the Doctrines of Thomas Aquinas and Baruch Spinoza

The thesis of this project
Very little scholarly attention has been given to the topic that this dissertation
addresses. So the thought that one could compare Thomas Aquinas’s and Baruch
Spinoza’s respective doctrines of the relationship between mind and body, at first glance,
might strike many as philosophically fruitless. One might assume that only a collision of
jarring opposites could be produced in the endeavor. This is understandable, given that
Spinoza has been for many years considered to be a debunker of medieval and premodern philosophical systems of thought. He has been considered by most to be, in the
words of Dan Levin’s subtitle to his biography of Spinoza, “the young thinker who
destroyed the past.”1 A good many of Spinoza’s interpreters assumed him to be only a
kind of super-Cartesian who drove the conclusions of Descartes’ definition of Substance
to its logical conclusions. Hence, Spinoza’s ontological monism, where Deus sive
Natura is the only Substance, has been considered a thorough refutation of the kind of
Christian ontology that one could assume is at work in Aquinas and others. As well, a
good many Christian philosophers and theologians have dubbed Spinoza an enemy of the
faith.
This dissertation is, therefore, a kind of minority report. For its author is
convinced that such a radical line of demarcation is unwarranted regarding Spinoza and

1

Dan Levin, Spinoza: The Young Thinker Who Destroyed the Past, (New York: Weybright and
Talley), 1970.
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the medieval philosophical scheme. The thesis I propose to explore is this: Thomas
Aquinas and Baruch Spinoza offer philosophically interesting and helpful ways of
conceptualizing the so-called mind/body problem that, upon close exegetical analysis of
the doctrines they advance, show a remarkably complementary, if not similar,
commitment to a version of what is today referred to as the “dual-aspect” theory
regarding the relation that exists between mind-body. As such, their perspective is, as
well, a kind of “identity theory.” I shall argue that Spinoza’s doctrine as expressed in the
Ethics – that “mind and body are one and the same thing; conceived now under the
attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension” (III, P 2, S) – gives postCartesian expression to a philosophical insight about the essential oneness of a human
being’s existence that can be shown to have very much in common philosophically with
Aquinas’s definition of a human person as a “rational animal,” i.e., an individual thing
that is simultaneously and essentially mental and physical. One implication of this,
which will hopefully become evident, is that one can find considerable help in
interpreting Spinoza’s much-discussed doctrine of the identity of mind and body if one
first understands Aquinas’s doctrine of hylomorphism rightly and then sees Spinoza’s
body-mind oneness doctrine as a further philosophical development of hylomorphism,
complementary to Aquinas’s thought.
In the course of the research, it will be demonstrated that the similar hylomorphic
doctrines that one can find in Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s identification of body and mind
differ significantly from many contemporary versions of the identity theory. Neither
Aquinas nor Spinoza granted ontological primacy to the physical. But, neither did they
countenance any sort of idealist primacy of the mental. Nor did the various kinds of
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dualist ontologies of psycho-physical parallelism or simultaneity fit their demands. The
same could be said about non-reductive physicalism. This is because, in the similar
doctrines that they espouse, the descriptors “body” and “mind” should not be thought of
primarily as substantives in themselves, but instead are designators of irreducible features
of a single entity, i.e., the human person. In Aquinas’s metaphysics, this notion of
singularity of essence is expressed via the phrase “rational animal.” Rationality is, for
Aquinas, the intrinsic reality – the Form – of our bodily existence (our animality) qua
actually existent entity; it is not something supervening upon or emerging from a
preceding biological state of affairs. But, as will be shown, “Rationality” considered as
the Form of the human body must not be thought of as a thing that exists. Rather, it is, in
Aquinas’s view, a subsistent principle that is necessary for an adequate metaphysical
account of the fact that rational animals – bodies that self-consciously know and reason –
exist in the first place. Similarly, Spinoza expresses a very similar view of the
coextensive reality of the body and what he calls “its idea.” He treats the extended body
and the mental awareness of that body as the (ultimately) single state of affairs that is a
human being’s existence. He does this through his development of the concept of
conatus. For Spinoza, as I shall show, each individual thing – ordinary particular – is
made to be the very thing that it is by a conatic essence specific to itself; and conatus is a
principle in Spinoza’s metaphysics that in fact makes everything alive (animata) to some
higher or lower degree.
I want to argue that conatus and anima are, for Spinoza, closely related concepts.
The conatus of a res in Spinoza’s metaphysics can be seen in one sense to be analogous
to the essence of a thing that makes it to be – and therefore to be “alive” – in a particular
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way.2 He describes conatus in III, 7: “The striving by which each thing strives to
persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”3 My reading can
take into account the general observation that being animata is a terms, for Spinoza, that
is related to the concept mens. Also, the term is hardly used in Ethics. However, what I
want to demonstrate by my reading is simply that being animata in Spinoza’s
metaphysics implies, for him, that there is a something (which I argue is related to the
notion of conatus, but not explicitly described as such by Spinoza) and this something
can be equated with the sort of thing that Aquinas calls the anima. Furthermore, my
reading shows how being animata means more for Spinoza than simply having mens.
Namely, the concept of an organism being animated or living can be taken to mean, in
Spinoza’s Ethics, precisely being actualized (i.e., “conatically” actualized by an
organizing principle) in such a way as to have a mind. This way of reading Spinoza has
the advantage of showing that the mind does not just attend in parallel fashion the body,
but suggests how we can read Spinoza as positing that mind and the body are “one and
the same thing.” In his metaphysics, I shall argue, this is the case because, for him, each
of these Modes, as he calls them, are the manifested features of a conatic essence
expressed in or through the specific conatic essence of each human being’s life.4
As is the case for Aquinas in his theory of the soul as the Form of the body, we
will see that the concept of conatic essences (anima) is, in Spinoza’s estimation, a

2

Jon Miller, “Spinoza’s Axiology,” http://post.queensu.ca/~miller/Papers/Spinoza's%
20axiology.pdf, 152.
3
My emphasis. Through out this work all references to Spinoza’s Ethics, trans. Samuel Shirley,
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1992).
4
This raises the question of the reality of Attributes and the question of whether the modes of the
Attributes of thought and extension are real or only ways of conceptualizing the one reality. This question
is related to issues that will be addressed more fully in Chapter 5.
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necessary description of what enables the “one and the same thing-ness” of the mind and
body. Therefore, for both Aquinas and Spinoza, descriptions of the body’s relationship to
the mind in any particular instance – any ordinary (human) particular – can only be
adequate when discussed in terms of a unified human essence that accounts for the
irreducible identity of mind and body in that individual. In their metaphysical
discussions of the psychophysical phenomenon that is a human being, neither the
physical body nor the mind can be considered to be more fundamental causally. Body
does not “cause” mental powers, nor does the mental “cause” bodily activity. That claim
(at least in Spinoza) is uncontroversial. It is more controversial to claim such a thing for
Aquinas, but I think it is true for him as well, strictly speaking. What I want more
specifically to argue is that for both philosophical schemes the ultimate “cause” in regard
to the active life of human persons is the particular life (anima/conatus). Spinoza would,
I think, find a point of agreement with Aquinas where the latter writes that we do not
speak of the mind knowing something, but the person, and similarly that the arm does not
lift a weight, but the man. For each of them the mental activities and the bodily
movements of a human being are the acts of a single living entity.5 The anima (soul or
conatus) is the reason for this oneness of existence, in both philosophers’ views. And the
anima is itself an essence that is an organizing principle that cannot be reduced to purely
physical descriptions, but cannot be adequately described in strictly dualistic terms either
(Augustinian or Cartesian or otherwise).

5

At this point the fact that Aquinas calls human beings “primary substances” and Spinoza
considers them to be “modes” of the One Substance is not in view. For both, the particular human we
might refer to as mental and physical is a specific entity.
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Secondary source considerations
The research of others – most notably Henry Wolfson – provides a background
for this present work. Wolfson famously, and controversially, argued in his now classic
The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Process of His Reasoning that Spinoza
can most helpfully be interpreted when one reads him as interacting with and being
influenced by medieval philosophical categories. The Philosophy of Spinoza, presents
Spinoza as a kind of latter-day Aristotelian, i.e. holds that Spinoza essentially seizes the
Aristotelian categories (as did Aquinas) of form and matter and then translates them into
his categories of thought and extension.6 Wolfson also makes a significant argument that
Spinoza’s theory of the natures of a mode of extension and the idea of that mode is
essentially a restatement of Aristotelian hylomorphism.7 One possible way to interpret
the implication of Wolfson’s reconstruction of Spinoza’s thought is to see Spinoza as
Aquinas’ “philosophical cousin,” at least. Such a reading suggests that Thomas’s
philosophy -- as a thirteenth century construct also influenced by Aristotle, but developed
beyond Aristotle’s – and Spinoza’s views might be fruitfully compared and contrasted as
Aristotelian philosophies of hylomorphism, broadly defined.
Wolfson also contends that Spinoza’s development of the categories natura
naturans and natura naturata is best understood as Spinoza’s engagement in dialogue
with Thomists on the nature of God as cause and the world as effect. Wolfson asserts
that “Spinoza’s description of these two phrases seems to be a modification of the
description given by Thomas Aquinas” and that Spinoza’s reason for the “modification of
6

Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning,
Vol. I, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 234.
7
Ibid, Vol. II, 46 – 48.
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[Aquinas’s] description can be adequately accounted for.”8 In other words, while
Spinoza is developing his metaphysical argument, he is engaged in dialogue with the
intellectual legacy of Aquinas as a background, even where he nuances his concepts in
contradistinction from the medieval Christian.
Very few scholars have taken Wolfson’s proposals as a starting point for
interpreting Spinoza. Perhaps Thomas Cook is no doubt correct in his assessment of this
circumstance. He argues that viewing Spinoza as a more medieval figure makes him
seem to contemporary philosophers to be “out of touch with philosophical questions and
issues of current interest.”9 Jonathan Bennett’s assessment of Wolfson is exemplary of
the general attitude. “[Wolfson’s] labor and learning are awesome, but the philosophical
profit is almost nil.”10 E. M. Curley, another of Spinoza’s recent respected
commentators, agrees with Bennett’s assessment, but demurs from Bennett’s total
disregard of Spinoza’s scholastic background.11 While the thesis of this project will not
address the question of Wolfson’s scholarship analytically, it is his insights that point us
in a helpful direction for this further and more focused analysis of Spinoza’s thought in
relation to Aquinas.
Others beyond Wolfson have also charted similar waters. Before Wolfson’s
work, Dunin-Borkowski, in Der Junge Spinoza, brought attention to the formative
8

Ibid, 16. Wolfson points out that Spinoza denies the Thomist notion of God as “an intelligent
and purposive cause” and that Spinoza also defied their notion of God as only immaterial substance, which
allowed him to develop his idea of the modes of substance, both extend and mental. One question,
however, to look at is how the Thomists themselves might have departed from Thomas’s idea of the
analogy of being and his philosophy of participation in God’s being.
9
Thomas Cook, http://fox.rollings.edu/~tcook/personalpage/SpinozainEnglish.htm.
10
Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1984), 16.
11
Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press,
1988), 137, n 2.
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influence exerted on Spinoza’s theory of the Attributes of the one Substance by certain
seventeenth-century Christian discussions on how to understand the relationship of the
“persons” of the Trinity.12 In the centuries between the thirteenth and the seventeenth,
Aquinas’s treatment of the Trinity proved to be mightily influential in Catholic and
Protestant theology.13 This does not suggest Spinoza’s dependence upon Aquinas, much
less a commitment to Christian dogma. Dunin-Borkowski rightly concludes that Spinoza
totally rejected the Christian dogma of Trinity. Nevertheless he contends that he paid due
attention to the philosophical exposition of the distinction of persons in the unity of the
Trinity that Christian theology offered. This was a conceptual framework for Spinoza’s
doctrine of the unity of the infinite Attributes of Substance. Once again, there are
interesting possibilities raised for purposes of historical interest, at least to the effect that
Aquinas and Spinoza might be considered together for philosophical purposes.
Even more directly related to the thesis of this present project, Efraim Shmueli
persuasively argues that Spinoza’s much-discussed lack of clarity in his theory of
Attributes can be adequately understood as Spinoza’s endeavor to reconcile the
intellectual heritage of medieval subjectivism (nominalism, from Maimonides) regarding
attributions made of God and that of medieval objectivist (realist) views. Shmueli
contends that Spinoza actually spans the divide in a way that harkens back (even if
unintentionally and independently) to Thomas’s basic view of the issue.14 Aquinas has
been called a “moderate realist,” because he argued that the distinctions and similarities

12

Stanislus Von Dunn-Borkowski, S. J., Der Junge de Spinoza (Muenster, 1920), 340f; 451; 489f.
M. William Ury, Trinitarian Personhood: Investigating the Implications of a Relational
Definition (Eugene, Oregon, Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2001), 215 – 224.
14
Efraim Shmueli, Journal of Religious Studies, 6-7 (Fall 1978- Spring 1979), 61 – 72, 71.
13
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that we perceive among things must be real if they have existence in our minds.
Regarding the distinctions between the Attributes of God, therefore, Aquinas argued that
they are real as “distinctions of reason,” but “in their highest form the Attributes are
identical with each other and with the simple divine essence.”15 Shmueli has argued that
one can discern an influence of Aquinas (indirectly) on Spinoza’s concept of Attributes.
He argues that Spinoza’s treatment of the Attributes of Substance was a reinvigoration of
the medieval debate about the nature of universals, especially as to whether any
predication could be made of God.
Ultimately, Shmueli argues that something akin to Aquinas’s notion of “the
analogy of being”16 allowed Spinoza to develop a view of the Attributes that was neither
a nominalistic view nor a strictly realist view. Thomas viewed the divine Attributes as
truly aspects of God’s essence, but known in our experience and conceptual framework
by analogy. He argued for this understanding because of his doctrine of God as the Act
of Being. By this ontological starting point, Aquinas could argue that the being of
creation participates in the Being of God. Shmueli's interpretation of Spinoza in the light
of this Thomistic view is that it formed a significant portion of the philosophical
backdrop against which Spinoza developed his notion of Attributes.
Seeing the indirect influence of a Thomistic doctrine is helpful, Shmueli
concludes, in addressing the much discussed issue of how Spinoza really viewed the

15

Ibid. 68.
Ibid. 67 – 68. “In general it was Thomas’s position that terms signify God to the extent that our
intellect knows Him. Attributes are predicated of God neither universally nor equivocally but analogically.
The divine perfection, like his wisdom or goodness, exists in God in a super-eminent and infinite (i.e.,
unique and most perfect degree). The Attributes really exist in God and can be properly predicated of him.
The analogical sense, however, does not mean that we have an adequate positive idea of what is objectively
signified by the divine attribute.”
16
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ontological status of the Attributes. According to Shmueli, Spinoza’s thought was
consonant with a general “Thomistic” analysis, i.e., that Attributes are real entities. Our
intellect, therefore, conceives Attributes as the true and real features – not simply
subjective delineations – that are present to us as “characterizing” the essence of
Substance. “The attributes are forms of God’s potency and, thus, aspects of natura
naturans, not just ways of thinking, not abstractions. They are inseparable in reality,
though distinguishable in kind. . . Distinctions are not divisions.”17 However, the
Attributes are not constitutive of Substance according to Aquinas. Aquinas denies a
constituting role to the Attributes of God because, on his view, God is simple (in the
sense that God is not a composite of any other concepts or principles or entities or stuff
that could be considered more properly basic than the essence of God itself). However,
the Attributes of God that we can name do indicate something real about God as God
relates to the world; that at least is Aquinas’s view. Observing this about Aquinas’s
understanding of God, we can see why Shmueli argues that a Thomist background for
Spinoza’s metaphysics would make him not to be a nominalist. Spinoza, Shmueli
concludes, is not ultimately a nominalist about Attributes, but embraces a way of
conceiving universal statements about God which echoes Aquinas. “The basic view,
then, of Spinoza [on the Attributes] is the Thomistic view of the attributes (universals) as
extra-mental realities without being distinctly existent on their own, not the
[nominalist/subjectivist] view of Maimonides.”18

17
18

Ibid. 71.
Ibid.
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The contribution of this project
The foundational thesis of this project is not, therefore, unprecedented, even if
contemporary scholarship has tended to downplay it. What will be offered is an analysis
of the metaphysical views that each of the two philosophers presents in the hope that two
distinct but related contributions might be made. The first is a demonstration of a
metaphysical view about the identity of mind and body that the two share. Such an
approach need not imply that Spinoza is in any way indebted to Thomas’s metaphysics,
as an informing influence. Nor will it be argued that Spinoza’s and Thomas’s larger
metaphysical programs are ultimately compatible. Yet, if it can be demonstrated that
Spinoza’s doctrine of mind-body sameness can be legitimately read as a post-Cartesian
development that expresses a nuance of a general “Thomistic” view, Spinoza scholarship,
as well as Thomistic scholarship, might develop a new and enriching dialogue. The
second thing that this analysis will allow is a kind of dialectical engagement of the
doctrines of each with the other, one in which Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s thought might
engage one another in fruitful exchange.
In the course of the dissertation, Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of the
question of mind-body identity can be seen as part of a larger philosophical issue: The
very fact of life in an essentially material world. In Spinoza’s case this is captured in his
doctrine that while all of reality (the One Substance) is essentially extended (as well as
mental and infinitely modal in unknowable ways). Life is also ubiquitous. However, his
ontology allows for a subtle discrimination about what “being alive” means, so that the
“aliveness” of a rock is not identical with the “aliveness” of a slime mold nor the
“aliveness” of a slime mold the same as that of a lobster, nor is the lobster’s way of being
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alive the same as that of a primate or a human. On Aquinas’s view, a distinction between
animate and inanimate is perhaps more clearly drawn. However, life is not, for him, a
supervening aspect that emerges from or supervenes upon an otherwise lifeless material
world. He insists that being alive is a particular way that many entities are in fact
material.
For both philosophers, the fact that one is dealing with life that is manifest in
living things, some of which, at least, have self-consciousness, is a matter of no small
consequence.19 The reality of self-consciousness (especially in humans) emerges for both
as an expression of the way that humans are alive as material creatures. Hence, selfconsciousness is not a Cartesian mystery for either one. Rather, it emerges from the very
fact of the way that human beings are physically alive. This is not to conflate
consciousness or self-consciousness with life, but to acknowledge that both Spinoza and
Aquinas see the former as a higher-order feature that life expresses. In allowing the
analyses of each of these men to engage the other, one might move some direction toward
a better grasp of the larger issue of consciousness as a feature of living things.
If Aquinas and Spinoza offer a similar way of conceiving the issue of mind-body
metaphysics that offers a new way of probing into the questions raised in philosophical
reflection, then this dissertation might point contemporary philosophers to an important
resource. Should that be the case, then Bennett’s disdain for the “medieval setting” of
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That Descartes’ metaphysics left Western philosophy with a view of the extended world that
saw living things mechanistically is well attested. However, much of contemporary philosophical
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Spinoza’s thought might prove to be shortsighted. Rather than being a philosophical
albatross around Spinoza’s neck, an affinity for a post-Cartesian Thomistic analysis of
the mind-body “problem” might prove, instead, to provide him with philosophical wings.
That metaphor implies a claim that is, no doubt, a controversial one in contemporary
philosophy, but is one I hope to defend.
A summary of the argument
This thesis of this dissertation as I have tried to sketch it above is not, I admit,
immediately apparent, so careful exegetical and interpretive work will be essential to the
project. Each philosopher must be allowed to speak on his own terms, so that what he
says can be expounded within the larger context of his ontological commitments. Doing
this, some important interpretive questions that are perennial issues in Aquinas and
Spinoza studies respectively, regarding each of their doctrines of the relationship between
mind and body, must be addressed in ways that prove integrative and reconciling.
Let us begin with Aquinas. He describes the “intellectual principle, which is
called mind or intellect,” as not only incorporeal but as “a substance, that is, something
subsistent” (Summa I a, Q 75, a 2). Aquinas argues further that the “intellectual
principle,” which is the human soul, is the Form (in the Aristotelian sense) of the human
body, but because intellect performs operations (the act of knowing) that do not
ultimately depend upon any bodily mechanism, the “intellectual principle” is itself a
substantial Form in its own right. If one were to leave Aquinas’s doctrine there, possibly
a straightforward substance dualism would fit him, but his analysis does not stop there.
He contends vigorously that a human being must be conceived as “a rational animal,”
with animality and reason seen as “one and the same thing” (I a, Q 76, a 3). This claim

13

cuts against a dualistic interpretation of Aquinas. Here Aquinas would seem to be
offering a medieval theory of mind-body metaphysics that can be described as a version
of identity theory, where a human being’s body and mind are essentially the same thing,
i.e., the human being in question.
There is no shortage of commentators who claim that such a way of describing
the state of affairs that attends the presence of rational consciousness in human beings is
self-contradictory in Aquinas’s basic Aristotelian metaphysics. How can it be, the
question is put, that the intellectual soul can be the Form of the body if it is itself an entity
in some way. Forms do not exist – except conceptually – apart from the physical things
that are “informed” by them. Absent the thing so “formed” the essence itself can no
longer be thought of as persisting. Aristotle certainly seems to have affirmed this. But
the notion of a subsistent anima, not only raises questions about the cogency of
Aquinas’s theory of the nature of the soul; it also raises the question of how human
beings can be analyzed as essentially “rational animals” if a substantial soul is,
ontologically and existentially speaking, a prerequisite existent in the hylomorphic entity.
Here the critique is that Aquinas cannot provide an adequate analysis for the ontological
oneness of a human being’s physical existence. Despite his remonstrations, Aquinas is –
so his critics claim – a substance dualist simpliciter. His arguments notwithstanding,
many contend, either one can conceive of an intellectual soul as a Form (Aristotle) or as a
subsistent entity (Descartes), but it cannot be both.
This thesis will argue that one can make sense of Aquinas’s claim about the
subsistent nature of the soul as a Form and allow him to be consistent, and perhaps even
convincing. In order for that to happen, though, we must unpack the meaning of his
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description of the soul as an intellectual principle. Essentially, anima must be
understood, in Thomistic terms, as a principle that is the essential cause (in the
Aristotelian sense) of the organization and interrelatedness of the component parts of the
human body. Anima, as a principle of the organization of matter, is the ultimate reason
that rationality is enabled as a feature of the world of extension in the life of the
biological creature called human. In other words, for Aquinas, this “intellectual
principle” is a feature of the biological life of a human being when one is considering that
life biologically.
In Aquinas’s argumentation, an “intellectual principle” is conceivable as a preexisting organizational force, whose existence makes possible the subsequent existence
of real primary beings – i.e., primary substances. As an organizational force, anima is
properly thought of as a subsisting entity that is a real feature of the world; however, this
subsistence does not entail its being conceived as an independently existing entity. As a
subsisting entity, therefore, this principle is (at least potentially) conceptually
independent of the actual organism it enables to exist as a rational animal, even if it only
has real concrete existence in the life of that actual organism. Hence it is conceivable as
an independent feature of the world and as having its own reality and subsistence,
although not existing as an actuality on its own. Such a reading of the issue would enable
us to contend that the concept anima is a necessary descriptor (even if one uses another
term), designating a real subsistent feature of the world. That would not, however, cause
us to have to commit to a Cartesian view of the soul as an entity that exists in itself.
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is crucial to show that Aquinas does not
promote a self-contradictory theory, much less that he is a closet dualist. Without this
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preliminary explication and analysis of his metaphysics, his hylomorphism will prove to
be no help at all in considering the puzzle of Spinoza’s own purported obscurity in his
claim that the human mind and the human body are “one and the same thing.” Properly
interpreted, however, Aquinas is self-referentially coherent and therefore a helpful lens
through which to read Spinoza. Showing this to be the case for Aquinas’s general
metaphysics will be the first challenge that we will address.
Spinoza, similarly, has presented his own challenge to his interpreters. His oftcited and commented-upon definition of the identity of mind and body has provided no
small amount of stress for his best interpreters; and Michael Della Rocca speaks for many
where he describes Spinoza’s statements on the identity of mind and body as “one of the
most famous and puzzling claims in the Ethics.”20 How are we to understand the
argument of Ethics III, P 2, sch. where he contends that body and mind are “one and the
same thing, conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of
Extension”? Spinoza certainly sounds as if he is promoting a numerical identity between
a mode of extension and its idea or between the body and mind.21 Given the causal and
conceptual barrier that Spinoza insists is a feature of Attributes in Deus sive natura, how
can a Spinozistic metaphysics allow for this identity? Those who wish to defend the idea
that Spinoza is promoting numerical identity have offered hypotheses including dual20

Michael Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind Body Problem in Spinoza (Oxford
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Benedict De Spinoza (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), p 89 and R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza (London:
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aspect theories, parallelism, and Curley’s fact-proposition interpretation. More recently,
Della Rocca has offered a semantic reading of Spinoza in which the concept of the
referential opacity of specific contexts and Spinoza’s own parallelism are the under
girding of his identity theory.22
However, many of the readings mentioned above leave us, in Spinoza studies,
with a functional dualism in Spinoza’s metaphysics that in practice is ultimately no
different than Descartes’ substance dualism. For instance, parallelism allows for what
Bennett calls a “mapping”23 of the mental with the physical. Parallel tracks, even on the
same road, are still ontologically distinct entities. Modes, understood along the lines of
parallelism, end up being conceivable only as twin realities. But Spinoza’s encumbering
description –“one and the same” – seems prima facie to be claiming more. Human
beings, in Spinoza’s ontology, may not be substances, but parallelism strikes me as
denying the essential singularity of anima or essence in each ordinary particular that
Spinoza wanted to contend for in Ethics. Parallelism misses Spinoza’s rather obvious
insistence that two modes are two necessary descriptions of a human being’s life, but that
qua necessary descriptors they are descriptions of one and the same res (thing). In the
interpretation offered by parallelism, however, the modes may be related, but they are not
the “same thing.” I believe Spinoza’s metaphysics would not countenance that. Thus, a
better explication is called for.
If Books III and IV of the Ethics are meant to follow from Books I and II, in
Spinoza’s strategy, then the functional dualism that parallelism leaves us with cannot be
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what he envisions by his causal and conceptual boundary between extension and thought.
Only if a human’s mind and body are together a singular entity that is “one and the same
thing” can Spinoza legitimately argue that emotions, desires, and volition are really the
mental expression of bodily needs and encounters in the world. Unless this oneness
functions in Spinoza’s metaphysics in a way that is consistent with his causal boundary,
the idea of the body – the thoughts reflecting the affections of the body that are that idea
– and the body along with its affections are really two things in function. The living
human organism – a specific and single conatus, I argue, for which Spinoza vigorously
contends – lives, as a result of the dual functioning that parallelism entails, two lives
rather than one. Parallelism misses Spinoza’s intention, I shall argue, because what
Spinoza wants to claim in II, 7 is not the existence of parallel orders (ideas and things),
but the essential sameness of the orders. In other words, Spinoza is arguing that when we
speak of “things” (here Spinoza gets sloppy in his terminology, equating things and
modes of extension) and ideas of “things,” we are not speaking of two distinct realms, but
of a singular reality that is only adequately described in terms of two distinct descriptors.
These descriptors are the modes in which the one single entity manifests its essential
conatic life. That, at least, seems to be the implication that Spinoza draws out in Books
III and IV of Ethics.
In this regard, dual-aspect theory is probably a better way to envision the intent of
Spinoza’s doctrine. However, it fails, as well as do some others, to give an adequate
explication of the essential unity for which Spinoza’s doctrine of mind-body unity seems
to call. The explanation of Spinoza’s metaphysics that dual-aspect explanations generally
offer simply takes for grated that there are singular and irreducible ordinary particulars.
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Thomas Nagel is representative in this regard. Defending himself against Searle’s
treatment of his position on mind and body, Nagel writes: “Searle identifies me as a
defender of property dualism. I prefer the term ‘dual aspect theory,’ to express the view
deriving from Spinoza that mental phenomena are the subjective aspects of states that can
also be described physically.”24 This move, of course, solves the ontological and
functional unity problem that, I contend, some versions of the parallelism doctrine fail to
solve. Yet it does so without providing an adequate explanation for why Spinoza might
contend for such unity in ordinary particulars qua ordinary particulars. The standard
expressions of dual-aspect theory seem to me simply to beg the whole question that
drives Spinoza’s ontology in Ethics. Furthermore, dual-aspect theory tends to identify
the question of the ultimate identity of the individual modes (minds and bodies) as only
resolvable, for Spinoza’s metaphysics, in God or Nature, where the ultimate unity of the
Attributes (Thought and Extension) is grounded. The unity of ordinary particulars,
therefore, is pushed back into the realm of the unknowable and the unaccountable. It
could be the case that Spinoza forces us to do this and was not concerned with the unity
of ordinary particulars qua the particular res that each particular in fact is. However,
given the import that the identity doctrine seems to play for Spinoza, we owe it to
ourselves to see if his philosophy might not provide us with resources for understanding
how he might indeed envision the unity issue in regard to the concept of conatus.
In any case, we cannot avoid putting the questions to Spinoza regarding both the
“real distinction” of the Attributes and the “real distinction” of the Modes of those
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Attributes. Related to this is the question of whether or not the Attributes and their
Modes are ultimately objective, and if so how, or are subjective ways of our knowing.
This is a debate of no small consequence and controversy in Spinoza studies.25 And dualaspect theories do not help us at this point. In this project it will be shown that, for
Spinoza, the Modes are real features of things and are really distinct from one another.
Hence, if dual-aspect theory sees the Attributes as really identical in God and really
distinct only in our ways of considering God, as “aspects” thereof, then it offers a further
problem for adequately interpreting Spinoza. Since dual-aspect theories do not address
the question of what provides the constitution of the singularity, in function and
existence, of a particular res (singular ordinary particular) in the first place, the dualaspect description of Spinoza’s ontology is superficial. Hence the need to examine, as
this dissertation will do, the import of Spinoza’s doctrine of conatus as the singular
essence of an ordinary particular that has dual-aspects to its singularity.
What I hope to offer is an alternative to dual-aspect theory as a description of
what Spinoza is after, although it currently comes closest to expressing the impetus of
Spinoza’s thought. The focus of this present work upon conatus will provide what dualaspect theory requires, i.e., an accounting for the constitution of the singularity and unity
of the “one and the same thing” that is expressed via mind and body. Clarity in this
regard requires us to concentrate upon the conatic essence of a single ordinary particular
(human or otherwise, but for our purposes especially human) in order to establish that the
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unity of the res in question is real, not simply a function of our way of regarding the
object of our analysis.
If Shmueli is correct, as quoted above, then the Attributes are, for Spinoza, real
distinctions, even if they are not divisions of Substance or do not constitute Substance. It
is worth the effort, therefore, to see if Spinoza might also be able to assert the reality of
the distinction between the modes of the Attributes while nonetheless allowing for the
unity and singularity of each ordinary particular in itself as an ordinary particular. In
other words, we can assert the singularity of a single particular in a way that truly goes
beyond regarding them merely as different aspects of an underlying single Substance.
Spinoza, it will be argued, far from rooting all distinctions merely in our understanding
and establishing all unity in the One Substance, contends for the unity of the “one and the
same thing” as being rooted in the essence of the res that is “one and the same thing” that
is “expressed” both as a particular body and as “the idea” of that body. This project will
endeavor to show that the identity of mind and body as “one and the same thing” is, in
Spinoza’s ontology, a necessary feature of the essence (the conatus) of the entity in
question in each case, qua the existent essence that it is. This, I contend, is ultimately
what Spinoza is seeking to establish in propositions 7 and 13 of Book II. If Spinoza
actually does conceive of the situation in this manner, his position is, therefore,
reminiscent of Aquinas’s claim that it is not the soul or mind that knows, nor the hand
that lifts. Rather, as Aquinas contends and Spinoza could, I argue, affirm, it is the person
who knows or lifts.26
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In Spinoza’s case he argues in III, 2 on the basis of II, 7 that “the body cannot determine the
mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest.” He intends to help his readers see
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In regard to this area of Spinoza’s thought, Hans Jonas’s observations are to the
point. Recognizing that Spinoza’s central concern in Ethics is “a foundation for
psychology and ethics,” Jonas rightly observes that the metaphysics of Spinoza enable
him to produce what other modern philosophers up to his time had not, namely, a
theoretical construct in which “an organic individual is viewed as a fact of wholeness
rather than of mechanical interplay of parts.”27 Even more, Jonas contends, Spinoza’s
metaphysics allowed him to continue to provide the modern period a great paradigmatic
gift: “For the first time in modern speculation, a speculative means is offered for relating
the degree of organization of a body to the degree of awareness belonging to it.”28 In
other words, Spinoza offers, according to Jonas, a conceptual framework in which mental
states are features of a physical organism and the physical states of said organism are
conditions (but not causes) of mental awareness.
Building upon Jonas’s claims, we can begin to understand a bit more clearly how
to translate what Spinoza means by the Latin verb expressa when he says in II, P 7, sch.
that mind and body as the same thing (res) that is simply differently “expressed” via
respective reference to either the Attribute of thought (of which minds are the modes) or
the attribute of extension (of which bodies are the modes). Many of Spinoza’s
interpreters see expressa in this scholium to proposition 7 in Book II as meaning
something equivalent to the meaning of the word “described.” What has been greatly
under analyzed, however, in Spinoza studies concerning this “puzzling claim” is the

that neither of these modes can determine the other, because they are not distinct from one another on a
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relationship that such a statement has to his more basic concept of physical organisms as
living entities. Yet this is the very issue upon which Spinoza builds his theory of mind in
II, 13. Taking Jonas’s observations into consideration, we can begin to see Spinoza’s use
of the term expressa in more than nominalist terms. Expressa can be taken to refer not
primarily to the act of our describing or expressing something we observe (nominalism),
but rather it might be seen as a function of the essence of the thing itself which is given
existential “expression” (objectivism) in distinct modes of existence. This will mean that
the thesis I put forth regarding Spinoza’s theory sees the unity of any distinct ordinary
particular -- which, of course, are the product of a specific and unique conatus that
essentially establishes and maintains any ordinary particular in question as a distinct
particularization of the essence of the One Substance that exists for us in the really
distinct Attributes of Substance. However, in this context, distinct modes are not thought
of by Spinoza as being thing-like in essence. In the strictest technical terms for Spinoza,
a particular mode that is a body and the particular “idea of that mode” which is its mind
are the ways that the singular entity (the res) exists in the world. What is “expressed” in
the Modes of Extension and Thought is the organizational complexity of a physical entity
that is capable of thought. And the greater the complexity of the physical organization,
the more capable, in Spinoza’s view, is the organism of higher-level thought.29 The
distinct modes of extension (its body) and “the idea of that mode” (its mind) by which the
organism is “expressed” are “one and the same thing” in the context of the organism’s
singular life qua physically organized living entity. But the modes are not in themselves
29
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things or essences, rather the organism that exists with the modal features of mind and
body is itself the thing under consideration. The distinct modes of thought and extension
are features of its life expressed via the two Attributes of Deus sive Natura of which
human rationality can be cognizant.30
To clarify the emphasis I am placing on the difference between the concepts
“distinct modes” and “distinct things,” we can contrast Spinoza’s view to that of
Descartes. While we cannot take the time to consider the complexities and controversies
of Cartesian dualism, it is uncontroversial to note that a Cartesian mind is in itself a thing
with particular existence quite apart from the body with which it is associated in
existence. And the mind is not only distinct from, but is in some significant ways cut off
from all other entities. (Consider his dependence upon the goodness of God to assure the
dependability of his ideas of the world and other minds.)31 This of course means for
Descartes that he is fundamentally “a thinking thing” – a mind or soul. But in Spinoza’s
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view it makes no sense to talk this way. Not merely his pursuit of the implications of the
Cartesian definition of Substance to its logical conclusions causes him to reject this kind
of dualistic theory of human nature. He is, as well, concerned to show how body and
mind are essentially descriptors of the “one and the same thing” that is expressed as (or
through, depending upon how one interprets the ontological existence of the Modes)
distinct Modes and, therefore, conceived as a Mode of extension when considered from
one perspective and conceived as a Mode of thought when viewed in a different light.
The distinct Modes, then are not distinct things to be defined as entities, but are rather
more aptly understood to be real features of existent things that are really distinct qua
Modes from one another.
Given that we are capable of encountering the existenceof the One Substance
(Reality) in only two of the infinite Attributes of God, our understanding can experience
and describe all of the ordinary particulars that we name only as physically extended (a
body) and/or as mental (a mind). This means that the Modes qua features of the one
thing that is “expressed” through them have boundaries imposed on their adequacy for
describing reality. So, mental Modes describe only phenomena that fit within the
general Attribute of Thought. And a similar rule fits for bodily Modes and the Attribute
of Extension. (Herein is the ontological foundation for the so-called causal boundary
between Extension and Thought and their various Modes.32)
Jonas’s interpretation of the significance of Spinoza’s emphasis on the
relationship between organizational complexity and the degree of awareness that an
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organism is capable of is certainly consistent with Spinoza’s discussion in II P 13 where
Spinoza intends to bolster, by way of a metaphysical demonstration of the nature of
“bodies,” his earlier claim that (I, P 7, sch.): “a mode of extension and the idea of that
mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two different ways.” In the Scholia,
Lemmas, Proofs, Corollaries, and Axioms that Spinoza introduces for the purposes of
demonstrating how to conceive of “the union of mind and body” he seeks to account for
the underlying principle(s) that account for the ongoing identity of individual entities. It
is quite significant and telling, I argue, that he does this in a proposition that is interested
in the relationship between mind and body. He informs us, however, that he is prompted
to do this because of his conviction that “nobody can understand [the union of mind and
body] adequately or distinctly unless he first gains adequate knowledge of the nature of
the body.”
Spinoza contends straightforwardly in this proposition that bodies are
distinguished not as primary substances as they are in Aristotle, but on a distinction of
motion and rest. And the motion and/or rest of any particular body is determined by a
prior body, ad infinitum. Yet, when he speaks of what he calls “composite bodies,” i.e.,
those that are made up of many different components, Spinoza must introduce the
concept of conatus, although he does not introduce it as a term until much later in the
work. I am suggesting that he must have in mind here, at least, something analogous to
conatus in this proposition, even if he does not use the term, because he has to speak,
when considering complexly organized living entities, of how composite bodies or, as he
says, “individual things,” preserve their own natures. Spinoza must have conceived of
some principle that could account for modal identity over time, given his monism, since

26

he denies that individual entities are in any way substantial in their existence. Instead,
they are products or “effects” of interactions with other modes – determinations
established by changes in motion or rest between bodies and between complex
organisms. Again Jonas’s observations are instructive: “The continuity of
determinateness [of a thing’s identity] throughout such interactions (a continuity,
therefore, not excluding change) bespeaks the self-affirming ‘conatus’ by which a mode
tends to persevere in existence, and which is identical with its essence. Thus, it is the
form of determinateness, and the conatus evidenced by the survival of that form in a
causal history, i.e., in relation to co-existing things, that defines an individual.”33
What Jonas, and many others apparently, have failed to notice, however, is that
such a conceptual framework was offered centuries before in the philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas. It is articulated in his particular development of a doctrine of hylomorphism
that he received from Aristotle. This failure keeps scholars from recognizing a helpful
archetype by which one could better understand the intent of Spinoza’s much and
variously interpreted claim. Building upon Aristotle’s definitions, but going beyond
them, Aquinas contends that anima rationale is the formal essence that causes (in the
Aristotelian sense of an essential or formal cause) a human body to be the kind of body it
is and produces in the union of form and matter a human person who is an irreducibly
singular “substance” that is inherently minded as a feature of biological existence. While
form and matter, as technical metaphysical concepts, are alien to Spinoza’s ontological
vocabulary, a careful reading of Aquinas will show that, although in different terms and
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based on a distinct ontology, the great medieval Aristotelian-Augustinian synthesizer
discussed a human being’s minded physical existence in a way that predates Spinoza’s
analysis of the mind and body as “one and the same thing, conceived under different
attributes.” John O’Callaghan comments on the general orientation in Aquinas’s thought
that this present project will demonstrate in the course of its own exploration and
analysis:
. . . for Aquinas we live but one life, the life of a rational animal. . . Aquinas
argues that the principle of rational life just is “one and the same thing” as the
principle of animal life in the human being. Thus the life of the mind or intellect
is identically the life of the animal that is human. . . Aquinas leaves no doubt
about his desire to emphasize the absolute unity of human life in all its
manifestations; animal could not be included in the definition of man, if the
principle of animal life were not “one and the same thing” as the principle of
rational life in man.”34
The description of mind and body as “one and the same thing” that is
conceptualized in two distinct ways, based on the ontological difference between the
attribute of extension and the attribute of thought, is perhaps rhetorically a Spinozistic
novelty. It is not, however, a philosophical innovation altogether. Aquinas, as
O’Callaghan suggests, contends in his essential definition of a human being as a rational
animal for a similar sense of identity between the mind and body of a human person
when he, in the Summa, argues that anima rationale is the Form that causes a particular
person’s body to be what and to be all that it is. “Rational soul” is not in Aquinas’s
thought a term that refers to the mind strictly defined or to the mental “aspect” of a
human being. Instead, it is a term that denotes some essential principle (an essence) that
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accounts precisely for the human body being the kind of body that it is – a body capable
of rational life.
Foundational for both Aquinas and Spinoza is the conviction that human beings
are in every aspect of their life and every phenomenal feature of their existence a part of
the material world. Human nature, therefore, must be described philosophically in such a
way that the essential nature of human beings is conceived in terms of active agency and
passive receptivity, rather than simply in terms of the Cartesian mind-body dualistic split.
By active agency I mean that both Spinoza and Aquinas begin with the empirically
immediate idea that humans are actors in the world they perceive. By passive receptivity
I indicate their shared conviction that human beings – both physically and mentally – are
acted upon by features or entities of this same perceived world. And they are acted upon
in both modalities by the very same world. This focus on agency means for Aquinas and
Spinoza that, from an even more fundamental metaphysical commitment on their part,
when one is philosophically analyzing human beings the real issue is not body/mind
interaction, but what it means to be a singular living agent in the world. 35
The problem of body/mind interaction is not a question they are troubled with,
contra Descartes and other dualists. Nor are they troubled with trying to account for the
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This way of envisioning the state of affairs that is a human being’s existence is what under girds
both Spinoza’s and Aquinas’s epistemologies. They are not worried about whether or not one can have
adequate knowledge about the world. Instead, both of them argue, that epistemological certitude is
possible into the very nature of reality. This certitude is possible for them, without reference to the
concurrence of God or the veracity of God (ala Descartes, and in some ways Augustine in his doctrine of
divine illumination of the mind.) Instead, certitude is possible because in the world an action upon the
body is ultimately an action upon the mind, because it is an action experienced by the embodied knower.
The act prompts intellectual awareness and reflection. While their epistemological commitments are
beyond the scope of this present analysis, and are quite discreet in their particulars, nonetheless both of
them can contend for adequate knowledge of the world on the basis of their monism regarding the
relationship between mind and body.
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presence of mindedness in an otherwise materialistic world, as though one must be able
to describe how mind is, if not actually produced by some physical feature of the world,
then in some other way added on to it. Neither dualism nor emergentism nor
supervenience as metaphysical problems troubles them. While dualism and various
forms of physicalism are often seen as the two mutually exclusive options in
contemporary philosophy, Hilary Putnam’s evaluation is informative, I think, where he
describes present-day philosophy of mind as methodologically Cartesian.36 The
metaphysical schemes of Aquinas and Spinoza avoid, however, the dilemma that
methodological Cartesianism creates, because in both of their philosophical
anthropologies, the concept of anima plays the critical role. Furthermore, as I shall
emphasize, neither of them employs this concept in a univocal and exclusive sense in
reference to human beings as does Descartes and all other mechanistic physics of early
modern philosophy. Both of them, rather, employ the term to describe states and features
and components of living beings generally and human beings particularly. In so doing,
both of them endeavor to express their metaphysical understanding of the relationship of
the body and the mind in terms of what it means for a human being to be irreducibly
mental and physical with neither “mode” (not Aquinas term) being more ontologically
foundational.
This reading leads to a second interpretive issue. I suggest that Spinoza’s view of
how a things conatic essence organizes it is quite similar to Aquinas’s notion of “soul”
conceived as subsisting form. The soul, for Aquinas, is a metaphysical principle that is
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the essence that makes a living thing to be what it is, and therefore has a logical and (in
some sense) ontological priority with respect to the existing entity. Similarly, the essence
of a thing in Spinoza’s thought – its conatus – is a metaphysical principle that must be
understood as having a logical priority in understanding the thing and a metaphysical
priority as a principle that organizes the entity in question to be what it is and to sustain
its identity across time. So soul in Aquinas functions in a way that is analogous to the
notions of essence and/or conatus in Spinoza. “Mind,” thereby, is not a synonym for
“soul,” but is the feature of living organized beings that have, on the basis of the essence
that organizes their existence, rational consciousness. Hence, for neither Spinoza nor
Aquinas does the term “mind” name either an independently existent entity in human
beings. Whereas “mind” does not, for Spinoza, denote a feature of human beings that is a
radical departure ontologically from the “essence” of living things generally, he would
not enter into disputation with Aquinas where the later contends that “rationality” is
unique to human beings. Jonas notes in this regard that “the universality of the principle
[of anima and the attendant presence of “thought”] by no means obliterates those
distinctions in nature by which we speak of animate as against inanimate things, of
sentient as against merely vegetative organisms, and of conscious and reasoning man as
against unreasoning animals.”37
The contemporary relevance of this project
Historical interest in Thomistic and Spinozistic scholarship motivates this work.
But that interest is not exhaustive. In so far as this thesis can help point Spinoza
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interpretation toward a vantage point in which his doctrine of the modal identity of mind
and body can be better accounted for than on a dual-aspect theory – which seems to me to
be the best of the current interpretations – it might also allow contemporary philosophers
to see that Aquinas, rightly understood, might equally be appropriated as a helpful
historical resource (in concert with Spinoza) for current metaphysical analysis of the
intricate relationship between human mentality and biology as features of the world. The
language of anima might indeed need to be recovered.
Thus, the final aspect of this thesis will be to consider how the issues raised in the
exegetical and interpretive analysis of Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s doctrines might
adequately address some contemporary issues in cognitive science and the philosophy of
mind and body. One could say that this project ultimately seeks to point to a ThomisticSpinozistic trajectory for contemporary questions, rather than merely sufficing as a study
of Thomas and Spinoza in historical detail.
The philosophical helpfulness of this perspective on the nature of mind and body
identity can be seen when one considers the length of time that philosophers have
contemplated, discussed, and offered various theories to “solve” the mind-body problem.
Strenuous and laudable philosophical efforts notwithstanding, the relationship of mind
and body in human beings remains a conundrum in contemporary philosophy. At least
one philosopher has outright argued that “we cannot solve the mystery.”38 Colin McGinn
contends that understanding how biology and conscious thought (or consciousness of
thought for that matter) are related might be beyond the mental ability of human beings,
38
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just as other perceptual and conceptual issues are “closed” to certain mental systems.
Our mental awareness and capacity to form explanatory concepts, as a feature of our
biological make-up, might be (and most likely is) thus cognitively closed.
The invisible parts of the electromagnetic spectrum are just as real as the visible
parts, and whether a specific kind of creature can form conceptual representations
of these imperceptible parts does not determine whether they exist. Thus
cognitive closure with respect to P does not imply irrealism about P. That P is (as
we might say) noumenal with respect to M does not show that P does not occur in
some naturalistic scientific theory T – it shows only that T is not cognitively
accessible to M. Presumably monkey minds and the property of being an electron
illustrate this possibility. And the question must arise as to whether human minds
are closed with respect to certain true explanatory theories. Nothing, at least, in
the concept of reality shows that everything real is open to the human conceptforming faculty -- if, that is, we are realists about reality.39
Most of the current debate in philosophy of mind operates on the presumption of,
as Jaegwon Kim notes, “the ontological primacy or priority of the physical in relation to
the mental,” so that the physical properties of things are regarded as “basic and what
mental features they have is wholly dependent on their physical nature.”40 For most who
concur that this description adequately expresses the state of affairs of our conscious
physical lives a further conclusion follows. It is simply assumed that if one rejects the
ontological priority of the physical then one is saying “that there are things in the
spacetime world other than physical things, like Cartesian souls, or at least that some
things in the world have certain properties that are independent of their physical
nature.”41 In any case, as Kim further observes the quandary of the mind-body relation
continues to challenge us to resolve two issues that present themselves in our lived
experience.
39
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“If we are prepared to embrace reductionism, we can explain mental causation.
However, in the process of reducing mentality to physical/biological properties,
we may well lose the intrinsic, subjective character of our mentality – arguably
the very thing that makes the mental mental. In what sense, then, have we saved
“mental” causation? But if reject reductionism, we are not able to see how mental
causation would be possible. But saving mentality while losing causality doesn’t
seem to amount to saving anything worth saving. For what good is the mind if it
has no causal powers? Either way, we are in danger of losing mentality. That is
the dilemma. . . .
. . . It is not happy to end a book with a dilemma, but we should all take it as a
challenge, a challenge to find an account of mentality that respects consciousness
as a genuine phenomenon that gives us and other sentient beings a special place in
the world and that also makes consciousness a causally efficacious factor in the
working of the natural world. The challenge, then, is to find out what kind of
beings we are and what our place is in the world of nature.”42
But perhaps the difficulty resides in the very nature of the thing being
conceptualized. Is the mind body “problem” really a problem in the way that some think
it is? Does causality and interaction really present us with an insoluble puzzle? Perhaps
the very starting point of our consideration is wrongly placed and we are trying to “solve”
a problem that is actually rooted in some previously instantiated state of affairs.
Conceiving of mind and body rather as states of a single entity’s unified life, that is itself
the product of an essence giving principle, is a better way to approach the subject. It will,
at least, consider some issues that drop off the table of discussion in much of
contemporary philosophy’s “methodologically Cartesian” approach. The approach of
Aquinas and Spinoza is to look beyond the phenomena of mind and body and to seek for
a cause of the profound unity of the mental and the physical.
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The procedure of the project
Toward the ends described above, the dissertation will unfold in the five
subsequent chapters to follow: The second chapter will deal with the Aristotelian roots of
Aquinas’ss hylomorphism as the foundation upon which the “Angelic Doctor” developed
his metaphysics of mind/body and human personhood. Here we want to look at the
philosophical motivations that drove Aristotle to such a doctrine, especially noting the
questions he thought could be answered by his view of act and potency as fundamental
ontological principles at work in the world. This distinction becomes the basis upon
which he developed his particular usage of the Platonic categories of “Form” and
“Matter,” giving him a significantly different ontology of plurality in unity. Chapter
Three will build on this chapter and will focus on Aquinas’s further development and
unique expression of the Aristotelian doctrine. This chapter is foundational for what we
must consider in the fourth and fifth chapters.
The fourth chapter will focus attention specifically on the challenge of
interpreting Aquinas’s view of human anima – the “intellectual principle” of human
existence – as both a substantial Form and a subsistent principle in its own right. This
will enable us to understand Aquinas’s doctrine of human being’s as “rational animals.”
It will also make it clear how Aquinas’s doctrine of mind-body can be understood as a
version of identity theory, very much a medieval anticipation of the kind of identity that
Spinoza wanted to assert. Hence, in Chapter Five, utilizing the insights of the third and
fourth chapters, we consider how best to understand Spinoza’s doctrine of
conatus/essence. Here we will consider Spinoza’s ontological commitments to Substance
and its modes in the light of the category of conatus/essence. We will show how the
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“Thomistic” reading offered in these pages can be helpful in addressing issues related to
Spinoza interpretation that other interpretations miss.
In the final chapter we will draw out some of the conclusions of this work and
also consider how to understand their respective doctrines regarding the state of the soul
after the death of the body. For Spinoza this doctrine is cast in terms of the immortality
of the mind. For Aquinas it is presented in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection.
We shall endeavor only to suggest ways that these doctrines can be made intelligible in
the light of their other ontological commitments. It will be argued that these doctrines,
while perhaps not convincing to scholars, need not be viewed as dangling issues that are
incoherent in the larger schemes of their particular philosophical commitments. As a
final task, suggestions will be offered as to the philosophical import of the confluence of
Spinoza's and Aquinas’s doctrines, namely ways that the study of human existence might
be recast as a unified enterprise in the search of the body’s mind and the mind’s body.
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Chapter 2
Hylomorphism: The Essences that Enable Substances

As a first step into our critical comparison of Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s
philosophical analysis of the nature of the mind-body distinction in human beings, we
must understand what the doctrine of hylomorphism of the Aristotelian-Thomistic variety
actually entails. The import for this dissertation of gaining clarity about this doctrine is
apparent. This must be done before we may look to Spinoza’s philosophical
demonstrations in order to show how hylomorphism, as a theoretical construct, can help
us understand the meaning of Spinoza’s assertion that mind and body are “one and the
same thing, expressed in two different modes.” This will allow us, then, room for the
argument put forth in this thesis that the respective conceptual schemes of the medieval
Angelic Doctor and the “young thinker who destroyed the past” actually offer views of
the unicity of the human person as a psycho-physical entity that are philosophically quite
similar. Furthermore, careful consideration of Aquinas’s metaphysics of mind and body,
will allow us better to judge how their theories may also differ.
In this chapter, therefore, we turn our attention to the seminal development of the
doctrine of hylomorphism that one finds in Aristotle’s metaphysics. Here we engage a
view that takes seriously a view of all individual physical particulars as metaphysically
composite in nature. This general exposition of the Aristotelian background of Aquinas’s
doctrine will thus help us understand more completely, in the next chapter, what
motivates Aquinas to contend that a human being is a compositum, i.e. a unitary entity
produced by the union of matter and a “substantial and subsistent form” – soul. In turn,
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then, we will be able to show in the following chapters what Aquinas’s doctrine of mindbody relation and interaction really involves. So doing, we will be able to correct some
misinterpretations of Aquinas on this point. However, the present chapter will only very
briefly outline the major premises of Aquinas’s own formulation of the doctrine of
hylomorphism and will give its main attention to an analysis of the theoretical problems
that motivated Aristotle’s development of his hylomorphic view of “primary substances.”
This Aristotelian background is the foundation upon which Aquinas built his system, but
he also went beyond it in his own particular development of the doctrine of
hylomorphism. In turn, understanding Aquinas’s dependence upon and distinction from
Aristotle, will be an important bridge for our latter forays into philosophical territory that
analyzes Spinoza’s doctrine of conatus as involving something very similar to Aquinas’s
understanding of the form or essence of an individual entity.
Considering Aristotle’s foundational role in this theoretical analysis is important,
given that the Aristotelian background of the doctrine of hylomorphism being considered
is regarded as suspect by many philosophers, quaint by others, or of only historical
interest by, perhaps, a majority. Perhaps we can at least provide an account of Aristotle’s
reasoning that allows us room for the suggestion to be made later in this dissertation, i.e.,
that hylomorphism can be a helpful concept in contemporary analyses of mind-body. At
best, it will help establish that such a claim for hylomorphism is cogent. Also, by
considering Aristotle’s development of this theory, we will be able to see how Aquinas
nuances hylomorphism in very important and philosophically justifiable ways that part
company with Aristotle.
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An overview of Aquinas’s theory
Aquinas’s definition of individual entities as “primary substances” – and the
pluralist ontology this entails – is well known. Employing Aristotle’s general conceptual
framework, he conceives of each human being as a basic particular entity that is
constituted as a composite of what one could call more basic forces, i.e. form and matter
in union with one another. He embraces this description for human beings, furthermore,
because of his doctrine of matter. Since matter, as we shall show, in Aquinas’s view, is
not only non-self-organizing, but never really exists apart from organization, all material
beings are necessarily (metaphysically) composite beings. These composite beings are
the ordinary particulars of our experience and are the epistemological starting point for
all our knowledge. Not simply following Aristotle, but further developing his insights,
Aquinas contends that primary substances are ontologically basic entities upon which all
other Aristotelian categories of existence depend. This is, of course, the famous
substance/accident distinction. Philosophy must pursue, however, an even more
fundamental question, in Aquinas’s mind. The question: How does a particular thing
have existence, in the first place, as the thing it is with all of the various predicates (both
essential and accidental) that one may establish are true in regard to that entity’s
existence? The issue at stake in this question is one that requires us to discern within the
world itself the principle(s) by which one might provide an account of the particularity
and specificity of existence of individual entities. And in this question we find an echo of
the concern raised in chapter one regarding the ordinary or standard dual-aspect theory
regarding mind-body relatedness that some of Spinoza’s interpreters embrace.
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With Aristotle, Aquinas argues that no existent thing qua the particular substance
that it is can be conceived to be self-explanatory or self-defining. Rather, each entity we
experience is analyzable into more fundamental constituents. Stated differently, the
question philosophy must pursue, in Aquinas’s view, is what principle or principles are at
work making the thing in question to be the particular thing that it is.1 “Form” and
“matter” are simply terms that name these fundamental principles. This analysis,
however, does not imply that either of the principles – form or matter – can be considered
to be itself a thing that has its own particular existence. Rather, these two together are the
component principles of specific entities. And it is the entities themselves that haves
existence as particular, unique beings whose essences qua individual being are
incommunicable, even if they share some features of organized existence with other
beings (members of the same species). The essence that an entity is has to be, in
Aquinas’s view, seen as something other than either the matter or the form that are
component principles of the thing’s existence; it is also more than the relationship that
exists between the matter and the form. Only of any entity that has a particular and
unique essence, Aquinas contends, can we say properly that it exists. Hence, only
ordinary particulars are adequately called substances.

1

The ambiguity of the copula is well known in Aquinas. Being something entails a question of
actual existence and the question of identity as a particular entity. The entire work On Being and Essence
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distinction between these two different implications of the verb to be. For a good discussion of the
objections to objections to Aquinas’s use of the copula in philosophical reasoning see Fredrick Copleston,
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Harper & Row, 1976) 82 -89. See Gyula Klima on the copula in Aquinas’s
thought: “Aquinas’ Theory of the Copula and the Analogy of Being,” Logical Analysis and History of
Philosophy, vol. 5, 2002, http://www.pla.uni-bonn.de/EnglishPages/start.htm.
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In De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence), he provides analysis of the
constituent elements or principles (form and matter) that are necessary descriptors in any
account of the existence of every being. Aquinas asserts,
In composite substances we find form and matter, as in man there are soul and
body. We cannot say, however, that either of these is the essence of the thing. . . .
the essence of a thing is that which is signified by the definition of the thing. The
definition of a natural substance, however, contains not only form but also matter;
otherwise, the definitions of natural things and mathematical things would not
differ. . . Nor can it be said that essence signifies the relation between the matter
and the form or something superadded to these, for then the essence would of
necessity be an accident and extraneous to the thing, and the thing would not be
known through its essence, contrary to what pertains to an essence. Through the
form, surely which is the act of the matter, the matter is made a being in act and a
certain kind of being. Thus, something that supervenes does not give to the
matter existence in act simply, but rather existence in act in a certain way . . .
When such a form is acquired, we do not say that the thing is generated simply
but only in a certain way.2
The crucial concept in this analysis is that “form” is the “act of the matter.” What
Aquinas means by the use of this ancient way of describing the conditions under which a
thing can exist can be understood as follows. There is a feature of reality (what he calls a
form) that causes any specific ordinary particular in question to be the particular thing it
is. Since each particular that we ever encounter exists not only as itself, but it also exists
as a particular kind of thing, when we define an ordinary particular in terms of its whatness, we are, Aquinas argues, identifying a feature of reality that the specific ordinary
particular we are analyzing shares with other entities that are similar to it. Following
Aristotle’s lead, Aquinas concluded that the specificity of material organization that
simply is the ordinary particular must be the result of some principle that is distinct from
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the material composition itself. The active force, therefore, should be conceived as a real
aspect of the state of affairs in the world of our sensory experience. Because principles
such as these are an active feature of the world, they are part of the cause, in Aquinas’s
view, that results in a particular arrangement of matter being, for example, an apple tree
rather than a sheep. Form is the active feature that accounts for the specificity of material
organization. As Thomas puts it, ‘form’ names how “the matter is made a being in act
and a certain kind of being.” Matter as such, he concluded, could not be self-arranging,
nor self-moving.3
The analytical conclusion he reaches – that there is a distinction between form
and matter – did not suggest to Aquinas that this difference (between matter and form as
constituents of existent essences) implied an ontological dualism of being in things.
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Neither matter nor form has real existence apart from the primary being which exists as
the compositum. Furthermore, neither matter nor form can be considered to be more
fundamentally the thing itself. The primary being/substance (the essence) that results
from this union of form and matter, thereby, is a particular kind of entity that is more than
either the matter of which it is made or the form which creates in union with the matter “a
being in act.” Again, each defined primary substance (ordinary particular) is an essence
on Aquinas’s view, and this essence is something more than its matter or its form or the
“relationship between matter and form.” This entails that, for Aquinas, any primary
being qua the essence that it is cannot be viewed as a supervenient feature. Neither can
an essence be thought of as an emergent reality over and above the relation of the union
of matter and form. Rather, the essence is the entity we are considering; it is simply
analyzable in terms of its matter and form.
The distinction between “form” and “matter” is the product of an even more
fundamental level of analysis, which Aquinas picks up from Aristotle, as well: the
distinction between “potency” and “act.” As Joseph Owens notes regarding Aristotle’s
metaphysical reasoning, “Problems emerging from matter and form, such as the identity
of the material and formal elements in the one thing, seemed soluble only in terms of
potency and act.”4 It is important, therefore, to have an adequate idea about the
Aristotelian background of this metaphysical concept to help us understand the Thomistic
application of it later. So, let us now consider the analytic considerations that produced
this theory of bi-integrant composition in Aristotelian metaphysics.
4

Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being and Act in Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical
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Aristotelian background
Substance and accidents
Aristotle develops his understanding of the essential singularity of each primary
substance as a result his view that individual concrete entities – ordinary particulars – are
ontologically foundational. Therefore, they have epistemological priority. He develops
this notion as a result of his logical analysis of the ways that our language enables us to
describe the world out of our immediate experience; for him, language follows thought.
As Fredrick Copleston has said of Aristotle’s theory of the relationship between language
and thought, language is “built up as an expression of thought and this is especially true
of philosophical terms.”5 The objects of our awareness present us with things whose
existence can, and must by virtue of the logic of our language, be analyzed in terms of
“categories” or “topics” of being.
By Aristotle’s analytics, we predicate of each item in our catalogue of experience
either that they are a determining feature of something, or alternatively, themselves an
existent entity that undergoes such determination: for example, the color of a person’s
skin considered as a color versus the skin in which the color exists. The technical
expression Aristotle gives to this analysis of what our experience of the world requires of
us takes the following form. For some X that we describe with reference to another thing
B:
1 – X is understood to exist as a feature of B
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Fredrick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 280. For Aristotle’s
development of his logic see: Categories and Topics, where he posits a ten-fold linguistic division of
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2 – B does not exist as a feature of anything, but is simply itself.
3 – X has no existence except as a feature of B
4 – B can exist in the absence of X
5 – X, therefore, (by 2 & 4) is not essential to the definition we have of B
6 – B gives existence to X (by 3)
7 – X, therefore, (by 2 & 6) we could never call a particular entity
8 – X, furthermore, (by 3) is not reducible to B essentially
9 – Hence, X, exists, but only in B and not as X per se
10 – B, therefore, exists as B but not in anything else6
In The Categories, the examples Aristotle gives are knowledge (X) and the soul
(B) or the color white (X) and a body (B). He contends that knowledge is real when it is
in a knower, but there is nothing called “knowledge” that has any existence on its own,
but only when predicated of a knowing subject. Similarly, a white body can exist as
qualified by the whiteness of it, but that whiteness does not exist as a subject of
discussion anywhere except in that body (or another body in which whiteness is
instantiated). On the basis of this, Aristotle reasoned that we are correct to describe some
items in our catalogue of experience as the “substances” in which other states of affairs
exist. The other states are called accidents. These substances cannot, in Aristotle’s view,
be thought of as existing in anything more properly basic than their own actual existence.
These individuals that provide the locus for the states of affairs that depend upon them or
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Princeton University Press, 1987), 5 – 11.
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existence are protai ousiai (primary beings).7 Such primary beings are, by definition, one
and the same thing with themselves regardless of the accidents that accrue to them.
Actuality and potency
In the actual existence of each prote ousia one observes changes, development, or
alterations in the act of its being what it is essentially. Because of this Aristotle posited
that there is a distinction in prote ousia that must be marked between what he called the
“actuality” and the “potency” of these ontologically foundational entities. By this
discrimination, Aristotle was attempting to provide a philosophical insight into the nature
of the sensory world that is filled with beings that are not static in their existence.
Reflecting on the intractable nature of our sensory awareness that presents us a world in
which change is the rule, Aristotle, via metaphysical analysis, set out to define the
ontological status of change.8 According to Aristotle, in the actuality of a primary
being’s state of being, as it is at any given moment in its “act of being,” there is specific
and focused potential inherent in them to become other things. However, the potential to
become some other actuality is not unlimited in the particular being under consideration.
Rather, the potential is a “potency” – a power or capability – that is limited by the
essence of the being.

And this endeavor ultimately led him to formulate his

understanding of the way that “form” and “matter” function as descriptors of the
ontological reality of change in protai ousiai.

7
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The pre-Socratic background of Aristotle’s metaphysics
The conceptual parameters of the philosophical discussion that Aristotle inherited
had been established in pre-Socratic philosophy by the juxtaposed theories of Heraclitus
and Parmenides. These, of course, were mediated to Aristotle via Plato. It will help us
understand the logic of Aristotle’s metaphysics if we can place it in the historical
philosophical context in which he applied his logical analysis. Understanding the process
of his logic may, in turn, allow for a more adequate assessment of what hylomorphism
(expressed via Aquinas and Spinoza) might provide contemporary discussions of the
relationship between mind and body.
At one pole of Aristotle’s philosophical world stood Heraclitus and his doctrine of
change as the only real feature of the cosmos. For Heraclitus, the “flux” is what really
exists. Discussion about constancy of entities was in some measure an abstraction, since
the constant movement from what is to what is not yet is the only reality that there is.9
However, the universal flux was ontologically enabled by what Heraclitus described as a
cosmic order (Logos). This Logos he conceived of as the essential harmony that the
tension of becoming and ceasing to be manifest in the sensible world. “The cosmos
works,” he proclaims, “by harmony of tensions, like the lyre and bow.” Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange has accurately characterized Heraclitus’ ontology: “in the process of
becoming, which is it own sufficient reason, being and non-being are dynamically
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identified.”10 Since for Heraclitus “becoming” is the ontological fundament of reality,
there can be no ultimate differentiation between things, because a constant reordering is
the only essence that really exists ultimately. Change is all there is; hence, there is not
any real ordinary particular that could be conceived of in any fundamental terms.
When considering the physical world, Heraclitus would reject the distinction that
Aristotle would later develop between “act” or what is “actual” and “potency,” that which
is possible but not yet existing in actuality. These differentiations are, ultimately, nothing
but mere human conceptual imposition, by Heraclitus’ lights. Our minds are the source of
the ideas of specific things. He says, “While cosmic wisdom understands all things are
good and just, intelligence may find injustice here and justice somewhere else.”11 He
argued, therefore, “that the principle of contradiction is not a law of being, not even of
the intelligence. It is a mere law of speech, to avoid self-contradiction.”12 If the process
of becoming is the only reality that exists, then no particular state of affairs in the “flux”
of the process is real qua the particular state of affairs that it is. Rather, the only reality it
enjoys is its part in the flow of the flux – the “war” of now-being and coming-being.
Change, for Heraclitus, is all that we must affirm as ultimate and finally real. Here is the
genius of Heraclitus’s metaphysics. By this perspective on the ontologically foundational
role that change has in the world, he offers a theory for change – the flux, and the
necessary “conflict” that is the flux – that is ontological, rather than empirical. He
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conceived of our world as unity in diversity. As Fredrick Copleston observes, “For him
the conflict of opposites, so far from being a blot on the unity of the One, is essential to
the being of the One. . . . the One only exists in the tension of opposites.”13 By so
defining reality, he denies any principle of continuity between moments of existence.
Fire, therefore, is the perfect elemental metaphor for Heraclitus to utilize.
Parmenides, on the other hand, contended on the basis of his attention to the logic
of linguistic expressions that a radical counter-proposal had to be affirmed. His view was
that the determinations of being that our language reflects drive us to only one
conclusion: that Being “is” and, therefore, non-Being “is not.” Contra Heraclitus, this
draws us irresistibly, Parmenides argued, to the logical conclusion that change, not
constancy is the illusion. Any notion we have of change is a mere fiction that we
perceive by the senses. Philosophical analysis can allow us to get “behind” our sensory
experience and understand the absolute, impassible oneness that is Reality. Of necessity
the One – i.e., Reality – is identical with itself. This law of identity and the law of noncontradiction together mean that our intellects wrongly attribute change, becoming, and
passing-away to the nature of the One Reality. To be philosophically honest,
Parmenides concludes, our thought, as revealed by grammatical analysis, should affirm
this analysis of being. “For thou couldst not know that which is-not (that is impossible)
nor utter it; for the same thing exists for thinking and for being” (Fr. 2).14 Furthermore,
Parmenides contended that the force of “true belief” will not “allow that, beside what is,
there could arise anything from what is not.”
13
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How could what is thereafter perish? And how could it come into being? For if it
came into being, it is no, nor if it is going to be in the future. So coming into
being is extinguished and perishing is unimaginable. Nor is it divisible, since it is
all alike; nor is there more here and less there, which would prevent it from
cleaving together, but it is all full of what is. . . . Wherefore all these are mere
names which mortals laid down believing them to be true – coming into being and
perishing, being and not being, change of place and variation of bright and color”
(Fr 8).15
Parmenides offered the philosophical discourse of his day a logical deconstruction of our
illusory notions about the reality of ordinary particular items.
Aristotle’s counter-proposal
The logic of change and unity
In both Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ doctrines, we are presented with the longstanding question of the ontological status of change and individuation in the sensible
world. One could say that they struggle with the status of ordinary particulars and the
relationship that exists between the myriad of ordinary particulars in our experience of
the world. They provide starkly divergent answers, even as they agree that any ideas we
have about the world that are based on empirical data are mere conventions, if not
illusions. In their agreement, they raise the question of whether or not our experience of
the world is, at the bottom, founded on some feature of the world. This is where
Aristotle’s assessment had to begin.
On his view, the fact that either of these pre-Socratics offered to assert any
philosophical claims, at all, about the nature of the world belied their conclusions that our
language is merely conventional and not, at its philosophical best, correspondent to some
extra-mental reality. Any linguistic expression is, by its very nature, an assertion about
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the way things are per se. When he began to address the issues as laid down in the
polarities offered by the pre-Socratic dichotomy, he embraced two assertions as starting
points for philosophical inquiry The first was epistemological, i.e., that the experience we
have of change in the world is a feature of reality to be granted a large measure of
significance, even if we find reason to qualify it in order to clarify our claims of
knowledge. At this point, he seems to have taken Heraclitus seriously. Yet, with his
second starting assertion, which entailed a claim about logic, he seems to have sided with
Parmenides against Heraclitus’s nominalism. His second assertion was this: the
principle of non-contradiction is a logical law that has the force of objective truthfulness.
Therefore, he could allow this logical principle to coexist concurrently with his
epistemological allowance of the import of sensory experience. We will consider the
work that this second assertion did in Aristotle’s philosophy in interaction with a
Heraclitean doctrine of non-constancy before we look at the way he addressed the theory
of Parmenides on the basis of the first assertion, i.e., that sensory experience ought to be
afforded a large measure of significance.
Based on the logic of the law of non-contradiction, Aristotle argued against
Heraclitus and his disciples as follows. “We shall reply to this theory that “although that
which is changeable supplies [Heraclitus and his followers], when it changes, with some
real ground for supposing that it ‘is not,’ yet there is something debatable in this; for that
which is shedding any quality retains something of that which is being shed, and
something of that which is coming to be must already exist.”16 Aristotle saw in the
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process of change more than Heraclitus was able to allow (at least from what we know
from his extant writings). Even the very reality of change in the world implied a level of
continuity. To explain: if our intellects can recognize a process of change and
becoming, Aristotle argued, then the principle of non-contradiction – which demands that
nothing can both be and not be simultaneously – is an epistemological corollary of the
empirically perceived process of change. The Stagirite thinks it is self-contradictory to
say that change is all that there is and then to contend that our language about change (the
law of non-contradiction) is simply a convention imposed on us by our language. To
recognize that particulars are (even momentarily) identical with themselves, but pass
away and some other particular in the next moment exists where that particular had
existed (think of Heraclitus’s river example) is to acknowledge that there was something
that both was and now is not; but that something is the ontological predecessor of the
state that followed it.
This being the case, for Aristotle, the law of non-contradiction itself is rooted in
the very flux that Heraclitus posits as ontological finality.
Generally those who argue in this manner overlook both the being (ousia) and
what it means to be; for it is necessary for them to assert that all attributes are
accidental and that there is no such thing as “being a man” or “being an animal.”
Now, if there is such a thing as “being a man,” it will not be “being nonman” or
“not being a man” (its negatives): for it has one meaning, namely, to define the
being of something. And to signify its being means that its being means that its
being is not something else. But, if “being a man” means “being nonman” or “not
being a man,” then a man’s being will be something else. Hence they must argue
that there cannot be such a definition of the being of anything . . . . But if all
statements merely predicate accidents, then there will be no first point of
reference since accidents always are predicated about something as a subject. It
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would be necessary, accordingly, to proceed thus to infinity; but this is
impossible.17
The reality of change imposes on us the law of non-contradiction and, ultimately, the
metaphysical conclusion that there is something that both changes and remains. Without
this first principle, Aristotle reasoned, thought is impossible (“it would be necessary to
proceed to infinity”). “Aristotle, against Heraclitus, holds that the principle of noncontradiction and the further law of identity are laws of reality, not merely of the inferior
reason and of speech, but of the higher intelligence, and primarily of objective reality.”18
In order to define the changing entities a definition of their essence is involved.
However, a definition implies, by its very nature, the awareness that the thing defined is
“not-this-other-thing” in its own existence. Hence, Aristotle argued that Heraclitus’s idea
– that only change is real – collapses because he can only see the essences of things as
accidents in motion, which entails the inability to ever attain a “first point of reference
since accidents always are predicated about something as a subject.”
Such an infinite regress must ultimately undercut any claim to philosophical
certitude about the ontological nature of things. Heraclitus cannot argue for change as
the foundation of reality if change is really all there is, Aristotle is saying, because he has
no epistemic warrant for such a claim. Any epistemic warrant for claiming that change is
real in the world must rely on some true ousia that is the Being of the things that are
undergoing change. Aristotle considered that the logos posited by Heraclitus could not
do this. So, for Aristotle, the continuity of being, conceived as a unified whole in which
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modification and change within and between individuals occurs – rather than a flux of
discrete moments – is a foundational doctrine of first philosophy. Without this, in some
form, philosophy cannot proceed. What had to be accounted for and defined in
Aristotle’s view is the feature of reality that allows for there to be continuity in things in
the midst of change. To this we will return below, but before that we must consider
Aristotle’s second metaphysical obstacle – Parmenides’ monism.
Heraclitean ontology had exacted from its detractors an account of constancy in
the sensible world, but the Parmenidian pole of Aristotle’s philosophical context
demanded a response to its own untenable conclusion. An adequate explanation of
change and individuation as real features of an essentially unitary and continuous reality
had to be provided. While Aristotle’s teacher, Plato, had attempted to answer
Parmenides’ challenge by positing an unchanging world of intelligible Ideas that is
unified by the Good as the ultimate “form” of all reality, Plato’s peripatetic student
found this wanting. The radically dualistic distinction of Plato removes the essence of a
thing from the thing, thereby creating a logical confusion and metaphysical nonsense.19
It also failed, in Aristotle’s view, to address the very weakness of Parmenides’ theory that
Plato wanted to undercut.
In Aristotle’s view, Parmenides and his school inflated the consequences of their
version of the law of contradiction – “what is cannot come to be, since it is already, and
nothing can come to be out of what is not, since there must be something underlying.”20
This principle, taken as first philosophy, fails to draw significant linguistic distinctions,
19
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Aristotle concluded, about the ways in which continuity and concurrence work in the
sensible world. Not-being, as a negation, he argued, can simply be the
acknowledgement of the finitude of a particular entity under consideration. In this
regard, to posit “not-being” is not a denial of Being itself (as Parmenides suggested);
rather it is simply a notation of lack in the particular entity under consideration. As
Aristotle reasoned, “We too say that nothing comes to be simply out of what is not; but
that things do come to be in a way out of what is not namely by virtue of concurrence. A
thing can come to be out of the lack, which in itself is something which is not, and is not a
constituent.”21 The notion of lack, therefore, points to a state of affairs – an absence. An
absence, for Aristotle, is, when considered per se, actually nothing. Yet, the very idea of
“the lack” entails in itself the idea of a concurrent already-existing reality that could
suffer this lack. As Copleston comments on the implication of Aristotle’s logic at this
point, “If Parmenides were to object that [this doctrine of privation] is tantamount to
saying that a thing comes into being from not-being, Aristotle would answer that it does
not come into being from its privation merely (i.e. from bare privation), but from its
privation in a subject.”22 So, to speak of a “lack” is not the same thing as speaking of
Non-being as though it were an entity or some principle in itself, thereby positing an
absurdity as the source for the coming-to-be of other things. Aristotle wanted
philosophers to realize that the very concept of lack entails a concept of something that
could lack, or as we might more cumbersomely say, something that is also not something
else. Each thing that actually is, is simultaneously not something else; so its very identity
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requires that it lack some feature that would make it something else. This suggests that
the new thing that comes from the lack is not per se arising from already existing being:
“it does not come into being from being precisely as such, but from being which is also
not-being, i.e., not the thing which comes to be.”23
Foundations of act and potency
Hence, in his view, not all language of not-being implies a “violation of the
principle that everything either is or is not.”24 Existence itself, Aristotle would contend,
requires even Parmenides to declare, at least, that existence (what is) is not non-existence
(what is not). Parmenides’ own linguistic negation (the “is-not”) posits a concept of nonexistence as part of the order of knowledge of the world. Aristotle further reasons that if
we accept that every specific thing in our experience exists as a particular, specific entity,
it follows that each of the existent entities that we know exists as what it is by
concurrently not being something-else. Coterminous, for Aristotle, with this dialectical
analysis is the view that something which is, yet which is not-something-else, can be the
source of the coming to be of another, if the other that “comes to be” does so as a result
of being “in potential” as an aspect of the already existing entity.
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An example Aristotle offers, in chapter 8 of Book I of The Physics, is that of a
doctor and the acts performed by the doctor that lead to healing. A doctor heals,
paraphrasing Aristotle, out of his actual doctor-ness. Such a defined, existent identity
entails by its very nature certain possibilities. But the state of affairs called the health of
X that is sick – before it is brought about through the art of healing – is non-existent or
not an actual feature of the world when considered as an actually existing thing (X’s
mode of existence.) However, it neither arises from non-being precisely per se, nor, in
Aristotle’s doctrine, from a concrete already instantiated and actual being – the present
concrete state of the doctor or the patient. Rather, the act of healing comes to be out of
the possibility inherent in the state of affairs we call medical knowledge and practice as
that is embodied in the actual doctor. Garrigou-Lagrange illustrates Aristotle’s position
on the reality, but non-actuality of potential by referring to sculpture. “For Aristotle, that
which is in process of becoming cannot arise from an actual being, which already exists.
The statue, in process of becoming, does not come from the stone that already exists. But
the thing in process of becoming was at first there in potency, and hence arises from
unterminated being, from real and objective potency, which is thus a medium between
the existing being and mere nothing.”25
By positing the notion of potentiality as distinct conceptually and ontologically
from actuality, Aristotle thought he could avoid the trap Parmenides had seen in some of
the ancient discussions of becoming and of change, while not falling into the pit that
Parmenides had dug for himself. Aristotle’s metaphysics allows him to posit “Being” – a
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la Parmenides – as the ontological starting point: “’being’ is used in various ways, but
always with reference to one principle.”26 But, he need not deny, he thought, the
ontological status of individual existents and change that our encounter with the world
suggests to us. In fact, Aristotle thought he could account for the ontological reality of
these changing particulars in a way that Parmenides’ own logic suggested, but did not
pursue. In his defense of the legitimacy of metaphysics, as he defines it, Aristotle gives
at some length a demonstration that “Being,” understood as a unity that exists in the
dynamic interplay of actuality and potency, is the true first principle. If that is the case,
then it follows that Unity of the Parmenidean variety is not a fundamental ontological
concept. It also follows that Heraclitus’ flux is not an adequate theory of reality, for
Heraclitean “war” cannot account for what unity there actually is in reality. A different
basis for the unicity of reality from those of the two pre-Socratic theorists must be
provided. Aristotle argues the point on the basis of Parmenides’ logical/linguistic
analysis of statements.
For some things are said to “be” because they are substances; others because they
are modifications of substance; others because they are a process towards
substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or
generative of substance or of terms relating to substance, or negations of certain
of these terms or of substance. (Hence we even say that not-being is not-being.) .
. . Hence the study of all the species of Being qua Being belongs to a science
which is generally one, and the study of several species of Being belongs to the
26
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specific parts of that science. Now if Being and Unity are the same, i.e. a single
nature, in the sense that they are associate as principle and cause are, and not as
being denoted by the same definition (although it makes no difference but rather
helps our argument if we understand them in the same sense), since “one man”
and “man” and “existent man” are the same thing.27
Being is, for him, the ontological homogeneity of the act of existing. In that
sense, then, the act of being that is also the unity of reality. Reality is singular in the
sense that all that is just is “Being” (the fact of existence and all existent things). On this
basis, then, Aristotle contends, with Parmenides, that Being is the starting point of
philosophy and that the one reality we have is a unity, contra Heraclitus. However, that
identification of all things as sharing the act of being, Aristotle contended, could not then
become the basis for a doctrine of unity that denied a plurality of beings and the
modifications that exist among all the members and within any particular member of that
plurality.
Aristotle was motivated, it would seem, by the desire to maintain the view that
thought and knowing are themselves part of the very same reality that we are analyzing in
philosophical inquiry. Our experience, he argued, presents us with features of being that,
considered epistemologically, establish for our thinking the particular identities of unique
beings. Statements about the identity of things in the realm of being entail definitions,
because to identify a being adequately we define it for ourselves. (This is as true for
nominalists as much as realists.) Such definition, furthermore, entails non-identity, i.e.,
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each thing that is a specific particular is also – by its very definition – not something else
(even being is not non-being).28
Something like this non-identity principle is the foundation upon which Aristotle
builds his metaphysical view that “a lack” is a real feature inherent in things that have
being. Since a lack, by definition, entails the absence of one state of being in an ordinary
particular, it therefore becomes the fundamental concept upon which Aristotle asserts that
there is such a thing as possible or potential being in entities that have a specific kind of
existence, i.e., his primary substances. By such a conceptualization, he is able, he thinks,
to avoid Parmenides’ critique – that being cannot come from what is not nor can being
come from what is already actually being. The doctrine of potentiality as a real feature of
actual being provides him an analytic solution that accounts for becoming in the world.
“Coming-to-be” arises from the potentiality inherent in the lack of each primary
substance – a lack that is part of its essence, but that does not entail an inability to
become. Becoming is, therefore, a real feature of the world, but it does not arise out of
nothing simpliciter. The lack is not qua a lack something concretely actual, but it is an
aspect of the already existent. What is left, then, for Aristotle, is to demonstrate how we
can conceive of “possible being,” or potency as a feature of the world and how that
would be related to the actual existence of protai ousiai.
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Form and matter
In accounting for both continuity and possibility Aristotle felt he required more
qualification of the nature of potency and actuality in his metaphysics. Regarding the
actuality of an entity, Aristotle embraces Plato’s category, “form,” as an adequate
description of that by which existent things are known to be the particular things that they
are: form is the actual principle that “acts” to make a being the prote ousia that it is.29
Therefore, the individual being is the substantial subject with which philosophy has to
work in the task of understanding: “It is because the protai ousiai are subjects for all the
other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are
called substances most of all.”30 Form functions in two ways in Aristotle’s physics; the
first is epistemological and the second ontological. Form is epistemic, of course, in an a
posteriori fashion in Aristotle’s philosophy. It is known to us in experience, contra Plato.
However, the knowledge of the true nature of any primary being is the knowledge of it as
a particular form (i.e., of a particularized form). This epistemological primacy of form is
expressed in the De Anima, where Aristotle begins to consider what it means to call the
soul the form of the body. There he says that form is the concept or principle “in virtue
of which [any thing we are considering] is then spoken of as a particular [a this].31 It is
this understanding of the form that enables Aristotle to posit that “protai ousiai are
subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in
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them.” Specific particulars are the means by which we begin our knowledge of the
world, for by or in them we engage the “this-particular-kind-of-thing” that a particular
“this” is.
But the epistemological function is only part of the meaning of form in Aristotle’s
thought; it also is the ontological reason that any particular “this” about which we might
predicate existence is what it is. He is no nominalist about eidos or form. As we have
noted, a prote ousia is the substance about which we predicate other things and the
substance in which other predicated categories exist. However, he describes the form
that makes any primary being what it is as having an existence that is more than simply
the primary being simpliciter. He also claims, controversially among some of his
interpreters, that the form that is the essence of a primary being can be described as being
substantial in a secondary and derivative sense. Since primary beings share features of
being with others that are like them, Aristotle contends that the species, general
description is the object of science; it is deutrai ousia – being in the secondary sense.
The factor that motivates Aristotle’s thinking at this point seems to be the similarity of
essence that many entities obviously share. On this basis he contends that form is an
ontological or metaphysical principle that is not simply predicated tautologically of an
entity, but is, at least partially, explanatory of how a thing comes to be what it is.32
Form, while it only exists in the thing that is “formed,” nonetheless is not
reducible to the primary being so formed. This is true of manufactured artifacts, in an
obvious way.
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It is evident, accordingly, that the form, or whatever we want to call the shape of
the perceived object, is not produced; nor is there ever any production of it; no
intrinsic nature is ever made. For an intrinsic nature comes to be in something
else made by art or by nature or by some power. It is a bronze sphere that is made
out of bronze and ‘sphere,’ since one makes a form enter into this matter, and thus
the result is a bronze sphere. . . . It is evident, therefore, from what has been said,
that what we have called the form or essential being is not produced, but that it is
the combined form-in-matter that is produced, and that in everything that is
produced there is matter, and that any object is, on the one hand matter and, on
the other hand, form.33
And in a parallel way this predetermining nature of form is also predicable of things in
nature, i.e., entities that are endowed with life.
All things begin in their primary being, as syllogism begin by stating what a thing
is; so from being come all becomings. Natural growths follow this same pattern.
For the seed is productive in a manner analogous to art, since it has the form
potentially; and that from which the seed comes is somehow like its offspring. . . .
For, as it is the bronze sphere that is produced, not ‘sphere’ or bronze, and
likewise in the production of the bronze itself there must always be present both a
material and a form in the production of any primary being. . . . However, we
may note a peculiarity of the production of primary beings: another primary
being, the producer, must pre-exist in complete realization for example, an
animal, if an animal is to be produced.34
Form is, therefore in Aristotle’s view, a kind of principle that accounts for the
existence of the primary being. Indeed, it is the actuality of a particular entity’s being.
Aristotle reasoned, as we have seen, that some principle had to be the source of the
dynamic of actuality in things. While it would be meaningless to ask why a particular
man is the man that he is – “It is pointless to ask why anything is itself”– one can wonder,
Aristotle allowed, what causes a primary being to be the kind of entity it is. 35 Since
everything exists as a particularized reality, something causes the matter to be that
particular rather than another, for matter per se can be many different things. Primary
33
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beings are definite in identity. Therefore, Aristotle reasons, as Joseph Owens observes,
that “a Being is a ‘what,’ i.e., something definitely determined by its form and so
distinguished from all other kinds of things.” Owens continues, “The form causes that
‘definiteness’ in the matter, and is therefore the cause of its Being. ‘Being’ evidently
means [for Aristotle] ‘being so and not so.”36
If form, according to Aristotle, is a principle that explains the existence of a
material being because it is involved directly in its being what it is, then the matter, as the
physical stuff that things are qua physical, is also an explanatory principle. He referred
to them both as causes, but by “causes” he meant something much more than what we
mean by cause and effect. He viewed these two principles as fundamentally necessary to
explain the existence of primary being (along with, of course, the efficient and final
causes). Since physical things are, indeed, particular in their essence and at the same
time capable of both change of existence while remaining within their own essence
(acorn to oak tree) and radical change into other kinds of things (acorn eaten becomes
pig), philosophy must attempt to describe the dynamic that would account for this. Form
is particularizing, so the source of the possibility of change he assigned, reasonably
enough, to the material stuff that was organized to be a particular expression of a form.
The material reality (what later philosophers would call extended reality) that one
is considering in a primary being is, Aristotle contended, both a “being so and not so.” It
has, in other words, a lack and a potentiality because it is formally a particular being
composed of matter. As was described above, Aristotle conceived of change in entities
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as produced in a subject – a prote ousia – but not in the subject as it actually existed at
any given moment. Change is rooted in potential that is inherent in the subject, whose
essence entails a lack, i.e. something that the primary being is not, but is capable of
becoming because of the nature it has. This lack was not simply nothing for Aristotle,
but was an aspect of the subject’s existence which allowed for certain kinds of potency to
be true of the subject.
His reasoning, as has been suggested above, was that both the continuity and the
mutability of the world had to be accounted for. Since he thought he had established
philosophically that one is justified in the beliefs that nothing can come from nothing,
that modifications of existence and of existent things are real, and that change could not
be so radical as to lack any continuity with precursor states, he then moved to provide
some philosophical account for the continuity of these modifying entities out of which
new states (or beings) arise. The paradigmatic example here is the development of an
oak tree from acorn to mighty arboreal giant. How does this change occur, without
denying the continuity between the acorn and the oak tree? Further compounding the
issue is the reality that acorns do not always or only become large trees. Wild pigs eat
acorns; and when this is done the acorn ceases to exist not only qua acorn, but qua
vegetative entity altogether. But, obviously as pigs eat many acorns in the wild, more pig
is produced. In Aristotle’s view this sort of development left us faced with the necessity
to account for continuity within the one reality in which all things exist. Aristotle
reasoned that the material stuff that was the acorn(s) has as a feature of its existence the
potentiality of becoming pig-matter, even while being a particular kind of material being.
Another way of saying this is that the physical stuff that took the form of acorn has the
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capacity of losing, under certain conditions, the form of being an acorn and can be
incorporated into the physical make-up the gormandizing swine. When this occurs, the
matter of the acorn is radically transformed (one might even say the matter is re-formed)
into something that it was not prior to the consumption. If the acorn is not eaten,
however, then under the right efficient conditions the form of oak tree will drive the oak
tree to move from the acorn stage of its existence to a telos.
This telos is not something imposed on it but something that is inherent to its
organization as a material entity. It is, as it were, its striving to continue to be – more
completely – what it is essentially. This inherent drive to continue in existence and to
flourish in its organized essence is, by Aristotle, labeled an energeia or “entelechy.” 37 In
Aristotle’s metaphysics, this drive or possibility of striving toward an end is an aspect of
the actual being of the thing, even if it is not exercised or operative at any given time.
Placing himself in direct opposition to another school of thought on the meaning of “act,”
Aristotle argued: “There are some, such as the Megarians, who say that there is a power
only [when actively operating] and that there is no power apart from its operation: that
when not engaged in building, a person is not able to build, and that he is a builder only
when he is in the act of building, and so forth.”38 Aristotle sees such thinking as leading
to absurdities. He distinguishes between the actual performance of a capacity and the
actual possibility of performing it. In both instances a power is present, he contends;
otherwise, we cannot account for change as a reality. “These doctrines [those denying
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potential power in the act of being what a thing is essentially] take away all possibility of
change and of coming into being.” But if, as Aristotle demonstrates, change in the
condition of an entity or its relationship to things around it is real, then he is right to insist
that we must conclude that “power and act differ; hence, those doctrines which present
power and act [as identical concepts], are trying to deny a difference that is far from
trivial.”39 The import of this analysis, in Aristotle’s metaphysics, is that “something may
be capable of being without actually being, and of not being, yet be.”40 Critically
important here is Aristotle’s idea that only things that are actually existing are capable of
producing change in themselves or in other things. It is for this reason that he closely
associates the concept of “act” (energeia) with the term entelechy. But for Aristotle
entelechy, in its close association with energeia, qualifies its verbal counterpart, allowing
him qualify energeia, in contradistinction to the “Megarians,” to mean more than
movement, i.e., powers in operation.41 He concludes: “The word ‘actuality’, which is
associated with ‘fulfillment’ (entelechy), has been derived from movements, though it
can be applied in other ways. . .”42
This concept, then, means that the actuality (the formal cause that acts qua
energeia) of things that “are or come to be naturally,” gives to the primary beings as
concrete particulars the possibility of future states of being that more fully express the
essence of their own existence. These primary beings have, in other words, a capacity,
whether exercised or not, to strive to express their own particular nature in the most fully
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adequate and flourishing way. A living entity’s nature is “also its form or primary being
or the culmination of its becoming,” or we might say, “the nature of anything is,” for
Aristotle, “in some sense its primary being.”43 From within the nature of a “natural”
being the source of its growth and “the processes of becoming” arise as part of its very
nature. Hence, the very nature of a living or natural thing is the source of “movement” in
its life-cycle, “because this source is inherent in them, either potentially or completely.”
The possibilities for becoming are inherent in living things because as an entelechy-act
there is an organization and orientation toward energeia-act that will, under proper
conditions, allow for flourishing of these things in their own natures. They have in them
a given striving to maintain their existence and to flourish as the things that they are.
Because of this inherent capacity for change that is a part of the nature or actuality
of “natural” beings, and since protai ousiai by definition are things that are not something
other than themselves, Aristotle reasoned that it must be matter, rather than form – the
definitional essence -- that undergoes potential change. The potentiality for change in the
prote ousia, qua material entity is the metaphysical counterpart of the formal act –
exercised or unexercised – of the possibility for growth, movement, sustaining, and
flourishing that is inherently involved in the entity’s nature. Only particular material
entities that have “received” form exist, so existent matter is always matter that has been
organized to be something definite. Matter receives form as the principle that accounts
for the fact that a primary being is “a definite abiding something – flesh, bones, a
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syllable, or anything else. And, for the Stagirite, ‘to be a definite abiding something’ is
simply to be.”44
Definiteness of existence is to be a this. Statements about being are then
statements about a particularity of being. Being-statements are about what a thing is
being. Aristotle concluded that if form is the essential definition of a thing
epistemologically, then in material entities the material component of their existence,
when considered per se must therefore be nothing else but a principle that is defined
simply as the capacity to become something particular. This is what he meant by Prime
Matter. It might not be readily discernible that this is a coherent notion. Yet, if one
takes Aristotle to mean, by prime matter, something like a principle of physics that is the
physical basis for any and all existing particular entities, but it is itself not definable
except as this underlying principle, his theory begins to sound much more like the
discussions in contemporary particle physics.45
Hylomorphism as coherent and compelling
It must be admitted that the kind of hylomorphic metaphysics that emerges from
Aristotle’s considerations about potency and actuality has been subjected to serious
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criticism by some of his commentators and by modern scientific principles.46 Something
as occult sounding as an entelechy in the biological (animal or plant) nature of a thing or
a substantial form that literally shapes an entity in its physical appearance and orients that
entity toward a particular function or end, has struck many as an unnecessary postulation
if not an implausible construct. “Of the Aristotelian four causes, the formal cause has
been the subject of the greatest attack. Modern science has, of course, always made use of
material and efficient causality. And the notion of final causality, although criticized by
the founders of modern science as well as contemporary scientists, has never been subject
to the same kind of critique as the notion of substantial form.”47 Yet, Aristotle felt
compelled to the conclusion that the Platonic concept of form (even though highly
modified by Aristotle) was a necessary description of a certain principle in a thing that
made it to be what it is. As well, it is a thing’s form that entails the subsistence of
potential states of being prior to their actual existence. However, he thought that these
states can so subsist only as a not-yet-realized feature of a material entity that is, at each
moment of its existence, fully actualized in a condition of real being. Again, the acorn
and the oak are instructive. To be an acorn is both to be a particular material thing, but to
be qua acorn a moment in the essential nature of being an oak tree. That is, while an
acorn, in one sense, is one thing and an oak tree another, an acorn is merely an episode in
the journey of being an oak tree. It is the oak that defines the acorn not the reverse.
This is the background in Aristotle’s thinking for what others call, in
contemporary terms, his philosophy of mind (the subject which concerns this
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dissertation). We shall have greater chance to defend hylomorphism as a philosophical
attempt to describe the existence of the mind when we turn our attention to Aquinas’s
mind-body philosophy in chapter four. But, at this point we should note that for many of
his interpreters, Aristotle’s hylomorphism, when transferred to his anthropological
theories, becomes problematic, if not incoherent. A thorough defense of Aristotelian
hylomorphism is not possible in the limits of this thesis. However, it should be noted that
Aristotle’s hylomorphism does not imply a dualism of the material and the immaterial, if
one wants to interpret the term immaterial as a synonym for “spiritual,” although
medieval theologians and philosophers certainly interpreted him as providing a
philosophical underpinning for their thoughts on this matter. And in chapter four it will
be argued that on the most fundamental level even Aquinas’s doctrine, as he develops in
conversation with Augustinianism, Avicennianism, Averroism, and Bonaventurianism,
does not imply the kind of dualism that troubles many philosophers.48
Bernard Williams represents one philosopher who appreciates and yet has big
reservations about Aristotle’s hylomorphism. For Williams hylomorphism gets
especially problematic when one begins to consider how to analyze human beings in light
of the doctrine. When one allows, as does Aristotle, that “soul” is the “form” of the

48

This is not a denial that Thomas’ doctrine of the survival of the soul after death is not a problem
for contemporary philosophy or his doctrine of the resurrection. Rather, it is a claim that what Owen
Flanagan has called the “manifest image” of the soul in its Cartesian perspective is not Aquinas’s. Cf.
Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul, (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Hence, the problems that beset
dualism are not problems that Aquinas has to face, because his hylomorphism does not suggest the kind of
dualistic view that Descartes holds. We shall have to address the “solution” to the issue of personal
survival after death that Aquinas holds, as well as the idea of the resurrection, but those issues must be
discussed in Aquinas studies in terms that go well beyond the familiar boundaries that Cartesian dualism
suggest.

71

individual human being, Williams gets worried. He critiques Aristotle’s doctrine,
therefore, and contends:
[It] earns its reputation as everybody’s moderate metaphysics of mind, I believe,
by in fact wobbling between two options. In one of them, so does basically
appear only adjectivally, and while the doctrine is, so far as I can see, formally
consistent, it is only a polite form of materialism, which is cumbrous, misleading,
and disposed to point in the wrong direction from the point of view of deeper
theoretical understanding. It also has precisely this disadvantage of readily
sliding into the other view, in which soul tries to transcend its adjectival status,
and become the bearer of personal proper names: in that form, it yields us a notion
of person which is a type-notion. . . . One last point. A strength of
hylomorphism, particularly in its more materialistic version, is that it does point to
human being as a basic concept in the philosophy of mind, and, consequently, in
ethics.49
Williams’ assessment of hylomorphism fails to see that addressing the very idea
of a non-material force that gives organization to material stuff cuts to the very heart of
the question in contemporary studies in physics and biochemistry. (His concerns about
soul becoming “the bearer of personal proper names” that yields “a notion of person
which is a type-notion” will be addressed later on in chapter four.) Only by concluding
ahead of time that the concepts physically inherent and material are somehow
synonymous term is it possible for him to suggest, however, that hylomorphism is a
“polite form of materialism.” Rather, it is a pre-scientific analysis of how the material
world could be understood as organized (formed) in the first place by some physically
measurable or describable principle that is not matter strictly speaking. We should be
able to distinguish, it seems to me, between Physicalism (i.e. the belief that we are not
dealing with occult “non-physical” entities when we are analyzing the items of physics)
and Materialism (that the physical world is describable in purely material terms).
49
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Contemporary science – both physics and biology – raises questions about the
nature of the relationship between the material entities that populate the universe and the
energy or forces that enable them to be what they are. In physics, the Big Bang Theory
implies that at the beginning of the universe an energy of some kind was unleashed that
continues to produce all of the forces that then enables material entities (atoms,
molecules. . . stars, planets, living beings, and humans) to form.50 In quantum mechanics
the distinction between particles (matter) and waves (energy) is blurred, when one begins
to perform calculations and observe phenomena. Biologically, the discovery of DNA as
an “information” bearing molecule enables us (perhaps it requires us) to distinguish
between the matter that is the molecule, including its chemical compounds, and the
information that is contained within that chemistry and that molecule. It is just begging
the question, it seems to me, to simply posit that the information is the matter that is
conveying the code that organizes a particular being to be the kind of being it is. The
DNA molecules are similar qua matter, but they convey remarkably different information
and enable profoundly different life forms, because of that informational, rather than
material, difference. Nancy Pearcey argues a position very similar to the one I am
suggesting where she observes, “Encoded messages [sic] are independent of the physical
medium used to store and transmit them. If we know how to translate the message in a
DNA molecule, we could write it out using ink or crayon or electronic impulses from a
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keyboard. We could even take a stick and write it in the sand – all without affecting its
meaning.”51
What Pearcey observes as true about the material medium not affecting the
meaning of the DNA “message” is also true about the effecting of the “message” in a
particular instance. There is a hylomorphic interplay between the matter that carries the
form that the DNA information entails and the form itself, which then produces a
material being whose existence expresses that form in a concrete specific and
incommunicable entity. As well, some principle of the world must account for how this
informing principle is effected in the actual life of a living entity. Robert Sokolowski
argues for the import of this as well. He posits that “it is the plant or animal form that
encodes itself in the DNA, and that the form is what the DNA serves to communicate.
The form is both speaker and message in DNA.”52 John Goyette agrees with this
conclusion.
… the information contained in the genetic material is a kind of expression of the
form that is analogous to human speech and serves as a kind of intermediary
between form and matter. This may seem somewhat farfetched, but it is worth
noting that Aristotle frequently refers to a thing’s form as its logos – speech,
formula, definition. When Aristotle calls the form a logos he is not simply
referring to the form as it exists in the mind of the knower; rather, he is indicating
that human speech is itself a reflection of the intelligibility of the form that is in
the matter. . . . the discovery of DNA lends greater credibility to Aristotle’s notion
of form by showing that it is not merely a projection of the human mind. . . . To
the extent, then, that contemporary science has shown that DNA is a “genetic
code” or “blueprint,” for a living organism, it reveals the inadequacy of a purely
mechanical explanation of life and seems to point instead towards the Aristotelian
notion of substantial form.53
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John Peterson agrees with the problematic nature of all reductionism that would
too hastily dismiss the complexity that is involved in the existence of the material
universe (any “polite” or impolite form of materialism or other totalizing view). He
helpfully critiques a reductionism that would attempt to decry the necessity to posit some
dynamic interplay of forces to account for the physical world. His argument can assist us
in at least appreciating the attempts of Aristotle to describe the complexity of the world.
It also might help establish the necessity of something like hylomorphism for our
thinking about the complexity of the material world of experience, even if that doctrine
haunts us with an idea that Williams finds troubling – that talk about “soul” might imply
a “bearer of personal names yielding us a notion of person as a type-notion.” Rather than
dismiss that issue up front, and see it as a detrimental possible implication of
hylomorphism, we might want to take seriously the necessity to posit hylomorphism (or
something like it) and then see what it helps us account for phenomenologically.
Peterson observes that reduction of any kind is a “mistake in logic,” which cannot
be avoided by any sort of monistic reductionism in the realm of physics or metaphysics.
Materialists say that all is matter, idealists say that all is mind, and neutral monists
say that matter and mind are appearances of some more basic stuff into the
definition of which neither matter nor mind enters. But any philosopher who says
that all is G, regardless of what G stands for, identifies G with the highest genus.
Otherwise he says that G falls under a wider genus, H. And then he countenances
that possibility that H has some species besides G. . . . Put generally, if it is true
that all is G then all difference within G must be due to something besides G. No
genus explains it own differences, because difference is outside the definition of
genus and anything that is implied by genus. No sooner, then, do philosophers
who say that all is G recognize difference in their world than they admit features
about the world that fall outside of G.54
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Peterson obviously sees reductionism as an equal opportunity fallacy.
Materialists cannot be nominalists in their explanation of difference in the world, without
positing that something (a knower that discriminates about matter) is also present in the
world. “Then they are dualists and not materialists.” Similarly, Idealists cannot explain
difference simply by mind, “otherwise differences in mind explain differences in mind;”
but this conclusion has to allow for difference to be part of the purportedly unified and
totalizing genus, mind. But if they suggest that something else (matter) explains
differences among mental things, they are admitting something besides mind. “They then
abandon idealism in favor of dualism.” In like manner neutral monists fail “to have their
cake and eat it, too.” While philosophers like James and (the early) Russell might
remonstrate that their monism allows for the diverse appearances of our experience to be
grounded in neutral being, rather than matter or mental naming, Peterson retorts that the
difference they might endeavor to argue for really makes no difference. “If the various
appearances have a foundation in reality then neutral being is no bare identity but itself
contains differences, quite apart from any differences that are introduced by us. But since
difference is not due to genus, it follows that some real thing besides neutral being causes
these differences within neutral being. And then neutral monism [as with materialism
and idealism] fails again.”55
The above arguments address, I think, those who, like Bernard Williams, would
argue that hylomorphism is just a polite form of materialism, but what about the other of
his concerns – the potential in hylomorphism for the soul to become the bearer of
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personal properties. In chapter four the interpretation of Aquinas’s mind-body
metaphysics will go a long way toward address this question. At this point in the present
work, however, we can make a preliminary observation. As will be argued later, on
Aristotelian and even Thomistic terms, the soul, if it is seen properly as a principle that
enables a primary being/substance to exist qua human, does not necessarily entail that the
soul will then become a bearer of personal properties. Of course, it might be called such
in a highly qualified way, as where Aquinas argues that the entire soul is named by the
highest “act” of which it is capable. The soul, as the informing, life-instantiating and
organization producing principle in the human composite, could be called – loosely – by
the personal names and properties of the primary being. However, strictly speaking, if
the soul is viewed as the “information” that makes a human being human, then the
comparison offered above to DNA helps us begin to quell some fears that Williams and
others might have. It is the person, Aquinas would say, that becomes the bearer of
personal names and properties, but since the person is formed by the organizing principle
of the soul, then one might, speaking broadly, refer to the soul in personal terms.
Aquinas, who saw the issue of personhood more clearly than Aristotle, would have no
problem allowing for this usage. However, he would insist that this is not to speak of the
soul proper. Hence he says, “the person knows, not the soul.”
Summary
To summarize Aristotle’s intellectual motivations that have been discussed above,
we can observe that in his estimation the nature of change and identity across change
necessitates the doctrine of form and matter. Without the reality of the relationship
between form as the locus of actuality and matter as the ontic seat of potentiality, one
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could only be left with the absurdity that all ordinary particular things had arisen from
nothing. Furthermore, in his mind, since these ways of being (form and matter) are
through analysis distinct from each other, one ought to, for the sake of the most adequate
explanation, conceive of them as discreet principles at work in reality. This means,
therefore, that in an Aristotelian metaphysics each and every individual entity, what he
calls a primary being, is analyzable as a composite of the material stuff that makes it up
and the form that accounts for the particular arrangement of the material stuff. “The
composite Being is not just the sum of its material parts. The form cannot be conceived
as just another material part.”56
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Chapter 3
Aquinas’s Version of Hylomorphism

The relationship between Aristotle and Aquinas is well-established. However, the
extent to which Aristotle’s philosophy is a “source,” rather than a mere backdrop, for
Aquinas’s own philosophy is debated.1 While it is beyond the scope of this project to
enter into the scholarly debate as to the best way to understand Aristotle’s contribution to
Aquinas’s thought, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the reintroduction of Aristotle to
Christian Europe was a profoundly significant development. Some scholars insist that
Aquinas was significantly different from Aristotle in the results of his philosophical
reflections, yet it is demonstrable from the writing of Thomas that he, at least, thought he
was interpreting and expanding upon the philosophical insights of Aristotle. It is also
demonstrable that Aquinas takes the seminal work of Aristotle and utilizes it in order to
create a theory of hylomorphism that is distinguishable from his peripatetic tutor. To
Thomas’s utilization of Aristotle and his development of the insights afforded by the
latter’s hylomorphism we now turn our attention. Understanding him at this point is a
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crucial component for understanding how to read and interpret, as we will in chapter four,
the specifics of the Angelic Doctor’s doctrine of mind and body identity.
Essences, identity, and Being
When Aquinas analyzed the world in terms of the complementary distinctions
form/matter and act/potency which are necessary to account for the existence of every
ordinary particular, he was driven to make a further distinction. Aquinas saw that behind
these concepts there was an even more basic metaphysical distinction that one has to
make, i.e., the distinction and the relationship between esse (Being) and ens (a being) or
essentia (Essence).2 This discrimination in Aquinas’s philosophy was developed as he
considered that the act of being some particular essence and being an essence were
distinct metaphysical issues. Taking Aristotle’s Categories as a starting point, Aquinas
reasoned that the relationship between a primary entity (substance) considered as an
essential particular in the world and the fact of its existence could be analyzed as a
distinction of significant import. Just as in Thomas’s Latin essentia was a derivative of
esse, he saw philosophically esse proper (existence, the act of being) to be more
fundamental as a metaphysical principle. We shall attend to this radical distinction in a
subsequent section of this chapter. At this point we must look at how the notion of
essentia as the act of esse shaped, in Aquinas’s thought, a metaphysical understanding of
the nature of an individual primary being (ens).

2

The following analysis of Thomas’s thought comes from Armand Maurer translation of De Ente
et Essentia – On Being and Essence (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968).
Although this is a relatively early work in Aquinas, he never moved fundamentally from the arguments set
forth in this work in a systematic fashion.
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Esse (Being), Aquinas informs his readers, has two uses, which Aristotle had
noted: “Taken in one way it is divided by the ten categories [of Aristotle]; taken in the
other way it signifies the truth of propositions” (De Ente, 1, 2). The difference between
these two uses can be understood in the following way. The first of these notions defines
for us two items in our catalogue of experiences, i.e. that which we may properly
predicate – entities and features we encounter “in” those entities. “In the first way
nothing can be called a being unless it is something positive in reality. . .” (De Ente, 1, 2).
Here Aquinas is recognizing that we cannot speak of anything that is completely nothing
(as with Parmenides and Aristotle, Aquinas recognizes this as absurd). According to the
second way that the term “being” is used, however, we can and do speak of “what is,” by
way of affirmative propositions about the states of affairs of which we are speaking, but
the affirmations, even thought the latter may not name any truly positive “essence.”
For example, when we say that the Rhythm and Blues musician, Stevie Wonder,
is blind, we are positing a true state of affairs, since he is, in fact, blind. In this sense, we
posit “the blindness of ‘Stevie Wonder’” as a true state of affairs of our world. Many
people, furthermore, are blind; hence, blindness can be called, in a way, a feature of the
world. However, blindness is an “essence” (or a “being”) only in the most qualified
sense, since essentially blindness is really a privation or an absence, even though it is
present to us as a feature of the real condition of some primary beings. The same could
be said of all privative designations in Aquinas’s view. On the basis of this kind of
reasoning, Aquinas says, “. . . in the second sense [of the term being], anything can be
called a being if an affirmative proposition can be formed about it, even though it is
nothing positive in reality” (De Ente, 1, 2). Aquinas contends, however, that the term
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essentiae can only be properly and adequately and completely understood to refer to
“being” in the first of the two senses of being; it posits something in reality.3
Aquinas’s reasoning is both semantic and philosophical. The semantic assertion
is about the meaning of essentia is related, as a derivative of the esse, to the (also
derivative) verbal noun ens. Philosophically, however, Thomas’s argument is that if ens
most properly names items that are present as real singular entities, then essentia as a
derivative of esse in relation to ens must name only those particulars that “posit
something in reality.” Without this qualification, the logical conclusion of taking
essentia in the second sense of esse would be absurd: we would be saying “essence” can
name even beings that are in themselves ontological negations, i.e. non-essences such as
blindness. “Blindness” names a feature of our experience that is fundamentally a “lack”
or privation or negation of a positive activity – seeing. In this sense, then, even a
privative state is really “existent” states in the world, but they are real only as a lack of
some activity that is actually present in the world. So, we can speak equivocally of the
essence of blindness. However, should ‘essence’ be understood as referring in the
strictest sense to particular a entity in the second sense of esse, we would have to defend
the logical absurdity: E = ~E
Thomas wants to make it clear that ‘essence’ in the strictest sense names only that
which can be defined as a particular “what.” In other words, essence, in his view, cannot
name those states of affairs that are negations or privations of some active feature of our
world. The only essences are those things which are active principles in our world. For
3

Ibid. Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto; aliqua enim hoc modo
dicuntur entia quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essential ab ente primo
modo dicto.
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example, sight is receiving light and sensible form into the eye – that is the essence
(definition) of sight. Or, as Aquinas defines in the Summa, as was indicated in chapter
one, rational animality is the essence of being a human.
So, ‘essence’ is a term that, with regard to logical function, just is the what-ness
of an entity. As Thomas E. Dillon says of Aquinas’s argument in this section of De Ente,
“. . . ‘nature’ is another name for the essence of a thing [in Aquinas’s view], since, as he
explains, it is the essence of a thing which makes it intelligible. In short, then, essence is
something that is possessed by all real beings and only real beings, and it is the principle
of their intelligibility.”4
And so the Philosopher says in V Metaphysicae cap. 4 (1014b36) that every
substance is a nature. But the term nature used in this way seems to signify the
essence of a thing as it is ordered to the proper operation of the thing, for no thing
is without its proper operation. The term quiddity, surely, is taken from the fact
that this is what is signified by the definition. But the same thing is called essence
because the being has existence through it and in it.(De Ente, 1)
The last sentence of the above quote indicates to us the metaphysical import of
essentia. Looking at the Latin text will help to make this clear. Aquinas asserts:
Quiditatis uero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per definitionem significatur. Sed essentia
dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse. The relation between essentia,
ens and esse, as well as quiditatis is a complex one in this passage. What Aquinas is
contending is that just as the quiditatis or the what-it-is-ness of an ordinary particular is
the very reality that is captured linguistically in its definition, so essence is more than the
counterpart of a true proposition; it is the principle of existence by which a particular
being has being as a definable and knowable existent entity in our world. Etienne Gilson
4

Doctoral dissertation, The Real Distinction Between Essence and Existence, Thomas E. Dillon,
Notre Dame, 1977.
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reminds us that this does not entail, in Aquinas’s metaphysics, that the essence is the
source of the being of the primary substance (particular). Nonetheless, Aquinas’s
position is that essences are real principles of being, present in the world as the
organizing forces in which and by means of which substances receive their particular
being as part of a species.5
Thus in Metaphysicae V, com. 14, the Commentator explains the cited text from
Aristotle by saying that being, in the first sense, is what signifies the essence of a
thing. And since, as said above, being in this sense is divided into the ten
categories, essence signifies something common to all natures through which the
various beings are placed in the various genera and species, as humanity (human
nature) is the essence of man, and so on. (De Ente, 1)
It is a tautological maxim of epistemology that no res (thing) has a general
existence in the world, but instead exists (has being) only as a specific entity (ens). But,
in Aquinas’s view, since sensible things all exist in a material universe and, by Aristotle’s
analysis, have the potentiality to become other things, something must cause the material
stuff to be P rather than Q. That something is the essence, conceived of as the
combination of form and matter in co-inherence. Hence, the particular what-ness of a
specific being (ens), is not merely a mental description imposed upon an entity by our
minds which conceive of it as a particular essence. That ens, rather – by Aquinas’s lights
– can only have its being (esse) as a particular essentia, and our minds simply recognize
the essence (or form) of the thing that makes it what it is concretely. (This
epistemological theory grows out of Aquinas’s commitment to a fully hylomorphic
metaphysics in which essences are part of the world of human experience, but only in the
specific entities of our acquaintance.)
5

See E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Doubleday, 1956),
448, n. 30. Hereafter, Gilson.
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This conception of the metaphysical significance of essence is tied to Aquinas’s
contention, quoted above, that “essence” also entails the concept of the “proper
operation” of a thing (res). 6 Aquinas is arguing here, in Aristotelian fashion, that
something must account for the fact that things have an operation proper to them and that
that operation itself is not self-explanatory.7 Hence, Aquinas tells us that essence is “also
called ‘form’, because it signifies the determination of each thing, as Avicenna says” (De
Ente, 1). It is clear later in De Ente that Aquinas is using ‘form’ here in a specialized
way, namely as the whole nature or essence of the thing under consideration. This is
obvious since Aquinas in the context of this portion of De Ente says that the term “form”
can be utilized as a kind of synonym for essentiae, only because “form” signifies the
determination (certitudo) of each thing, i.e., it speaks of the concrete specific, unique
truth that can be predicated of a res.8 He is clear, in chapter two of De Ente, that in what
he calls composite substances form and matter are found together as essential to the
entity.

6

On the difficulty of translating the Latin term res, which can be translated thing; event, business;
fact; cause; property, see Theodor Haecker, Vergil: Vater des Abendlandes, (Frankfurt am Main and
Hamburg: Fischer Bucherei, 1958), 131 – 132. He considers res to be one of the Hertzworter, heart-words,
for the Latin tongue, in which is concentrated something of the genius of the language. Res must be
considered a term of some ambiguity, almost a place holder, but not necessarily indicating itself a
metaphysical commitment as to the nature of the entity for which it holds a place. Res need not name items
of our experience that we could think of in atomistic substantialist terms. This is especially important when
considering Aquinas’s account of the “participation” of all ens as things in Being. The same can apply for
Spinoza’s usage in the light of his discussion of modes of substance.
7
Note the similarity here to Spinoza’s definition of “essence” in Ethics II, def. 2. “that without
which the thing (res) can neither be nor be conceived, and, vice versa, that which cannot be or be conceived
without the thing.”
8
“Certitudo. The Arabic term which the mediaeval translator rendered [from Avincenna] by this
Latin word has the meaning of perfection or complete determination. On the one hand it signifies the
objective truth of a thing, on the other the precise and clear knowledge of it.” A. M. Goichon, La
Distinction de l’Essence et de l’Existence d’apres Ibn Sina (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1937), 34, n 7.
Referenced in Maurer, 31, n 8.
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But it cannot be said that either one of these alone is called the essence. That the
matter alone of a thing is not its essence is evident, for through its essence a thing
is knowable and fixed in its species and genus. But matter is not a principle of
knowledge, and a thing is not placed in a genus or species through it but through
that by which a thing is actual. Neither can the form alone of a composite
substance be called its essence, though some want to assert this. It is evident from
what has been said that the essence is what is signified through the definition of a
thing. Now the definition of natural substances includes not only form but also
matter; otherwise there would be no difference between definitions in physics
[physical sciences] and in mathematics. Nor can it be said that the definition of a
natural substance includes matter as something added to its essence, or as
something outside its essence. This is the kind of definition proper to accidents;
not having a perfect essence, their definition must include their subject, which is
outside their genus. It is evident, therefore, that essence embraces both form and
matter. (De Ente, 2 [1])
What Aquinas is arguing here is that an ordinary particular, what he calls a
natural substance, cannot be adequately defined apart from the physical existence that it
has. The material existence of the entity is its natural substantiality. Its form (what
makes it the kind of thing it is) is actual only in union with the matter of the physically
existent entity. The matter he has in mind at this point of the argument is the “prime
matter” of Aristotelian metaphysics. Aquinas is establishing that matter is essential to the
definition of natural substances. However, matter qua matter does not instantiate the
specificity of being – the species and genus – of a thing (res). Aquinas is describing here
how “form” is the organizing principle of an ordinary particular (or a primary, natural
substance) by which it is qua physical an actual concrete being. However, “form,” when
conceived of as this organization-giving property or cause, cannot be the essence of an
individual material substance, because natural substances have as a part of their definition
the material stuff which, qua organized by form to have a “proper operation,” is essential
to their actual existence as to their defined essence.
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If there is, then, any cogency to the notion that matter, considered simply as a
physical and potentially measurable reality, does not organize itself into specific units of
material being – which is what Aristotle argued at length -- then the formal principle that
does account for the physical organization of the entity, and allows the physical entity to
have an “operation” proper to it is distinct from the matter, but not separable from it. So,
“form” is not the “essence” any more than “matter.” “The essence, according to which a
thing is called a being (ens), cannot be either the form alone or the matter alone, but both,
though form alone is in its own way the cause of this being”(De Ente, 2 [3]).9
The import of all this is that Aquinas conceives of essentia as, on the analytical
level, the definition of what an ordinary particular is. But it is so, because the material
ordinary particular actually is what its definition entails; and it is so because of the
organization-giving form that shapes matter. Thus, when Aquinas speaks of essences (he
often means just ordinary particulars). In these cases, he is thinking of entities that are
encountered in sense experience of the extended or physical world. “Essences,” in this
sense, exist, he is arguing, because matter and form are co-operatively co-inhering in the
primary being (Aristotle’s term). This action causes the primary being (natural
substance/ordinary particular) to be the particular thing it is by giving it – in actuality –
proper and unified operation.10 To speak of it having its proper operation “in actuality”

9

The Latin text reads: Quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nequetantum
materiae, sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundumquam res esse dicitur: unde oportet ut essentia
qua res denominator ens non tantum sit forma, neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamuis huiusmodi
esse suo modo sola forma sit causa.
10
Here we should recall the “four causes” of Aristotelian metaphysics. These “causes” are not
causes in the sense that we often think of them in the analysis of cause and effect. Rather, the “causes” are
principles necessary to describe and account for the actual existence of a particular being or entity. The
formal and material “causes” are the analytically necessary descriptions of the aspects of the entity’s own
being. Of course, the “efficient cause” is Aristotle’s – and Aquinas after him – recognition that substances
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also recognizes that an “essence,” if only considered as truthful predication of a being
without regard to its existence, could be said to have a proper function merely in
concept, as well, as e. g.,when we discuss the species concept “horse” in isolation from
actual horses.11 However, our concepts are dependent upon the actual entities. Only the
actual concrete entity itself can truly be an essence. Matter and form, as analytical
concepts, are both subsumed under the definition of the essence, because qua causes of a
things existence matter and form both co-inhere in an essence to make it what it is. We
must, therefore, consider the roles that matter and form play in this respect.
Materia signatum/designatum
The state of affairs that results in the actual existence of any particular entity is, in
Aquinas’s view, the union of matter and form. This union is what Aquinas means by a
composite being. What Aquinas means by this notion is that every physical entity that
we encounter is constituted by two distinguishable principles. These principles, in
Aquinas’s theory, are what Copleston describes as “the primary co-constituents of a
material thing.”12 They are the irreducible principia entis (principles of actual existence)
that are required to account for the existence of any particular thing. However, neither

are dependent upon other substances for their own existence as embodied forms in the physical world. The
“final cause” points to, as is well-known, Aristotle’s convictions about the teleological way the substances
function. While a full-blown analysis of Aristotle’s final cause is not possible here, it can be observed that
final causality does not need to entail a commitment to any sort of theological assessment about the origins
of substances nor of the universe itself. (Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover” is not a creator.) Instead, the final
cause can be considered in terms of the ends toward which entities tend in sustaining their existence and
that the idea of a species essence has within it its own particular strivings for survival and flourishing. This
would be an analytical distinction that Aristotelian metaphysics could make between the formal cause as
instantiating and the final cause as sustaining in accounting for the existence of any natural substance.
11
Kant’s statement that “existence” adds nothing to the concept of 100 thalers, is true when
thinking about the essence of 100 thalers solely qua definition. However, an existent 100 thalers is quite
distinct from the concept of 100 thalers, if one is engaged in the activity of paying a bill.
12
Copleston, Thomas Aquinas, 89, n 1.
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form nor matter in general (primary matter) can be considered to be physical entities
properly so-called. The formal element and the material element in an entity are
necessary elements of an entity, because they provide an account of the physical
existence of an entity. However, they do not, in themselves, define the essence of the
entity so described, e.g., to be Socrates is to be Socrates – not generically a human being.
To be Socrates is to be a particular human body “informed” by the substantial form
humanity.
Socrates’ particular essence is, as Aquinas views it, not some idealistic essential
nature (as a Platonic metaphysics might have to argue), but is the particular identity of an
irreducibly material entity. Matter, therefore, is essential to the definition of Socrates, but
matter must be understood always, Aquinas contends, in its relationship to particular
forms. Each entity must have, according to Aquinas, a substantial form that causes the
matter of the entity to be the kind of thing that it is. This concept – “substantial form” –
takes the place of the concept of “immanent entelechy” that one finds in Aristotle’s
terminology. The substantial form is the particularizing information that gives to any
being its form of existing. In material beings (as opposed to angels or pure intelligences,
in Aquinas’s view), this substantial form is what causes, for example, a maple tree to be a
maple tree, rather than a sage brush. The matter that is “informed” in a particular entity
thus cannot be first matter (materia prima), in Aquinas’s metaphysical construct, because
“matter cannot be said to be [esse]; it is the substance [the particular, essential thing]
itself which exists.”13

13

Summa Contra Gentiles, 2, 54. A passage from his early writings illustrates Aquinas’ thought
on this point, which never substantially changed. “Note that although [first] matter in its nature is neither
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This has important implications for Aquinas’s ideas about the nature of the
physical structure of any ordinary particular. Following Aristotle, Aquinas conceived of
matter, when thought of as the physical stuff out of which things are composed, as being
purely the potential to become a specific ordinary particular.14 On this basis, Aquinas
asserts the confusing claim that “designated matter” is the “principle of individuation”
between particular physical entities. In De Ente, Aquinas asserts that “matter is the
principle of individuation,” but it must be realized, he contends, “that the matter. . . is not
just any matter but only designated matter.” By designated matter, Aquinas explains, “I
mean that which is considered under determined dimensions” (De Ente, 2 [4]).
In order to understand what Aquinas means by such a description, we must be
clear about what he does not mean. First, he does not envision a dualism that our world
participates in of pure form versus pure matter. This, in fact, is precisely what he does
not want to posit. He is clear in De Ente in his insistence that the essentia of an ens that
is a physical particular is the identity of a being that is informed matter or materialized
form. But his way of articulating this dipolar operation “must not be taken to mean that
the form [of an ens] existed with some kind of universal status before the tree came into
existence.”15 The universality of the form that beings of a similarly definable nature

formed nor formless (as bronze in its nature is neither shaped nor shapeless, it never exists stripped of form
and lack of form, but sometimes takes on one form and sometimes another. By itself it can never exist for it
has no form of its own and so – because actual existence comes with forms—matter by itself never exists
actually but only potentially. Nothing actually existent then can be called first matter “ (emphasis mine).
All quotations in this dissertation from Summa contra Gentiles are taken from the translation at The
Jacques Maritain Center, http://www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc4_81.htm.
14
One qualification is important. For Aquinas, the “heavenly bodies” were not made of the same
kind of matter as the physical bodies of earth. Things of which the matter is the same are mutually
interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly
bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
15
Copleston, Thomas Aquinas, p 95.
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share, while real, is not existent apart from the individual primary being to which the
form applies. This analytical proposition significantly shapes Aquinas’s epistemology in
Summa Theologiae
The object of every sense faculty is a form existing in corporeal matter, and so,
since this sort of matter is the principle of individuation, all the faculties of the
sense part of man know only particulars. . . . it is proper for [the human
intellectual capacity] to know forms which, in fact exist individually in corporeal
mater, yet not precisely as existing in such or such individuated matter. Now to
know something which in fact exists in individuated matter, but not as existing in
such or such matter is to abstract a form from individual matter, represented by
sense images. Thus we have to say that our intellect understands material things
by abstraction from sense images. . . .
I claim that whatever pertains to the definition [rationem] of any species of
material reality, for instance stone or man or horse, can be considered without
individuating conditions which are no part of the definition of the species. And
this is what I mean by abstracting the universal from the particular . . . . (Summa,
Ia 85, reply and ad 1)
While he does not suggest a dualistic view of things, Aquinas nonetheless
believes that the two principia entis (principles of being) are really distinct, when
considered as principles necessary to account for the singular and unified existence of a
primary being. Hence, we see the second of our needed clarifications for understanding
Aquinas. The universal forms that define species do have an extra-mental, real existence,
though not as “universals” in a Platonic sense. The mind abstracts to gain clarity about
the particulars in its field of sensory experience, but in so doing is not simply nominally
applying descriptions. Rather, the human intellectual capacity – when it thinks clearly –
constructs a reliable picture of reality that has adequate correspondence to a true state of
affairs in the extra-mental world. “Necessarily distinct as determining principles but not
ontologically separate” seems to be what Aquinas wants to assert regarding the form and
matter that together comprise the essence of particular beings. This conception is
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reflected when he describes what makes for falsity in understanding the relationship
between form and matter.
Therefore when it is said that that understanding is false which understands a
thing other than as it is, the statement is true if ‘other than’ refers to the thing
understood. For if the understanding is false whenever one understands a thing to
be other that it is; hence the understanding would be false if one should abstract
the species of stone from matter that he would understand it to exist apart from
matter, as Plato held. The proposition would not be true if ‘other than’ were
taken as referring to the one understanding. For there is not falsity if the mode of
understanding in the one who understands is different from the mode of existing
in the thing – a thing understood is in the one who understands in a immaterial
way, according to the mode of the intellect, and not in a material way, according
to the mode of material reality. (Summa Theologicae, 1a, 85, ad 1)
With this in mind we can then better see what Aquinas means in De Ente when he
says that the principle that makes ens to be an individual is “designated matter” or matter
“considered under determined dimensions” (De Ente 2 [4.]). To get to the meaning of
Aquinas’s terminology here, we should reflect on the way his technical metaphysical
language changes in regard to “designated matter.” Armand Maurer notes that while
Aquinas uses the word ‘determined’ to qualify ‘matter’, following Avicenna in De Ente,
he adopts a different concept in later works (In II Sentences., d, q. 1, a. 4 and In Boethius
de Trinitate, IV, 2, ad 3) written shortly after De Ente. In these works, he chooses
Averroes’ concept ‘undetermined dimensions’ over the idea of ‘determined matter’ to
account for individuation.16 The difference in these two descriptions seems to be a
semantic clarification that does not change Aquinas’s fundamental position in De Ente.
Rather, the term ‘undetermined’ allowed Aquinas to acknowledge that matter could be
“designated” (in the sense of being specific and particular, rather than matter in general)

16

Cf. Mauer, 37, n 12.
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without being “under determined dimensions.” One of the reasons for this change would
seem to be that he came to see that growth and change in primary substances would entail
a change in dimensions. Aquinas would not want to allow the implication that the
primary substance’s essentia as an individual had become a different essentia, simply
because the dimensions had changed.
What Aquinas wanted to do in this analysis was to insist that if matter is truly a
part of the essence of Socrates, then the matter of which we speak has to be a specifically
designated material organization. But furthermore, if matter is essential to Socrates’
identity as a living, breathing, rational ens, then the material that Socrates is qua rational
and living must be – in some way – unique to Socrates. It is a part of his essentia. It
could not, in other words, be matter in general or “first” matter. Were this not so, one
could conclude that the distinction between Socrates and other entities is illusory or, at
least accidental and not a matter of substantial identity. Thus, even the matter of Socrates
must be differentiable from all other material beings, if Socrates is, in fact, a specific
“what,” or a quiditas. This implies, in Aquinas’s hylomorphism, that the material which
is Socrates is unique to him, so that the Athenian philosopher has to have “this particular
bone and this particular flesh” as part of his essence.
More fundamentally, however, Aquinas’s emphasis on signified or designated
matter seems to develop in his metaphysic because he somewhat deviates from Aristotle
somewhat concerning the nature of matter and its relationship to form. The departure is
not radical, but it is more fully apparent in Aquinas’s metaphysics of matter than in
Aristotle’s. Designated matter is the only kind of matter that we can know about,
because only designated matter actually exists. More fully than Aristotle spelled out,
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Aquinas clearly taught that prime matter is purely an idea we posit through the process he
calls “precision” or abstraction; it does not actually exist. What actually exist are
material particulars and the informed matter that makes them up.17 In Boethius de
Trinitate, Aquinas asserts that “form is not individuated in that it is received in matter,
but only in that it is received in this or that distinct matter, and determined to here and
now.”18 The notions "here" and "now" are Aquinas’s ways of referring to the individual
(the primary substance).
They indicate "hœc caro et ossa". And they are only possible by reason of
(informed) matter, the ground of divisibility and location in space. Still, it must be
noted that "materia signata quantitate" is not to be understood as primordial
matter having an aptitude towards fixed and invariable dimensions. The
determined dimensions that are found in the existing subject are to be attributed,
St. Thomas teaches, to matter as "individuated by indeterminate dimensions
preunderstood in it.19
The distinction that Aquinas draws was perhaps not lost on Aristotle. However,
Aquinas’s doctrine of creation, which Aristotle lacked, would have informed his thinking
on this topic. Matter was eternal, in Aristotle’s view. He could conceive of it in some
Platonic way as the eternally uncaused and undetermined substance that is the foundation
of all physical reality. While he rejected Plato’s dualism and was willing to grant that
matter was a principle of being (unlike Plato), Aristotle’s idea of the uncaused eternality
of matter was another of his Platonic hold-overs. Aquinas, on the other hand, could not
17

At this, one might call to mind Spinoza’s later claim that what exists are Substance and its
Modes. The Attributes (Thought and Extension) do not exist. While this point of Spinoza’s philosophy is
hotly contested by his interpreters, the view that Extension as an Attribute of Substance does not exist,
except in its Modes has real resonance (possibly) with Aquinas’ view of Prime Matter, i.e., that it is a
proper and necessary abstraction from nature of the world, but it does not exist, because no matter ever
exists unformed in some way.
18
Boetheius de Trinitate Q. iv, a. 1
19
New Advent, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10053b.htm, (Boeth. de Trin.", Q. iv, a. 2; "De
Nat. Mat.", vii.) The concept of “preunderstood” means, for Aquinas, something like “already existing as a
form for understanding”.
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embrace this conceptually for theological, as well as philosophical, reasons. In the
Summa Theologiae, I a, Q 66, a 1, he contends that matter was created together with
form. Only one substance could be so basically simple as to be indefinable, for Aquinas.
That would be God. As a created reality, therefore, Prime Matter had to be conceived of
as having an essence, however vaguely.
However, the conception of matter as the physical (or extended) stuff out of
which all things are made is, the thought, an irreplaceable one. All of our understanding,
according to Aquinas’s epistemology, begins with the real, the concrete being. But in
our experience we encounter any number of primary substances (ordinary particulars)
that undergo changes. As an explanation for this, we must infer the coexistence of matter
and form – the determinable and determinant. We may, as Aquinas does in De Ente, 2
[11], “prescind”20 from the existential situation of real entities in our endeavor to
understand them. By so doing, we “bracket” the material particularity of the entity under
consideration and strip matter, by abstraction, of this or that determination. In other
words, we may by analysis consider the material element apart from all its
determinations. However, if we achieve abstract consideration of matter apart from that
(formed particularity) by which alone we can know it, then there is, in Aquinas’s view,
nothing about which we could be speaking, because have we stripped it mentally of the
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The term translated in the referenced passage as ‘precision’ is the Latin praecisio. Maurer
comments on the significance of this term in Aquinas: “[Praecisio] Precision is a mode of abstraction by
which we cut off or exclude something from a notion. Abstraction is the consideration of something
without either including or excluding form its notion characteristics joined to it in reality” (Mauer, 39, n
15).
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potentiality of definiteness in union with form. Hence, for him, even prime matter exists
only insofar as it is essentially the potential to be concrete physical ordinary particulars.21
As Francis Aveling has noted regarding Aquinas’s doctrine of matter:
Matter is neither realizable nor thinkable without its correlative. The proper
object of intelligence, and likewise the subject of being, is Ens, Verum. Hence St.
Thomas teaches further that primordial matter is "a substantial reality" (i.e., a
reality reductively belonging to the category of substance), "potential towards all
forms, and, under the action of a fit and proportioned efficient cause,
determinable to any species of corporeal substance" (In VII Met., sect. 2); and,
again: "It is never stripped of form and privation; now it is under one form now
under another. Of itself it can never exist" (De Princip. Natur.) . What has been
said may appear to deny to matter the reality that is predicated of it. This is not the
case. As the determinable element in corporeal substance it must have a reality
that is not that of the determining form. The mind by abstraction may consider it
as potential to any form, but can never overstep the limit of its potentiality as
inexistent (cf. Aristotle’s ti enyparchontos (Phys., iii, 194b, 16) and realized in
bodies without finding itself contemplating absolute nothingness. Of itself matter
can never exist, and consequently of itself it can never be thought. 22
On this basis, Aquinas concludes, “It is clear, therefore, that the difference between the
essence of Socrates and the essence of man lies solely in what is designated and not
designated” (De Ente 2 [5]). This concept is rooted in the view that all things that exist in
the realm of sensible objects are, by definition, “informed” material. On this view, prime
matter is, in itself, a mere abstraction, and therefore not definable.
The metaphysical significance that materia signata has for Aquinas’s view of the
ontological particularity and identity of primary substances can be seen if we consider
how he deals with the idea of “species form” in relation to the individual. He takes it as a
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(De Princip. Naturæ) Prime Matter, Aquinas teaches in this treatis, “has its being by reason of
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given of our experience that the concept we have of “species” corresponds to a real
feature of the world. Any species is not, in itself, a universal existent reality.
Nonetheless, the concept that we have of individuals as members of a class of entities that
share certain features is a true concept and not simply a nominal classification, even if the
“species” has no existence outside the mind.23 Socrates is the informed designated matter
that one could point to and name “Socrates.” However, something makes Socrates to be
the kind of thing he is as Socrates. The thing that makes him to be the quiddity that is
Socrates is the form of humanity. However, ‘humanity’ does not name a particular thing,
but signifies “that by which man is man.” Humanity is, in Aquinas metaphysics, the
“special form” that marks and makes the difference between human beings and other
beings. “Humanity is a term signifying a certain form, called the [forma totius] form of
the whole [species]. (De Ente 2 [9]) Yet, that form which makes Socrates to be a human
being is only part of the ens that is Socrates, because the definition of man includes
matter, generically conceived, and the material aspect of the “definition” or identity
includes a particular arrangement of matter – “this flesh and bones.”24
This view of matter establishes, for Aquinas, a certainty that no ens (being) can
share its particular essentia (essential identity) qua ens with any other ens, not even one
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Copleston notes: “St Thomas did not think of forms as first existing separately and then being
individuated, for the forms of sensible objects do not exist in a state of temporal priority to the composite
substances; but the idea of individuation is certainly due originally to the Platonic way of thinking and
speaking of forms. . . . it would not become an historian to turn a blind eye to the Platonic legacy in
Aristotle’s thought and consequently in that of St Thomas” (A History of Philosophy, vol II, 328.)
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Aquinas’ views on prime matter in relation to form distanced him from the prevalent
Augustinian idea of his day that within matter was embedded rationes seminales as some sort of vague
preliminary force that allows matter to be self-arranging (within the providence of God). Copleston notes:
“St. Thomas certainly employed the term rationes seminales, but he meant thereby primarily the active
forces of concrete objects, e.g. the active poere which controls the generation of living things and restricts it
to the same species, not the doctrine that there are inchoate forms in prime matter.” Cf. Summa I a, 115, 2;
De Veritate, 5, 9, ads 8 and 9.
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that has the exact same forma totius. By bracketing the question of Socrates’ particular
physical existence, Aquinas is able to ask the question how Socrates could share features
of existence with other entities of his kind, and yet be distinct from them and have an
unshareable particular essence. Performing this act of bracketing, we can acknowledge
that the species form that is the nature “humanity” is only a part of Socrates, when
considered as a particular man. But it is the part that organizes the designated matter that
is Socrates, making it to be a man instead of his being some other kind of entity. It is this
species form that establishes in the physical world the proper operation in which Socrates
engages as a particular man, i.e., as an individual and particular “rational animal”25 (De
Ente 2 [4]). Socrates is not, however, identical with the humanity per se that makes him
to be human. Neither is the humanity that makes him human identical to the essence of
Socrates. Were that later statement not true, then every human, in Aquinas’s view, would
be Socrates. So, Aquinas asserts, “If the nature of the species is signified with precision
from designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, then it [the nature of the
species] will have the role of a part”26 (De Ente 2 [11]). There must be some other
feature that is also essential to the existence of an ordinary particular.
In other words, if when we analyze the essence of Socrates we can bracket for the
sake of philosophical analysis the material that he is, then we are able to see that
something must make him to be the particular physical entity he is. Looking at the form
for this, we nonetheless realize that it cannot be the principle of individuation alone. His
particularity is instantiated only, therefore, in the union of form with matter. Other
25

Quoting Averroes approvingly, Aquinas agrees that “Socrates is nothing else than animality and
rationality, which are his quiddity.”
26
Emphasis is mine. See above note, 86.
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beings can share the form of humanity with him, in Aquinas’s view, but no other entities
can share the designated matter that he is. The particularity of his identity within his
species is absolutely a function of the designated (undetermined) matter that is Socrates.
So, the reason that an ens cannot share its essence with any other is clear. The matter of
Socrates is designated through the organizing influence of the form. This form
establishes for the designated matter a “proper operation.” One might actually say that
the “proper operation” of the physical, living body named “Socrates” just is another way
of describing the materia signata that is Socrates. One way of speaking identifies the
activity that the material entity performs the other denotes the entity so acting. Therefore,
as a particular composite, Socrates is the specific material entity that is the composite ens.
Because of this analysis, Aquinas can contend that Socrates – and all composite
substances – are irreducibly both form and matter in union. The implication of this, then,
is that the being (esse) of a being (ens) is incommunicable, because the ens is a particular
essence, that is a body with an operation proper to it. This is what Aquinas means when
he says that matter is the principle of individuation.
Materia designata and diachronic identity
As individuated in designated matter, an essence obviously undergoes many
changes to its material make-up. This is not only true in cases of radical change – as
with the acorn-to-oak tree scenario. It is just as true in cases involving less radical, but
nonetheless real changes, as in the growth, maturity, and aging of an animal. What does
it mean to say that something is the same entity, if its changes materially? In other
words, material change raises for Thomas’s metaphysics the question how can one speak
of designated matter being part of the essence of a primary being, if the matter changes
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over time – not just its shape, but the actual material stuff that is involved in its essential
existence.27 This is the question of diachronic identity.
Aquinas addresses this issue in Summa contra Gentiles in a passage that is
concerned with how to explain the Christian doctrine of the continuing identity of
persons upon the “resurrection” from the dead. He argues there that the answer starts
with a metaphysical, rather than a theological one.
In a man's body while he lives, there are not always the same parts in respect of
matter, but only in respect of species. In respect of matter there is a flux and
reflux of parts: still that fact does not bar the man's numerical unity from the
beginning to the end of his life. We have an example in a fire, which, while it
goes on burning, is called numerically one, because its species remains, though
the wood is burnt out and fresh wood supplied. So it is in the human body: for the
form and species (kind) of the several parts continues unbroken throughout life,
but the matter of the parts is dissolved by the natural heat, and new matter accrues
by nourishment. But the man is not numerically different by the difference of his
component parts at different ages, although it is true that the material composition
of the man at one stage of his life is not his material composition at another. So
then, for numerically the same man to rise again, it is not requisite for all the
material that ever entered into his composition throughout the whole course of his
life to be gathered together and resumed, but just so much of it as suffices to make
up his proper bulk and stature. (Contra Gentiles 4, 81)
Identity across time is not, Aquinas says, dependent upon the specific materia
signata/designata that comprises the primary being at a given moment (at least not in the
case of human beings). Rather, the thing that instantiates and maintains identity in the
face of corporeal difference is the life (anima) that gives to the living entity its proper
operation and its material organization. At issue, for Aquinas, is the question of the
identity of the primary being that has to be considered as a being in act, not an entity with
a static existence. This question could not arise, in Aquinas’s view, for non-living
27

Such a question drove pre-Socratic reflection, as is obvious in Heraclitus’ famous embrace of
the dictum that change is all there is, i.e. that there is no diachronos identity. However, this is an issue that
raised metaphysical concerns among the early modern Rationalists, as well as the Empiricists.

100

entities, because if a statue, for instance, were not always the same matter, it could not be
the same statue. Its identity as that particular statue is tied not only to the form it has but
the specific granite it is chiseled from. That granite shape that is that granite statue.
Living entities pose a different problem, he thought, for the issue of identity.
More than merely a traceable history is needed to maintain a cogent doctrine of
the metaphysical identity of a living entity, for Aquinas. A traceable history could, he
might say, be a nominal, rather than an essential, description. Identity requires – to
borrow Aquinas’s distinction in a different context – a real relation, not a relation of
reason. This realness of the relation is rooted in Aquinas’s understanding, informed by
Aristotle, of the primordial nature of a primary being. Thus, Aquinas conceives of
identity in living beings across material changes as a result of the relationship between
form and matter. The size of a body and some features of its shape, as such, are
accidents. For Thomas, no accidental feature can account for the individuality of its own
subject. Features such as quantity and some shapes result, by his lights, in corporeal
substance by reason of matter. And as was discussed above, prime matter, as an
abstraction, has a relation to shape and size, etc that is resultant, arising from prime
matter’s relation to form.28 Matter is actually necessary a priori (i.e., prime matter) in the
existence of an entity. However, it is only granted dimensions through the organizing
influence of form which makes matter to have concrete existence in a primary being.
This process or relation is what Aquinas refers to as "inseparable concomitants that
determine it in time and place.” 29

28
29

(De Nat. Mat., iv).
(De Princip. Individ.).
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Earlier in this chapter we discussed the semantic changes Aquinas embraced
regarding the dimensions of materia designata. This change and its import are now seen
for the importance they have in his metaphysics of essential identity. He dropped the
Avincennian notion of ‘determined dimensions’ for that of ‘undetermined dimensions’.
In his later works he discusses the identity of a primary being qua materially in terms of
its matter being "individuated by indeterminate dimensions preunderstood in it.”30 The
substantial form that grants the dimensional quality of a primary being in material terms
is the explanation of the reality we recognize in individual entities, i.e. that an individual
can vary in dimension without losing its identity. A propensity to sustain its
organization, even through material changes, is granted to the primary being through the
principle of its substantial form.
It is this same substantial form that can arrange all the various material particulars
of a living entity into a singular being is, for example, the various bodily parts that makeup the human body: soft tissue, blood, bone, mucous, as well as heart, lungs, stomach,
and brain, etc. In an argument to establish that Christ had to have a human soul, Aquinas
indicates that the soul as the substantial form of the human person is what makes the
human body to be human in all its parts functioning together. “For flesh and the other
parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are
no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9;
Metaph. vii, 34).” (Summa III, Q 4, a 3, reply)
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Only one substantial form
Just as Thomas insisted in his more mature teaching that an ens is has an essentia
that is a singular, incommunicable reality, so he came to argue that each ens is made to be
the essence that it is because the materia signata is organized with its proper operations
by one substantial form.31 He rejected the view of some of his time held regarding the
nature of composite substances, namely that each composite substance had a plurality of
organizing substantial forms that organized its physical existence. The concern that
shaped his thinking in this regard had, once again, to do with the concept of essence and
the attendant notion of the definition of a being. His reasoned conclusion was that the
plurality doctrine undercut the identity of a substance. Whereas many of his day argued
that forma corporeitatis is the “first act” that makes prime matter to be a specific
organized material entity that could then be receptive of further “perfecting” – or clearly
defining – forms, Aquinas viewed this as a concept fraught with philosophical confusion.
Contesting the coherence of the plurality doctrine, he asserts in the Summa:
If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite
impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be
made clear by three different reasons.
In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were
several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing
has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity;
and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely
one; as, for instance, "a white man." If, therefore, man were 'living' by one form,
the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and "man" by
another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one.
Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of
31

In his early Commentary of the Sentences (2, 18, I, 2) he accepts the standard theory of forma
corporeitatis as the first substantial form in a corporeal entity that then includes other forms. However, in
Summa Theologica 1 a. 47, reply 1 his rejection of this idea is indubitable. “The natural agent acts by the
form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only.”
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an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not
absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls
in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"– that is, what makes
them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather
does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. (Summa I a, Q
76, a 3, reply)
The crux of Thomas’s argument here involves how a substance can be understood
to be identical to all that it is qua substance. For us to conceive of a poly-formal
specification to be involved in the make-up of entities would require us to deny, Aquinas
thought, the absolute oneness of identity in each of those entities. So, he continues in his
argument for singularity of the formal principle.
If we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it
is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of
the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one
another – or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second
manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both
of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is predicated of man
essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal,
but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal
and man. . . . (Summa I a, Q 76, a 3, reply)
With regard to his own earlier acceptance of the idea of forma corporeitatis as the
“first act” that caused the existence of a corporeal substance, Aquinas came to reject this
because he viewed this kind of plurality doctrine as necessarily implying that essential
predicates would have to be considered as subsequent accidental forms. This, he thought,
was logically incoherent. So, he rejected the doctrine of plurality, with its ideas about a
forma corporeitatis as the instantiator of the corporeal essence, which would then receive
or accrue subsequent forms as hoc aliquid in actu (a specific already existing thing). For
Aquinas, only the first form – the most basic organizing principle – could be considered
to be the substantial form. He held this on the basis of his views about the essence of
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things. The essence of an entity is given to it, he argued, at the same moment that its
substantiality (the character of being (esse) a substance) is made actual.32 Aquinas was
convinced that without this idea of a unitary substantial form that is the single organizing
principle of a corporeal substance, one could not maintain the strict identity of things qua
their inherent natures and specific identity. Such a strict way of construing the function of
substantial form does not, however, mean that many features cannot be true of an entity.
Consider what he says in De Ente:
In the genus of substance we give the name ‘body’ to that which has a nature such
that three dimensions can be counted in it; but these three determined dimensions
themselves are a body in the genus of quantity. It does happen that something
having one perfection may also possess a further perfection, as is evident in man,
who has a sensitive nature and, besides this, an intellectual nature. So, too, over
and above the perfection of have in a form such that three dimensions can be
designated in it, another perfection can be added, such as life, or something of the
kind. (De Ente 2 [6])
This statement, taken by itself, would fit, it would seem, with a pluralistic metaphysics of
forms in individuals. However, Aquinas qualifies what he has in mind when he says a
few lines later:
The soul [anima – that which makes alive in a certain way] is not a form different
from that which gives to the thing three determined dimensions. That is why,
when we said that a body is that which has such a form as allows the
determination of three dimensions in it, we understood this to mean any form
whatsoever: animality, stones, or any other form. In this way the form of animal
is implicitly contained in the form of body, inasmuch as body is its genus. And
such also is the relation of animal to man. (De Ente 2 [7])
The background of this discussion is the view that there are a hierarchy of forms
in which the “higher” forms assume the aspects of those that fall under them and give to
those forms a particular kind of expression. For example, humans considered as those
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beings who are what one might call physical rationality or rational bodies are made what
they are by the union of the single form humanity with materia designate/ signata.
Humanity as a species form has as its specific difference rationality, in Aquinas’s view.
This specific difference, however, is a difference that entails a number of other realities,
since humans are essentially an animal part of the corporeal world. So, humanity – both
definitionally and existentially – assumes the following formal features: 1) life, which
Aquinas sees as a fundamental, rather than an emergent phenomenon; 2) a capacity,
therefore, for sensory engagement with the world; 3) growth and mobility; but the
overarching reality that is involved in all of these features is 4) rationality. On this basis
Aquinas describes the singularity of form that makes humans to be human. On different
level of analysis, the same kind of discriminations can be made of other non-human
animals; they merely lack rationality. The same analysis can even apply to botanical life;
and to a much lesser extent to non-living physical things. The crux of the issue and its
implications in Aquinas’s metaphysics is that a single organizing principle accounts for
all the essential attributes that one might discover to be a part of the nature of a primary
substance. This principle is its substantial form. As was observed earlier in this chapter,
by analyzing the whole of the world and its particulars in terms of hylomorphism, with its
attendant polar corollaries act/potency, form/matter, species/individual, et al., Aquinas
came to conclude that hylomorphism implies a sense of composition in non-necessary
beings that is the most fundamental constitutive distinction of all in those non-necessary
beings.
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Esse and “participating” essentiae
The distinction posited in the title of his work De Ente et Essentia is a necessary
differentiation, Thomas argues, between what a thing is and that it, in fact, has existence
This concept is developed even further in the Summa. In a passage dealing with the
“simplicity” of God, he argues as follows regarding the dependent nature of essences.
First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the
constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies
the species– as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man– and is caused by the
constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent– as heat is caused
in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this
existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential
principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential
constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence,
if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its
essence, must have its existence caused by another. . . .
Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness
and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality,
as actuality to potentiality.
Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by
participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by
participation. (Summa I, a, 3, 4, reply)
In Aquinas’s view, a thing simply is its essentia. However, no essence can be said to be
its own esse, i.e. the existence that it has.
The essence of a thing is what it is as itself, hence the absurdity of considering the
essence to be something other than the thing itself. “Because we use the term ‘a being’
absolutely and primarily of substances, and secondarily and with qualification of
accidents, it follows that essence is in substances truly and properly. . . .” (De Ente 1 [5])
To conceive the essence of a natural substance or ordinary particular to be something
besides its own identity as a substance, Aquinas contends, would be to think of the
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essence-substance relationship in terms analogous to the relationship between substance
and accident in Aristotelian metaphysics. But the fact that a thing actually has existence
(or its “act” of existing) is different from the essence that it is. Such a medieval way of
stating the relationship between the activity of existing and the factual essence that the
thing is qua its identity might strike some as odd. So, we must look at what Aquinas
means when he says that a being is not its own act of being.
Aristotle’s contribution to Aquinas’s thought is well established, but in the matter
of the relationship between essence and existence Aquinas moved well beyond
Aristotle’s views. Gilson has noted that for Aristotle the demonstration of the truth of an
essential definition was the same as demonstrating its being, its reality or existence as an
essence. The Stagirite analyzes this relationship as follows in the Prior Analytics:
The being (existence) of anything as fact is a matter for demonstration, and this is
the actual procedure of the sciences, for the geometer assumes the meaning of the
word triangle, but that it is possessed of some attributes he proves. What is it then
that we shall prove in defining essential nature? Triangle? In that case a man will
know by definition what a thing’s nature is without knowing it exists. But that is
impossible.33
Because Aristotle conceived of the universe as necessary and eternal, he drew no
distinctions between essence and existence as metaphysical principles. Since the
demonstration of fact about an entity or state of affairs was, by Aristotle’s lights, the
result of knowing the cause(s), all statements about the truth of an essence had to be
statements about its actual being. His epistemological commitments about how we know
things (rejecting Platonic idealism) shaped his ontology, and his ontology gave rise to his
logic. Joseph Owens comments about Aristotle’s intertwining of logic and metaphysics:
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“To ask whether the moon is eclipsed or not, is . . . precisely the same as asking whether
A (i.e., the eclipse) has a defining condition (logos), and if this condition actually exists,
we assert that A also actually exists.”34 So, in Aristotle’s account of the relationship
between essence and existence, the relationship is one of identity: a thing exists as what
it is, because it is.
Whereas Aristotle was not (apparently) concerned with the act of being
(existing) that a thing evinces, in the sense that this “act” contingently applies to the
essential concept of the thing, Aquinas saw it as the most fundamental of all
relationships. For the Greek logician, a contingent relationship would be a per accidens
relationship. He was “dealing with the universal and necessary connections between the
elements of definition and demonstration.”35 In Aristotle’s view, the radical distinction
between Being and non-Being did not allow Aquinas’s later question to arise. But for
Aquinas, the issues that attended the Aristotelian doctrine of potency and act implied the
necessity to examine the distinction between esse (Being) and essentia (Essence). An
essence, he argued, entails, the possibility of its existence, but it does entail the fact of its
existence. In De Ente he follows Avicenna’s insights.
Whatever does not belong to the notion of an essence or quiddity comes from
without and enters into composition with the essence, for no essence is intelligible
without its parts [the form and matter that make it exist as real]. Now, every
essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being known of its
existing. I can know what a man or a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it
exists in reality. From this it is clear that the act of existing is other than essence
or quiddity, unless, perhaps, there is a being whose quiddity is the very act of
existing. And there can be only one such being, the First Being.36
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What this does not mean, for Aquinas, however, is that existence is added to an
essence, such that the fact of a thing’s reality is in someway accidental to the thing that it
is. For when Aquinas argues that a thing’s essence is identical with it, and that the only
things that really exist in themselves are primary beings or substances, this implies that
existence and essence in a thing are not separable when one is considering the thing itself.
In other words, a being is a being only because it has being (esse). His metaphysics
require that esse be understood as the highest intrinsic principle of the being (esse) of a
primary being (ens). To understand this aspect of Aquinas we need to consider his view
of how a thing can come to exist in the first place.
In the Summa Theologica Thomas Aquinas famously argues for the existence of
God. 37 The “Third Way” is his expression of the distinction between essence and
existence in terms of a demonstration of the existence of a First Cause, or Being, that is
the source of all other beings.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found
to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not
to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not
to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one
time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now
there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins
to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in
existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and
thus even now nothing would be in existence– which is absurd. Therefore, not all
beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which
is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another,
or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have
their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient
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Brian Davies has noted that the “existence argument” is granted special emphasis in Aquinas’
philosophy as a demonstration of God’s reality. “In appears again and again in his writings, and it is often
presupposed in contexts where it is not given explicitly. It is fleshed out in De potential 7 and Summa
contra Gentiles, 1. 22, and 2. 52. But it is particularly concisely stated in Summa Theologiae, I a. 65. 1.
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causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of
itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in
others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. (Summa I a, 2, 3, reply)
The import of Aquinas’s argument is that some Being, by which he means some
activity of existing, that is not dependent upon anything else must be that upon which all
other entities depend, not for their instantiation alone, but for their very reality.
If things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that
agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence
whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be
that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different
bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common
to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle
of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether
they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. (Summa I a, 65, 1, reply)
In other words, there is some active condition or substance, understood in the
widest possible terms, upon which all else depends.38 What this implies, however, is that
each being exists only if it participates in Being as the most proper principle of its
essence as a being. On the basis of this reasoning – plus the additional conclusion that
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It falls outside the scope of this dissertation to deal with the various objections that have been
proffered as refutations of this argument for the existence of God. It should be noted, however, that
Aquinas is not here arguing for a sequential chain of causes back to a cause that is the very first cause in the
chain. Such a notion would not let him posit a truly First and necessary cause. Rather, he is arguing here
that the existence of any particular and obviously contingent being is dependent for its existence upon a
prior condition. Also, any contingent chain of events or beings can exist only if some prior condition is the
ground upon which the capacity for existence evidenced by that chain of contingent events or beings
depends. Hence, some foundational something must be posited as the metaphysically prior condition or
state in which other things exist via participation. Hence, when he argues above that “we cannot but
postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another,
but rather causing in others their necessity,” he is establishing that something has to be thought of as the
foundational point of reference. This is not unlike, it seems to me, Spinoza’s argument that the one
Substance exists in itself and all other things exist in this Substance as temporal, even if logically necessary
in their temporality, modes. Of course, Spinoza’s method of demonstration is “geometrical”, i.e., a priori.
Aquinas’ proceeds a posteriori from the beings encountered in the world and the world as it is given to us
in experience. The conclusion that Aquinas draws above that a necessary prior condition all men call God
is his endeavor to demonstrate that Christian belief in God is not irrational. We can demonstrate the
philosophical appropriateness of introducing God-language into metaphysical discussion, Aquinas would
argue, even if we cannot establish a knock-down proof of the Christian God. Spinoza would have agreed.
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God must be defined as self-subsisting39 (not existing in anything else) – Aquinas puts
forth the following conclusion about the relationship between God and all beings:
It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is
found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs
essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (3, 4)
when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting
Being; and also it was shown (11, 3,4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if
whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by
its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified
by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused
by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly. (Summa I a, Q 44, a 1,
reply)
This means, among other things, for Aquinas, that only God can create; and the
notion of creation is a profoundly unique idea.
To create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be
reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most
universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and
most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii)
that "neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works
by divine operation." Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being,
belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God
alone. (Summa I a, 44, 5, reply)
If one adds to this notion Aquinas’s earlier insistence that all that has being does
so by participation in some principle that is the act of Being simply, then we can see that
in Aquinas view the act of creation is not a reference point in the past – i.e. the starting
point at the beginning of a chain of events. Rather, the idea of creation entails that all
creatures (primary beings, forms and matter, prime and designated, as the principles of
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being, all specific essences, the laws of nature, mathematical principles, spiritual beings,
etc) exist in some way as a ‘participating’ expression of God’s own act of Being.
Because God is “simple” and not composite, Aquinas would contend that God’s act of
Being just is identical to God’s essence. Brian Davies has noted about Aquinas’s thought
on this point that “This means that all things depend upon God for their continued
existence. In saying that God is the Creator of something, Aquinas is not just saying that
God just got it going at some time past. He means that God sustains being. . . . the
conservation of things is, for Aquinas, closely related to their first coming into being.
Both depend upon God’s activity.” 40
What this does not mean, for Aquinas, is that the things so created and
participating in God’s act of Being are God properly considered. Rather, things exist in a
way that is distinguishable from God’s own essence as Being itself. They exist, however,
only because God allows them to partake of God’s own existence, without being divine
themselves by association.
God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as
an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to
that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in
Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since
God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as
to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only
when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is
caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as
long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of
being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all
things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown
above (7, 1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. (Summa I
a, 8, 1, reply)
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It should be reiterated here that for Aquinas God is simple not composite in any
way. This means that God’s acts as agent are ultimately not separate ontologically from
God’s being in the way that our acts are separate from our essence. Thus, while the
things themselves have, in themselves, their own identity strictly speaking (their own
essence) they do not have in themselves their own individual act of existing. That can
only be had via God’s presence in them. And this state of dependence would obtain, in
Aquinas’s view, even if the created world were conceived of as eternal.41 In turn, this
view of God’s relationship to creatures is one that notes the distinction (although in a
different way) which Spinoza would later observe between that which exists only in or
through another and that which exists in itself.42
Summary
The doctrine of hylomorphism in Aquinas entails that individual entities have
existence only via participation in the Being of God. Aquinas defines God as Infinite,
Perfect Act that has no potency. However, in recognizing this kind of substantial
dependence for existence, Aquinas argues that the individual entities that participate in
God’s Act of Being cannot be confused with the ultimate identity of God, because as
Being Itself God’s “essence” is not communicable to any single entity that is composite
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Aquinas is willing to entertain the notion that “temporal origin” of the universe is not
demonstrable. However, temporal origin and metaphysical dependence are distinct concepts in his mind.
Cf. Summa Theologica, I a, 46, 2.
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Ethics I, defs. 3 & 5. “By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through
itself; that is, that which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed.
By mode I mean the affections of substance; that is, that which is in something else and which is conceived
through something else.” It is interesting that Aquinas’s view about God’s necessity and the dependence of
all other things for their existence upon the Being of God – not just God’s first instantiation of stuff in
creation – has some similarity to Spinoza’s views. This is not to say that their metaphysics are the same,
but to note another potential point of comparison between Aquinas as a Medieval Christian Scholastic and
the Modern Rationalist.
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in any way. So, participation in God’s existence grants reality to essences (particulars,
both substantial and accidental), but these particulars are always understood to be
something less than God, even when the realm of particulars is taken as a whole. In
Aquinas’s view, even a chain of contingent composites – even an infinite one taken as a
whole -- would not be self-explanatory, or self-causing
Making things essentially what they are, the dynamic interplay of form and
matter creates individual essences, as form gives a proper orientation to the particular
matter that is organized as an ordinary particular (an essentia). So, things that exist via
participation in God’s act of Being, in Aquinas’s metaphysical schema, do so as
irreducibly physical entities. But the principle that grants to them a particular physical
existence cannot be conflated with the material that they are, because the material qua
material does not and cannot be the source of its own organization. This implies that
form is distinct conceptually from designated matter, even if form cannot “exist” apart
from the matter is so designates. The import of this is that form as a principle of
existence is some force that “acts” not merely upon matter (that would be too Platonic)
but acts in concert with matter to constitute, and by participation in God’s act of Being to
cause, a particular essence to be what it is. Matter, by the same lights, must be thought of
as a second principle of existence that is passively there as a cooperating stuff that the
organizing principle, form, establishes as a definable and specific ens.
Only one form, in each ordinary particular, can be conceived of as the
foundational reason that that a thing exists the way that it does. This is the substantial
form. If a thing is a singular essence, then all other “forms” that express themselves in
the individual must be thought of as either accidental or incidental to the organizing
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presence of the substantial form. As examples, consider the color of Socrates hair and
the shape of his body. His hair color can change, but he remains the same. So, the form
of brown can give way to the form of white, as the organizing principles of his hair color
change. However, it is still the hair color of Socrates. Thus, the forms that his hair can
receive qua his hair are dependent upon the substantial form of his Socratieity, i.e. his
actual existence as the singular essence Socrates. The shape of Socrates body might
change, as well. This could be conceived of as the reception of accidents. These
accidental forms do not change the essence of Socrates, even though they are expression
of his actual existence at a particular moment. They are, therefore, incidental in the
dictionary sense that they are minor or casual or subordinate in significance or nature or
occurring as a chance concomitant or consequence. These incidental accidents are
dependent upon Socrates-ness.
However, the shape of Socrates’ body is a different and more complex subject,
metaphysically speaking, in Aquinas’s hylomorphism. It would seem that what Aquinas
refers to as the proper operation of a primary being is intricately tied to the way that it is
organized as a body. And further, the designated material that makes it up is crucial to
the proper operation being fulfilled. In any case, while the identity of an entity is not
simply a nominal matter, but rather the entity is what it is because the body that it is can
be said to function in a certain way. This specific operation happens because the form
that organizes and designates the matter that has been formed into the body in question
causes the physical organism (the body) to be capable of performing certain operations.
Strictly speaking, these functions and operations are not those of either the body or the
form per se. Rather, they are the acts of the particular primary being that is the composite
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“product” of the interplay of the basic forces – matter and form. Maintaining the
particular proper operation particular to it (and its kind), an animated primary being’s
identity as an individual is maintained diachronically in spite of the fact that changes in
the material make-up take place (perhaps many times) over the course of its life.
In this way, Aquinas utilizes Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory to develop his own
theory in important ways that distance him from his Greek predecessor. The distinction
he draws between essence and existence proper finally is a still more radical example of
how he drives the act/potency distinction to do work it did not do for Aristotle. This
distinction may be such an important one that it provides an example of a philosophy that
anticipates some of Spinoza’s arguments about the “oneness of Substance.” Aquinas’s
oneness of Being, in which all things must exist and which must be expressed in all
things has, of course, significant differences from Spinoza’s ontology. However, it is
worth suspending judgment about this matter until we have opportunity to consider
Spinoza’s doctrine in a later chapter.
Now, however, we must turn our attention to an area where many commentators
insist that Aquinas parts company with Aristotle in a fundamental way; a way that some
think is incoherent. This is the conception that Aquinas’s develops that sees the human
soul qua form as not only a substantial form of the body, but that claims that we must
think of the human soul is itself a subsistent feature of the world.43 As we shall examine
in the next chapter, the distinctions that Aquinas draws between from and matter and
essence come together in his focus, regarding the relationship between mind and body, on
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the concept person – “an individual entity of a rational nature.” This is the crucial point
in understanding Aquinas’s real doctrine of mind-body identity. As we shall see, he
would perhaps have understood what Spinoza meant when he said that “mind and body
are one and the same thing; conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the
attribute of extension.”44
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Chapter 4
Mind-Body Identity in Aquinas:
On Being Composite and Being One

In this chapter we turn our attention toward the issue that directly concerns the
thesis of this dissertation. We will look at Aquinas’s doctrine of the unity of a human
being’s existence and indicate how his hylomorphism is a kind of “identity theory”
regarding the relationship between mind and body. Hylomorphism allows him to think of
the mind and body as dual aspects of a single entity, and therefore, identical as that
existent thing, but described in distinct ways. This crucial analysis will lay an important
foundation for our consideration in chapter five of Spinoza’s own metaphysics. There we
shall endeavor to show how his doctrine of mind body can be helpfully interpreted as a
post-Cartesian expression of a Thomistic perspective. This claim does not entail any
dependence of Spinoza upon Thomism rather it simply marks a striking similarity. While
the language in which Aquinas and Spinoza wrote was the same, Latin, the philosophical
terminology that they utilize is different, reflecting the contexts in which they lived and
thought. Differences notwithstanding, it will be argued in the next chapter that
Aquinas’s way of seeing the issues involved, provides us with a helpful interpretive
schema for understanding Spinoza’s own cryptic statements describing the mind and
body as “one and the same thing, considered under two distinct modes.” This will allow
us to address the much-discussed issues surrounding various interpretations of Spinoza’s
theory of mind-body identity.
It is hoped that we might be able to find a better way of understanding Spinoza’s
own doctrine in the light of Aquinas’s and, therefore, advance somewhat in our
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understanding of the great modern rationalist’s concepts. But, before we begin to suggest
how looking backward in time could help us understand Spinoza, let us look to Aquinas’s
own metaphysical position.
Interpretive difficulties in Aquinas’s theory
Aquinas’s metaphysical theory on the nature of man is a challenge for his
interpreters. Parts of his doctrine are particularly difficult. He claims, for example, that
the soul is both a substantial form and subsistent in its own right, that is, that the soul is
both a principle that grants certain form and function to the human body and also itself
thing-like and having its own subsistence, which he argues means that the soul is able to
survive the death of the body it has formed and enabled to function. Aquinas’s
articulation of this doctrine presents many contemporary readers with the challenge to
understand what he could possibly mean – and not just by Aristotelian lights – in making
this claim. And, as if this difficulty of understanding his idea of subsistence were not
enough, he also presents other challenges.
A second obstacle to understanding Aquinas is the way that he speaks about the
essence of a human being as soul and body in union. In particular, he describes the
metaphysical status of human beings in two different ways which seem mutually
exclusive, rather than complementary. Gyula Klima sets out in a very concise fashion
what is at stake in the tensions that Aquinas’s doctrine of soul-body unity presents to his
interpreters.1 Regarding the Angelic Doctor’s descriptions of human beings, Klima notes
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The following analysis is indebted to Klima for pointing out the semantic difficulties in
Aquinas’s theory, especially Klima’s essay “Man = Body + Soul: Aquinas’s Arithmetic of Human
Nature,” Philosophical Studies in Religion, Metaphysics, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Heikki
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that Aquinas says both that a particular human being is a specific kind of body – a
rational, sensing, and living corporeal entity – and that a human being is a composite
being that consists of a soul united to a body. These two descriptions will not co-exist
easily, at least at first glance, Klima observes, because to be something (a body) is not the
same thing as consisting of something as a part of one’s being. Indeed, by this second
definition the whole human being cannot simply be this body, because a part, no matter
how integral it is to the whole, cannot be the same as the whole. But, this confusion is
only part of the challenge an Aquinas interpreter faces.
Furthermore, when contemporary readers of Aquinas consider his doctrine of the
soul that posits the rational soul as is the one and only substantial form of the human
body, it is difficult to understand, in contemporary terms, what this might mean.
Aquinas’s argument in the Summa insists that there is only one soul and one substantial
form of human existence – the rational anima. So he concludes in I a, Q 76, a 4, ad 1:
“And so it is said that the soul is the actuation of a body and so on, meaning that due to
the soul it is a body and is organic and has power to live.”2 This was in answer to an
objection that contended, against the single-form theory of Aquinas, that the life when
considered as an activity of a living body should be judged to be something over and
above the body that is alive (a kind of supervenience). Hence, a third question arises for
Aquinas’s hylomorphism as to how the same form could be both the essential cause of
the animality of a human being (the life) as well as the formative principle that gives
spatiality to the organization of the human body. In much contemporary metaphysical
Kirjavainen, ed. Timo Koistinen and Tommi Lehtonen, (Helsinki: Luther Agricola-Society, 1997), 179 –
197.
2
My emphasis.
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thought, the doctrine of supervenience is the preferred way of envisioning the
relationship between the presence of life and the chemical and atomic structure of the
bodies of living things. Hence, the doctrine of supervenience would describe the
organization of the material body as sufficiently complex to allow life to supervene or
emerge epiphenomenally. This means (to translate it out of medieval terms) that
contemporary scientific paradigms consider the material make-up of a living being to be
one thing and the presence of life which makes the living being alive another thing. Even
in Aquinas’s own day, the pluralists, who contended that there were distinct souls that
accounted for the organization of the body and the presence of sensory life, had their own
version of supervenience. But even more critical for the purposes of this dissertation is
the further Thomistic assertion that a human being’s humanness is the result of the very
same form that makes him be an animal in the first place. For the typical supervenience
theories in science and philosophy in contemporary thought, this way of construing the
issue is challenging to understand.
Here a fourth hurdle is encountered. While he asserts the unity and singularity of
form in a human being’s existence, because a human being has a single essence,
Aquinas’s articulation of this doctrine is misleading, at least apart from a careful analysis
of what he is actually saying. Aquinas seems to hold that the essence of a human being
and the soul of a human being are not actually the same thing. Again, Klima gives a
good description of the challenge that a modern commentary on Aquinas must deal with,
one that it seems might run afoul of the metaphysical essentialism that hylomorphism
entails.
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Aquinas also argues that a man’s humanity or quiddity is what he calls the ‘form
of the whole’ [forma totius], as opposed to the “form of the part” [forma partis],
which he identifies as the soul, and the form of the whole differs from the form of
the part because the form of the whole contains both matter and form. So the
form of the whole, the quiddity of man, contains the soul as its part, so it
obviously cannot be the same as the soul. But if it is not the same as the soul, and
yet it is a form of the human being, and it is clearly not an accidental form, then it
seems that we have at least two substantial forms here, one of which is a part of
the other, and which, besides the form of the part, also contains matter!3
Klima’s observations, outlined above, only suggest a part of the difficulty faced
by anyone who wants to take Thomistic metaphysics seriously. Other of Aquinas’s
formulations, which at times seem to conflate the soul (anima) and the intellect
(intellectus) or mind (mens), introduce a different kind of confusion into the mix.
Making things even murkier, Aquinas argues that we can say that intellect and anima are
both principles by which a living human being has biological “life.” His discussion in
the Reply of question 76, article 1, of the Summa, regarding the nature of anima as the
life-giving and the intellectual principle in human beings, brings out the importance of
carefully reading what he says there:
The intellect, as the source of intellectual activity, is the form of the human body.
. . And the reason for this is that what a thing actually does depends on what it
actually has to give; a thing acts precisely by virtue of its actuancy. Now it is
obvious that the soul [anima] is the prime endowment by virtue of which a body
has life [vivo]. Life [vita] manifests its presence through different activities at
different levels, but the soul is the ultimate principle by which we conduct every
one of life’s activities; the soul is the ultimate motive factor behind nutrition,
sensation and movement from place to place, and the same holds true of the act of
understanding. So that this prime factor in intellectual activity, whether we call it
mind [intellectus] or intellectual soul [anima intellectiva], is the formative
principle of the body [forma corporis]. . .
Should anyone wish to maintain that the intellective soul is not the form of the
body, he would have to find some way of making the act of understanding an act
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of this particular person. For each is conscious that it is he himself that
understands. . . So we must either say that Socrates understands through his whole
self, as Plato held, saying that man is an intellective soul, or else we must say that
the understanding is a part of Socrates. Now the first of these is untenable. . . on
the grounds that one and the same man perceives himself both to understand and
to have sensations. Yet sensation involves the body, so that the body must be said
to be part of man. It remains, therefore, that the intellect whereby Socrates
understands is a part of Socrates, in such wise that the intellect is in some way
united to the body of Socrates. 4
In this passage, Aquinas certainly seems to be saying that intellect (intellectus) -which he acknowledges is a mental activity -- is the actual form of the human body. This
way of speaking seems to imply that mental activity is something more than an activity.
While it would be clear how mental activity could be a feature of a human being, it is far
from clear exactly how an act in which the human being engages could also be described
as the form that enables the same human being to perform the activity of knowing. At the
very least it is unclear how Aquinas could employ this kind of description, if he is indeed
serious about being an Aristotelian, rather than a strict Augustinian Platonist. Even if one
allows for what we saw in chapter three, that a form is logically and in some sense
ontologically distinct from the body it informs (which gives the form actual existence
rather than metaphysical subsistence), we can still ask how it could be that the intellect
could be thought of as a subsisting and substantial form. How could an activity of
knowing ever be conceived of as a substantial form (much less a subsisting one), unless
one embraces a Platonic view of mental activity?
Our dilemma grows more confounding, because in this very same passage he
contends that “the understanding is a part” of the human knower’s existence. This way
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of putting the matter would seem to imply the same thing that Klima described in terms
of the soul generally, namely, that the intellect is (comparable to) a forma partis. Aquinas
insists that the fullness of the act of knowing in sensation and intellect involves, in some
way, the body, which is informed presumably by the very “intellect” which is an activity
of the knower qua bodily. Hence we have a description of the intellect as simultaneously
both a result of the forma totius -- or soul-body union – and at the same time the
“formative principle” of the very same union.
One can survey ever so briefly the varying commentaries and interpretations on
Aquinas to see the conflict that this kind of locution creates. Aquinas’s interpreters have
provided us with quite disparate readings of the metaphysical implications that his
doctrine has for understanding the nature of human beings. On the one hand there are
those who focus on Aquinas’s contention that intellect is the activity of an embodied
knower. Peter Geach is an excellent example of this reading of Aquinas. He argues that
if we take the whole of Aquinas’s treatment of human beings into consideration (which
the passage we have been considering only outlines) we must see Aquinas’s view of
human beings in very physicalist terms. Aquinas, according to Geach, views a human
being as “an animal, an animal is a body; so [a human being] is a body, not a body plus
something else.”5 Contrary to such a reading, Anton Pegis interprets Aquinas’s doctrine
as a refutation of Aristotle’s description of a human being is a physical substance-- a
body formed by the soul as its enabling principle. Aquinas instead prefers, Pegis argues,
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Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 98.
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to describe a human being as an “incarnated intellect.”6 Obviously, Pegis is focused on
the terms of Aquinas’s doctrine that highlight the “intellect” itself as a form.
At least one scholar has posited an even more radical interpretation of Aquinas’s
ostensibly bifurcated rhetoric about the nature of human beings. Linda Jenks suggests a
reading of Aquinas that goes beyond either Geach’s or Pegis’s appraisals, but hers is one
that makes Aquinas even more difficult for contemporary readers to consider seriously.
In her view, as a consequence of his account of the uniqueness of the human soul qua
form, “Aquinas assigns man a correspondingly unique ontological status which is
intermediate between spiritual and corporeal creation.”7 It is not the focus of this
dissertation to critique Geach or Pegis or Jenks in the various readings they give of
Aquinas. Yet, in what follows in the rest of this chapter it will become obvious that
choosing between Geach’s “physicalist” Aquinas, Pegis’s “intellectualist” Aquinas or
Jenk’s “intermediate” Aquinas is unnecessary, when one sees the import of his
hylomorphism and the doctrine of mind-body “identity” that follows from it.
Because of interpretive issues such as those discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, some conclude that Aquinas’s metaphysical scheme regarding human beings
is woefully confused. So, getting clear about Aquinas’s doctrine and its implications is
crucial if we are to make sense of Aquinas’s doctrine as a possible ally in interpreting
Spinoza’s own difficult doctrine. Hence, in this chapter we must wrestle with what
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7
Linda P. Jenks in Aquinas On the Soul: Substantial Form and Subsistent Entity, (Ph. D. diss.
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exactly Aquinas’s metaphysics regarding human beings actually entails. The question to
be addressed is whether or not we can make sense of his theory of mind-body. To do so
we must be demonstrate that Aquinas can be accurately designated as one who holds a
type of dual-aspect identity theory. And of course, this analysis is not important just in
order to understand him adequately, but also to set the stage for the next chapter of this
project, in which we will suggest how Spinoza’s own doctrine of mind and body as “one
and the same thing” can be understood in light of Aquinas’s metaphysical doctrine of
human nature. To those ends we will specifically consider five crucial metaphysical
claims that Aquinas defends. We will first consider them following, in order.
(1)

A human being is unitary in essence, yet composite.

(2)

The soul is rightly called “intellect” or “mind.”

(3)

The composite of soul and body is rightly called a “person,” which is a
foundational metaphysical concept.

(4)

A human being has an essential unity.

(5)

The human soul can survive the bodily death of a human person.

The first four of these will be treated in this chapter. The fifth will be discussed in the last
chapter where we take up at the same time Spinoza’s doctrine on the same issue:
As we analyze Aquinas’s attempts to be an Aristotelian as a Christian
philosopher, we shall be in a much better position to understand both why he believes -and how he arrives at that belief -- that every human being who exists in the world does
so as a fundamentally psycho-physical singularity. Also, we shall see why, in his view,
neither of the aspects of this being can be subsumed by the other as we attempt to
describe them; neither can be reduced into terms that describe the states of the other, i.e.
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mind cannot be described in physical terms simply. Again, and as Spinoza would say
later of the essence of human existence and as Aquinas could possibly concur (even if he
would reject much of the former’s ontological commitments): the mind and the body are
one and the same thing, conceived of in distinct modes.

It is precisely this kind of unity,

I contend, Aquinas is seeking to articulate in his “Treatise on Man” in Summa
Theologiae.8
Human “being” – soul and body composite
In question 76 of the Summa, Aquinas takes up directly the question of human
beings as comprised of the union of soul and body. There he is forthright in his
contention that there is only one soul (essence-giving principle) that is associated with the
animated human body, namely, the “intellectual soul.” Aquinas’s main focus in this
passage is to establish that the activity of rational living is the form of a human being’s
life. Since that activity is the definition of a human being, a human being is a rational
animal. This definition provides the foundation upon which Aquinas built his argument
against the pluralists of his day. The medieval pluralists argued that there must be more
than one form that accounts for human existence, in order to account for the various
“powers” that human beings evidence, namely, growth, locomotion, sensation, and
reason. Aquinas contended that on Aristotelian terms there could really only be a single
form that would be the principle at work in the material existence of a human being,

8

Timothy Suttor describes Aquinas’s treatise on man as one of the three “highly technical”
treatises that shaped the theoretical orientation of western culture. The other two are Aristotle’s Categories
and Boethius’s theological works. “How original was it,” Suttor asks. “One is struck by how little he
repeated his predecessors, and how radically he reorganized the material they had left. . .” Thomas
Aquinas: Summa Theologiae (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970), xv – xvi.
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making that human being to be what he is essentially and not accidentally. Any other
way of reasoning about the essential nature of a human being, he argued, would force us
to conceive that the definitional elements in question – rationality and animality – only
exist accidentally in the essence of a human being. That would, he believed, mean that
there the essential definition of a human being, as both rational and animal – or mental
and biological irreducibly -- would have to be sacrificed; but these dual aspects are, he
argued, both indubitable and irreducible as essential features of human existence.
In the Summa Q 75, a 1, reply, we can glimpse Thomas’s logic on this matter. He
is arguing for the unitary nature of a human being, and asserts:
The nature of a specific type includes whatever its strict definition includes, and
in things of the physical world [rebus naturalibus] this means not only form, but
form and matter. Thus materiality is part of the specific type in physical natures;
not this determinate matter here, which individuates a thing, but materiality in
general. For as it belong to the very conception of ‘this man’ that he have this
soul and this flesh and bone, so it belongs to the very conception of ‘man’ that he
have soul, flesh and bone.
But we could [take the statement “the soul is the man”] to mean that “this soul” is
“this man”. And this indeed could be maintained, if we postulated that the
activity of the sense-soul belonged to it apart from the body. For all the activities
attributed to a man would then be attributable to the soul. For that is a thing
which does what the thing does, and so that is man which does what man does.
But it has been shown [in article 3 of this same question] that sensation is not an
activity of the soul alone. Sensing is an activity of the whole man, even though it
is not peculiar to man [since all animals have sensation]. And hence it is plain
that man is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body. It was because Plato
held that sensation belonged to the soul as such that he could speak of man as a
soul using a body.9
Once he has argued for this conception as the definition – “compound of soul and
body” – of being human, he is then able to begin to present his argument that

9

In this passage Aquinas is addressing the critical issue that was much discussed in his day
regarding the relationship between specific entities and universals.
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demonstrates how the soul, therefore, only a part of a human being, rather than, ala some
Platonistic positions, that it is most essentially the man. The soul is “part” of Socrates
only in the sense that Socrates is not his soul, for “man is no mere soul, but a compound
of soul and body.” To be a human being is to be a compound entity, but it is nonetheless
to be a singular thing, yet the singularity cannot be attributed to the soul. As belonging to
rebus naturalibus a human being (Socrates) is essentially physical as a particularly
informed and specifically defined entity. The soul of Socrates is what makes the living
“body” of Socrates to be a human body, rather than some other type. Socrates is the
union of the two principles, because the soul is the part of Socrates’ actual essential
existence qua Socrates the rational animal that makes him a human being, insofar as, not
generically but in a very defined way, it causes the matter of his body to take on life.
Socrates’ being alive, rather than inanimate (as his corpse would be after his death), is his
being alive specifically as a human being. One cannot, in Aquinas’s view, legitimately
differentiate the two (his being alive and his being human), except through abstraction
from actual existence. On Aristotelian principles, therefore, Aquinas asserts that the soul
is not Socrates (or any man), but is part of the compound entity. This sets him against the
kind of neo-Platonic view that would claim that the “soul is the man.”10 But, as it might
be better to put the point, the point is simply that the soul is a component of the very
essence, without being the essence, of the existent compound entity in question. This

10

The parallel between neo-Platonic, Augustinian and Cartesian thought is obvious regarding the
question of identity. When the soul is conceived of primarily in terms of consciousness (and therefore
almost strictly equivalent to the mind) the idea that one’s identity is anchored, either primarily, at least, or
exclusively, in the soul is the logical conclusion. However, neither Aquinas nor Spinoza would so conceive
of the soul.
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means that the soul is not the existent man per se but is the feature without which his
existence as a man cannot be.
Aquinas’s arguments in question 76 about the soul’s union with the body are
rooted in Aristotle’s contention that each and every entity has only one substantial form
that makes it what it is. There can be other accidental forms that are associated with a
thing, but as accidents they cannot be part of the definition of the thing. Hence, as
accidents they cannot be considered to be even a part of a things essence. Rather, as
accidents their essence is part of the substance. On the basis of this understanding of the
nature of accidents of substances, Aquinas argues vigorously that the intellectual or
rational soul must be the only form of the human body, since being rational or engaging
in acts of intellect is not something that human beings do in addition to being human; that
would be an accidental relationship to their essence. Being rational is the form of the
actual concrete essence of a human being. If there were, he reasons, some other form that
made them human qua physical that was different from their being human qua rational,
then rationality would be accidental to their humanity. Or the same conclusion would be
reached, if rationality were fundamental to human existence, but being embodied were
only a contingent feature. His reasoning is laid out in the Summa Q 76, a 4, reply. The
form of his argument is, as follows.
1) A thing exists only as a particular concrete expression of a specific kind of
existent essence, not generically.
2) A concrete existent is what it is because of the substantial form that makes it
be what it is.
3) A living entity is the result of an anima that gives it life.
4) The life of the entity is not distinct, in reality, from its essence.
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5) Therefore, there can only be one substantial form/soul in any living entity.
By Aquinas’s lights, one can think about the question of what makes a human
being a human being as follows. If the essence of a human being, by (1), is to be an
animal that has the specific difference qua animal of being intellectual/rational,11 then by
(2 and 3) there is a human anima of each human being which is the form that makes the
being under consideration to be human. It follows, thus, that by (4) the soul that is
productive of rational thought and understanding must be the sole animating principle in
a human being. In his view, it makes no sense to say that, even in a non-temporal, purely
metaphysical sense, humans exist first as physical bodies of a particular type, then as
animals in a generic sense, and only in the last level of analysis as human. Aquinas does
not deny the continuity between human beings and other organisms qua animals, but he
cannot conceive of how one could define the humanity of the human animal in any terms
other than by an essential definition. In other words, human beings do not have any
generic existence qua animal.
To conceive otherwise would run afoul of the Aristotelian in Aquinas, because, as
for Aristotle, what is primary in existence are the individual members of species, not the
species. A genus such as “animal” is a secondary substance, at best, that exists only
because there are organisms that can be called “animals. Hence, for Aquinas, the
animality of a human being is a part of the definition of human being, namely rational
animal, but neither rationality nor animality can be thought of as ontologically prior to
11

The terms intellectual or rational when used by Aquinas as adjective qualifiers of the term
anima have a synonymous use. Hence, I shall use them interchangeably. What he means in either case is
the organizational form or essence of human existence that gives to an individual the quality of being a
rational animal.
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the actual creature (the primary substance) that expresses in the world both animality and
rationality. Any other way of thinking would be, in Aquinas’s view, an abstraction from
actual existence. The only animality that human beings have is always specifically
rational animality. Thomas’s main concern in this analytical position is that we not
attempt to posit any existential or ontological real distinction between the rationality of a
human being and his animality. Following his peripatetic mentor, he concluded that if
one conceived of the distinction between the two as a distinction between ontologically
different substances, a human being’s rationality would be something over and above his
actual, physical existence in the world. He was convinced that, philosophically, we could
neither divorce the rational from the material in human beings.
It cannot be the case, Aquinas contends, that a human being’s rational existence
is something other than his life as a living physical entity.

If rationality and animality

are both essential to the definition of a human being, there could only be, in Aquinas’
view, one sole animating principle of the human creature. To allow for more than one
animating principle (to posit, with the pluralists, a sense-soul that accounts for the
animality and then another soul to account for the rationality) would erode the essential
oneness of a human being’s essential existence. On this basis, Aquinas asserts in the
strongest terms that there can only be what he calls the single “intellectual soul” making a
human both alive and rational in nature simultaneously.
Among other implications, Aquinas’s resolute conviction that there can be only
one anima that makes a human being alive qua rational animal forces the conclusion that
rationality is never something over and above the other features of human life. Rather, in
some way intellect is involved in the power of growth and the power of sense that
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operates in a human being’s life. Hence, the “lower” (in the medieval sense) aspects of
biological life – sensory perception and motive life and growth – have a very specific and
utterly unique manifestation in human life. So, Aquinas says in Q 76, a 4, reply: “We
must affirm that the rational soul alone informs man so as to give him existence, no other
form does so. And just as it contains within its capacities all that the sense-soul and the
nutritive soul contain, so it contains all the more elementary forms and of itself effects
what they effect in other cases.” The act of living rationally gives a distinct “flavoring”
or expression to the other features of the animated (animal) existence of a human being.
This way of thinking about the place of rationality in human existence leads Aquinas to
reject the plurality doctrine and the quasi-supervenience it entails.
The irreducible unity of the definition of humanness with which Aquinas works in
this section of the Summa is further revealed when one considers Aquinas’s dissertation
about how the “intellectual soul” must be understood as only a “part” of some other
entity. In Q 76, a 4, ad 1, he explains what he means by this: “[The soul] is the
activating part of an organic physical body that has the power to live.”12 In asserting
this, Aquinas is saying that something other than the physical elements and principles that
makeup the material body must be posited to account for the fact that the “physical body”
actually has “the power to live.” Matter is not, by Aquinas’s lights, self-organizing,
much less capable of being the sole explanation (cause) of the existence of life in a
particular entity.13 But the matter that is organized to be alive, in the case of a human

12

My emphasis
In so arguing, Aquinas is not suggesting the need for some radically occult explanation, such as
immediate reference to God’s power. His view is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of hylomorphism
which we traced in chapter two of this dissertation, in which the organizational principle that provides the
13
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being, is alive in a very particular way. The life that is being lived is a rational life; or
one could call it living rationality. This intimate connection between rationality and life
produces the Thomistic hylomorphism according to which the intellectual soul is the part
of a human being that operates as the single formal cause of a human being’s humanness.
For Aquinas, there cannot be a plurality of essential causes for the humanness, say, of
Socrates; otherwise Socrates would be many things and not essentially one with himself.
However, if Socrates bears the form of humanness that all other human beings
share, then Thomas must provide an account for Socrates’ individuality. Socrates cannot
exist apart from the form of humanness that gives him life qua Socrates, but he is not
identical with the human anima that makes him human; what makes Socrates to be
“Socrates” in the metaphysical scheme we are considering. Socrates and Plato, according
to Aquinas’s metaphysics, are only distinguished from one another by the fact that the
humanness of the one is present in this arrangement of matter and the humanness of the
other in that arrangement of matter. Hence, the “body” of each individual particular
(Plato and Socrates) is distinct and, therefore, Plato is distinct from Socrates. There is no
other way, in Aquinas’s view, to understand the distinctness, since the essence of
humanity is to be composed of matter and form. They share the form of being human,
hence, in respect to their humanness they do not differ from one another.14 But what
could Aquinas mean by saying that the arrangement of matter makes them individuals?

necessary information to cause matter to be arranged in an appropriate way so as to make life possible is
asserted as a necessary description and an inescapable conclusion.
14
This way of discussing the matter would seem to be entirely consonant with contemporary
science of DNA. The encoded information that humans share is not the thing that makes them distinct from
one another, even if issues of height and pigmentation and other features that are expressed in the physical
make up of a particular human being are also in the DNA information. For, there is no real distinction

135

On the basis of Aristotle’s metaphysical principles, Aquinas argues that Socrates
is made to be an individual, and therefore “Socrates,” by the rational human-making soul
specifically but only insofar as it informs some particular material stuff in the composite
entity “Socrates.” This doctrine is a simply an application of his general theory of matter
as the principle of individuation within species. The spatial dimensions of Socrates’ body
are what individuate Socrates from all other human beings, as well as from all other
entities. In part three of the Summa, Aquinas describes the way that dimensions work in
the individuation of an entity. In III, Q 77, a. 2, while discussing the Eucharist, Aquinas
argues that “dimensive quantity in itself has a certain individuation; we can imagine
many lines of the same kind, but all different because of their position; and this position
is part of the very idea of this quantity. For it is of the very definition of a dimension to
be a quantity having position.”15 What is interesting here is the role that “position” plays
in Aquinas’s account of individuality. As Andrew Payne notes, “Rightly understood
[Aquinas’s account of] the nature of dimensive quantity includes position, so that
whatever has dimensive quantity will also be made of parts having position in relation to
each other and will therefore occupy a determinate place.”16

between the humanness of human beings simply on the level of DNA, since the DNA has a shared “formal”
essence and is, as I have argued, analogous to information. The distinction is, rather, only real when actual
spatial differentiation occurs. An interesting question to pursue, but which is beyond the present focus of
this project, would be whether or not a Thomistic metaphysics or the metaphysics of Duns Scotus, with his
doctrine of the haecceitas more closely approximates the modern science of DNA and the way that the
information encoded gives expression to each specific person’s humanness.
15
For an excellent discussion of Aquinas’s theory of individuation see, Andrew Payne, “Garcia
and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation,” The Thomist 68 (2004): 545 – 575. A substantive criticism
of Aquinas’s doctrine is found in Jorge Gracia, Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics,
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988), 155 ff.
16
Payne, 568.
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One could add as well, I think, that Aquinas’s view of individuation includes the
further notion of being an individual by having particular dimensions that particularize
that individual’s “place” in relation to all other entities in relation to which that
individual exists. This is inherent in the idea of place, especially in light of the argument
presented in the previous quotation, according to which all the lines are individuated from
one another because “of their position.” Hence, the individuality of Socrates, say, is only
ultimately comprehensible regarding the place and position he fills in relation to other
individuals who are also similarly individuated. So, Socrates is made to be “Socrates”
both because matter has received form and because in so receiving form the matter takes
on, (out of its own nature, not that of the form) the “dimensive quantity” of Socrates in
relation to all other material entities.17
Hence, individuals are what exist primarily, but they exist in their ontological
primacy as entities that share in a specific kind of act of being. In the Summa, 1-2, Q 17,
a. 4 he concludes that: “Many individuals that are one in genus or species are many
absolutely speaking [when considered as ordinary particulars], and one with respect to
something, for to be one in genus or species is to be one with respect to reason.”18 This
means that Socrates and Plato can be considered to be “one” kind of thing (human), in a
conceptual sense, but not ontologically.19 Just as every thing that exists only exists as a
specific kind of thing, the only way that specific kinds exist is in the particular thing(s)

17

See chapter three for the discussion of Aquinas’s ideas about signate matter, 93 ff.
My emphasis
19
But as was argued in chapter three that does not mean the existence of the concept is not real.
The existence of the concept is the product of the abstract reasoning powers of a human knower who is
capable of recognizing similarities between ordinary particulars. Such similarities are not nothing, even if
they have no concrete existence except in the ordinary particulars that share the manifested similarities
18
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that exist concretely in the world. In other words, ordinary particulars that are similar to
one another share a common nature. However, Aquinas refuses to think of that nature as
existentially prior to those ordinary particulars, despite the fact that, the individual
character of each of the similar particulars only exist in the form of the specific essence
to which each of them gives expression.
In the section of the Summa just mentioned, Aquinas is attempting to articulate
how things can be conceived of as “being many in some respects and being one in
another.” He utilizes the example of human compositeness in the argument. “. . . in the
genus of natural things [things that exist in the material world], some whole is composed
of matter and form, as man from body and soul, who is one natural being, although he
has a multitude of parts.”20 What Aquinas is arguing for in this Question of the Summa is
fully consistent with the rest of his metaphysical system. He is pointing out that we can
analyze or describe ordinary particular items of our experience from various points of
view, but that this need not deny the ultimate oneness of an entity under consideration.
We can discuss human beings as composite entities comprised of body and soul, and that
would be, analytically speaking, correct. However, for Aquinas that mode of analysis
does not determine the ontological status of a human being as a rational animal. There is,
for him, some absolute standard “according to which the mereological constitution of the
whole is not dependent on us, namely the ontological status of the parts so distinguished
and of the whole thus marked off.”21 “

20
21

My emphasis
Klima, 182.
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Soul” and “body” are terms for the ontological principles of rational animal
existence, according to Aquinas. In their composite unity they instantiate an entity called
a human being. As principles, they are not substances, but are, respectively, active and
passive attributes of being. Soul is the active factor, in that it grants specific kind of
existence to the physical entity that lives because of the union of soul and the matter that
becomes the informed body. The body is the passive dynamic in human existence
because it is only capable of being formed, but it grants particularity and individuality in
its passive capability of being formed. Reference to both of these principle is necessarily
involved in descriptions of the act of being human. Soul, therefore, is not an immaterial,
much less mental, “thing” that exists in its own way and in a unique realm. When
Aquinas says, as quoted above, that the soul is in the body, he means that it is “in” it in
such a way as to be truly one with the body, namely, insofar as it is the very being
(existence) of the body that is a human being and perceived as the source of the specific
material organization of that same being. And yet, the soul can be regarded rightly in
metaphysical analysis in abstraction from the material conditions of the being so
organized.
The essential unity of a human being
The intricacy of Aquinas’s theory that the soul and body are one qua human
person in act (in the Aristotelian sense), is made more obvious when one considers the
reciprocal relationship that exists between the human body and the soul. In his
metaphysical appraisal, not only does the soul establish a body as a particular kind of
essence in act, but as well, only a particular kind of matter can be adequate for expressing
the form of the human anima. Because of the kind of intelligence that a human being

139

exhibits, the human soul must activate matter to become a very particular kind of body.
Hence, not just any matter will do as the receiver of the information by the human anima
gives form (literally) and function to the human body. He describes the reciprocity in I a,
Q 76, a 5, reply.
Since form does not exist for the sake of matter but rather matter for the sake of
form, the form explains the character of the matter, not the other way around.
Now the intellective soul [as he has argued in I, Q 55, a 2] is the lowest grade of
intelligence in the hierarchy of nature, in that it does not have the angelic being’s
inborn knowledge of the truth but has to gather it from quantified things through
sensation. . . . the intellective soul needs the power of sensation as well as the
power of understanding. But there can be no sensation except through a body.
Therefore, the intellective soul has to have a body which is a suitable organ of
sense.
Now all the other senses build on touch. And the organ of touch needs to
embrace contraries within its range, hot and cold, moist and dry and so on, the
things touch comprehends. . . And the more it occupies a sort of middle position
between such contraries, the more touch-perceptive the organ will be. So that the
body to which an intellective soul is joined has to be a compound body occupying
a sort of middle position as regards objects of touch. For this reason man is the
most touch-perceptive of the animals and intelligent men the most touchperceptive of men. For instance, sensitivity and insight go together.
Whether or not Aquinas’s assessment of the relationship between one’s physical
sensitivity and one’s intellectual prowess is acceptable is open to question, but it is clear,
from this passage, that Aquinas is deeply indebted to Aristotle’s claims in the De anima.
Aristotle’s argument in that work regarding the dependence of mental acts upon the
physiological conditions of the body has greatly shaped Aquinas’s philosophical
anthropology. In fact, in his commentary on the De Anima the Angelic Doctor is willing
to acknowledge that human emotions can be described, at least in part, by decidedly
physical categories. For instance, he thinks that Aristotle’s contention that anger is
“inflammation of blood around the heart,” should not be neglected as a part of the
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analysis of what anger itself is. Of course, Aquinas thought that this would not fully
describe the nature of anger and that much of what Aristotle theorized about this matter is
(understandably) undeveloped. Aquinas would presumably not be dismayed by the
discoveries of contemporary brain science, namely, the detection and demonstration of
associations between psychological/mental states and physical events in the brain. More
important for this dissertation, however, it might indeed be the case that he would have at
the very least understood, if not have been able to affirm at least in part, Spinoza’s
argument in Book Three of Ethics that there is a fundamental physical “part” of the very
being of human emotions.
In addressing the pluralist claims of his day, namely that there must be some other
principle that organizes the physical structure of the body besides the rational soul,
Aquinas says that the soul does not merely actuate the body (as Plato might have
insisted), but as the principle of animate existence of the living human being, it is
”included in that which the soul is said to actuate, just as we say that heat actuates
something hot and light something luminous – not as if it would be luminous apart from
the light, but that the light makes it luminous” (Q 76, a 4, ad 1).22 This illustration
entails, what has been stated earlier, that the “intellective soul” is the principle by which a
particular human being lives the organic life of a rational animal. As was discussed
above, the particular kind of body that a human being has is a necessary part of his
existence as a rational animal. As Thomas puts it, “so it is said that the soul is the
actuation of a body and so one, meaning that due to the soul it is a body and is organic
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My emphasis.
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and has power to live. But the first actuation [being a body] has a relation of potentiality
to the second [being organically alive], which we call activity;’ there is no such
potentiality apart from or excluding the soul.”23
The essential unity that Aquinas attributes to a human being is made clearer
elsewhere in this same Question in the Summa. In article 3 Aquinas addresses the
question of whether there are other souls, not simply other forms (principles of biological
organization) besides the “intellectual soul.” Aquinas lays out the objection that he
wishes to address in the fourth objection.
Aristotle says that genus stems from matter, while the differentiating features
stems from form. But rationality, the differentiating feature constituting
humanity, comes from the intellective soul, while man is said to be an animal
because he has a body animated by a sense-soul. Thus the intellectual soul is
related to the body animated by the sense-soul as form to matter. So the
intellectual soul is not the same as the sensitive soul in man, but presupposes it as
the matter it energizes.24
In answering in the negative on this issue, Aquinas sought to overturn a theory of
his day which claimed that a human being was comprised of a plurality of souls
(organizing life-forces), which made intellect a state supervening upon lower organic
states. He answers those who objected to the idea that the “intellectual soul” was the
only source of life in human beings in a way that is crucial for understanding his general
position on the issue of the absolute oneness of body and soul in the singular entity called
a human being. He begins by noting that we can and do make logical distinctions
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Klima, 184.
The assertion that this is a medieval version of supervenience theory is based on the implication
in this argument that the “intellectual” soul needs the “sense-soul” in the same way that form, generally
conceived, needs matter. Hence, the conclusion that the intellectual soul “presupposes” the sense-soul
strikes me as a kind of supervenience doctrine, which contends that the mind supervenes upon an physicalorganic state of affairs that are necessary for, even if not productive of the mental supervenience.
24
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between certain concepts such as sensory life and intellectual activity in human beings.
In his rebuttal, he maintains, however, that the distinctions are logical, not ontological -that human reason actually “can grasp a single existing thing [unum et idem – one and the
same] in a variety of ways.”
His rejection of these distinctions as real divisions of being is based on his
conception of the intellectual soul; he conceived of the reality of souls in the world as
entailing a concept of a hierarchy of life. In Aquinas’s understanding of this issue, every
more complex level of biological life is actuated by an anima that gives these entities not
only the more complex form of its own level but contains, as well, the kind of existence
that the less complex life forms exhibit. Hence, no other “soul” is needed to account for
the why of human existence, because a single organizational force (anima) gives life,
function, a drive to flourish, rational understanding and anything else essential to being a
human being.25
Because the intellective soul contains within its capacities all that the sense-soul
does and more, therefore analysis can look at the sense powers as matter in need
of form. And as this characteristic (soul with sense powers) is common to man
and to other animals, the mind forms the concept of a genus embracing both.
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This particular way of arguing for the substantial unity of entities and insisting that the human
soul was hierarchically capable of subsuming within itself all the powers of the lower vegetative and
sensory soul of plants and animals was thought to be a dangerous innovation by many of his day and
afterward. Coppleston in Aquinas comments about this doctrine’s controversial reception. “It was
combated at a debate in Paris, before the bishop, about 1270, Dominicans and Franciscans, especially the
Franciscan Peckham, accusing St. Thomas of maintaining an opinion which was contrary to the teaching of
the saints, particularly Augustine and Anselm. . . . the chief ground of complaint being that the Thomist
doctrine was unable to explain how the dead body of Christ was the same as the living body, since
according to St. Thomas there is only one substantial form in the human substance and this more, the soul,
is withdrawn at death, other forms being educed out of the potentiality of matter. . . .on March 18th, 1277
{Thomism was condemned] at Oxford, inspired by Robert Kilwardby, O.P., Archbishop of Canterbury, in
which figured among other propositions the unicity of substantial form and the passivity of matter. . . .
Kilwardby’s condemnation was repeated by his successor, the Franscian Peckam, on October 29th, 1284,
though by that time Thomism had been officially approved in the Dominican Order.” Copleston, 153 – 155.
Cf. Suttor, 255.
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This means, in Aquinas’s view, that those who, on the basis of mere ordinary
observation of behavior, posit a plurality of souls really do not fully comprehend the way
that a single human anima provides for complexity of organization in a being who is
essentially one, and only one, in the most basic sense. It is not the case that one needs to
posit a different organizational principle, he argues, to account for various human
capacities. The single rational soul grants the very capacity for sensory life upon which it
is itself dependent in order to be able to reason discursively in the first place. In the
relevant observation of behavior, our minds merely identify distinct operations, rather
than disparate forms of life, in human experience and action. As he puts it in the same
passage : “Those features of the intellective soul which are beyond the power of sense
are seen by the mind as shaping and completing and thus constituting that which makes
man different.”26 By contrast, doctrines involving a pluralistic hierarchy of supervenient
souls go hand in hand with the suggestion that each of them, including the highest, is
something over and above the material nature of human existence. Aquinas could not see
how this would fit the point of the essential definition, “rational animal. The doctrine he
proposed was simpler and more consistent, he thought, only needing to posit a single
informing anima to explain the organizational complexity of a human being. This in turn
leads to a reconciliation of the claims that the soul is “in” the living human being and that
it is at the same time “one and the same” as that being.
Aquinas observes, as a part of his proofs, that the departure of life at the death of
a person was both the end of rationality in that bodily entity and the beginning of the
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My emphasis
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disintegration of the body qua spatial entity. In Aquinas’s mind, just as the initial unity
of soul and body means that rationality is part (in potency, at least) of the nature of the
new entity so in-formed, so in even the most rudimentary forms in the course of the
process of human development, rationality is still part of the definition. That is why the
departure of the intellectual soul results in the cessation of life.
Substantial form enables a thing simply to have existence, so that when it is there
we say the thing is there, and when it is not there we say the thing has
disintegrated. . . . If it were the case that as well as the intellective soul some
other substantial form already existed in the soul’s subject material, so that it
came into something already existing, it would follow that the soul did not give
precisely existence, and was consequently not a substantial form. Its embodiment
would not generate existence nor its departure bring on disintegration simply
speaking, but merely as regards some particular aspect. This is clearly untrue.
We must affirm that the intellective soul informs man so as to give him existence;
no other form does.
There is only one organizational principle that accounts the complexity of the
organization of the human body into a human being. This is the singular human anima
that Aquinas calls the rational soul. By this measure, Aquinas can argue, as he does, that
the mental activity that a human being engages in because of the in-forming principles of
the rational anima, however, is not the product of the soul alone. The matter which is
informed by the soul provides, in Thomas’s judgment, the individuation of a human
particular essence. The humanness of the essence is that which the rational soul brings to
the material stuff that becomes the human body. The matter so organized is what, and
only what, the body of a human being is, in his view. But the soul does not account for
the particularization of the essence; that is the function of the matter that is informed.
Since, Thomas’s hylomorphism focuses on primary substances as the fundamental
existents of reality, rather than essences or natures, he must conclude that without the
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body that is produced in the union of soul and matter the organizational information that
the soul provides to the material stuff goes unexpressed and, therefore is not truly
existent. Soul, in other words, requires body in order to exist strictly speaking. The
human being that is the singular composite and primary substance is his bodily life; and
that bodily life is produced in the union of soul and matter. Both individual existence and
of human nature, generically named, is communicated to the matter of the body by the
formation principles that the rational soul brings.
The knowing subject: The soul as “Intellect” or “Mind”
Beyond what we have already discovered, we must ask what Aquinas’s argument
means when he, in certain passages Aquinas utilizes the nouns “mind’ and “intellect” to
name the soul of a human being. Such a designation might suggest, in light of his claim
that the soul is subsistent and incorruptible, that he is -- all protestations aside -- really a
kind of substance dualist. At least it could be argued that if he holds to a doctrine of
incorruptibility of the soul and he uses ‘mind’ to name the soul, it makes no sense to
interpret him as holding that mind and body are one and the same thing, for that would
seem to suggest that ‘mind’ is a kind of thing in itself (a Cartesian and un-Spinozistic
sounding concept.) Hence, we need to ask what alternative meaning there could be when
Aquinas says we can characterize anima as “intellect” or “mind.” Without this alternative
reading, we may find that Aquinas not only is unhelpful for understanding Spinoza but
actually gainsays his metaphysical commitments as an Aristotelian. If he uses these
terms to refer to the soul insofar as they might be interpreted as saying they point us to an
actual thing as their shared referent, that would be remarkably un-Aristotelian.; and yet
Aquinas thought of himself as unpacking Aristotle’s doctrines for the Christian Church in
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a manner that was consonant with Christian orthodoxy and faithful to Aristotle’s
intentions.27 But even if it is not the case that Aquinas holds to a quasi-substance
dualism, if it could be shown even that Aquinas conceived of mind as some power or
feature that is, not distinct from the matter of the body but set off from the body, the
suggestion that Thomistic hylomorphism is a helpful interpretive category for
understanding Spinoza would be weakened beyond all hope of rehabilitation.
In order to analyze how Aquinas develops his argument that the soul can also be
called the mind, we will benefit by considering a recent ‘Cartesian’ reading of Aquinas’s
doctrine, one that makes a strong case for considering Aquinas’s ‘mind’ as, in itself, a
categorical entity, that of Anthony Kenny.28 By considering such an interpretation of
Aquinas, and showing how it fails, the argument of this dissertation – that he conceives
of mind and body as one and the same thing – will be strengthened. According to Kenny,
Aquinas would agree with the discoverer of the cogito in the judgment that human beings
‘have’ minds. This might be, on some level, defensible, but not as Kenny unpacks it.
The Thomistic mind, by Kenny’s definition, is a single power in itself that is a “knower”
constituted by the two capacities of (1) intellect and (2) the desire for the good that
corresponds to the nature of the mind, i.e., will.29 Kenny attributes this position to
Aquinas, because he interprets Aquinas as defining the mind as “the capacity for
acquiring linguistic and symbolic abilities” that exists along with will as an additional
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Of course, Aquinas might be wrong about this. Suttor points out, for example, that in the
Treatise on Man Aquinas’s “argument for Aristotle’s [harmony with Christian] orthodoxy is tenuous, and
he can be understood [in the sense Aquinas interprets him] only if we can overcome several grave
difficulties cf De generatione animalium, 736b 273.” Summa Theologiae, 163 n.
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Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, (London: Routledge, 1993). Hereafter, Kenny.
29
Kenny, 18. “The will, too, is part of the mind, as the Aristotelian tradition maintained, but that
is because the intellect and will are two aspects of a single indivisible capacity.”
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power.30 The import of all this for Kenny is that he believes that “mind” in Aquinas’s
view is a power that is metaphysically distinct from the biological considerations that
science deals with in its analysis of human life. While he quite rightly, in his
interpretation, describes the mind as a power of the soul – but as a ‘power’ is not identical
with the soul – he realizes that in Aquinas’s metaphysics the soul possesses sensitive
powers that are not part of the ‘mind’ as Kenny conceives of Aquinas’s ‘mind,’ Kenny’s
way of describing Aquinas’s doctrine is fraught with inadequacies as an interpretation of
a Thomistic philosophy of mind.31
Kenny’s interpretation lands us in a methodological dualism that, as O’Callaghan
says, “separates the philosophical study of mind from the scientific study of everything
else, including the animal life of the human body.”32 This dualism is apparent when he
describes an “Aquinas in whose philosophy there is some power called “mind” that exists
in as some “irreducible core amenable only to philosophy.”33 This Aquinas would, in the
methodological dualism Kenny offers, seem to run afoul of the medieval Aristotelian’s
own insistence that the one anima that organizes the biological life of a human being also
establishes in the human being the vegetative and sensory elements of life. While Kenny
recognizes and accepts this aspect of Aquinas, he nonetheless undercuts it by making
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Ibid, 17
Kenny’s treatment of Thomas’s doctrine sounds, as O’Callaghan also notices, very much like
his own notion of the nature of mind. In The Metaphysics of Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), he argues that human beings alone have minds but they share features of life with other animals. In
Kenny’s view, Thomistic anima is fundamentally possessed of two powers, what he calls “psyche” and
“mind.” He offers this distinction: We may wish to hafe a word to refer to the cluster of sensory
capacities in the way in which ‘mind’ in my usage refers to the cluster of capacities whose major members
are the intellect and will. The most appropriate word seems to be ‘psyche’. If we adopt this usage we can
say that whereas only human have minds, humans and other animals have psyches.”
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John P. O’Callaghan, “Aquinas Rejection of Mind”, The Thomist 66, (January, 2002), 21.
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Kenny, 5.
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Aquinas sound similar to the very pluralists that he stood against. As noted by
O’Callaghan in an essay critical of Kenny: “Kenny preserves that plurality in a weaker
sense, by his emphasis upon a strong distinction within the soul between the set of
powers of vegetative and sensitive life on the one hand, and mind as a thoroughly
different power of the soul on the other.”34
If Kenny’s account is lacking, how will we progress toward understanding what
Aquinas, in fact, does mean where calls the soul “mind or intellect?” We may begin with
the foundational focus Aquinas provides in his “treatise on man” in the Summa. The
discussion of the mind he provides later is built first upon his discussion of the nature of
the soul and then secondly upon his view of human beings as composite beings who each
have in themselves an essential unity in the integration of soul and body. In Question 75,
a 2 of the Prima Pars, where he presents his argument about the soul’s nature, he argues
that the form of the human body (the soul) is what he refers to as the “principle of the act
of understanding” and this act is incorporeal and subsistent.35 He continues on to say that
“the principle of understanding, which is called mind or intellect, has its own activity in
which body takes no intrinsic part.” It seems odd that Aquinas would name the soul
“mind or intellect” when it is clear from his other discussions of the nature of the soul
that the human anima has powers that are not describable as intellectual or mental in any
reasonable sense (growth and motion). Intellect or mind is really but one of the powers
of the rational soul. Aquinas, however, is thinking of mind as the “principle power” of
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O’Callaghan, 19. O’Callaghan’s article is an excellent analysis of not only Aquinas’s mature
doctrine of the soul and mind-body relations, but also an insightful exposition of how his later theory
articulated in the Summa relates to and grew out of his earlier work in his commentary on De Anima,
through the Summa Contra Gentiles.
35
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the soul: “the intellectual soul sometimes gets named from the intellect as its principle
power” (Ia, Q 79, a 1, ad 1). As the “principle power” of the soul, intellect (intellectus)
is still only “a power of the soul and not the very essence of the soul” (Reply). So, the
soul is called mind or intellect in an equivocal sense as a way to name the most specific
feature that it brings to human life, i.e. the specific difference of being a rational animal.
If intellectus is not “the very essence of the soul” in Aquinas’s doctrine, then he
is effectively distancing himself from Augustine’s authority, who considered the process
of thought and understanding as the ontological nature of the soul.36 In Augustine’s
theory, the mind is distinct from the body and the soul is essentially the mind. Sensation
is not part of the mind, for this great Christian theologian, because the mind is essentially
one thing that has three acts it performs: memory, intellect, and will.37 The result is of
course a dualism in Augustine, reflected in his description of the “inner” and “outer”
man.38 The former acts to understand eternal truth and the latter focuses on the sensory
data the body experiences; and the result of this kind of thinking means, for Augustine,
that the mind is an immaterial thing with its own special unity of operation. Aquinas,
while needing to distance himself from Augustine’s brand dualism, had to square himself
with Augustine’s authority as a theologian. Aquinas cites the Father of the Church in the
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Augustine’s most important, influential, and sophisticated statements on the mind come in De
Trinitate, in which he uses the example of the human mind to endeavor to establish the possibility of
plurality in the Godhead. He posits the mind as a foundational existent but then suggests that the selfknowledge that the mind can have and the love that the mind can feel for the knowledge it has of itself are
three substantive distinctions that do not imply ontological division. “Love and knowledge are not in the
mind as in a subject, but they too are substantial, just as the mind itself is; and even if they are posited
relatively to each other, still each of them is its own substance. . . . the mind therefore and its love and
knowledge are three somethings, and these three are one thing, and when they are complete they are equal.”
The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1991), 273f.
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Ibid., 298 ff.
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While Augustine is careful to insist that the body is an intricate part of the human person, he
nonetheless, with his doctrine of the inner and outer man posits a dualism.
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first point of Question 79 where he is interpreting Augustine. Aquinas there says that we
call the human soul the mind or the intellect in the same sense in which we speak of the
souls of lower animals as sense-souls. “And likewise the intellectual soul sometimes gets
named from the intellect as its principle power, in the way, as the De Anima remarks, that
the intellect is a substance. And in this way Augustine says that mind is spirit or
essence.”
The import of the above exposition is that in the Summa we find Aquinas saying
that the terms “mind” and “intellect” are only a kind of short-hand for describing the soul
with respect to that which is the highest expression of a life that is truly human. These
two terms signify the highest activity of the human being’s embodied life that results
from the organizing form that is the principle of a human being’s existence qua rational
animal. The act of intellection takes place in the life of a rational animal, because the acts
of the intellect (thought and awareness and reason) are the highest expressions of life that
the soul qua organizing principle produces in the “composite” being in question. “Mind”
names the highest act of the human being. These terms – “mind or intellect,” then, refer
to the soul in respect to its highest power. Thus for sake of convenience and to make sure
his rhetoric is reconcilable with the authority of Saint Augustine, the Dominican
theologian says we can call the soul the mind, while at the same time not allowing that
the soul is the mind.
In this sense, for Aquinas, it is not the term “mind” or “intellect” but “soul”,
understood as referring to the informing or organizing principle of bodily existence, that
actually has a referent. While the soul can be called the mind in the sense outlined above,
the mind is strictly speaking a power of the soul, not a thing itself with certain powers.
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However, we must understand this idea of the mind as a power of the soul rightly, if we
are going to understand Aquinas. Rationality is the act that is called ‘mind’ by Aquinas;
it is a capacity inherent to a human being made possible by the rational soul. Hence, we
can say in a qualified sense that the mind is a ‘power’ of the soul, in the sense that the
instantiation of the act of being minded is the highest capability that the soul grants to the
organized matter it informs. O’Callaghan’s exegetical observations in this respect are on
the mark:
The intellective part of the soul consists [for Aquinas] in the powers closely
associated with intellect or mind. No suggestion is made [by Aquinas] that they
form a potential whole that is itself a power. . . . Now ‘intellective part’ is
nothing more than a phrase for the classification of powers associated with the
intellect. Most importantly, ‘mind’ is uniformly associated with ‘intellect’ alone
[with no intimation of will as a part of the ‘mind’].39
At the heart of Aquinas’s concerns is not the Cartesian problem of how to define
the mind in itself or discuss the ontological status of consciousness, but how to
understand human existence as one whole entity that is essentially the act of rationality
qua animal.40 He presents us with a philosophical anthropology rather than a philosophy
of mind. Hence, Aquinas does not offer a doctrine that would make all mental acts the
acts of a Cartesian mind, or even an Augustinian one (with its inner and outer man).
Rather, he thinks of mental acts as the acts of a being that is as essentially material as it is
mental, because they are ultimately the acts of a rational animal. As shall be argued
below, this allows Aquinas to avoid the attendant problems of causation and origination
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O’Callaghan, 38.
Recall Linda Jenks’ work cited above, note 7. While I disagree with her interpretation of
Aquinas as holding that human beings are a kind of ontological intermediary between the material and the
spiritual, she is correct to note that the rationality of the human is a partaking of rationality that is, in itself,
immaterial. Hence, the best way to describe Aquinas’s of human rationality is to say it is rationality qua
animal.
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that attended and attend various dualisms. With respect to the question of the connection
of mental acts with human bodies, he sees mental acts as the actions or experiences of a
biological creature, in whom soul and body are involved in process involved in the
achievement of understanding. (The same can also be said about the nature of physical
motion.) Knowing is the act of a human being qua bodily, at least in the sense that it is
not something that takes place in addition to the actual bodily life of the human being.
But since knowing and understanding constitute the highest level of that complex
biological life which is made possible in a human being through the organizational
principle of the human anima, one is to that extent – but no further --justified in calling
the soul “mind” or “intellect.”
This failure of “mind” to be a genuinely “referring term” in the sense in question
is underscored by Aquinas’s insistence that the human “intellective soul” is the kind of
intellect (the lowest in the hierarchy of intellect in reality) that can perform its operations
only in relation to a body.41 In the Summa (I a, Q 77, art. 3) Aquinas makes the case that
the “powers” of the soul are distinguished from one another by their acts, and these acts
in turn are distinguished according to their objects. “Object” is to be understood in the
medieval sense rather than in terms of our contemporary metaphysical currency. It can
refer to a thing that is the objective or purpose of a passive power of the soul, for example
music would be an “object” of hearing. In terms of the acting powers of the soul, the
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In his doctrine of the immortality of the soul Aquinas argues that certain powers of the soul are
kept operable after death, namely, intellect and will. But these incorruptibly operating powers would not
have become operable in the first place prior to the body’s relationship with the soul. We shall look at the
logic of Aquinas’s view of the incorruptibility of the soul at the end of this chapter, but for now we can
observe that this way of stating the issue underscores the fact that Aquinas thinks of soul and body in union
as enabling actual existence and real “expression” to an entity that is neither body nor mind strictly
speaking and yet, in some sense, is in fact both.
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“object” of an active power of the soul would be the aspect of reality that is the goal or
the end for which that active power exists. An example would be truth as the “object” of
the rational soul; or health the “object” of medicine.42
What then is the object of the mind, if the mind is understood to be the act of
understanding that is manifest in a human being qua rational animal? Aquinas’s
epistemology can take us some way toward understanding how to answer this question.
First, as was indicated in the previous section, he conceives of the human intellect as
requiring the body to perform its acts of understanding. This does not mean that the body
causes the mind to attain or receive knowledge. Instead, he argues, the issue that needs to
be analyzed is simply how a rational animal is both animal and rational, because the
activity of knowing is one that involves the whole being of a human person. To analyze
this process, Aquinas offers a theory of how sensory perception provides the mind with
the material that it is to understand. For Aquinas, the proper object of the human mind
(at least in this life) is the nature of the material world. Based on his Aristotelian
commitments, he insists that the mind is not endowed with innate ideas, that “the first
thing which is known by us in the state of our present life is the nature of the material
thing, which is the object of the intellect . . .” (Summa I a, Q 88, a 3).
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to interpret or analyze Aquinas’s
epistemology in great detail goes without saying, we can observe how he understands the
term “mind” by noting the general way he describes the process by which human beings
come to attain knowledge of any kind. We discussed above how Aquinas viewed the
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O’Callaghan observes, “Aquinas uses color as the object of vision for an example of a passive
power, and physical maturity as the object of an active power like growth, O’ Callaghan, 40.
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necessity for a certain kind of body to be the effect of the human soul’s organizational
power in the material stuff of the human animal. In the Summa he maintains consistently
what he says in his answer to the third objection posed in question fifty of the prima
secundae partis of the Summa: “a man is made apt of understanding by the good
disposition of the interior powers [of the organism], in the production of which the good
dispositions of the body has a part to play.” It is through the organs of sense, which are
bodily, that the sensible forms of things first present themselves to the human being.
Hence, in the first analysis the body is involved in the reception of these forms into the
power for understanding of a person. In fact, the organizational principle of the
intellectual soul establishes certain organs of sensory perception in order to serve the
purpose of knowing:
The powers [of sensation, which are rooted in the soul] do not exist for the sake of
the organs [of sensory perception], rather the organs exist for the sake of the
powers. Hence it is not that different organs give rise to different powers but that
nature establishes diversity to go with the diversity of the powers. Likewise
different senses naturally use different media, depending on what the powers need
in order to act. As for knowing the natures of sense qualities, that belongs to the
intelligence [intellectus].
[A natural change] occurs when the form of the source of change is received into
the subject of change in a physical way, as heat is absorbed by something being
heated. [A “spiritual” or nonphysical change occurs] when the form of the source
of change is received in the subject of change supraphysically, the way that the
form of a colour is in the eye, which does not become the colour it sees.
[When] the intention [of the sensible form that is sensed] comes to be within the
sense organ. . . [in sense other than sight] there is a physical change as well, either
on the object’s part only, or on the part of the organ also. . . Natural change of
place on the part of the object occurs in the case of sound, the object of hearing,
for sound is caused by impact and movement in the atmosphere. . . Touch and
taste involve physical change in the organ itself; the hand touching something hot
gets hot, and the tongue dampens through the moisture of what it tastes. The
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organ of smell or hearing, on the other hand, is physically affected only per
accidens.43
This establishes quite clearly that all of our knowledge results from our initial
experience of sensory awareness, which is an act of the human being as a whole person,
but it implies much more. Sensory knowledge is not, in Aquinas’s doctrine (contra the
Cartesian theory) a solely mental power strictly speaking. Neither is it an act of the
“outer man,” as Augustine argued. Rather, sensory awareness, which is the foundation of
all knowledge in Aquinas’s epistemology, is the achievement of the entire human entity –
body as well as mind. For Thomas, sensory knowledge -- when considered in mental
terms -- involves not just an awareness of actual changes to the physical body and the
perception of external objects, but a real engagement of the mind with those changes as
the sensory organs are, as one could say, acted upon by the nature or the form of another
entity. The acting entity in this context is described by Aquinas as acting out of its own
nature (that is what a sensible form would be, according to the passage quoted above.)
There is a change that occurs in the sensory organ of the body (for example, the eye).
The intention of the entity is communicated to the eye as the form of the object, say the
redness of an apple, is “received into” the organ of sight.44
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My emphasis.
Such a way of speaking, it is worth noting, would be entirely consistent with the argument that
the apple’s redness is not strictly in the apple qua the redness that one sees. That would not in the least
attenuate recognition of the fact that something from the apple’s own existence is communicated to the
sensory awareness. It would simply mean that the organs of sense are geared in such a way that the objects
acting on them can act on them in certain ways. Just because the redness of the apple could not act upon
the eye of, say, a honeybee in the same way does not negate the claim that the apple is acting out of its own
essence upon the eye of a human being in such a way that redness is “received” as a result. The same thing
could be said of the hardness of the apple, or its sweetness, or its crunchiness in relation to the appropriate
bodily parts.
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What is happening is sensory experience, according to Aquinas, is that some
entity is acting upon the body out of its essential powers, and the mind is aware of this.
He defends this view in I a, 84 a 1, Reply, of the Summa.
Even in sensible things we observe that the same form can be in different sensible
objects in different ways; for instance, whiteness can be more intense in one thing
than another, and whiteness can be associated with sweetness in one thing but not
in another. Furthermore, the same is true of the form of a sensible object: it exists
in a different way in the thing outside than it does in sense knowledge, which
receives sensible forms without their matter – for instance, the colour of gold
without the gold itself. Similarly, the intellect receives material and changeable
species of material things in an immaterial and unchanging way, in accord with its
nature; for things are received in a subject according to the nature of the subject.
Aquinas’s doctrine of form qua in an object versus form qua in sensory experience
requires us to think about objects of sensory awareness in terms of the functions and/or
powers that form gives to them as primary substances. Each thing acts in certain ways
and is individuated in relation to other things specifically because it is materially
organized in certain ways by the form that makes it what it is. It acts or is acted upon – in
accordance with its essence. Hence, when the sensory apparatus of a human being is
acted upon out of the essence of the acting entity, something about the acting entity is
conveyed to the sensory organs of a particular part of the body that is receiving the
action. Copleston describes Aquinas’s view in this in a similar way.
Our organs of sense are affected by external objects, and we receive senseimpressions. The eye, for example, sees colours or colour-patches; but it would
not do so unless it were affected by its object acting on it through a medium. It
receives an impression, therefore, and undergoes a physical alteration. The
process of sensation cannot, however, be reduced to mere physical change. . .
Sensation is a psycho-physical process in which a sensible “form” is received.45
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While Aquinas does accept the idea that the human soul has the “power of
sensation,” his hylomorphism requires that he argue that this “power of sensation” is a
principle of the very same soul that qua rational soul informs the human body even
before it is actually exercised in the process of sensation. Only with the body so
informed can human sensory experience take place, for human sensory experience qua
rational is distinct from that of other sense-capable entities. The “intellect” requires
objects of sensory experience in order to engage in its own proper work of understanding.
Only through these sensory-obtained “objects” can the rational capacity of the human
being begin to operate to acquire knowledge of reality or being. In other words, if all
knowledge begins with sensory experience via the body’s engagement with the material
world, then knowledge, while much more than a physical phenomenon, is not a feature of
a Cartesian “thinking substance,” but is the activity of a being that is irreducibly a
rational biological organism.46 Because he conceives the relationship between mind and
body that results from the integrated union of soul and the matter of the body in these
terms, Thomas declares in the Summa I a, Q 98, a 1, that it is clear that it is good for the
rational soul to be united with a body. And again in Quaestio disputata de anima, 2, ad
14, he pronounces a conclusion that is fully consistent with his doctrine as it is described
in the Summa: “Origen thought, like Plato, that the human soul is a complete substance,
and that the body is united to it accidentally. But since this is false, as has been show
46

See Summa Ia, 77, a 8, for Aquinas’s discussion of how the soul, when “separated from the
body,” loses some of its capacity for knowledge. Again, it is outside the scope of this dissertation to deal
with Aquinas’s doctrine of the soul exhaustively. But consider what he says in the reply of this article:
“Certain powers, namely, understanding and will, are related to the soul taken on its own as their subject of
inhesion, and powers of this kind have to remain in the soul after the death of the body. But some powers
have the body-soul compound for subject; this is the case with all the powers of sensation and nutrition.
Now when the subject goes the accident cannot stay. Hence when the compound corrupts such powers do
not remain in actual existence. They survive in the soul in a virtual state only, as in their source or root.”
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above, it is not to the detriment of the soul that it is united to a body, but for the
perfection of its nature.”47
The first object of the mind is the essence of each material ordinary particulars
through their forms qua sensible. To say that these material things are known through
their forms qua sensible is another way of saying that These particulars act according to
what they are in relation to the human body’s organs of sense. As he contends in the
extended passage quoted above, the sensible forms cause some change in the various
sense-organs of the body. However, the changes are, what he calls, “supraphysical.”
What he seems to mean by this is that the physical nature of the sensory organs remain
exactly what they are physically speaking, but they entertain some affect that the sensible
form brings to them. Perhaps we could say that the sensory capacity of the human being
which relates to the retinal tissue of the eye, when it receives the sensible characteristics
of rock that are part of the rock’s essence, is acted upon by the sensible form that
communicates the characteristics of the rock, which allow us to have an adequate
awareness of its nature. The sensory capacity of the human being undergoes a change as
the sensible form (visually speaking in this example) acts upon the retinal tissue of the
eye in that both the retina and the sensory capacity now contain within them the
something of the essence of the rock that can be conveyed visually. This is a change in
the sense that the retina, prior to the reception of that sensible form, was not acted upon
by the essence of the rock, nor was the sensory capacity that is inherently tied to the
changes that take place in the retina when light is refracted on it through the other media
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Quoted in Copleston, Aquinas, 163.
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of the eyeball acted upon by the changes the retina underwent. However, the presence of
the sensory image of the rock now entails that a change has occurred. But that change
has not changed either the matter of the retina or the metaphysical essence of the sensory
capacity that relates to the sense of sight. They are still, the one physically and the one
non-physically, exactly what they were in themselves
Since all knowledge begins with a human being’s engagement with the material
world through the supraphysical changes that sensible forms provide, and these changes
occur in the sensory organs, then the actions of material objects upon our senses are the
first “object” of the mind.48 Something like this is what Aquinas means by his insistence
that the material world is the first object of the mind. But, our knowledge is not of the
sensory objects or our ideas that we formulate from these sensible forms. Rather, these
are the means by which we perceive the first object of the mind (the material world).49
So we could say that the mind of a person is that person’s awareness of the material
48

We cannot in the confines of the present study adequately analyze Aquinas’s epistemology,
which posits a “possible intellect” and an “active intellect” in human life. Yet we can at least point out that
in his complex theory the “possible intellect” is a power of the soul to receive the information that comes
through the sensory organs. One possible way to interpret this is to say that for Aquinas the sensory data
are communicated to the sense organs via the changes that the essence of a thing produces in the state or
condition of the sensory organ. In turn, the receptive intellect, which is part of the power of the intellective
soul, which is the form of the body that has the sensory organs, is aware of the changes. But, qua intellect,
the changes in the sensory organs do not “cause” the knowledge. Rather, the receptive intellect is a process
involving immediate awareness of the information provided. This information is what the active intellect
works with to abstract universal knowledge of essences, natures, accidents, substances, and, ultimately,
being itself. But neither can this active or agent intellect be construed as a cognitive power all its own.
Rather it is a part of the human being complexly organized so that rationality can attend biology; and it is
the power to abstract, from the “objects” already otherwise known, a fuller and deeper kind of knowledge.
Indeed, for Aquinas, the actions of the senses and the receptive intellect are ordered to serve the activity of
the agent intellect through the informing presence of human anima in matter. For an excellent discussion
of these concepts see Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Oxford University Press,
1993). Also see Copleston, Aquinas, 178 – 184. For a critique of Aquinas’s complicated and “naïve”
theory of knowledge and intellect see Anthony Kenny, “Aquinas: Intentionality,” Philosophy Through its
Past, ed Ted Honderich, (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 78-95.
49
For an excellent discussion of Aquinas’s understanding of the way that the soul interacts with
sensible forms see Sheldon Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,”
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Apr., 1982).
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world that is made accessible to the person’s understanding through the sensory capacity
that the intellectual soul grants to the human body, so as to enable intellectual awareness
of the material world (the world of extension) as the body’s senses interact as physical
organs with that world.50
Aquinas even contends that the rational soul’s awareness of itself is the product of
its prior engagement with the objects of sensory experience and the intellectual activity
that is prompted by that engagement. Since the mind is not an entity that exists Aquinas
could not conceive of how the mind could know itself know itself qua mind. Aquinas
contends that we become aware of our own existence, not via Cartesian introspection
(which he would have pointed out must assume the presence of ideas that are not
identical with the act of thinking about them), but through the activity of perceiving
things in the material world. All of the mind’s awareness is awareness of something that
is its object. His doctrine is a kind of medieval version of intentionality in which thought
is always thought about . . . X. But, in his view, thought about X always entails some
kind of awareness of the subject of such an act. So, while there is first of all an object of
the mind’s awareness, the very act of being aware of something creates the possibility to
encountering oneself as the subject of the knowledge of the act of knowing. Aquinas puts
it as follows in De Veritate, 10, 8:
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The possible parallel between this way of putting the process of knowledge and Spinoza’s own
articulation will be discussed in the next chapter. But consider, by way of anticipation, Spinoza’s statement
in The Ethics II, p 16, proof & corollary 1: “All the modes wherein a body is affected follow from the
nature of the body affected together with the nature of the affecting body. Therefore the idea of the modes
will necessarily involve the nature of both bodies. So the idea of any mode wherein the human body is
affected by an external body involves the nature of he human body and the external body. Hence, it
follows that the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies along with the nature of its own
body.
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The soul is known [by the human person] by its acts. For a man perceives that he
has a soul and lives and exists by the fact that he perceives that he senses and
understands and performs other vital operations of this kind. . . No one perceives
he understands except through the fact that he understands something, for to
understand something is prior to understanding that one understands. And so the
soul comes to the actual realization of its existence through the fact that it
understands or perceives.51
The mind is really, for Aquinas, a term that captures the whole human being’s
capacity for knowing things and abstracting understanding from his engagement with the
world. Those objects can be material entities engaged through the sensory experience or
truths about the world that are realized through acts of reasoning; it can even be the
embodied-self experienced as subject of the thoughts and experiences. However, what is
clear is that the mind is an aspect of a human being that requires an object that is nonmental in order to be instantiated. The thing that “knows,” therefore, is not the mind, or
even the soul, because the rational soul’s capacity for knowing is instantiated by the
engagement with sensory experience via the body’s sense organs being acted upon and
the body acting. “It has been shown that sensation is not an activity of the soul alone.
Sensing is the activity of the whole man, even though it is not peculiar to man” (Summa I
a, Q 75, a 4, reply).
It must be emphasized, however, that knowledge is not being thought of here as
“caused”, by the passive receptivity of the bodily organs, much less by any action that the
bodily organs might exert on the “mind."’ The Summa in I a, Q 76, a 1, reply, is where
Aquinas asserts his Aristotelian credentials and commitments on this issue:
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Here Aquinas is using the term “soul” in a very ambiguous way, one time for something that a
human being “has” and then again for the knowing human being itself. In any case, what he is saying is
that self-consciousness is dependent upon the knowledge of objects that are, in some sense, intentional.
This distances his view of self-consciousness from both Augustine and Descartes, for who self-awareness is
the most fundamental type of knowledge.
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The activity of a moving agent is attributed to the thing it moves in one case only,
when it uses it as an instrument, as when a carpenter imparts his motions to his
saw. There if understanding were to be attributed to Socrates on the ground that it
was the activity of some agent acting on him, it would follow that he was said to
understand because being used for understanding. This is incompatible with the
Philosopher’s contention that understanding takes place without physical
instrumentality.
The mind performs its act of understanding, as a result of the soul’s informing power in
the human being, with no dependence upon the physical functions of the body. But, that
negative way of stating Thomas’s doctrine does not get a far down the ontological path as
he wants to take us. One must also say that the mind’s understanding is the act of a
human being who, while being essentially physical, is capable of rational insight that is,
in itself, the expression of a human power that, while indeed present in the physical body,
is not a purely physical power of the body insofar as it is part of what makes it the sort of
body that it is in the first place. The intellect engages the objects of sense – as we
described above -- but neither the act of engaging the objects nor the act of understanding
what is engaged is caused by anything bodily in Aquinas’s theory of mind and its
knowledge.
In fact, this contention is the foundation of Aquinas’s doctrine of the
immateriality of the intellectual soul, as well as its incorruptibility, which shall be
discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. Aquinas conceives of the state of
affairs in the following way in Contra Gentiles, 2, 49: “If the intellect were corporeal, its
activity would not reach beyond the order of bodies. So it would understand only bodies.
But this is patently false. For we understand many things (such as universals and
mathematics and the natures of species) which are not bodies. Therefore, the intellect is
not corporeal.” The logic of Aquinas’s argument is built upon a supposition common in
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his day (and even in the early modern period) that only like things can interact. He
thought that there is, one could say, a kind of explanatory barrier that exists between
thought and the body that is the location of a thought, because there is a real difference
between the material and the immaterial. Hence, as we said above, the act of knowing is
one which is not simply part of a physical body’s activity, but is a power of the soul that
enables the physical body of a human being to be the kind of body that is capable of
knowing. This concept of the mind’s relation to the body via the soul’s informing power,
plus the argument that the intellect or mind can actually know things that are far beyond
the scope of material reality or sensible form (differential calculus, geometry, universals,
God, and, again, the natures of species), leads Aquinas to the conclusion the true nature
of the soul must be other than corporeal. However, the intellect’s awareness of sensible
form does not violate the principle that only like can know like and thereby refute or
confuse Aquinas’s claim that the soul is immaterial. It does not do so because the
sensible form of an ordinary particular entity is not a feature of the essence of that entity
qua material. Rather, the sensible form (one might say) “projects” the characteristics of
the entity into the perceptual field of a human knower. The sensible form then, is not the
essence of a thing acting upon the sensory apparatus of animals in such a way so as to be
engaged by them and known qua object of sensation. But, the sensible form does express
the characteristics of that entity’s essence in such a way so as to act upon the senses and
the sense organs. We could say, in this regard, that Aquinas would allow that the sensory
organs are really acted upon as physical entities when the sound waves produced by a
piano strike the eardrum and activate the physical process involved in hearing. But, the
essence of the musical sound is heard and comprehended, not in the way that the sensory
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organs receive the sensible form, but as music in its essence as it is given expression
through the piano and the sound waves it produces. The process has a decidedly physical
component. However, the event of comprehending that one has heard is not, itself,
reducible to the physical. Hearing is physical, but knowing what has been heard is not.
The soul is called “mind” only because the act of understanding is a power of the
soul. Understanding itself is an act of the human being in Thomas’s doctrine, i.e. it is
something that is exercised by a human being qua rational animal. Hence, Aquinas’s
pronouncement that it is not the soul that knows, but the man that knows.52 A human
being is an agent, acting in the world to know it, and that act is made possible only by the
organizing information that the soul brings to the matter of the human animal. In the
human agent-knower, the body, then, via its sensory organs (which are the result of the
power of the soul to so order matter) is receptive of the various sensible forms of things
that are appropriate for each organ as a particular type of sensory organ attuned to a
specific object. Engagement with the changes that these sensible forms work. on the
body’s organs of sensation provides the intellect with items of experience upon which the
active intellect works – with no causative determination from the body at all. Such
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Aquinas’s discussion of the soul in Quaestio disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis which he
wrote in 1269, probably after the “Treatise on Man” in the Summa was written, further illustrates his
conviction that the soul is not a set of powers, but contains “powers” that can activate a body to be human
and capable of knowing as a person. In article eleven he demonstrates this negative conclusion. None of
the soul’s powers are its essence, hence intellect could not be the soul’s essence. “The soul’s abilities are
called essential characteristics not because they constitute its essence but because they derive from [its
essence]” -- my emphasis. Furthermore, he rejects the idea that the ability to understand is the soul’s
essence, which would entail that the soul is mental activity. “[The human soul], being essentially body’s
form, gives body existence (being the form of its substance) and that sort of existence we call life (being
the sort of form we call soul) and that sort of [human] life we call understanding or intellectual (being the
sort of soul we call intellectual. For “understanding” sometimes names an activity (and then its source is an
ability or disposition), and sometimes names our very existence as creatures of an understanding nature
(and then its source is the very essence of our intellectual soul). From Aquinas: Selected Philosophical
Writings, trans., Timothy McDermott, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 121-129.
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knowledge is not caused by the body; it could not be, Aquinas maintained, because
knowledge is not material. But I have tried to show how its lack of materiality is very
different from the sort of lack of materiality involved in a Cartesian view of knowledge.53
He did not conceive of the act of knowing as a supervenient addition to a world
filled other wise with naked bare particulars, because the form of knowing is part of
reality itself. Just as life is a principle of the world that we cannot really account for, but
can only acknowledge as inherently present in the world, so thought for Aquinas, was a
feature of reality that could not be reduced to material causes that would explain it. At
the same time, on the other hand, Aquinas would presumably not be shocked at findings
in current brain research that show various links between cognitive and biological
processes. Since cognition is a universal principle at work in a world that (as was
discussed in Chapter Three) participates in the Being of God, every individual act of
understanding must be, by the light of a Thomistic metaphysics, a subsisting reality. And
this it can be, as we have seen, only by virtue of its embodiment in the natural processes
of living organisms.
In light of the foregoing, it is arguable that Aquinas’s Latin “intellectus,” which
some translators simply render “intellect,” is better translated, in the context of the

53

It seems reasonable to suppose that the reason that Aquinas thought that human anima could be
described as “mind” or “intellect,” and even be referred to as a “subsistent entity,” is related to his broader
views about the universe as a whole,. He does not conceive of reality in Cartesian terms where an
otherwise extended substance is coincided with individual “thinking things.” Rather, his willingness to call
the soul, “mind” is the result of his belief that act of knowing (quite apart from any particular knower) is
part of the very make-up of the universe. Quite apart from the question of individual knowers, Aquinas
saw the form of knowing, to be a subsisting reality that is a fundamental feature of the universe.
Knowledge is not something, for him, in addition to the material world. No! the material world, since it is
intelligible, is itself part of the same world qua rational knowledge. Thought is thought about the world
and it is the world that is thought. Hence, rationality is precisely a possibility that is a part of the essence of
rational animals.
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Angelic Doctor’s thought, by means of the gerund “understanding.” This is the practice
of the Blackfriars edition of the Summa that is being utilized in this dissertation. It is
better translated in that way, I would argue, insofar as intellect or mind, for Aquinas, is
simply the act of knowing a human being exercises. It is a power of the soul in the sense
that the soul provides the possibility of this act for a rational animal, but intellect or mind
itself is not a power; and the soul does not do the understanding – that is the act of a
human being. In the Summa, “mind” is simply a synonym for “intellect”: “the human
soul, which is called intellect [intellectus] or mind [mens]” (I a, Q 75, a 2, Reply).

Since

this act of knowing is what Aquinas means by intellect or mind; and since this activity is
the result of the incredible organizational complexity of a human being; and since this
organizational complexity is the result of the “informing” nature of the soul, Aquinas
says that the soul can be called (equivocally) the “mind.” Hence, insofar as “mind” is a
equivocal term for the soul, Aquinas would say that the soul can be said to be involved in
the immaterial act of knowing. However, for him the act properly speaking is the result
of a rational animal performing an act that is not itself bodily. All this comes about
because the human anima informs a material being in such a way that rational life can be
present in the biological entity.
Persons are metaphysically foundational
Aquinas, however, is not satisfied to stop the discussion of the act of knowing and
understanding by describing them, even equivocally and conventionally, as the act of the
soul. His contention is that we must focus attention, rather, on “the person” as the one
who is acting in the attainment of the knowledge. (This can also be said for any and all
physical acts.) This latter concept captures the full-blown focus of Aquinas’s
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metaphysical scheme, for “person” provides him with a category that allows him to
discuss the act of knowing as the act of a particular mode of intellectual being (since in
his view angels and even God are higher intellectual beings). But his concept of human
beings as “persons” allows him to conceive of this act of knowing as something that is
essentially, in the case of human persons, an act that can be understood as the act of a
thing that is both body and mind.54
Aquinas defines ‘person,’ following the authority of Boethius, as “an individual
substance of a rational nature” (Summa 3a, Q 2, a 2 reply.)55 Such a being is also called a
supposit by Aquinas, which means an entity that is capable of expressing a particular
essence, as well as being the substantial subject of other acts of being. A person,
therefore, is a kind of primary substance, in the Latin Aristotelian sense that translates
Aristotle’s own term prote ousia (primary being). Thomas’s most critical discussion of
the concept of a person takes place in the part of the Summa that deals with his defense
and philosophical demonstration of the logic of the doctrine of the Incarnation. There he

54

It is, I think, the concept person is that which Aquinas seizes upon to attempt to refute
Averroism among his Latin counterparts. By linking the term “person” to the definition “a substance of a
rational nature,” following the authority of Boethius on the matter, he utilized an important Christian
theological concept to refute the doctrine – mentioned in Q 76, a 2, 1, as well as in the reply to this same
article. Although he does not utilize the term in article 2, for he is arguing a different metaphysical
response to Averroism there, it could not have been far from his mind. By ultimately linking the act of
knowing with a human person, which he defines as mind and body in integrated material-rational life,
Aquinas would have formed a base upon which Averroes’ monopsychism would have been made
problematic for a Christian audience. The concept of person developed in Christian theology in the West to
address the doctrine of the Trinity without denying the oneness of God. Persona was taken up for the
Greek term hupostasis. In Christian theology the idea of the “Persons” of the Trinity entailed the notion
that each person is distinct without being separate. This concept could have allowed Aquinas a foundation
upon which to discuss, against Averroism, the distinctness of each act of knowing (because it is the act of a
person), given that the Christian dogma contends that human beings are made to be persons in the image of
God. That would have provided Aquinas with a strong position to insist that Averroism was doctrinally
untenable for Christian believers, even as he endeavors in Q 76, a 2, to refute the doctrine via the logic of
his philosophical theology.
55
For Aquinas, person is, in a qualified and derivative sense an allowable synonym for “human
being,” since he believed that human beings were made in the image of the Trinity.
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distinguishes between essence and person; and it is not essences that exist but persons,
for only individual substances exist in the most precise sense56 Human individuals –
persons – are supposits that exist through the formal cause of human nature (the union of
matter with human-making form). Yet each person is more than his human nature. All
persons have additional and incommunicably unique existences and characteristics that
cause them to be distinguished from all other particulars that are formed by that same
formal essence. Recall the above discussion of the individuating role of matter. Hence,
Aquinas claims that “in things composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated
of the supposit; we do not say for example that this man is his humanity” (3a, Q2, a 3,
Reply).
“Person,” therefore, is a different metaphysical concept than essence or nature; in
fact “person” is a primary concept for Aquinas because a person is a primary being in the
Aristotelian sense. As “an individual substance of rational nature,” a person is essentially
rational, but the bodily existence of a human being is essential, as well, for the true
human personhood of that human being.57 He asserts this strongly in Summa I a, Q 75, a
2, reply, where he argues that the soul’s substantiality is a highly qualified sense of
substance. He describes the soul as “some kind of incorporeal and subsistent principle.
In other words, as he puts it in ad 2 of this question, the soul is itself something that is
real, but it is not strictly speaking “this particular thing, for the concept of a particular
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In an Aristotelian philosophy, essences (or natures) only exist (as we saw in chapters two and
three) in concrete beings that express those essences.
57
Again, when utilized in reference to human beings, “person” must entail the idea of a body,
since the definition of a human being is “rational animal.” Animality is, therefore, part of personhood and
being human, itself, becomes a basic concept in philosophy of mind. Cf. chapter two, p 67, where
Williams is quoted: “A strength of hylomorphism, particularly in its more materialistic version, is that it
does point to human being as a basic concept in the philosophy of mind, and, consequently, in ethics.”
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thing can have two applications. One is what we might call a “weak” reference, i.e. that
any real feature of the world can be called a particular thing. (We might refer to the
DNA “code” that makes my bodily and mental existence possible a particular thing -- or
an ordinary particular, if we utilize a contemporary locution -- without positing it as an
actually existing thing or primary substance in the Aristotelian sense or ordinary
particular in the contemporary sense.) The soul, Aquinas argues, can be called a
particular thing, in this “weak” sense.58 On this basis, Aquinas argues in Q 75, a 4, ad 4,
“Not every particular substance [understood in the weak sense] is a hypostasis or person,
but rather, that which has the full nature of the species. Thus, a hand or foot cannot be
called a hypostasis or person. Nor, likewise, can the soul, as it is a part of human
nature.” The concept “person” captures for Aquinas the substantial existence of a human
being as a primary substance. It is a metaphysical concept that expresses the full nature
of the entity produced in the hylomorphic integration of soul and body.
Since the intellectual soul is the form of the human body it is subsistent as a real
particular thing (in the weak sense described above). The form-giving reality of the soul
does not need something else to grant it reality qua form-giving. But it is also a
substantial form, meaning that its own essence is to give essence or form to a primary
substance. The essence of the soul as a particular thing (in the weak sense) is to make
possible the existence of a different particular thing (in the strong sense). From these two
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Suttor’s comments on this passage help in grasping what Aquinas is doing by providing an
ambiguous usage of the idea of the soul. “Thomas is concerned with a far-reaching rectification of names.
Because ‘soul’ is a noun, we tend to think of it as a thing. We can hold a man’s hand, and say by
metonymy, ‘This particular thing has an existence of its own,’ e.g.. meaning the man has, not the hand.
Now the same is true of the soul: properly speaking it is man who comes into existence, and has an
existence of his own.” 12 note c.
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aspects of the nature of the soul, it follows that the primary substance that is created in
the union of the soul with the matter of the body is a substance (and therefore a particular
thing in the “strong” sense), but the soul alone is not. Only in the existential integration
of intellectual soul in the matter of a body does one find a hypostasis.59 This is what
Aquinas means by his more epigrammatic assertion: a soul is not a person.60
The metaphysical importance of Thomas’s notion of a “person” is emphasized
when one considers his ideas about the incorruptibility of the soul and what that doctrine
entails for him. Substances are what really exist fundamentally as the subjects of all
other categories of being. The subsisting soul, while a reality on its own is not, as we
have shown, for Aquinas, a substance. Yet, he argues that it is capable of surviving the
death of the body. The soul is not a rational substance, but a substantial principle of
rational life. This is what it means for the soul to be the form of the body. Hence, the
soul is by its very nature meant for union with and existence in the material body that it
59

This is unquestionably a complicated theory, but perhaps no more truly complicated than the
current scientific understanding of DNA information. In the current science of DNA, we have two notions
that are quite distinct philosophically speaking, which could not be reduced one to the other except by a
rather bald assertion of materialism or idealism. One the one hand there is the material stuff (the proteins,
amino acids, chemical interaction and molecular structure) that carry the genetic information. But that
which is carried is not itself thereby to be regarded as material. Rather, it is, as was argued in chapter two,
something (at least arguably) quite other than the matter by which the information is communicated and
instantiated in its incipient form. This information in the matter in question is the source of a particular
living thing’s life qua the particular kind of thing that it is. Hence, as we understand by the light of
contemporary micro-biology and organic chemistry, the feature of the universe that grants life to a human
creature (its DNA in the sperm-egg union) is the same principle that makes the person to be rational
animal. The same information encoded in the DNA that makes me have brown eyes and produces my
heartbeat and orders every cell of my body to be productive and reproductive of life, in order to sustain my
existence and enable me to pursue certain “ends” toward which I am naturally ordered [oriented] as a
human being, is also the information that enables my rational awareness of the world and my own life.
Thus these potentialities inherent in the DNA code are not potentialities for various sorts of activity on the
part of DNA itself. Rather, they are potentialities for the human beings of which that DNA is a component.
And yet, the information is, itself, something (in the weak sense.)
60
An intriguing insight about Thomas’s formulation of the idea of person and the import of
maintaining the integrated union of soul and body is offered by Suttor . “Thomas was seeking to replace
[the common, more neo-Platonic claim that the soul used a body] with something more in accord with the
doctrine of the Incarnation.” Suttor, vol. 11, 19 n.
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informs. The soul’s separation from that body, while allowed by Aquinas’s philosophical
conception of the soul as immaterial and demanded by his theological commitments, is
nonetheless, in that state of separation, continuing in existence in a state that Aquinas
viewed as praeter naturam (beyond what is natural). It is unnatural in the sense that the
soul qua informing and organizing principle is meant to be in the matter that it informs.
In the union for which it is meant, the soul qua informing and organizing principle causes
(in union with matter) a person to exist. This means, then, that the rational soul separated
from the body is not strictly a human person, because the term “person” signifies the
whole complete primary substance that expresses human nature by its very existence.
That nature so expressed, however, is by definition a primary being or substance that is
the result of the organizational influence of rational soul in a particular matter.
It could be objected, that if it is the person who knows, because soul and body are
one entity, namely a human person, then perhaps the distinction that Aquinas is
attempting to draw between soul and body is a merely nominal one. In other words,
Aquinas’s radical emphasis upon the unity doctrine might be regarded as supporting the
conclusion that, in the words of Klima, “the concepts of soul and body provide us merely
with different aspects for considering the same, essentially materially entity.”61 But as
our preceding discussion should have made clear, such a view would be built on a
misapprehension of what Aquinas conceives to be the state of affairs. Klima has
commented on Aquinas’s thought about the real distinction that must be posited: “But
since these [the human body and the life of the body] are obviously distinct perfections,

61

Klima, 195. Emphasis added.
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whose distinction is given regardless of the intellect’s considerations, the parts of the
whole accounting for these perfections, each of its own sort, have to be parts that are
really distinct, again, regardless of the intellect’s consideration.”62 The real distinction
that exists is a kind of explanatory barrier, since the form cannot account for the body’s
materiality per se even if it does account for the kind of organization that the material
body has received, just as the body cannot explain the information that is integrated into
its very existence and has no concrete existence apart from the informed body. And
again, as it seems to me Klima has demonstrated regarding Aquinas’s theory:
What this means, then, is that in line with St. Thomas’s general conception of the
analogy of being [discussed in chapter three of this dissertation], the whole and its
essential parts, while they are denominated beings on account of the same
substantial act of existence, are not denominated beings in the same sense. For
the whole substance [the person] is denominated a being in the primary,
unqualified sense of being, in the sense in which only a complete, self-subsistent
entity can be called a being, existing on its own. The essential parts of this being,
namely, its matter and substantial form, however, can be called beings only in
some derivative sense of the term. And this is because for a form to exist is
nothing but for the thing to exist, or to have existence, in respect to the form,
which makes it clear that the sense in which existence is attributed to the form is
obtained by adding some qualification to the sense in which existence is attributed
to the substance which is said to exist in the primary, unqualified sense.
Obviously, similar considerations apply to the body, in the exclusive sense of the
term, insofar as it is the other essential part of a living being.63
His view of person as a metaphysical foundation is helpful in understanding how
Aquinas views the issue of mind and body ‘interaction. In his discussion of the will in I
a, Q 82, a 4, Reply, Aquinas points us toward how he conceived of bodily movement in
relationship to mental powers. In this passage he closely associates will with
understanding; it is certainly not treated as an immaterial entity that has a realm of its
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own from which it acts upon other things. Aquinas discusses the activity of the will in
terms of the functioning of a whole system. As a rational animal, a human being is
oriented towards certain particularly human ends. The pursuit of those ends, in
Aquinas’s account, is engaged in rationally, which entails awareness of ones needs and
deliberation about how best to meet those needs. Deliberation and choice, in this
scenario, are not acts that are mental, however, in the Cartesian or Augustinian senses of
being solely immaterial acts absolutely speaking.

Aquinas argues the point like this:

One thing can set another in motion in two ways. First as an aim, and this is the
way its fulfillment moves an agent cause and also the way that the understanding
moves the will. For a good understood is will’s object and moves it by being
something to aim for. But secondly, one thing can change another by its activity,
as in chemical or physical change. And it is after this fashion that the will moves
the understanding and all the other powers of the soul. . . .
The explanation is that in a system of active powers the one that concerns the
perfection of the whole moves those that have more particularized objectives.
This is just as clear in physical nature as it is in political society. . . Now the
object of the will is goodness and fulfillment in general. . . So the will actively
moves all the soul’ powers to their acts, except for vegetative powers, which are
not subject to our decisions.
This concept of the will is consistent with Aquinas’s hylomorphism and its
implication that neither one of the “aspects” of human existence (body or mind) can be
conceived of as having a causal relationship to the other. This conclusion follows from
Aquinas’s assertion that it is the person who acts and wills and knows, not the mind that
directs the body nor the body that effects the workings of the mind. Thus, Aquinas
describes the relationship between mind and body in terms of the type of description that
one finds in various dual aspect theories of mind and body in human life. He contends
that our reason can grasp a single existing entity in a variety of ways” (Q 76, a 3, ad 4).
The italicized phrase “single existing entity” can be translated “one and the same thing”
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(unum et idem). This would imply that such terms as “will,” therefore, do not name some
entity, or even some ultimately isolatable power (as Kenny tries to find), in a Thomist
metaphysics. Hence, the problem of the interaction of the immaterial and the material
would seem to be attenuated, at least. Mind or will do not refer to any immaterial force
or thing that would be analogous in relationship to the body (as a metaphysical cause of
the body’s actions) to the captain of a ship or motor of a vehicle. Rather, both are simply
a terms that name the human person’s capacity to make informed, reason-guided choices
regarding how best to achieve human flourishing. Bodily acts, then, are not caused by
the will, in Aquinas’s view. They are the actions of a person who is acting volitionally
(i.e., in a goal-directed way) in the pursuit of a thing or state of affairs that is perceived to
be a good. For example, when I reach for a piece of apple, rather than a donut, as a
snack, it is not my will (or for that matter my mind) that lifts my arm.
Thus, Aquinas is not inconsistent to allow us to call the soul “mind,” nor to allow
there to be a real distinction of the aspects (mind and body) of the human person. First,
since the mind, as we have seen, is not a “thing” that acts, then the soul, not the mind, is
the source of the relevant activity, but by naming the highest potential that the human
soul brings to the human person, he can use the convention mind to refer to the soul.
Secondly, since the soul grants the power of mental activity to the person, and since the
soul is not the body – but is the principle of the body – we are correct to call the
distinction between mind and body a real one. So, thirdly, Aquinas could hold that the
mind qua immaterial entity, strictly speaking, does not cause the body to move, but the
motion of the body cannot be accounted for unless one acknowledges that the person who
moves and acts bodily does so in a goal-oriented way; and that goal oriented way is
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rational and purposive in intent. Finally, the motion of the body is not mental, but it is
distinct from the mind that is part of the person’s acts.64
The preceding discussion shows that Aquinas’s hylomorphism sets the question of
mind-body interaction on a different footing. His commitment to the unity of human life
in the soul-produced person is the distinct contribution he makes to the philosophy of
mind. Conundrums would seem to be mitigated, at least over how the so-called
immaterial mind, with its ostensibly, non-law governed acts, could interact or act upon
with the material body that is qua physical subject to physical forces and laws. To
advert, in our discussion of human acts, to the intellectual or even the volitional feature of
human experience does not provide us with an additional causal explanation for, say, a
man swimming that must be appended to the otherwise merely physical description.
Bodily acts, then, are not best described or conceived of as caused by the acts of the
mind, such as belief and will. That way of putting the matter posits an ontological
distinction between the two aspects of the unitary human life that, in Aquinas’s view, is
wrong. Rather, both the acts of the mind and the acts of the body are endeavors that
reveal to us that to be human is to be a physical being that makes informed, reasonguided choices regarding how best to achieve human flourishing. All the acts of a human
being’s life (both the volitional and the non-volitional) are, ultimately, acts associated

64

Here we come to way of conceiving the relationship between mind and body that points to a
solution to the Cartesian problem of mind/soul and body interaction, one which does not make the mistakes
of eliminative or reductionistic theories of mind and body. Since the power and action of knowing,
deciding, willing, and bodily actions or movements can only belong properly to a being that is real in the
primary sense, the problem of interaction simply does not present itself Rather, the mind is the result of an
activity [Remember that you earlier said that it was an activity itself. Of course, you also said it is a power.
It seems that this a third way of talking about it.] that is taking place in or by the entirety of a human
person. Hence, mind is not something that can be described as acting or causing to act, except in qualified
analogous way (much the way that soul can be called “mind” analogously.)
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with a person, who ultimately lives in a goal-directed way, pursuing things or state of
affairs perceived to be a good. However, if we take seriously Aquinas’s definition of
human’s – i.e., rational animals – and realize that for him to be human is to be a person
(of a particular sort) then we can say (in a qualified sense) that even acts of the autonomic
nervous system, which have no conscious quality to them for the person -- or the cellular
processes that sustain life – can be regarded as acts of a person. They are animal acts of
the rational animal. Hence, they qualify as the acts of a person, although not an act that is
specifically human. As life sustaining acts, they too would be part of the intellectual
soul’s gift of orientation toward a particular end – the living of the life of a rational
animal.
If we speak of beliefs, intentions, desires, choices, and reason we are not, in the
hylomorphic theory of Aquinas, introducing mental concepts that have no relationship to
the material world. For Aquinas, our life is that of a material agent, capable of awareness
and understanding qua a material agent, who lives in the law-governed and ordered
material world. To speak of them is to provide an adequate portrayal of human acts. But,
as human acts they have involved in them physical factors, as well. We choose, as we
do, because we are oriented, toward the good, Aquinas argues: “The will is a rational
appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. . . . Since, therefore, everything,
inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is
to something good."
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That which is perceived as “the good” we choose. This perception is, of course,
linked to our experience in the material world.65 Hence, the man (described above) who
is swimming may be swimming to escape a sinking ship, or to save a child, or to impress
a young woman with his athletic prowess, or to improve his health. Each choice is
informed by the physical state of affairs that is perceived to be relevant. The fulfillment
sought is not divorced from the material set of conditions. But since the rational
awareness (it could be deliberative, but need not be) that leads to an action is not caused
by the material set of conditions (even when we are directly acted on by an essence), then
in Aquinas’s doctrine of human action qua rationally animal acts our choices are free acts
of a rational mind. The problem that belief, judgment, intention, choice, etc face is not
one of being deterministically caused by the physical. Rather, the challenge that the
person who believes, judges, . . . etc must confront in order to make right and good
choices, as Aquinas contends in his reply in Ia, involves Q 19, a 3, having adequate
knowledge of the good and so ordering his acts and thoughts.66
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“For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above (1, 2); those
are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of
movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is
necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of
the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other
hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or
movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in
something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in something
else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are
not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have knowledge of the end
are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for
an end.’
66
“. . . the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed
to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or
imaginary good is proportionate not to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the
universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good,
apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way
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Aquinas’s hylomorphism and contemporary mind-body theories
Aquinas’s arguments regarding his doctrine of hylomorphic unity allows him to
embrace a theory of mind-body “identity.” And to describe this identity we can talk of
duals-aspects of a more basic underlying entity that is the relevant source of the
“identity” of the mind and body. He developed his own nuanced theory of hylomorphism
from an Aristotelian starting point, but the permutations he introduces to Aristotelianism
place him in a distinct philosophical category.67 As we have seen, his locutions
sometimes make him confusing to read. However, as we have shown, by positing form
and matter as fundamental “causes” of the existence of all primary substances, including
human beings, Aquinas looks beyond the problems that are associated, even in his own
day, with the problematic status of mind and body interaction. Instead, he focused
attention on the existence of primary substances (i.e., the specific ordinary particular
entities of everyday encounter) as the true ontologically concrete expressions of being.
His doctrine of the relationship between mind and body is a consequence of this starting
point, since in his view mind and body are distinct “parts” of human existence. But these
‘parts’ are not primary substances that have existence. When considering the relationship
between mind and body metaphysically, Aquinas’s paradigm looks to the human being as

as it depends on the object.‘ Also, see his discussion in the entirety of this Question, especially articles 3 –
6 for a fuller picture of his view of the relationship between reason and the will.
67
Suttor claims that Aquinas’s treatise on man “probably did more than any earlier document, and
perhaps more than any later document, to confirm Christians in the realization that
ensoulment (active) and embodiment (passive) are the same process looked at from different angles.” It is
my conviction that this estimation is essentially correct regarding Aquinas, who utilizes concrete nouns to
name the various angles of vision upon the process being described. “Yet, the usage,” as Suttor also
acknowledges, “leaves its mark on his text, in sentences which do not do sufficiently delicate justice to the
reciprocal and co-relative intelligibility of the nouns ‘soul’ and ‘body’, which are better thought of as
gerunds. . . He recognized that concrete terms better expressed than abstract terms the conditions of actual
being.” xv – xvi.
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a unitary whole as the primary substance that is ontologically foundational. As is the
case with all primary substances in Aquinas’s hylomorphic metaphysics, the human being
must be considered to be the subject in which all other features or aspects of that
substance exist.68 Seeing the relationship between mind and body from this starting
vantage, Aquinas offers to philosophy of mind a metaphysical scheme in which ‘mind’
and ‘body’ are understood to be distinct linguistic terms that describe or express the two
very real modes of human existence. But human beings do not exist in these modes;
rather these modes express the complexity of human life as an organic unity.
Aquinas’s insistence that mind and body are both equally modes that give
expression to the essential nature of unitary human existence means that he is not
reductionistic in the way of many modern identity theories. These theories attempt to
make mental statements reducible to or translatable into statements about physical states
(or at least into statements about various sorts of relations involving states of human
beings, where those relations are neutral as to the existence of anything ultimately
“mental” in character). However, in Thomas’s judgment (as was discussed in chapter
three) the very concept of “being physical” itself requires some explanation. For him, in
a world such as ours that has in it both physical states and mental states, “being physical”
would be no clearer – in itself – than is “being mental,” so a reductive materialism that
dismisses the mental as a real irreducible feature of our world, preferring to claim that the
mental is in the final analysis really and only physical, would be woefully inadequate. In
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Recall from chapter three that for Aquinas Being is in some sense an even more fundamental
ontological category than substance. This makes his view of substance somewhat different from
Descartes’s. And it means that Aquinas’s use of the term “substance,” while carrying some of the
metaphysical freight that Spinoza would want it to carry, is not necessarily the same concept as his. Being,
then, is perhaps much more like Spinoza’s Natura Naturans than Natura Naturata.
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his estimation, the hylomorphism that he develops out of Aristotle as a beginning source,
allows us to begin to understand that both the mental and the physical are required to
account for one another; neither can be ontologically prior, because anima informing
matter is productive of both.69 Because his hylomorphism allows him to explain the
nature of the physical bodies that exist qua informed entities, as well as explain how the
mind must be understood to be distinct from the physical, he would understand the
epistemological objections to reductive physicalism posed by Barbara Montero:
Indeed, since most think that the mind must be physical, the project they are
engaged in is not so much arguing that the mind is physical, but, rather, trying to
show how the mind could be physical (given that it is). And so, whether the
account of mentality that physicalists propound is expressed in terms of reduction,
realization, identity, supervenience, explanation or even elimination, the goal is to
provide a plausible theory of mentality (or, as the case may be, a theory that
accounts for what we mistakenly took to be mentality) that is compatible with the
view that the world is fundamentally physical. For example, if one thinks that it
is incumbent on physicalists to explain mentality then the explanation, it is
thought, must make reference exclusively to physical phenomena; if one thinks
supervenience suffices for physicalism, then the supervenience base must be
entirely physical; and so forth. But what does it mean to be physical? It seems
that those who take the central concern of the mind-body problem to be the
relationship between mental properties and physical properties—and if Kim is
right, this is just about everyone—should have at least a rough idea of what it
means to be physical, not necessarily a strict definition, but at least a notion of the
physical that excludes some, if not actual, then at least possible, phenomena from
being physical. For if we cannot even conceive of something being nonphysical,
it is difficult to grasp what physicalists could be arguing for—to say nothing of
what that they could be arguing against.70
Rejecting reductive materialistic explanations for the mind and body relationship,
Aquinas is just as adamantly anti-dualistic, except in a highly qualified theological sense.
He acknowledges that the soul is distinct from the body and can survive the death of the
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See chapter three of this dissertation.
Barbara Montero, “Post-Physicalism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies Vol. 8, No. 2
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body, but this does not entail dualism of the Cartesian or Augustinian variety. In
Aquinas’s ontology, while being a “thinking thing” or a mind is part of the definition of a
human being (rational animal), his very definition requires us to acknowledge that being
human involves a form of intellect that is essentially biological. The allowance Aquinas
makes for the survival of the soul after physical death is built on the combination of two
intellectual commitments. The first is his rejection of any reductionist account of the
world in which we live – a world which contains minds that are engaged in acts of
knowing that are quite ontologically different from any physical states with which they
are associated. The second is his theological belief that the soul is naturally immortal.
But because it is the person who exerts the powers made possible by the soul and not the
soul itself, then powers such as sensation and memory are not exercisable in such a state.
So, he contends the soul’s natural orientation for union with the body will, sometime
following physical death, be reunited with the matter of the body in the resurrection. 71
But during this period the soul is active in knowing: “As soon as it ceases to turn to the
body it turns to higher beings. It does not follow on this account that the knowledge is
not natural, for God is the author of the infowing of light [knowledge] not only of grace,
but also of nature” (Summa, I a, 89, 1 ad 3).
Nor would Aquinas be a proponent of various non-reductionist theories of
physicalism such as supervenience or emergentism. The first of these, supervenience, is
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This theological proposition is, of course, incredible to many philosophers. However, while its
intelligibility will not be defended or critique in this chapter, it is worth noting that the belief in the
resurrection of the body in Aquinas’s theology is a further proof that calling him a dualist is wide of the
mark. To be human is, for him, to be a corporeal being endowed with the image of God and living a
rationally biological life, even eschatologically. We shall explore Aquinas’s doctrine of the incorruptibility
of the soul (as opposed to the idea that it is immortal (as Spinoza puts it) in the final chapter of this work
along side Spinoza’s own claim that the mind is immortal.
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an attempt to allow for mental state, without necessarily accepting the ontological reality
of mind as something that engages in the mental activity that those states would involve.
Supervenience does not want to insist on, in the strictest sense, the dependence of mind
upon the body. It does not argue, for instance, that mental states are simply physical
states described differently. And yet, there is, for the philosophers who hold to
supervenience, a primacy of the physical. As Kim notes:
According to some philosophers, mind-body supervenience gives us the right kind
of physicalism: It respects the primacy of the physical by giving a clear sense to
the idea that the physical determines the mental. Without the instantiations of
appropriate physical properties, no mental property can be instantiated, and hat
particular mental properties are instantiated depends wholly on what physical
properties happen to be instantiated. And yet. . . mental properties remain distinct
from their physical base properties.72
However, many philosophers who embrace supervenience as an account of mind
and body in human beings do regard it as “affirming a relation of dependence or
determination between the mental and the physical; that is, what mental properties a
given thing has depends on, or is determined by, what physical properties it has.”73 In
the case of supervenience as a description of the relationship between mind and body,
this theory does not suffice, in Aquinas’s judgment, because as he saw it the acts of
understanding and reasoning cannot be intelligibly described as causally dependent upon
any underlying physical substrate. For Aquinas, even though the mental acts of a human
being cannot be done without the so-called physical substrate (the body, he would say),
they are acts that are so radically distinct from the matter which underlies the human
activity of understanding and reasoning . Even if one posits (as supervenience doctrines
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do) thought as a thing over-and-above a brain-state, but nonetheless contend that the
brain-state is necessarily causal of the mental act, he fails, in Thomas’s judgment, to see
that understanding is something quite distinct from any set of physical conditions. The
very nature of rational insight necessitates, he argued, that thought be conceived as nondependent qua rational insight upon physical states of affairs.74
It would also be incorrect to place Aquinas in the so-called emergentist fold.
This species of non-reductive physicalism is committed to the reality of laws of
emergence at work in the world such as the following: “When appropriate [material]
‘basal conditions’ are present, emergent properties must of necessity emerge.”75
Emergentism attempts to protect the integrity of mind as an existent reality in its own
right. The properties themselves, although still “physical,” would be a special sort of
physical state, not reducible in terms of the sorts of states out of which they emerge.
However, against this theory of mind-body relations, Aquinas would argue, I think, that
such a commitment to laws of emergence entails a granting of metaphysical priority to
the “physical” as ontologically foundational without accounting for the physical
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Aquinas would find common cause with the perspective of William Hasker regarding the nonmateriality and, therefore, independence of rational acts. “Now let us suppose that all human thinking is
physically determined in the following sense: (1) Every thought or belief accepted by a person is a result of
that person’s brain being in a corresponding state. (2) We assume, provisionally, that the physical
indeterminacy which exists at the quantum level makes no perceptible difference in the overall functioning
of the brain. So that the brain functions, in effect, as a [materially or physically] deterministic system. It
follows that (3) every brain state, and therefore every thought and belief of the person, is fully determined
by the physical functioning of the brain in accordance with the deterministic laws of physics. Is it not
evident, on this supposition, that rational thinking is an impossibility? In cannot be true, on this
assumption, that anyone’s thinking is guided by rational insight; rather, it is guided entirely by the physical
laws which govern the brain’s functioning, which proceed with no regard to whether the thought processes
they generate correspond to principles of sound reasoning. . . . [To hold this, one] must admit that our belief
that we are capable of rational thinking is an illusion [which would, of course, undercut the claim that such
a theory, itself, is true in any sense that we define the concept of being true.” Metaphysics: Constructing a
World View, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1983), 48 – 49.
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I am indebted to Kim for this definition of emergentism. See, Kim, 228.
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organization of the very ‘basal conditions’ it posits in the first place. He would argue, in
good Aristotelian fashion, that the physical basal conditions cannot account for
themselves, since the organizational information (form) that enables the existence of such
basal conditions is distinct from the physical states that are organized in such a way so as
to make possible the existence of those states as basal conditions for mind to supervene.
Here, as with every other point of comparison between Aquinas’s doctrine and
contemporary theories, his hylomorphic understanding of the soul is critical. Something
makes the biological entity capable of rationality through a particular mode of physical
organization capable of life and awareness; and that same something is the source of the
mind as an aspect of human existence that is radically distinct from the body, but not an
essence in its own right.
Aquinas’s hylomorphism positions his theory of mind-body in relation to other
philosophical discussions as an important alternative way of expressing the nature of the
question in our quest to envision the mind-body relationship; yet, his perspective, it will
be noticed, has at first blush much in common with so-called dual aspect theory. But
there is a difference, even in this positive comparison. Dual aspect theory is for the most
part content to describe the paired phenomena of mind and body without pursuing an
account of the reason why any entities might in fact be doubly-aspected in this way. We
have demonstrated, that if we acknowledge Aquinas’s doctrine to be a kind of dual-aspect
theory, the employment the term “dual-aspect” need not cause us to think of mind (being
rational) and body (being animal) as distinct aspects of a human being’s life, in the sense
that they have nothing to do with each other. Were that false interpretation allowed, we
would be placed, as we endeavor to interpret Aquinas, in the difficulty that faces the
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parallelism interpretation of Spinoza’s doctrine, namely, that we now have a functional
dualism in the place of an ontological one.
As we have shown, in Aquinas’s judgment, a human being qua mind and body is
a primary substance whose essence can be defined as but the unitary process of living as
rationally the life of a biological entity. For analytic purposes Aquinas considers mind
and body as something like two modes that express existentially the single act of being of
an entity that is irreducible in its rational animality. However, that kind of analysis is, in
his view, abstracted from the actual living of a person. Mindedness, while distinct from
the matter that is minded, is not ultimately able to be thought of as separable from that
minded matter, because the mindedness itself is the mindedness of a living physical entity
– i.e., a person. 76 Hence, Aquinas provides at least the beginning intuitions of an
account of how a human being can be described as a singular entity, yet can be regarded
simultaneously as mental and physical in his existence. He offers us in medieval and
Aristotelian terminology a theory of the relationship between the organic complexity of
the human body -- whose complexity is dependent upon the in-formational powers of the
soul -- that accounts for the presence of the mental in biological beings as an aspect of
their living embodiedness. Aquinas grants to us in his hylomorphism a philosophical
analysis of the nature of the mind that provides what Jonas claimed for Spinoza’s
76

This is captured in Aquinas’s definition of a person, when considering a human being. A person
is, in his metaphysics, an individual substance of a rational nature. Such a definition can apply to the
“persons” of the Trinity. But a human being is called by Aquinas both person and rational animal. Hence,
a good Thomistic definition of human person would be something like, an individual primary substance of
a rational nature whose rationality is rooted in its biology and whose biology does not exist separately from
its rationality. We shall address in the final chapter how the last part of this way of envisioning the human
person is reconcilable with Aquinas’ claim that the act of reason is not dependent upon the body and is,
thereby, separable from the body at death. Suffice it to say at this point that I am, at present, addressing
Aquinas’s doctrine of the identity of the “thing” that is a rational animal, not the distinction that must be
posited between the principles (form and matter) that in unity instantiate a particular rational animal.
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metaphysics, i.e. “a speculative means is offered for relating the degree of organization of
the body to the degree of awareness belonging to it.”77 The Angelic Doctor, therefore,
provides us with a reason to think a dual-aspect theory is true, not just as a description of
the state of affairs, but as the metaphysical situation of a human being’s existence. He
gives, in his doctrine of anima and its relationship to both mind and body, a way to
recover the unitary nature of human existence that both dualistic metaphysics and those
that grant ontological priority to the physical fail to do. What Jonas says of Spinoza can
also be said of Thomas: He gave to philosophy a way to describe the “intrinsic
belonging-together of mind and matter, which gave causal preference neither to matter, as
materialism would have it, nor to mind, as [dualistic] idealism would have it, but instead
rested their interrelation on the common ground of which they were both aspects.”78
In his metaphysics, the mindedness of a living body is not simply to be the
mindedness of something that is, in one of its aspects, a living body; or the mindedness of
something that also has a bodily aspect. Rather, it is the case, for him, that the singular
act of existence that is a human being expresses itself in two aspects, but these aspects,
while distinguishable in their own powers, are always involved not only alongside one
another, but in one another. The physical act of human existence is essentially
manifested in the act of living rationally. Likewise, the mental activity that is the specific
difference in the definition of a human being is the activity of a physical entity that is a
living body.79 So Aquinas refuses to think of the mind (and the acts of understanding
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that we associated with it) simply as an immaterial aspect of a being that is also physical,
but precisely as the non-physical activity of a being that is physical. But the being itself is
in the final analysis not reducible to either. Mental acts and physical acts are both the
acts of a subject and agent -- a person.
In any case, if one is to be able to acknowledge any validity to Aquinas’s
metaphysical theory, he must be able to accept the idea that intelligibility and intellect is
a fundamental principle of the way the universe is. Spinoza would have been able to
agree with that, as his doctrine of Thought and Extension as Attributes of Deus sive
Natura indicates. So now we will turn our attention to reading Spinoza’s cryptic and
complicated claims about conatus and about “mind and body as one and the same thing”
in the light of the Thomistic framework that has been developed in the last two chapters,
and then eventually return to questions concerning the “subsistent” and even “immortal”
status of the human soul.
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Chapter 5
Reading Spinoza Afresh:
Thomistic Hylomorphism and Spinoza’s Conatus
Spinoza’s doctrine of mind and body has spilt an ocean of ink;1 so much so that
we cannot undertake an exhaustive survey of the various interpretations offered in the
secondary literature. In much of the commentary, however a common difficulty
confronts his interpreters, i.e. the meaning of his statement in II, P 7, sch.:
Thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance,
comprehended now under this attribute, now under that. So, too, a mode of
Extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, expressed in two
ways. . . And so, whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of Extension or
under the attribute of Thought or under any other attribute, we find one and the
same order, or one and the same connection of causes – that is, the same things
following one another.2
In this argument he builds on the conclusions of Book I of Ethics that there is only
one Substance, namely God or Nature; and the “God” is “the thinking Substance” and
“the extended Substance.”3 While Spinoza’s argument in the scholium involves his
conception of a single substance of which Thought and Extension are attributes, it is not
necessary for the purposes of the questions this dissertation is considering that we
critically evaluate the logic Spinoza employs to reach this. We can bracket the way that

1

A brief survey of some of the literature on this subject includes: Timothy L. S. Sprigge,
“Spinoza: His Identity Theory,” Philosophy Through its Past, ed. Ted Honderich, (New York: Penguin
Books, 1984), 164 – 167. Albert G. A. Balz, Idea and Essence in the philosophy of Hobbes and Spinoza,
AMS Press, Inc., 1967. (First published in New York, 1918.) E. M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, (London”
Routledge U Kegan Paul, 1930), 16 – 23. Henry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the
Latent Processes of His Reasoning, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 33 – 70.
Add to these R. J. Delahunty, Jonathan Bennett, and Michael Della Rocca, who are cited below.
2
My emphasis. [
3
We could, perhaps, just as readily put this in gerund-like terms, that Thought is Substance
“thinking” and Extension is Substance “being” extension.
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Spinoza arrives at his monistic conclusions, simply acknowledge that he does, and
proceed with an analysis of how exactly Spinoza conceives of the “one-and-thesameness” of the mind and the body. Of more immediate relevance, for this dissertation,
is Spinoza’s use of this conclusion that he posits in this scholium. It is the foundation
upon which Spinoza later seems to be clearly asserting (III, P 2, sch) mind-body identity.
He says, “mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute
of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension.” Interpreting Spinoza’s contention that
mind and body are one and the same thing is made further difficult, however, by what
many have called his explanatory or causal barrier between thought and extension, as
indeed between modes of any distinct Attributes.

In Book III, Proposition 2, Spinoza

claims that “the body cannot determine the mind to thinking, nor can the mind determine
the body to motion or rest, or to anything else.” Such a proposition would appear to
contradict or at least make confounding the claim he makes (which we have already
alluded to) in the scholium of this same proposition. If mind and body are in fact the
same thing how, one can ask, can these two sorts of Modes not be causally related in
some way? Hence, what he means by mind and body being “one and the same thing” and
how this idea relates to the prior statements of II, P 7 is a subject of no little controversy.
As we exposit and analyze Spinoza’s metaphysical commitments about mind and
body, the interpretation that follows will show how Spinoza’s concept of mind and body
oneness is comprehensible in the light of his concept of conatus, which is, I contend, a
much more foundational concept in his metaphysics than has previously been
appreciated. In the course of demonstrating the importance this concept has for Spinoza,
the similarities between conatus in his metaphysics and the hylomorphic understanding
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of form in Aquinas’s philosophy will be highlighted. What will be demonstrated, by this
approach, is why Spinoza’s doctrine is cast in the form it is, namely, mind and body as
one and the same thing. His doctrine is an important and particularized form of the
“identity theory” of mind and body (as is Aquinas’s) that is best captured by seeing mind
and body as two differing aspects of a single entity that is neither mind nor body
simpliciter. What follows will not attempt to tame Spinoza’s monism or radicalize
Aquinas, rather it will show that the distinctive terms that express Spinoza’s ontological
commitments regarding the oneness of human existence actually do much of the same
work in his metaphysics of mind and body that Aquinas’s Christian-Aristotelian
categories do in his philosophy.
Spinoza and “Identity Theory”
As we consider Spinoza’s cryptic statements about the identity between mind and
body, we should be aware of some issues that bemuse commentators regarding Spinoza’s
doctrine on this issue. There are essentially only two basic approaches that Spinoza
affords us. The first is to deny that there can, in Spinozistic terms, be an identity relation
between mind and body. The other option is to take Spinoza seriously, and then try to
explain how the identity in question can be understood. R. J. Delahunty is an example of
one who claims quite forcefully that Spinoza’s metaphysical statements are selfcontradictory on this issue. Two of the more engaging recent treatments of Spinoza that
take the identity approach seriously are those of Jonathan Bennett and Michael Della
Rocca.
Bennett sees Spinoza’s theory as asserting an actual identity, but in a highly
qualified sense that does not entail the numerical identity of mind and body. He argues
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that Spinoza’s concept of the identity of minds and bodies rests rather on the idea that, for
any given mind, there is a numerical identity between the “fundamental mode” in which
that mind in some sense consists and the fundamental mode in which some particular
body consists; and vice versa.4 By contrast Della Rocca, who is critical of Bennett’s
reading of Spinoza, argues that Spinoza’s metaphysical doctrine and his accompanying
epistemology require that a full-blown, strictly applied view of the numerical identity of
mind and body be attributed to Spinoza. This identity, Della Rocca emphasizes, is rooted
in Spinoza’s so-called “parallelism.” The distinction between these two approaches will
be seen below, but it is closely tied to how one interprets three issues: (1) the relationship
that the Attributes have to Substance; (2) whether there can be, in Spinoza’s thought
some type of Modes that are not Modes of the Attributes; and (3) the place that
parallelism has in Spinoza’s doctrine.
First, a world about parallelism will serve us well as a backdrop to the issues that
will concern us in this chapter. Both Bennett and Della Rocca, in different ways, see the
notion of a psycho-physical parallelism as playing an important role in Spinoza’s
thought. Typically, however, a discussion of psycho-physical parallelism is brought into
a discussion of Spinoza as an alternative to any sort of reading in terms of identity,
reading Spinoza rather as following Leibniz’s theory of the way that the physical and the
psychic worlds are related. On this view, given that there can be no interaction between
mind and body, because they are dissimilar in essence, it is simply held that there must
rather be no more than a kind of isomorphism or mapping between the physical world
4

Bennett’s view is thus indeed a kind of numerical identity view, even though he does not himself
put it in those terms, and chooses to present it as in opposition to “numerical identity” approaches to
Spinoza. This issue will become clearer as we proceed..
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and the mental (or perhaps, more specifically, between the physical world and the way
that world is represented in the mental). Parallelism generally fails, I contend, as an
explanation of Spinoza’s own doctrine, because it allows us to assume that he was willing
to ensconce himself safely in the harbor of such unexplained mapping of activity.
Psychophysical parallelism eschews interactionism on the grounds that events so totally
dissimilar as those of mind and body could not possibly affect one another. However,
parallelists simply accept the fact that every mental event is correlated with a physical
event in such a way that when one occurs, so too does the other. This does not seem, in
my estimation, to be consistent with Spinoza’s treatment of the nature of the way that
mind as a location of thought and emotions relates to the body as the location of activity
and changes which are, in some sense, the objects of the mind. Parallelism, if it wants to
be an adequate explication of Spinoza’s doctrine, ought to try to provide us with an
explanation of how the parallelism could work.5
Parallelism fails, in part, because it misses the importance of an aspect of
Spinoza’s thought that, I contend, is the central issue in Spinoza’s own theory, namely
his describing all things as being alive [II, P 13, sch]. While pan-psychism is the label
that this aspect of Spinoza’s doctrine often receives, pan-psychism is not going to enter in
any substantive way into my treatment of Spinoza’s doctrine. However, it should be
noted that Spinoza’s actual argument in the second part of Ethics is not just saying that all
things are “minded.” Rather, his position seems to be that the universe is imbued with

5

Parallelism is, in my view, an example of the fundamental Cartesian divide that functions in
philosophy of mind. This prevailing attitude was mentioned in chapter one.
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life through and through.6 I take this to mean, for him, that “life” is a fundamental aspect
of the way Reality is, not a supervening property. This way of looking at the matter opens
up the possibility that for Spinoza the identity of mind and body is actually rooted in the
identity of a “living” entity as one with itself. Mind and body, then, are dual-aspects of
such a single thing. Where parallelism rejects dual-aspect theory on the grounds that no
“third” entity, whatever that might be, could be responsible for such vastly different
effects as those of mind and body, Spinoza’s doctrine attempts to describe just this kind
of situation My own eventual proposal will be a form of the dual-aspect approach.
However, the interpretation I offer will attempt to ground the duality of aspects in an
underlying unity in a way that can explain the unity of mind and body as resulting from
what Spinoza calls conatus.
Delahunty, Della Rocca, and Bennett on Spinoza
I will begin by considering the arguments of Delahunty, Bennett, and Della
Rocca, as a way of putting the issues that must be kept before us in clear relief. Let us
begin with Delahunty. He offers a criticism of Spinoza’s own formulation of his doctrine
of mind-body identity in Ethics; and his assault is a serious one.7 Delahunty focuses his

6

Lewis Feuer has commented about this aspect of Spinoza’s thought. “Panpsychism . . . was born
as a mystical, social revolutionary doctrine in the seventeenth century, but it was remarkably reinforced by
the science of the time. The last half of the seventeenth century was the age of microscopy . . . Spinoza
was indeed one of the Dutch microscopists, reveling in the magnifications which revealed the variety of
minute living things, and fitting his observations into his philosophy. As Colerus narrates” ‘He observed
also, with a Microscope, the different parts of the smallest Insects, from which he drew such Consequenses
as seem’d to him to agree best with his Discoveries.’ . . And Spinoza in explicating his gounds for
believing that ‘each part of Nature accords with the whole of it” made full and explicit use of the new
physiology and microscopy of blood and its constituents.” Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1958), 236f.
7
R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
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criticism on Spinoza’s insistence that there is a causal barrier between thought and
extension.
Whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of Extension or under the
attribute of Thought or under any other attribute, we find one and the same order,
or one and the same connection of causes – that is, the same things following one
another. . . .God is the cause – e. g. – of the idea of a circle only in so far as he is a
thinking thing, and of a circle only in so far as he is an extended thing. . . . as long
as things are considered as modes of thought, we must explicate the order of the
whole of Nature, of the connection of causes, through the attribute of Thought
alone; and in so far as things are considered as modes of Extension, again the
order of the whole of Nature must be explicated through the attribute of Extension
[II, P7s].8
In a later section, Spinoza unpacks this metaphysical claim. Building on this
scholium in III, P2, he flatly asserts the barrier to interaction mentioned above: “The
body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion
or rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else).” The proof offered for this
proposition is the ontological distinction between the Modes of the Attribues that Spinoza
believes is implied in the distinction he posits between the Attributes of Substance.
All modes of thinking have God for their cause in so far as he is a thinking thing,
and not in so far as he is explicated by any other attribute. So that which
determines the mind to think is a mode of Thinking, and not of Extension; that is
it is not a body. . . Now the motion-and-rest of a body must arise from another
body . . . and without exception whatever arises in a body must have arisen from
God in so far as he is considered as affected by a mode of Extension. . . .

8

This passage has been seen by those who have insisted on calling Spinoza’s doctrine
“parallelism” as a main pillar of that interpretation. The problems inherent with parallelism were discussed
in chapter one, namely that it presents us with a kind of functional dualism in Spinoza that does not do
justice to Spinoza’s further treatment in the Ethics of the relationship between mental states such as will
and bodily states. The functional dualism implied by the parallelist reading of Spinoza might as well be
ontological. This will be discussed below.
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Because of this insistence by Spinoza, Delahunty rejects the coherence of
Spinoza’s own claims that mind and body are actually one and the same thing. The
reasoning he employs in his refutation is in the following form:
1. If mode of thought (T) 1 is identical with mode of extension (E) A and
2. If EA causes another mode of extension EB, then
3. T1 has caused EB.
This result would be contrary to the obvious ban stated in III, P2; so Delahunty concludes
that Spinoza, although he does say that mind and body are the same, should not have said
this. He contends, therefore, that Spinoza himself is confused in his conclusions, because
his claims about mind and body sameness transgress against his own ban on causal
interaction between the Attributes of Substance. This would seem to be quite a strong
objection against the notion of numerical identity between the Modes.
A response to Delahunty’s critique of Spinoza’s mind-body identity statements is
found in Della Rocca’s work. He contends that Delhunty’s arguments fail because he
does not see that Spinoza’s system, far from being incoherent, actually requires us to
posit identity between mind and body in the strongest and the strictest sense. Della Rocca
refutes Delahunty’s objection, noting that Delahunty’s criticism of the mind-body
identity reading of Spinoza “turns on the view that causal contexts are referentially
transparent.”9 Della Rocca instead insists that one can read Spinoza as holding that
causal and explanatory contexts are referentially opaque.10 Following Quine on this

9

Michael Della Rocca,121 f.
This observation is significant. However, my concerns are different from his, although the
reading I will offer is consistent with Della Rocca’s claim that not all causal contexts need be referentially
10
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matter, he says that “a context is referentially opaque if the truth value of the sentence
resulting from completing the context does depend on which particular term is used to
refer to that object.”11 With this general principle in hand, he points to Spinoza’s own
stated sensitivity to the description-relative opacity of truth statements. Della Rocca
rightly reminds us of Spinoza insistence that any statements about God’s causality will be
true only if we describe God with specific consideration of the Attribute of Substance
under which we are describing that causality. Spinoza considers God to be the immanent
cause of each finite mode (1p18). A finite mode would be a transitive cause of another
finite mode. Now, Spinoza says quite clearly that whether it is true to say that God is the
immanent cause of a finite mode depends on how God is considered. Thus: “The modes
of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under the
attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other
attribute.”12
Undaunted by Delahunty and others who have insisted that the “barrier” between
the various attributes makes a “numerical identity” view impossible, Della Rocca argues
“that it is in part because of the explanatory barrier (and not in spite of it) that Spinoza
holds the numerical identity view.”13 For Della Rocca, the opacity of causal contexts is
the key to understanding Spinoza’s dual insistence: (1) Modes of completely distinct
Attributes can have no causal relationship, as well as the claim (2) that Modes of different
Attributes can be in fact numerically identical. “Spinoza thinks that the truth-value of

transparent in a Spinozistic system. What Della Rocca does not provide is a metaphysical explanation for
why referential opacity might be a part of Spinoza’s view about certain causal contexts.
11
Ibid, 122
12
Ibid, 122 – 123.
13
Ibid, 118.
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certain immanent causal claims is sensitive to the way in which the immanent cause is
described.”14

Della Rocca believes that his own reading avoids violating “the

conceptual [and causal] separation between the attributes,”15 without denying the proper
ontological relationship that the Attributes have to Substance. The secret to this is two
fold for Della Rocca: the opacity of causal relations and Spinoza’s parallelism.The
doctrine of parallelism provides Della Rocca the foundation for understanding Spinoza’s
acceptance of mind-body identity in the first place.Commenting on Spinoza’s statement
in II, P 7, which says “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things,” Della Rocca takes this to mean not only that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between ideas and extended things, but that, for Spinoza, “the fact that
the order and connection within the two series is the same entails that certain neutral
properties are shared by parallel modes.”16 But parallelism alone cannot account for the
identity statements that it allows for.
On Della Rocca’s reading, Spinoza had a view of identity in which the identity
between two modes requires only that have all their extensional properties in common.
By “extensional property” Della Rocca means a property that is neutral regarding
whether or not the property in question is one of extension or thought (or one of the other
Attributes). The reason that only extensional properties are relevant for the question of
how Spinoza argues for mind-body identity regards what is involved whenever we
recognize non-identity. In Della Rocca’s view any statement of the kind “a is not b,” can
only be true if there is “some difference between a and b that explains their non14

Ibid, 123.
Ibid, 158.
16
Della Rocca, 133.
15
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identity.”17 He thinks that Spinoza insisted that any facts about non-identity could only
be true if they could be explained by property difference between the items under
consideration. This way of describing Spinoza’s reasoning he bases on proposition 4 of
Book I, which he interprets to be telling us clearly “that there must be a way to
distinguish two distinct things.”18
Thus, since Spinoza regards the properties of being extended and being thinking
as intensional, these properties can be left to the side for the purposes of the
argument here, and so can all the particular properties that presuppose on or the
other of these general properties. Any conclusion about the identity of a mode of
thought and a mode of extension will have to be reached on the basis of a
relatively impoverished class of properties.19
Since intensional properties (those that are Attribute-relative) are irrelevant, in
Della Rocca’s opinion, for deciding the issue of identity between mind and body,20 he
contends that there must be a class of extensional properties that is small but nonetheless
important for Spinoza’s logic. These properties are properties that Spinoza assumes in
the Ethics; and they are comprised of properties that Spinoza utilizes in the course of his
various proofs and explanations. For instance, the property of having X number of
effects would be a neutral property in that more than one Mode could share the property
of having X number of effects. Also, there would be the property of being temporal or

17

Ibid, 132.
Ibid. Shirley’s translation of this proposition reads: “Two or more distinct things are
distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the
difference of the affections of the substances.”
19
Ibid, 132.
20
Della Rocca claims that Spinoza held to a version of what Della Rocca calls “Leibniz’s Law.”
“a = b iff a and b have all their properties in common. As Leibniz himself and other have recognized,
however, this principle does not hold in complete generality. There are certain kind of properties that are
such that the fact that a has a property of that kind, and b does not, does not by itself undermine the claim
that a = b. The properties included within the scope of the above principle are, of course, intensional
properties. Since intensional properties are not covered by Leibinz’s Law, we can formulate a version of
Leibniz’s Law that is exceptionless” a = b iff a and b have all their extensional properties in common”
[130 – 131].
18
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having duration [is this really a word?] existence. A final extensional property that Della
Rocca thinks is important is the property of being a complex individual. These neutral
ways of describing Modes does not commit one to a point of view regarding the type of
Attribute in terms of which one is describing them, since such descriptions can apply
across Attributes. Hence, on this level a similar description could be given of Modes of
different Attributes that would allow for these different Modes to share extensional
properties. For Della Rocca, Spinoza’s identity theory, as we have said, is based on the
centrality of parallelism in Spinoza’s thought. This parallelism is, however, a parallelism
that entails the presence of neutral properties and not Attribute-relative properties. He
argues that if there is a neutral property F that is a neutral property of a certain Mode of
extension (E1) that contributes to the order and connection of the extended series, then
(by parallelism) there must be a parallel mode of thought (T1) that also has property F.
“If there were no parallel mode of thought that had feature F, or if the fact that feature F
is present at that point were not explained by a certain feature of another mode of
thought, then,” Della Rocca asserts, “the order and connection of the mental series would
be different in a certain respect from the order and connection of the physical series.”21
That would violate the parallelism that Della Rocca thinks is the foundational premise of
Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology. Since there must always be an intra-attribute
modal explanation (as is described in the previous quote) for all causes; and since
parallelism always holds in Spinoza’s metaphysics, Della Rocca reasons to the existence
of shared extensional, that is, Attribute-neutral properties.

21

Ibid, 135.
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However, Della Rocca wants us to understand that things need only share certain critical
neutral properties in order for identity-statements to hold with regard to what modes are
parallel to each other. Such a qualification about the necessity of sharing extensional
properties means that relevant to parallelism, it follows that a Mode of extension and a
Mode of thought will share certain extensional properties that are Attribute neutral. By
focusing on certain extensional properties only then Della Rocca believes that the proper
distinction between Modes qua thought or extendeness can be maintained, without
denying identity between mind and body. Since only a certain set is critical for identity
to be asserted, then we can on the basis of other extensional properties allow for
distinction. This reasoning allows Spinoza, to rightly claim that “mind = body, without
treating distinction between the two as merely nominal.”22
Della Rocca’s view of parallelism in Spinoza attempts to posit identity of mind
and body in the strictest possible form, but to do so without denying some kind of duality
in Spinoza’s doctrine. For Della Rocca, “the duality in Spinoza’s parallelism is not one
between distinct things but between distinct descriptions or ways of conceiving things;” it
is a semantical parallelism.23 This idea of semantical parallelism is, in part, rooted in the
“relativity” of explanatory contexts. Thus, parallelism is strict with regard to identity, but
is relative with regard to ways of considering the things that are identical. An object has,
for example, the property of being physical only relative to a certain manner of
conceiving or describing it. This conception of description-relativity of mental and
physical properties in general is additional to the mind-relativity of content in particular

22
23

Ibid.
Ibid, 19.
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[Spinoza’s insistence that things are “known” differently in different minds]. . . Thus, the
general notion responsible for much of what is most intriguing and important about
Spinoza’s theory of [mental/ideational representation] is also the notion that provides the
key to understanding his position on mind-body identity. This is the notion of relativity.
That different kinds of relativity should be so significant in Spinoza is not a surprising
fact about a philosopher whose favorite locution is, perhaps, “insofar as” (“quatenus”).
Since . . . mode identity results from parallelism, we can see how this identity stems from
Spinoza’s theory or representation and, ultimately, from his explanatory barrier between
thought and extension.24
The view of the mind in relation to the body that Della Rocca offers us would
seem to be one in which the mind is a complex set of organized “ideas” that not only
precisely parallels the body, but is at the same time one essentially with the latter. But
how could this be? On Della Rocca’s reading, when Spinoza says that, “the object
constituting the essence of the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension
which actually exists, and nothing else,”25 [II, P 11] we must understand Spinoza to mean
by “object,” if we follow Della Rocca, to mean something like the following: the mind is
a representation of the things that are going on in the body that qua representation
parallels the body exactly and essentially.26 Della Rocca seems to suggest that as a
representation, the mind can be the same as the body for Spinoza, because of Spinoza’s

24

Ibid, 139.
Della Rocca’s translation.
26
Ibid, 18 – 19. “Spinoza’s use of the traditional term objective {when describing the how things
follow in God formally from God’s infinite nature from his idea in the same order and connection]
indicates that he is speaking of a representation relation between the items in the causal chain of things and
the parallel items in the causal chain if ideas.”
25
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contention that an idea of X (at least unconfused ones) always involve the idea of X’s
essence. This is the same thing as saying, in Spinoza’s terms, that the idea is not a
Humean representative impression one has which is radically distinct qua idea from that
which it represents. Rather, “idea”, as Della Rocca puts it, represents an objective
essence and not a mere impression of something. And since the essence of the body is, in
some sense, what the body is, and since the mind’ essence is simply to be the ideas of that
essence, then the mind and the body are one and the same. But the presence of the
essence in the mind is not caused by the body; rather the mind is always active in its
knowing. Parallelism allows then for there to be an essential oneness of mind and body
as these two Modes share certain extensional properties without being the cause or
explanation of each other.
According to this way of stating the order of things, the mind is numerically
identical with the body in the sense that the mind is just the essence of the body relative
to the way that the essence is considered under that Attribute of thought, rather than the
Attribute of extension wherein the essence is “located” qua extended Mode. This idea of
the parallelism of essence is then applied by Della Rocca to the identity of mind and
body, in conjunction with the thought that all causal contexts (and therefore explanatory
barriers) are opaque, in order to defend his claim that the mind is the body, because it is
constituted in its essence by the essence of the body; hence it is identical with the body.27
Contra Della Rocca’s subtle reading of Spinoza, there is another and better way to
interpret the meaning of parallelism in a Spinozistic system. It can also deal with

27

This seems to be the import of Della Rocca chapter entitled, “The Essence Requirement on
Representation,” 84 – 106.
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Delahunty’s objections, but is more straightforward in its reading of Spinoza. It requires
taking a closer look at II, P 7, sch, which Della Rocca cites, which is according to
Spinoza (in III, P 2, sch) what we are to consider so that the denial of causality between
mind an body might be “more clearly understood.” But here, I contend, Spinoza is
introducing only an explanatory limit rather than a causal barrier between modes of
thought and extension. I am not denying that Spinoza might very well hold to a causal
barrier; in fact he does. However, the specific focus in this passage is on explanations,
not causality. He focuses our attention on the impossibility of explicating a mental state
of affairs by reference to a physical event or state. Concomitantly, he instructs us that
neither can a physical state be explicated in terms of concepts that apply to the mental.
He is essentially arguing that we cannot translate (or reduce) explications of states of
affairs involving modes of a given Attribute in terms of language referring to a different
attribute.28 Similarly, what Spinoza’s proposition 2 of Book III is arguably meant to do is
not to deny mind-body interaction, but simply establish that we have no proper way of
explaining such interaction. Spinoza indeed denies causal interaction in a sense – which
amounts simply to denying the intelligibility of such interaction – but does not thereby
need to deny interaction in some other, more ontological, sense. In fact, it could be that
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This should, I think, be a hint to those who would like to make Spinoza into a reductionist (of
sorts) that they should take pause. See as examples of those who want to reduce mind to body: Odegard,
Douglas. “The Body Identical with the Human Mind: A Problem in Spinoza’s Philosophy.” From The
Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, Vol. 55. 1971, 579-601.
Odegard contends that Spinoza’s theory, i.e. that the human mind is identical to the body, can only be true
if it is a human body. Wallace Matson, “Spinoza’s Theory of Mind.” From The Monist: An International
Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, Vol. 55, 1971, 568-578.Matson’s Spinoza actually has
no theory of mind, because the mind is explained functionally not causally. Donald Davidson endorses
this kind of interpretation of Spinoza in “Spinoza’s Causal Theory of the Affects,” Desire and Affect:
Spinoza as Psychologist, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (New York: Little Room Press, 2000), pp. 95-112.
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the notion of conatus which I shall try to unpack below gives Spinoza precisely a kind of
oneness of action on the part of an organism that can eschew the difficulties he has with
interactionism. In any case, bringing in axioms 2 and 4 in Book I, we see that conceptual
and explanatory descriptions are closely related in his mind. I take it that Spinoza means
something like the following in these two statements.29
Axiom 2: If one thing cannot be conceived through another then the thing must
be explained through itself.
Axiom 4: Knowing causation requires us to know the relationship an effect has to
a cause.
If the interaction cannot be “explained” then, for Spinoza, the interaction qua
perceived is nil. Absent an explanation, the very concept of causal interaction is void.
Hence, there is no causation attributable between mind and body. Della Rocca explicitly
argues, however, that a distinction such as the one I am drawing fails to interpret Spinoza
correctly. Hence, we are parting ways. He contends that “. . . such a separation of
causal relations and explanatory relations is a possible position and, indeed, a popular one
in contemporary philosophy. But, although it may be tempting to read Spinoza along
these contemporary lines, there is no evidence for doing so. This interpretation must
attribute to Spinoza the view that a claim of the form ‘mode of thought 1 causes mode of
extension B’ can be true, even if the corresponding explanatory claim is false. However .
. . for Spinoza, the truth of a causal claim depends on its explanatory value.”

29
30

30

The following is my translation of the Latin put in more colloquial terms.
Della Rocca, 124.
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I think that there is strong support for this way of understanding parallelism as
close to Spinoza’s actual position. In the latter part of the scholium to III, P 2, he focuses
on this very issue of explanatory agnosticism:
. . . (1) the order and the linking of things is one, whether Nature be (2) conceived
under this or that attribute, and consequently (3) the order of the active and
passive states of our body is simultaneous in Nature with the active and passive
states of the mind. Yet, although the matter admits of no shadow of doubt, I can
scarcely believe, without the confirmation of experience, that men can be induced
to examine this view without prejudice, so strongly are they convinced that at the
mere bidding of the mind the body can now be set in motion . . . . (4) Again, no
one knows in what way and by what means mind can move body, or how many
degrees of motion it can impart to body and with what speed it can cause it to
move. Hence it follows that when men say that this or that action of the body
arises from the mind which has command over the body, they do not know what
they are saying, and are merely admitting, under a plausible cover of words, that
they are ignorant of the true cause of that action and are not concerned to discover
it.31
I have numbered the steps of Spinoza’s argument so that we might be able to set down
the flow of his logic very clearly. Following the inserted numbering, we can see what
Spinoza is claiming:
(1) There is only one order of “things”
(2) This order can be conceived under either Attribute
(3) So, there is simultaneity of occurrences in Nature in the states of the extended
mode EA and the states of the mode of thought T1.
(4) And, attributing mental causation upon body or physical causation of mind is
epistemically indefensible (and therefore nothing of substance).
What we are allowed to say (according to III, P 7), then, can be cast as follows:
(1) If EA causes EB (by the law of Mode of Attribute causation)
(2) Then T1 attended EA’s causation of EB and caused T2

31

My Emphasis.
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(3) And the nature of T1’s relation to EB is opaque.
(4) Hence, there is no causal interaction, because [on my reading – “in the sense
that”] there is no explanation of it.
At this point it might be useful to note the ambiguity of a key concept in
Spinoza’s discussion of the oneness of mind and body, namely, that of a res (thing). The
role that this concept plays (ambiguously) in Spinoza’s thought will allow us later in this
chapter to articulate a perspective on mind-body identity that is distinct from Della
Rocca’s emphasis on representation, relativity and shared neutral properties. While res is
a general term, it seems to function in a technical (or at least quasi-technical way) at
times. Spinoza’s locutions that say mind and body are one and the same thing are
examples.32 Now, Spinoza claims that Substance and the affections of Substance are all
that really exist – and he equates affections of Substance with Modes [I, def. 5]. But
arguably, he may be taken as at least committed to the view that there are things that are
not precisely Modes of extension or Modes of thought, and not substances either. Rather,
they are something that can be alternatively considered as modes of extension or modes
of thought in the light of the two distinct Attributes of Substance thereby in question.
Another way of describing the nature of “things” in relation to the Modes of the
Attributes would be to say that they are necessarily expressed by (or in or as) the various
Modes of the Attributes of Substance. As such, each “thing” will be expressed in
different ways relative to the Attribute in question. (To that extent I agree with Della
Rocca.) If this way of stating the matter is correct, then it might be argued that, qua these
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See above in chapter three, pages 83 & 84, note 6 for a discussion of the way that res actually
functions in Latin. There Theodor Haecker, is quoted where he calls res one of the Hertzworter-- heartwords --for the Latin tongue, in which is concentrated something of the genius of the language.
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“things,” Spinoza is indeed arguing that a mode of extension and the idea of that mode –
the body and mind – are to be identified as the same as, not each other as such, but rather
identified as the same as the “thing” of which each of them exists only as as an aspect.
This is a different focus upon identity than that offered by Della Rocca. In his
interpretation, there is presumably a set of properties (F 1……10) that are Attribute neutral
that are shared by a Mode of thought and a Mode of extension. However, the question
becomes how these things are, in fact, shared. Here, I think, the ambiguity of the term
res comes into play. The parallel sharing of properties can only make sense if we can
contend that these properties are in a particular something. If so, one could then grant
that bodies and minds do not, as such, causally relate to or even “explain” one another;
but nevertheless, qua whatever “things” are involved in regarding “things” as either
bodies or minds in the first place, bodies and minds do indeed after all causally relate to
one another. (The advantage of this approach will be filled out below, as we consider
how Spinoza viewed the integrity of complex organisms.)
The way of reading Spinoza that I am suggesting at this point has at least some
affinity with that of Jonathan Bennett, whose view is not only distinctive in the way that
he posits the identity between mind and body, but it is possibly the most sophisticated in
the literature. Bennett offers what he calls the “mode identity” thesis as a way to account
for Spinoza’s insistence that “mind and body are one and the same thing.” Just as I have
suggested, Bennett argues that the identity of mind and body is not rooted in the sharing
of properties, as Della Rocca has contended. Nor is it rooted in parallelism (he thinks
that mode identity explains parallelism). Rather, there is some “something” that is
present in Spinoza’s identity equation, but is neither a Mode of thought or of extension
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strictly speaking. In order to offer his interpretation, however, Bennett has to argue that a
distinction must hold in Spinoza’s metaphysics between what he calls Attribute-involving
Modes and trans-Attribute Modes.
On this reading, it is the Modes that are the most properly basic features of
Substance. They are the way that Substance exists most fundamentally in concrete
reality. Such Modes, Bennett argues, are not essentially either Modes of thought or
extension or of any other of the Attributes. Instead, the truly properly basic Modes are, in
some sense, entities that are neither, because “they lie deep enough to be combined with
both attributes.” Bennett asserts that this way of construing the matter is critical if we are
to enable Spinoza’s claims to be coherent; it is the price one has to pay to allow Spinoza
to mean that mind and body can be the same thing. It must be “read into” Spinoza’s
metaphysic, Bennett contends, because for Spinoza extension and thought, while not
merely nominal distinctions about God or Nature, are not “really fundamental properties,
although they must be perceived as such by any intellect.”33 In Bennett’s view, the
Attributes of thought and extension would seem to be best understood as qualitative ways
that things exist; but as ways they are not basic properties that make a Spinozistic Mode a
mode.
When Spinoza says that “whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of
Extension or under the attribute of Thought, . . . we find one and the same order, or one
and the same connection of causes – that is, the same things following one another” [II P
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Ibid, 147. Cf. Shmueli, 61 – 72, 71. See 7 – 9 of this dissertation, where Shmueli’s
interpretation is presented: Shmueli has argued that one can discern an influence of Aquinas (indirectly) on
Spinoza’s concept of Attributes. He argues that Spinoza’s treatment of the Attributes of Substance was a
reinvigoration of the medieval debate about the nature of universals, especially as to whether any
predication could be made of God.
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7, sch], he knows that something has to be able to account for this psycho-physical
“parallelism.”34 Furthermore, embracing parallelism as he interprets it, Bennett considers
the Modes of thought to be best described, in their relationship to the Modes of extension
in terms that take mentality to be a psychological state of existence. (This distances him
from interpretations such as Balz and Curley who conceive of the parallel “identity”
between mind and body in a way that negates the psychological nature of ideas. 35) But
one can ask Bennett, nonetheless, how his brand of psycho-physical parallelism is to be
accounted for, since it is not clear how, in Spinoza’s system, a Mode can be something
that has its Attributes stripped off.
Bennett proposes a seemingly radical a solution to this problem involving what he
calls a differentia.
[Spinoza’s] thesis is rather that if P1 is systematically linked with M1, then P1 is
extension-and-F for some differentia F such that M1 is thought-and-F. What it
takes for an extended world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a
thinking world to contain my mind. . . .Spinoza usually takes it that a mode
‘involves the concept of’ an attribute (2p6d), so that entailments run upwards
from mode to attribute; but in our present context I must suppose him to be
thinking of modes – or ‘things’, as he calls them – as having their attributes

34

Ibid, 127 – 156. The concept of parallelism, as has already been suggested, is itself ultimately
an interpretation of Spinoza that could have difficulties as an expression of Spinoza’s thought. It all
depends upon how one conceives the parallelism. It could be seen as implying the same order, but on
parallel planes of existence that would seem to entail a kind of dualism that is more than conceptual, but
actually a dualism of activity. That conclusion would not be amenable to Spinoza’s thought. For example,
where he says, “. . . we find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes—that is, the
same things following from one another” [II, P 7, sch]. Bennett is right in his version of parallelism,
however, to dismiss Curley’s “logical” interpretation of Spinoza’s “parallelism” as simply meaning that an
idea is reducible to truths about each particular event, since “ideas can scarcely be regarded as individual
psychical entities.” [Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1969), 118. The question is not whether or not ideas can be so regarded, but what it
means to be an idea of a Mode of Extension in the first place, in Spinoza’s ontology.
35
Both Balz and Curley seem to view the “ideas” of the body as propositions that mirror the way
that reality itself is. Hence, our ideational life is the same as our physical life, because the propositions are
true propositions about real states of affairs.
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peeled off, i.e., as consisting in the F which must be added to extension to get my
body or to thought to get my mind.36
By allowing for the existence of such differentiae in Spinoza’s thought, Bennett claims
that we can make sense of Spinoza’s claim and allow him actually to mean that “physical
state P1 = mental state M1.” However, the identity of these states necessarily involves
the differentia as the unstated member of the identity equation: “if P1 is systematically
linked with M1, then P1 is extension-and-F for some differentia F such that M1 is
thought-and-F.” Bennett describes the general implication of this way of reading
Spinoza as meaning that what it takes for the world to contain a certain body is exactly
what it takes for a thinking world to contain the mind of that body
For Bennett, the cryptic nature of Modes, in Spinoza’s system, can be best
understood in the way that he (Bennett) describes the nature of extended modes.37
Bennett describes Spinoza’s understanding of the nature of a mode of extension as
functioning descriptively (qualifying or quantifying) as “adjectival” or “adverbial” with
respect to space (extension).38 This is a rather odd sounding way to put it, but what
Bennett means is fairly straightforward, once one begins to think about extension (space)
in terms of contemporary physics’ notion of “quarks.”
Contemporary particle physics depicts fundamental particles . . . . not as little
lumps of matter, but rather as spheres of influence; and their unsplittability is not
remotely like the end point on a line running through water drops, marshmallows,
billiard balls, diamonds and . . . fundamental particles, quarks. This may make
quarks unsplittable in a manner which satisfies the strongest demand that Spinoza
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Ibid, 141.
“As for Spinoza’s thesis that all particulars – minds as well as bodies—are modes: I have to
suppose that he started with a sound doctrine abut the modal nature of extended particulars and then
stretched it over mental ones as well on the strength of a general thesis that the extended world is mirrored
in detail by the mental world,” Bennett, 94.
38
Ibid, 95.
37
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could reasonably make [that they have true particularity in substance]. But it
deprives them of substantial status in a different way, by making them adjectival
upon space: the existence of a quark in a given region, according to this way of
looking at things, is the region’s having certain qualities. . . . [it] is a version of
Spinoza’s own position. . .39
Bennett labels this a “field metaphysic” and utilizes it to interpret the meaning of Mode
qua modifications of substance (i.e. ways that Substance is “qualfied” and “quantified”).
A complete Spinozist account of the world would have to provide replacements
not only for quantifications over regions but also for mentions of individual
regions. . . . we can replace [the substantial language] ‘Region R is F’ by ‘Space is
F there’ while pointing to R, or by ‘Space is F here’ while occupying R. . . . 40
By Bennett’s account, Spinoza’s view involves regarding extended Modes as ultimately
resting on properties whose instantiation by space amounts to the existence of what we
ordinarily refer to as distinct “regions” of space. The Modes that Bennett offers us, then,
are real states or properties of Substance. But ultimately, Spinoza’s one Substance would
have to be regarded as somehow the “totality” of all of the various ultimate “fields” that
there are - that of space simply serving as the model for how we are supposed to think of
the latter in general. Building upon this general thesis about the nature of Modes, then,
Bennett develops his view about Spinoza’s theory regarding the identity of mind and
body.41 He argues that, for Spinoza’s metaphysic: “If my mind is a mode and my body
is a mode, and my mind is my body, it follows that my mind is the same mode as my
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Ibid, 84.
Ibid, 95.
41
About this presentation Bennett interestingly says about Spinoza’s theory: “It is a metaphysical
speculation which I suppose is not true, and it is not even philosophically useful as an object lesson. But I
care whether I am right in attributing it to Spinoza, since it displays his basic metaphysic as more coherent
and better thought out than any previous commentator has found it to be.”
40
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body. . . . [Spinoza’s] thesis about the identity of physical and mental particulars is really
about the identity of properties.”4243
Applying this general description to Modes of all the Attributes, we can say that
for Bennett, for every Mode of any Attribute there must be a “fundamental mode” that is
itself not as such a Mode of any Attribute, and that is strictly speaking the identical Mode
involved in any ascription of “identity” across the Attributes. As we might put it, this
fundamental mode is in a certain way “in” the two distinct Modes thereby (but not
strictly) identified with one another; indeed the latter modes might even be said to
“consist” (each in its own way) in that fundamental mode, but without being strictly
identical with it. And this fundamental mode would not be anything like we take to be
ordinary particulars like minds or bodies, i.e., like Modes of thought or extension. For
the relation of those fundamental modes to Substance, again, is simply that of a property
to something “propertied” by it. Thus, the fundamental mode that is “in” some mode of
thought (and in which that mode of thought in some sense “consists,” although it is not
absolutely the same as the mode of thought) is numerically identical with the
fundamental mode “in” some mode of extension, and vice versa. This way of
understanding Spinoza means, for Bennett, that we can take Spinoza seriously, when he
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Ibid, 141.
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to argue this point of Bennett’s views critically,
I want to point out that, if there is some plausibility in it, then, as has already been suggested earlier in this
work, one might be able to read Spinoza’s view of Substance in relation to its Modes as having interesting
parallels with Aquinas’s view of God as pure Act of Being. Just as God’s own being, for Aquinas, is the
only real source of being, in which qua the only source of being all other things participate, so Spinoza’s
substance (especially if one takes into account Natura naturans) is the source in which all other things exist
qua modes.
43
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insists that Substance and Modes are what really exist. Further, we can also account for
how Modes can be understood as real qua particulars.44
Bennett is focused on keeping the conceptual distinction between Attributes (that
I suggested above is the focus of the relevant scholium) intact. What Spinoza cannot be
saying, Bennett concludes, is that “physical P1 = mental M1.”45 To say that would
violate the conceptual distinction between the Attributes, argues Bennett; and he thinks
his view of the fundamental modes as being the source of the identity relation between
the mind and the body keeps this inviolate. The fundamental modes, because they are
certain properties of Substance that are in a certain sense “in” the Modes of thought and
extension, may, in turn, themselves be regarded as true “Modes” (and indeed must be,
given Spinoza’s view that all that exists are Substance and its Modes). We are simply
viewing them as ways in which the one Substance is “propertied.” For this reason, but
also in order to distinguish his approach from the more familiar versions of the “identity”
thesis, he calls his view the “mode identity” thesis. One need not transgress the
conceptual barrier, Bennett concludes, because the explanation of identity in terms of
differentia means that identity is rooted in the differentia and not the Attributes, since it is
the differentia that combines with all the Attributes. Hence, no defiance of the barrier
between Attributes can be charged.
44

Cf. Bennett, 94, where he quotes appreciatively Edwin Curley’s observations: “Spinoza’s
modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be related to substance in the same way Descartes’
modes are related to substance, for they are particular things, not qualities. And it is difficult to know what
it would mean to say that the particular things inhere in substance. When qualities are said to inhere in
substance, this may be viewed as a way of saying that they are predicated of it. What would it mean to say
that one thing is predicated of another is a mystery that needs solving.” Bennett goes on to claim that his
reading has “solved the mystery.”
45
Ibid. Also see Bennett’s article “Eight Questions About Spinoza,” Spinoza on Knowledge and
the Human Mind Vol. 2, Y Yovel, (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 18. This is a volume of the “Spinoza by 2000: The
Jerusalem Conferences.
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Unlike the view of identity of the Modes as it is more ordinarily put forth – and
which requires some form of “relativization” of identity for its formulation – Bennett’s is
not, strictly speaking, a view according to which Modes of thought and extension are
identified with one another. Again, the identity relation concerns only certain
(“fundamental”) “modes” that are in a special way “in” modes of thought and extension,
and in which the latter might at best be said in a certain sense to “consist.” But one
might ask what these fundamental modes or differentiae might be in Spinoza’s system?
This question is especially important, since differentiae are described as something that
“consists in the F which must be added to extension to get my body or to thought to get
my mind.”46 Again, the identity that Bennett has in mind is strictly speaking an identity
relation involving the “fundamental modes” in (ordinary) particulars.
Two questions must be asked of Bennett’s interpretation. First, what could it
possibly mean for Spinoza to think of “modes or things” as having their attributes “peeled
off,” but able to be added to the Attributes. Does he mean this merely conceptually or as
a metaphysical given? This idea of a thinking Mode as being T + F is a problematic way
of constructing the relationship that a Mode has to itself. While the idea that I suggested
earlier, that in Spinoza’s thought there are some “things” that can be “expressed” in two
Modes, is itself consistent with Spinoza’s own statements, Bennett’s claim that there are
things (differentiae) that get “added” to Attributes is confusing. For instance, my body is
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Ibid., 142. Bennett does admit that his reading has to “credit Spinoza with having this change
of tune: it is the price for letting him mean that a certain mental mode is a certain physical mode, rather
than dismissing those texts as lapses or rescuing them through ‘relative identity’ manoeuvre.” I think the
Bennett is essentially on to the right track, but he does not account for what such a differentia might be in
Spinoza’s system. In fact, he thinks that it cannot be found and must be implied in Spinoza’s logic. Later,
as we consider the role of conatus in Spinoza’s thought, we may find a helpful inter-textual way of making
sense of Bennett’s notion of differentia.
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E + F and my mind is T + F, but then what am I? Am I ET + F? Or am I (E+F)+(T+F)?
Or am I F in the most basic sense? Thus while Della Rocca argues that Bennett’s theory
does not give him mind-body identity,47 there would seem to be an even more pressing
existential problem; Bennett’s view does not account for how I (and so, for that matter,
how anything) could actually be one with myself (or itself). As I shall presently suggest,
however, perhaps there is a different way to utilize the idea of “things” that are not as
such the Modes of extension or thought, but rather “expressed as” Modes of the latter
sort.
A second problem for Bennett is this. , Does it not follow from Bennett’s
suggestion that these stripped-down fundamental modes, at the very least, have an
ontological priority over the Attributes that are supposed to make them conceivable and
intelligible in the first place? How do these differentiae then avoid not being nothing
within the confines of Spinoza’s system? Perhaps something like this is what Spinoza
means, but it is an open question whether or not such a reading of the concept of Mode is
actually reconcilable to Spinoza’s system. 48 In Spinoza’s account, the Modes prima
facie must have properties that reflect the primacy that he grants (in some sense) to
Attributes of Substance. For the Attributes of Substance are the essence of Substance.
Since the Modes are modifications of Substance, how do the differentiae “somehow”
relate to substance as “properties” of it without the Attributes being involved in that
relation at all?. Bennett seems, in his interpretation, to turn Spinoza’s ontological ladder
upside down from the rather hierarchical view that Spinoza suggests, i.e. that Substance
47

Della Rocca, 158 - 160
Della Rocca, who will be considered below, thinks Bennett’s kind of reading is “Spinozistically
unacceptable. For Spinoza, all modes are modes of attributes.” Della Rocca, 121.
48
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is foundational, manifesting or manifested in (according to how one reads Spinoza’s view
of the Attributes) infinite Attributes that themselves are expressed by or in infinite and
finite attribute-expressing Modes. Reversing this conceptual scheme, Bennett argues:
Now, according to my ‘mode identity’ interpretation, there is a good sense in
which the most basic properties of the one substance are not the attributes but the
modes, since they lie deep enough to combine with both attributes. Of course
extension is more basic than squareness; but to be square is to be extended and F,
for an F which does entail extension because it is also combinable with thought.
Given that there are such Fs, Spinoza rightly won’t say that an attribute is an
essence = most fundamental property, but only that it must be conceived or
perceived as basic, since to get deeper we would have to think of finite modes in
abstraction from either attribute, which is impossible.49
I think that Bennett’s basic insight here is on target, namely that there is another
something that must be at work to account for the identity in question. But his
description of his “differentia” as being added to extension or thought is an unfortunate
formulation. In fact, although I have spoken of his fundamental modes F as if they are
simply “in” the ordinary Modes in question, when we are concerned with the relevant
identies, isn’t it really the case on Bennett’s view (though he denies it) – or at least so one
might argue – that the ordinary Modes are F? Namely, isn’t the Mode of thought in
question simply F “as differentiating” Thought and the mode of extension in question
that same F “as differentiating” Extension? Now of course Bennett can insist that F “as
differentiating” Thought and F “as differentiating” Extension are not identical in any
way; they simply both contain something that is identical. But is it so clear? After all,
given the model taken from the “field metaphysic,” isn’t the particular in question simply
some way that the “substance-field” is propertied? And that is F. The (distinct) Modes of
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Bennett, 146 In this portion of his argument Bennett contends that the definition of an Attribute
that Spinoza offers in I def 4 “that there is something in the nature of an illusion or error or lack of
intellectual depth or thoroughness in taking an attribute to be a basic property.”
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thought and extension in question are then simply that F: in one case qua differentiating
Thought and in the other case qua differentiating Extension. So it turns out, after all, that
Bennett should have to resort to relativization of identity, in order to maintain his position
that the identity relation in Spinoza doesn’t hold between ordinary modes, but only on the
level of the Fs.] That is some Mode of thought is identical with some Mode of extension,
qua the “fundamental” Mode that the “two” of them are – that is, with the identity
statement so relativized – but is not identical with it qua ordinary Mode.
Furthermore, why would one not be allowed to conclude from Bennett’s
description that we would, in some sense, have an F whose existence is dualistically
distinct from itself. If this F combines with the Attribute of extension and the Attribute
of thought, and if Spinoza imposes a causal barrier between the Modes of the Attributes,
how would the same F be able to be the cause of all its own acts, since it would have acts
that are qua thought not its acts of its own in terms of its existence qua extension plus F.
This F would have to have two different existences, in some sense, as it exists as E1
(extension and F) rather than T1 (thought and F).50 Any attempt to describe the acts of F
would, it seems to me, be liable to the charge that the act of a Mode of Thought (if F
combined with Thought makes F a mode of a particular Attribute) would explain the acts
of a Mode of Extension (if F added to Extension makes it a mode of a different
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Ibid, 141. Bennett contends (146) that for Spinoza the most basic properties of the one
Substance, “since they lie deep enough to combine with both attributes.” But Bennett’s view requires that
there be something even more fundamental than the ordinary Modes, i.e. the differentia, because these are
capable of combining with the Attributes to make the Modes of those Attributes possible. But what could
such a thing be? He denies in the passage on 146 that “essence” could mean anything more than the
“fundamental property of a thing.” I cannot mean, he contends, “something deeper and more general.
What Bennett means by deeper is not clear, but it seems that he is wanting to deny that Spinoza has any
place for Universals in his system.
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Attribute). Perhaps the impulse behind Bennett’s idea of differentiae might be
salvageable if we can find a better way of putting the issue.
In the case of both Bennett and Della Rocca, their accounts of Spinoza could benefit from
taking a different look at what the significance might be of Spinoza’s argument that the
existence of the mind is integrally one with the body, and vice versa, because of the
conatus that grants in some simultaneous sense both organizational complexity and
mental capacity.51 The key hint to this better way of interpreting Spinoza is found where
he asserts: “From the above we understand not only that the human is united to the Body
but also what is to be understood by the union of Mind and Body. But nobody can
understand this union adequately or distinctly unless he first gains adequate knowledge of
the nature of our body” [II, P 13, sch.]. What we shall proceed to demonstrate in the rest
of this chapter is that Spinoza’s concern in Ethics is to offer a view of the nature of a
human life as that of a complex individual; what Jonas calls “an organic individual . . .
viewed as a fact of wholeness.”52 This reading can pick up where Bennett leaves us with
his concept of the differentia and Della Rocca with his concept of Modes as also bearers
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Della Rocca does, in an earlier section of his work [33 – 38], develop an argument for the
importance of conatus in understanding the nature of individuality. “Spinoza’s discussion of the conatus,
or striving, of all things fits nicely with and indeed corroborates this reading of Spinoza’s account of
physical individuals. According to this doctrine, each thing – complex physical individuals , complex
mental individuals, and also not-complex things, if there are any – by its very nature strives or tends to
persist in existence” [35]. The troublesome portion of this assessment of Spinoza’s doctrine, from my
vantage, is that Della Rocca interprets conatus to imply that “complex physical individuals” (CPI) and
“complex mental individuals” (CMI) are both types of “things” that strive to persist. Such a reading, while
it fits well with Della Rocca’s insistence that parallelism is the key to understanding Spinoza’s identity
doctrine, suggests that the striving of the mind (CMI) and the striving of the body (CPI) are two different
acts of striving. Della Rocca attempts to put the issue of the constitution of individuality in “attributeneutral terms” as a way to avoid this implication. However, as he develops this idea he argues that the CPI
is constituted by a feature that is relevant to it (the tendency to preserve their proportion of motion and
rest), but that the CMI has its own relevant feature that constitutes it (the feature of affirming the existence
of the body). It would be a good thing if we could establish how these two strivings are not two, but one.
52
Jonas, 269.
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of extensional properties but also provide a much more dynamic understanding of
Spinoza’s view of life as irreducibly minded and bodied. The benefit of the following
exposition and interpretation will be the realization that the concepts of anima, conatus,
and essentia work together in Spinoza’s metaphysics as he analyzes the nature of the
existence of ordinary concrete particulars, to provide us with a helpful concept—the
living conatic essence that a thing is. It will be demonstrated that this concept could very
well represent the door that must be opened if we are to understand Spinoza’s doctrine
correctly. Aquinas’s hylomorphism, it will be argued, is a key to that door. To get to
this, however, we should address one glaring difficulty that is faced by anyone who
would want to compare Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s ontological commitments. That hurdle
is Spinoza’s monism.
Spinoza’s “Substance” compared to Aquinas’s “Being”
No concept is more central to Spinoza’s philosophy or more axiomatic in Spinoza
studies than his complementary claims that there is only one Substance and all else that
‘exists’ either is an Attribute or a Mode of Substance.53 The demonstration of this is the
main theme of the first book of the Ethics. Any attempt, therefore, to understand what
Spinoza means by the claim that mind and body are “one and the same thing” will have
to consider the way that this oneness is related to the oneness of Substance.54
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I do not intend to take a position on whether or not the Attributes are really existent in Spinoza’s

ontology.
54

By this assertion I do not mean to suggest that I hold embrace the “relative identity” thesis,
which contends that the oneness of mind and body as Modes of the Attributes of Substance are one because
Substance itself is one. There is a different, and better, way to account for Spinoza’s identity doctrine, as
shall be shown.
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If one were to argue (as does Descartes) that the obvious distinction between
various attributes implies that they are ontologically distinguished, Spinoza’s reply would
surely be that this does not follow. The distinction of Attributes, whereby this one
Substance is expressed, poses no difficulty for monism as Spinoza develops it, because of
his conception of Substance as infinitely real. From that, he argues, that Substance must
have an infinite number of attributes and an infinite number of Modes within each
Attribute that give expression to the existence of Substance. The radical ‘difference’ of
these attributes does not pose a problem, because an attribute represents in our
understanding a certain quality of existence that implies its own unique state of affairs.55
Attributes in Spinoza’s view are (by implication from I, P 2) something that substances
“have.” As Attributes, Thought and Extension are not, self-explanatory strictly speaking.
They can only be “explained” as qualitative ways that Substance exists. With this focus
on Substance as the ontological ground of Attributes, Spinoza argues, then, that qua
qualitative ways of existing, even though they seem totally disparate from each other
explanatorily, are not (by principles 6-8 above) expressions of different substances.
Rather, they are Attributes of the same Substance, but since they are distinct as Attributes
they can be conceived through any other Attribute.
On the basis of this logic Spinoza insists: “Consequently nothing can be clearer
than this . . . that an absolutely infinite entity must necessarily be defined as an entity
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Again, the perspective that I am developing does not rely upon taking a side in the debate about
whether or not the Attributes are real or nominal. However, I agree with the perspective of Shmueli
developed in chapter one of this dissertation that something similar to Aquinas’ concept of “the analogy of
being” allowed Spinoza to develop a view of the Attributes that was neither a nominalistic view, nor was
his a strictly realist view. “The basic view, then, of Spinoza [on the Attributes] is the Thomistic view of
the attributes (universals) as extra-mental realities without being distinctly existent on their own, not the
[nominalist/subjectivist] view of Maimonides” [7-8].
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consisting of infinite attributes, each of which express a definite essence, eternal and
infinite. . . in Nature there exists only one substance, absolutely infinite” [I, P 10, sch].
And this Substance must, by definitions 3 and 6 in Book I, be conceived of as nothing
other than God. This conclusion is argued in propositions 11 – 13; and leads Spinoza to
the conclusion that no other substance, other than God, can be conceived, “since God is
an absolutely infinite being of whom no attribute expressing the essence of substance can
be denied and since he necessarily exists” [I, P 14, pr].
Spinoza’s particular way of conceptualizing the relationship of Attributes and
Substance, plus his willingness to embrace the traditional term “God” as a part of his
argument, leads him to the proposition (15) in Book I that “Whatever is, is in God, and
nothing can be or be conceived without God.” Spinoza is quite aware, in the course of
his “geometrical” argument that we do not experience Substance in our ordinary
experience. Rather, we encounter ordinary particulars. This is the assumed background
of the demonstrations of the Ethics. His point is to describe the necessity of recognizing
that the ordinary particulars and every feature which we encounter of Nature is not selfexplanatory. Axioms 1 and 2 of Book I express this fact for Spinoza. Because he takes
our experience of the particularized “many” as the foundation of our daily experience,
Spinoza asserts in his very first proposition that “Substance is by nature prior to its
affections.”56 An “affection” of Substance is, in Spinoza’s metaphysics, a way that
Substance exists in concrete expression that our minds can conceive. “Affections” of
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This way of seeing the issue is not in discontinuity with the Thomistic insistence that what we
know in the first instance is “primary substances.” It is from these that we reason our way by abstraction to
recognize species and universal concepts; and from these to realize the distinction between essence and
existence until finally we demonstrate the necessity of God as Pure Act of Existing in which all things must
exist via participation.
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Substance, then, are best understood as the “form ‘taken on’ by something, a state of that
thing, and therefore logically posterior to that of which it is an affection.”57 This is a
broad concept for Spinoza by which he describes the ontological dependence that
everything that exists (both infinite features of Substance as well as finite features –
concrete and universal) has upon Substance. Because there can be no existence
conceivable apart from Substance (nor can it be actual), everything that has actual
existence (materially or immaterially) is a Mode of God qua Substance. From the
conclusion that all that exists is in God and that God is expressed in an infinity of ways,
follows for Spinoza that the ways (Modes) by which God expresses its necessary
existence and essence are themselves “in the divine nature and can be conceived only
through the divine nature” [I, P 15, pr]. Consequently, we cannot conceive of anything
existing in reality “except substance and modes [of substance].”58
This implies, of course, for Spinoza that material entities are qua material “part”
of God, because material reality, just as much as immaterial reality must be part of God
qua Substance.59 In the scholium of proposition 15, as Spinoza endeavors to defend the
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Shirley, 24.
Spinoza would include in this not just finite modes, but the infinite modes, as well. However,
for the purposes of the present discussion, we will focus on the relationship of finite modes to the one
eternal and infinite Substance. We can bracket the questions that attend the interpretation of Spinoza
regarding the nature of infinite Modes. Cf. Bennett for a good discussion of various aspects of the infinite
modes” [107f, 111-113, 118f]. Also see, Walter Horn, “Causality of Substance: Spinozistic Proof of the
Physical Plenum,” (Chapter 4) of Substance and Mode: A Spinozistic Study, (Ph. D. diss. Brown
University, 1978) UMI Dissertation Services, 2003.
59
Spinoza’s argument, by which he defends this conclusion, is found in propositions 12 and 13 of
Book I. He argues in P 12 that even the divisions (or parts) of Substance must qua divisions exist in
something. As parts of Substance the divisions cannot be conceived of as each themselves substances, nor
can they be thought of apart from Substance nor can they have some other ontological status other than
existing in Substance. Hence the fact that Substance could be conceived as having parts does not imply
that division as such cannot be part of the infinite Substance. Also, by P 13, the infinity of Substance
means that we cannot conceive of anything as ultimately distinguishable from Substance. Even divisions
exist in the infinity of Substance, hence the divisions into parts that we conceive of as being the case in the
58
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implication that God is Substance qua extended, he presents an argument against the
objectors to God’s materiality who declare that the divisibility of matter rules it out as an
Attribute of God. To demonstrate the appropriateness of his own conclusions, he utilizes
the distinction between matter as existent in itself and the modifications which are the
concrete instantiations of matter.60 He says, “. . . matter is everywhere the same, and
there are no distinct parts in it except in so far as we conceive matter as modified in
various ways. Then its parts are distinct, not really but only modally.”61 Such a
distinction was not unique to Spinoza when he made it. It is a distinction that was posited
by Descartes. Prior to Descartes, the medieval philosophers had embraced it. As a
translator and commentator, Shirley argues that it is the Cartesian background that is
relevant.
. . . it is probably the Cartesian version of the distinction that is relevant. . . .
[According to Descartes’s dualism], a modal distinction [as opposed to a
substance-distinction] is a distinction either between a mode and the substance of
which it is a mode or between the various modes of substance. . . . Spinoza uses
this philosophical terminology to express the difference between matter as divided
up into individual corporeal parts and matter as pure homogeneous extension.”62

various Attributes does not imply that Substance, insofar as it is substance,” is divisible. All exists in the
infinity of Substance.
60
Bennett’s interpretation of how Spinoza could make the distinction that he does argues that
Spinoza’s view has much in common with contemporary quantum field theory. Bennett, 91 -97.
61
Horn’s observations are on the mark, I think, expressing Spinoza’s general position on the
actual existence of the distinction between modes. Spinoza embraces the partitioned nature of physical
modes from one another, because [his] faith in the real distinction of the attributes led him to the opinion
that the cause of the real existence of a physical object must contain some other physical object. A finite
mode cannot be self-caused. . . . And thought the cause of a physical object may include an infinite mode of
extension – a physical law – it cannot be composed entirely of such modes, for whatever follows from an
infinite mode alone must itself be infinite” (112). The import of the finite modes, then, is obvious in
Spinoza’s metaphysics. They become a part of his explanation for change and contingency and a part of
his proof for the necessity of the existence of God qua Substance. E.g. the modes are not self-caused, but
as temporal they cannot be immediately the result of Substance.
62
Shirley, 42, note 2.
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What strikes me, however, is not the “Cartesian” comparison (which one might
expect), but that such a “modal” distinction as Spinoza draws is very much like the
distinction that Aquinas makes in his own metaphysical analysis of the nature of primary
entities that exist materially and the prime matter upon which they depend for their
existence qua material entities. (Of course, Aquinas calls them “primary substances” but
let us set aside, for the moment, this important difference in terminology from Spinoza to
see if we cannot draw an instructive comparison.) Spinoza insists that there are Modes of
Substance qua extended that do not contain in themselves the source of their own being,
as well as maintaining that “extended substance” is itself to be distinguished from the
Modes that express the reality and nature of extended substance. It must be remembered
that while the Attribute of Extension is an attribute of Substance, Extension does not
precisely “exist,” since what exists are Substance and its modifications.63 Spinoza, by
regarding the nature of extended things as Modes of the Attribute of extension that
enables their existence qua extended modes, offers a metaphysical theory of dependence
and existence that has analogy to the Aristotelian/Thomistic ideas about prime matter.64
While Aquinas does not think of prime matter as an eternal principle, much less
an attribute of God’s essence, when thinking strictly in terms of material existence, he is
insistent that it is primary entities qua “designated matter” that actually exist materially.65
Some might suggest in reply to this claim that Spinoza’s identification of extension as an
63

Cf. Shmueli, see chapter one in this dissertation, for an argument that Spinoza’s understanding
of the ontological nature of the Attributes is neither strictly nominalist or realist.
64
As was discussed in chapter three, Aquinas views prime matter as real, but not a truly existent
thing, because it is pure potentiality. While Spinoza does not describe extension in these precise terms, it
would seem that his insistence that the Modes of Substance are what exist along with Substance itself could
imply that the Attribute of extension is not precisely an existent thing, but nonetheless real qua an
Attribute.
65
Cf. Chapter 3, 90f.
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Attribute of God would undercut the comparison with Aquinas; and no doubt that would
be troubling for the metaphysics of the latter. However, taking Aquinas’s claim that
prime matter is a principle in which material entities exist qua material and then reading
this understanding of prime matter in terms of his even deeper claim that nothing that
exists can exist apart from participation in the Being of God, possible parallels between
the ontological commitments of Spinoza and the most influential of the Christian
Aristotelian medieval thinkers begin to suggest themselves. Regarding the participation
of the principle of materiality in the Being of God, the logic of Aquinas deliberation can
be found in Q 44, a 1 & a 2 of the Summa’s prima pars: 66
(1) No entity or principle of existence (including matter and material things) has its
existence in itself, but exist only by participation in God’s own act of Being.67
(2) Prime matter is a principle of existence.
(3) Therefore, Prime matter can only exist by participation in God’s Being.68
The differences between Spinoza’s account of Substance and Aquinas’s idea
about God’s Being as the ontological foundation of all existent things are obvious, but
perhaps the ways that these concepts do similar work in the philosophical systems under
consideration is not. It is worth noting, therefore, the functional and (to a limited extent)
ontological similarities that one can find. Consider first, in this regard, Spinoza’s
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For the discussion of Aquinas’s views on participation in the Being of God see 105f above.
“Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.
Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be
more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.”
68
“Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not
only according as they are "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say
that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things. . . . But here we are speaking of things
according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is
not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.”
67
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argument that Substance (God or Nature) is infinite and compare this concept to
Aquinas’s contentions that God is Pure Act. In the course of his demonstration, Spinoza
asserts in I, P 8 that “every substance is necessarily infinite.” At this point in his
argument, Spinoza has not yet proposed that there can only be one Substance, so the
content of this proposition and its proofs and scholia are important for that conclusion. In
scholium 1, he contends, “Since in fact to be finite is in part a negation and to be infinite
is the unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from Proposition
7 alone that every substance must be infinite.” The thrust of P 7 is the necessary
existence of Substance, because it cannot – by definition – be the product of some prior
set of conditions. So, “its essence necessarily involves existence.” What Spinoza seems
to be contending for is that there can be no non-being conceivable in itself. Hence,
Substance must be infinity per se. This way of stating the issue resonates, I suggest,
harmoniously (so far) with Aquinas’s belief that God is Pure Act with no potentiality.
Recall the argument of chapter two where it was shown that the basis for Aristotle’s
distinction between act and potency is rooted in the concept of negation (not being
something else).69 Taking this Aristotelian starting point, Aquinas argues that God
cannot be conceived of as having any kind of potentiality. Hence, there is no non-being
in God.70 On the basis of the claim that God is the Act of Being itself, Aquinas argues
for the infinity of God.71

69

Cf. above 55f.
Aquinas argues the point as follows: “God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (3, 4).
Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot
thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if
this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created
70
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If it should be argued that Aquinas’s claim that there cannot be an infinite
magnitude undercuts the argument being presented -- that Spinoza and Aquinas have
possible points of continuity on the question of the ontological primacy of God in all
things -- the reply must be two-fold. First, it has already been acknowledged that there
are significant differences that separate Spinoza and Aquinas on the metaphysical issue of
God’s identity in relation to the Universe. Aquinas’s Christian views and Spinoza’s
theology are not, ultimately compatible; that is uncontroversial. It is worth noting,
nonetheless, that the real source of their disagreement would be (on the question of God’s
relationship to the world) the following: (1) denial of God’s volition by Spinoza, (2) the
positing of necessity in Spinoza’s God, and (3) Spinoza’s failure to see the distinction
between existence and essence as implying the necessity of God’s transcendence.
Replying to the objection, we must, as a second stage of our response, analyze exactly
what Aquinas’s rejection of the idea of an infinite magnitude actually entails. Aquinas’s
argument against this concept is an argument about the conceivability of such an entity.
In I a, Q 7, a 3 of the Summa, Aquinas argues that we cannot simultaneously think of an
infinite magnitude and a particular physical thing. His argument is that whether or not
we “consider” the infinite magnitude as “a natural body” or as “a mathematical body” we

perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being
after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of
argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not in any single
mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he
adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things" [Summa, Ia, Q 4, a 2, reply].
71
Summa I a, Q 7, a 1, reply. “. . . form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by
matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of
something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (4, 1,
Objection 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own
subsistent being as was shown above (3, 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
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run into the same logical problem. What Aquinas is arguing is that the concept of an
infinite magnitude, considered as a particular thing, is a self-refuting concept.
(1) To be a body is to be bounded by something.
(2) To be infinite as a body is to be unbounded.
(3) Hence, the idea of an infinite body (magnitude) is absurd.
When comparing this syllogistic form of Aquinas’s reasoning with Spinoza’s
assertion that extension must logically be conceived as a part of God, other interesting
similarities emerge. Spinoza argues that because God is truly infinite there can be no
state of existence that is not involved in the essence of God as an Attribute of God.
However, we must consider an important interpretive point in order to understand
adequately the import of this claim. For Spinoza, the infinity of God qua the Attribute of
Extension does not allow us to conceive of God as a particular thing qua extended, To
posit God as infinite in “magnitude” (to incorporate Aquinas’s term) does not allow us to
conceive of God as an extended “thing,” strictly speaking, because the only particular
things that exist are Modes. Such a conclusion about Spinoza’s view would seem
consistent with his claim [I, P 15, sch] where he refutes those who deny that Extension
cannot be an Attribute of God on the basis of the divisibility of the material:
The student who looks carefully into these arguments [against Spinoza] will find
that I have already replied to them, since they are all founded on the same
supposition that material substance is composed of parts, and this I have already
shown to be absurd (P 12 and Cor. P 13). . . . [Any] alleged absurdities . . . from
which they seek to prove that extended substance is finite do not at all follow
from the supposition that quantity is infinite, but that infinite quantity is
measurable and is made up of finite parts. . . .
If therefore we consider quantity as it is presented in the imagination – and that is
what we more frequently and readily do – we find it to be finite, divisible, and
made up of parts. But if we consider it intellectually and conceive it in so far as it

229

is substance – and this is very difficult – then it will be found to be infinite, one
and indivisible. . . . This will be quite clear to those who can distinguish between
the imagination and the intellect, especially if this point also is stressed, that
matter is everywhere the same, and there are no distinct parts in it except in so
fare as we conceive matter as modified in various ways.
Spinoza would agree, I suggest, that God qua extended Substance is not a “thing”
in itself, because being extended is an attribute of the infinite God who is qua the matter
of extended Substance “everywhere the same.” When Spinoza argues that being
extended infinitely is an Attribute of God, he is not identifying God qua material as some
“thing,” e.g. the whole of the universe.72 Instead, he is identifying God or Nature as the
source (out of God’s own essential nature as the immanent cause) of there being extended
reality at all. But, God is not qua extended Substance identifiable as any particular thing
no matter how grandiose the identification. We can add this conclusion to Aquinas’s
willingness to say that Prime Matter qua the material principle of existence participates in
the Being of God. Hence, there is, quite possibly, not quite the distance between Aquinas
and Spinoza on this matter as might be suggested by a mere passing consideration. We
can compare them in the following way. I enumerate each of the comparisons to
highlight the ways we can note an affinity between them.
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The reading I am suggesting is consistent with the self-described “radical” suggestion of Curley
in Behind the Geometrical Method, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 149, note 52. “The
assumption that Spinoza’s God may be identified with the whole of Nature is so common in the Spinoza
literature that few commentators feel any need to justify it.” In fact, Curley argues convincingly that
Spinoza rejects “that kind of pantheism” in Letter 43. Curley notes that, engaging the arguments of
Velthuysen, Spinoza contends that “his having said that all things emanate necessarily from the nature of
God does not commit him to holding that the universe is God.” By Curley’s account, “the general
disposition to identify Spinoza’s God with the whole of Nature comes mainly from . . . a misreading of the
Preface to E IV.” Cf. Bennett, 118, where he opines that “Spinoza’s terminology [regarding extended
reality] is dangerous.” He says, that Spinoza’s descriptions offered in Letter 64 in defense of his
metaphysics cannot imply that “the make of the whole universe” suggests that this locution suggests that it
names “the totality of particular facts about the extended world.”
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(1) Spinoza – Modes of extension are not distinct, strictly speaking, from
extension.
(1’)Aquinas – Material entities (primary substances) are not distinct, strictly
speaking, from prime matter.
(2) Spinoza – Extension, as an Attribute of Substance, does not explain itself
apart from Substance.
(2’)Aquinas – Prime Matter as “potential” cannot account for its own existence.
(3) Spinoza – Extension must be an Attribute of Substance.
(3’)Aquinas – Prime Matter must express the Being of God (in some way).
With the above issues addressed we can look at a second analogous conception in
their respective metaphysical schemes. We can observe that Spinoza’s Substance and
Aquinas’s Being both grant existence to the things that exist in them because those things
qua particular entities participate in the ontological reality of the first cause. Although
any number of Spinoza commentators have asserted that Spinoza’s theory of causation
rules out the idea of a “final cause” because he does not grant purposiveness to things, it
is difficult to argue that he would not share something of Thomas’s claim that there is a
“first cause” that grants existence to all else by way of its very being. Spinoza’s
insistence that God is the cause immanens and not the cause transiens does not separate
him entirely from Aquinas. Of course, his pantheistic rejection of the concept of God as
transcendent would be heretical, for Aquinas. However, Spinoza’s description of God as
an immanent cause is not completely alien to Thomas’s own notions about the Creation’s
ontological dependence upon God. In chapter three of this dissertation, it was argued that
Aquinas believed that
. . . the existence of any particular and obviously contingent being is dependent
for its existence upon a prior condition. Also, any contingent chain of events or
beings can exist only if some prior state provides the capacity of the existence of
that chain of contingent events or beings. Hence, some foundational something
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must be posited as the prior condition or state in which other things exist via
participation. 73

To this we can adduce further support for the present case being made for a
complementary comparison between Spinoza and Thomas. In, of all places, his
commentary, Exposition of the Gospel of Saint John, we find Aquinas commenting on
what it means for God to be his own pure act of being and the relation of contingent
beings to this pure act:
Since, then, all the things that are participate in existence (esse), and are beings by
participation, there must needs be, at the summit of all things, something that is
existence itself by His own essence (aliquid. . . quod sit ipsum esse per suam
essentiam), so the His essence is His existence (id est quod sua essential sity suum
esse), and this is God, Who is the most sufficient, the most worthy and the most
perfect cause of the whole being, from whom all that which is participates in
being.74
Spinoza’s concept of God as immanent cause is admittedly different from
Aquinas’s notion of participation in a crucially important way, metaphysically and
theologically speaking. The immanent causal agency of Spinoza’s God is not in reality
distinct from its effect(s), whereas Aquinas’s idea of participation entails the distinct
ontological identity of God apart from the things that exist via participation. Spinoza’s
cryptic use of the distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata does not
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Cf. above 110, note 66
Quoted in Etienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, (New York: Doubleday & Co,
1963), 328 n 12. Gilson interprets the significance of Aquinas’s theory of participation as follows: “A new
field of metaphysical prospection is here offering itself to our inquiry. Before being anything else [e.g.
members of species], the objects of sense experience are so many existents. Their only possible common
cause, qua existents, is therefore Existence. But what is Existence? Thomas says it is that which, being
absolutely immovable and most perfect, is also absolutely simple; in short, a being that is to itself its own
being.” 112
74
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assuage the tension between their metaphysical systems.75 Spinoza’s concept of nature as
naturing (naturans), does imply enough of a distinction within the nature of Substance
itself that we could reconsider the judgment of one such as Bennett who claims that this
locution is “quite without significance in the Ethic” His is not the final word.76 One need
not attempt to read into Spinoza’s doctrine any traditional understanding of
transcendence and volition in order to assert that the naturing power of Nature is
something other than the natured effects of Nature. In fact, it would seem to be precisely
such a distinction that Spinoza is insisting upon in his arguments about the dependence of
Modes upon Substance. The ontological dependence runs only one way. It is not the
case, for instance, that Substance is dependent upon the Modes. So, while Spinoza would
give to us a thoroughly naturalistic, transcendence-void metaphysic, it does not
necessitate that we interpret him as holding the that distinction between Naturans and
Naturata is of no consequence.77 There is a clear distinction logically, for Spinoza
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Spinoza asserts that there is a difference between Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata. While
we cannot undertake a critical examination of this distinction, it can be noted that Spinoza the distinction is
one between (Naturans) the Attributes of God that “express eternal and infinite essence” and (Naturata)
“all that follows from the necessity of God’s nature. . . modes of God’s attributes in so far as they are
considered as things which are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God” [I, P 29 sch].
See, Wolfson’s claim that Spinoza inherited this distinction from Aquinas, even as he modified it from its
former use. Wolfson, I, 16. See Bennett for an argument that this distinction is “quite without significance
in the Ethics, 119. Also, see Curley’s claim that “given Spinoza’s identification of God with natura
naturans, and his identification of God’s power with his essence, we have here a thoroughly naturalistic
explanation of Spinoza’s claim that God’s essence, i.e. the totality of his attributes, is eternal and
immutable. The eternality and immutability of God’s essence is the eternality and immutability of the
fundamental laws of nature,” Behind the Geometrical Method, 43.
76
Bennett, 119.
77
Also, Spinoza’s later insistence that the object of intellectual investigation is the “love” of God,
would seem to suggest that he wants his readers to make a distinction between the naturing aspects of
nature and the natured aspects. Consider, for example, that in Spinoza’s view the idea of loving some thing
when applied to our experience of the Modes of Substance is inadequate. The implication of his arguments
in Books III and IV would seem to be that the way of beatitude is to know that love is but a feeling we
attach to favorable states of the body. It is those favorable states experienced as favorable. The love of
God which he discusses in Ethics V, P 32 – 35 is quite different from the inadequacy of this feeling love.
Even if this love is, as would seem to be the case for Spinoza, the result of an epistemological shift (the
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between what provides or accounts for the possibility of naturing and those things (or the
totality of things) that are natured (i.e. given essence and existence). Hence, we can see
that the concept of contingents having their existence qua existent contingents by being
in something that is itself the necessary prior condition of itself and, therefore, of
contingent beings is that dominates the discussion of Substance for Spinoza as much as it
dominated the discussion for Aquinas. The differences cannot be glossed over, but the
reality that in both views God gives existence to all other things out of the divine
existence should not be ignored either. Whatever the oneness of mind and body is, for
each of them it is in some way an expression of the being of God.
Hylomorphic existence and conatic essence
The notion of expressing the essence or being of God, for a commentator such as
Wolfson, was enough to account for the one-and-the-sameness of mind and body in
Spinoza’s metaphysics.78 In Wolfson’s view, the identity of mind and body is a relative
identity that is rooted in the fact that the Attributes of extension and the Attribute thought
are not really distinct in God; hence the oneness of mind and body is relative to the

third kind of knowledge) one need not deny that even this opens-up for those who embrace this beatitude a
new object of love. Although it might argued that such a realization in only an embrace of the way things
really are naturalistically, even this naturalistic interpretation would not mitigate the distinction between
naturata and naturans in toto. An appropriate distinction remains, because what we come to love is the
eternal necessity qua eternal necessity that makes the Universe possible; and this eternal necessity is quite
distinct in itself from the necessary, infinite flow of Modes that exist because of the one Substance.
Naturans is the infinite logical source of what exists; Naturata is what exists as a result of that infinite
necessity.
78
Wolfson, 33f. “[Spinoza} finds an analogy between the interrelation of extension and thought
in God and the interrelation of body and mind in man. But there are fundamental differences between
them, and the first fundamental difference which he discusses is that between the relation of extension and
thought to God and the relation of body and mind to man. God is a substance in whom extension and
thought are attributes. Logically then, God is the underlying subject of these attributes, without himself
being composed of them. But man is not a substance, and logically he is not the underlying subject of body
and mind; rather he is composed of them.”
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reality that there is only one undifferentiated Substance – God.79 This, it seems to me,
would suggest that not only is it true for the Attributes of Substance, in a Wolfsonian
reading of Spinoza, that the distinction between them has no reality. 80 Concomitantly,
the Modes of Substance would also be but phenomenal manifestations with no reality qua
Modes and hence no real distinction as Modes. But this would also mean that the that
Spinoza grants them would be negated. And such a conclusion would run against
Spinoza’s assertion that “what exists are Substance and Modes.”81 It would seem that if
the Modes really exist qua distinct modifications of the one Substance, then something
has to account for their distinction, as well as their identity. But Wolfson’s relative
interpretation of Spinoza can say little to solve the problem of mind-body identity except
to assert that the mind is the body in someway that reflects the nature of the one
Substance’s unity with itself.
Something more is needed to account for the oneness of mind and body precisely
because there is a real distinction of some kind; and many of Spinoza’s interpreters have
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Wolfson’s reading of Spinoza makes him a modern Neo-Platonist with regard to the nondifferentiability of the One. However, Spinoza is clear in his insistence that our knowledge of the
Attributes and their Modes gives us true (adequate) knowledge of God. For a strong case against
Wolfson’s understanding of the Attributes in Spinoza’s philosophy see Martial Geroult, Spinoza, Vol. 1,
(Paris:Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), 430: “[The understanding] produces only true ideas that adequately
reflect what is the case. If, therefore, it perceives an infinity of attributes in the substance, then they are
really there.” Also, see Francis S. Haserot, “Spinoza's Definition of Attribute,” Philosophical Review
Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 1953): 499-513.
80
Wolfson, 154 – 157. Also, see 257f: “The independence of each attribute which Spinoza insists
upon is merely to emphasize his denial of the interdependence of matter and form in mediaeval philosophy;
it is not an independence which implies the reality of the attributes in their relation to substance or a reality
in the difference between themselves, with the result that the unity of substance can no longer be logically
maintained. The relation of the attributes to each other is of the same order as their relation to substance.
Just as the difference between attribute and substance only a conception fo the human mind, so the
difference between the attributes themselves is only a form of conception in the human mind. . .”
81
My emphasis. Wolfson’s argument, if the unreality of the Modes is the implication of his view,
that a human being is composed of mind and body would beg the question: What is a human being, then, if
the human being is composed of Modes that are not themselves real things. A Wolfsonian Spinozistic
world would be truly occult.
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offered to add the more. What many of the commentators, however, have missed is the
integrating insights provided for the whole of Spinoza’s metaphysics by the concept
conatus. Admittedly, he does not introduce the term specifically until Book III, but it is
arguable that this concept is what makes the establishment of the identity of mind and
body metaphysically possible in Spinoza’s analysis. In III, 7 Spinoza suggests that this
kind of reading of his metaphysical system is on target. This proposition clearly
identifies what Spinoza means by the term: “The conatus with which each thing
endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.”
What is instructive here is not simply that he defines the term as being the property “with
which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being.” That was a common place
notion in Spinoza’s day.82 I suggest that the more intriguing and helpful statement in this
proposition is Spinoza’s statement that the conatus is “nothing but the actual essence of
the thing itself” [my emphasis]. This is, in one sense, at least a startling identification,
since Spinoza identifies the essence of a thing in terms a property or principle upon
which the thing dependence for its existence: “. . . there pertains to the essence of a thing
that which, when granted, the thing is necessarily posited, and by the annulling of which
the thing is necessarily annulled; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be
conceived, and, vice versa, that which cannot be or be conceived without the thing.”
Unless by conatus Spinoza means something more than merely a process of preserving
(or tending to preserve) certain proportions or arrangements, this kind of identification of
essence and conatus is confounding. I suggest that there is an important ambiguity in
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Wolfson, 195 – 199. “At the time of Spinoza the principle of self-preservation became a
commonplace of popular wisdom. . .”
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Spinoza’s use of this concept which, once it is recognized, helps us to interpret his
doctrine of mind-body identity, even as it allows us to see some very intriguing parallels
with Aquinas’s hylomorphism.
Bennett seems to interpret the doctrine as being confounded. He finds Spinoza’s
arguments for the striving of things to persevere “disgracefully bad.” He sees Spinoza’s
conatus doctrine merely as a subsequent account of a process of self-preservation in
which all entities are engaged to a greater or lesser degree. And while it is certainly true
that Spinoza only introduces the concept after he has offered his metaphysical arguments
for the oneness of Substance and the nature of the mind, the doctrine that things are
ordered in such a way so as to be “actively” engaged -- qua specifically instantiated
Modes -- in the preservation of their own existence is a doctrine that is fundamental to the
very conception of modal existence for Spinoza. Unable to see this, Bennett tends to
follow Stuart Hampshire’s reading and view this doctrine primarily as a psychological
basis for ethics, rather than a metaphysically basic hypothesis.83
One could ask, however, what it would mean for the idea of conatus to be a
metaphysically basic notion. Thus, we must proceed attentively. First let us consider
some semantic issues regarding Spinoza’s statements about the nature of conatus.
Proposition 7 in the Latin text of the Ethics reads: Conatus quo unaquaeque res in suo
esse perseverare conatur nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam. Here Spinoza is
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Bennett, 240 – 251. Bennett acknowledges that “the criteria for individuality, for the large class
of individuals, do involve the concept of self-preservation; claims of the form ‘x is an individual’ can
sometimes be rejected as failing certain self-preservation tests.” However, he fails to see that even this way
of interpreting the idea of self-preservation does not account metaphysically for the fact of the existence of
the self-preservation impulse. Much less is it able to account for why the mind’s self-preservation would
be “one and the same thing” as the self-preservation of the body. Cf. Hampshire, 122 – 143.
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utilizing conatus as though it points to a referent of some kind. But this does not mean
that he conceives of it as being thing-like. However, he does identify conatus by the
phrase nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem. Shirley translates this phrase “is nothing but
the actual essence of the thing itself” and R. H. M Elwes renders it “is nothing else but
the actual essence of the thing in question.” These translations express very well the
identity between conatus and the rei actualem (the actual thing or the thing active). This
conatus, identified with the actual thing (or perhaps we might be able to say the thing’s
actuality), is also further identified with some specificity in Spinoza’s Latin as the feature
of a thing “with which each thing endeavors to persist. . . ” (Shirley) or “wherewith
everything endeavours to persist” (Elwes). The structure of the sentence in Latin would
allow that conatus is being identified as a feature or perhaps a power that is also identical
with the “actual essence” of a thing. It is described as quo unaquaeque res in suo esse
perseverare conatur. The pronoun quo has as its antecedent the subject conatus; and the
composite world unaquaeque refers to something other than the conatus. Hence, the
grammar of the sentence suggest that we designate the conatus as a something “by
which” (quo) “each single one [endeavoring thing]” (unaquaeque) endeavors to persist.
So whatever Spinoza more fully means by the notion of conatus he at least conceives of it
as some feature or aspect or quality of a thing that enables its to endeavor “to persist in its
own being” and not simply a description of the act of striving to endeavor. That being
the case, we are able to suggest that conatus, in Spinoza’s usage here, has some
ambiguity; and can be thought of not only as “striving” but as “something” that in some
sense is prior to the concrete striving (conatus) of the entity and as the essence of the
thing determines it to strive in a particular way.
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Another important semantic consideration in Spinoza’s Ethics involves how he
understands the relationship of essences to existent things. Spinoza provides a definition
that explains what he means when he utilizes the term “essence”: “There pertains to the
essence of a thing that which, when granted the thing is necessarily posited, and by the
annulling of which the thing is necessarily annulled; or that without which the thing can
neither be nor be conceived, and, vice versa, that which cannot be or be conceived
without the thing” [II, def 2]. It is prima facie apparent by this definition that the essence
of a thing is in someway to be distinguished from the thing itself. When essence is
“granted” the thing is necessarily posited, but absent “essence” the thing either is
inconceivable or cannot exist. But Spinoza also goes on to say that the essence of the
thing “cannot be nor be conceived without the thing.” An essence, therefore, is not an
existent entity in itself, strictly speaking, (that would make it a Mode), because it can
only exist or be conceived by us as “accompanying” the existence of the thing that gives
actual existence to the essence. The distinction between essence and existence is further
drawn out by Spinoza in Axiom 1 of this same section of the Ethics. He predicates of
human beings in this axiom that the “essence of man does not involve necessary
existence [which reserved for God’s essence].”
Spinoza assumes some type of ontological difference between essence and
existence, considered as aspects (not Attributes) of the one Substance, God, throughout
the Ethics. All that he says, intimates, or assumes throughout is consistent with his
statement in the second scholium of proposition 10. In this proposition Spinoza is
building his case that substantiality cannot be a part of man’s essence (since he has
already demonstrated that God is the immanent or indwelling cause of all things). He
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seeks to establish that God -- if truly understood -- will be conceived as the substance of
the existence of human beings, both qua species and particular. But he wants to protect
against the illicit implication being drawn that God’s essence qua God pertains to the
essence of the individuals.84 Having argued in Book I that human existence cannot be
conceived of in terms that would allow a human being to be called a substance, he posits
the distinction between essence and existence that is a real distinction in human beings,
as well as in all particular things:85
All must surely admit that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all
are agreed that God is the sole cause of all things, both of their essence and their
existence; that is, God is the cause of things not only in respect of their coming
into being (secumdum fieri) [this would be existence], as they say, but also in
respect of their being [their essential nature]. But at the same time many assert
that that without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived pertains to the
essence of the thing, and so they believe that either the nature of God pertains to
the essence of created things [which need not follow] or that created things can
either be or be conceived without God [which is impossible]; or else, more
probably, they hold no consistent opinion. . . 86
The distinction between the essence and the existence of a thing, that Spinoza
accepts as a given suggests, at the very least, that he thought of essences as logically prior
to existent ordinary particulars. The essence is what makes the ordinary particular to be
what it is. However, the essence does not establish that it is. Something more is needed;
and that something more, for Spinoza, is not only the necessary infinite modifiability of
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Wolfson comments on Spinoza’s brand of pantheism “While indeed he considers man as well
as all other beings as modes of the attributes of thought and extension of God, he does not consider them as
being in the literal sense of the same essence as God.”
85
Spinoza’s insistence in II, P 10, sch 2, “individual things can neither be nor be conceived
without God, and yet God does not pertain to their essence,” implies two things: first, a human being (nor a
Cartesian human mind) is not a substance. But secondly, it suggests that there is a real distinction to be
made between God qua God’s essence and identity as Substance and the Modes which exist only because
the one Substance is infinitely modified, according to the necessity of its very essence. Perhaps this
distinction is another way of expressing the difference between Natura naturans and Natura naturata.
86
My emphasis.
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God/Substance. Some eternal necessity of the nature of God (naturans) causes a process
of coming to be -- and coming to be in highly particularized and real ways -- to be at
work in Natura naturata. Spinoza can say that existent things are dependent upon their
essences in order to exist qua their specific selves and that those very essences cannot
and do not exist, either conceptually or in actuality, apart from the particular existent
things that are posited by the essence given or granted to it.
With these semantic clarifications in place, we may move to a consideration of a
systematic concept that we can rightly infer from Spinoza’s own analysis. It has already
been noted that Spinoza defines the conatus as the actual essence of a particular thing. If
that identification is in place, then a thing’s conatus must, as is the case with the thing’s
essence, be thought of as something more than its existence ‘actively’ engaged in
pursuing self-preservation. Rather, qua essence a thing’s conatus is what makes the
actual existence of the thing possible existentially and conceptually.87 The conatus is the
feature or principle of a thing’s existence that makes it what it is. Also, this very same
principle, one could argue, is what grants to an entity its power of self-preservation,
because it has been ordered in such a way through the ‘presence’ of this conatus as the
particular-existence giving principle.
We will return to this process of unpacking and analyzing conatus as a causative
essence shortly, but at this point let us consider a particular interpretive implication that
arises from this reading of the importance of conatus. Proposition 7 in Book 2 has been
treated as a foundational passage for the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism as a way
87

The existence of things as a result of essence being “granted” to them is what makes any
particular essence conceivable. And the existence of things that are not self-explanatory, but require
essences to explain them, is what makes the notion of essences as distinct from existence possible.
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to understand Spinoza’s metaphysics. While neither essence nor conatus is the subject in
II, P 7, it is not far afield to suggest that the parallel between existence and conceivability
is what Spinoza is really after in the scholium of the proposition. In other words, this
passage is epistemological in focus, not existential or metaphysical. When he contends
that “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things,”
he is not asserting some metaphysical principle – the so-called psycho-physical
parallelism. To interpret him this way, at this point, is to move to quickly to
psychologize the meaning of Spinoza’s doctrine on this subject. While he might, indeed,
think of the “mind” as merely a collection of ideas that in some way is a parallel to the
world of which they are ideas, his concern here is not to posit a mental-physical mapping
pattern. Rather, he is insisting in this passage that in the activity (act) of existing the
nature (act) of being intelligible is also given. While it is not clear exactly how
proposition 7 – which is a proposition about the parallelism of ideas and things -- follows
strictly from axiom 4 of Book I,88 what is clear in Spinoza’s utilization of this axiom in
the proof of the proposition is that he is thinking here epistemologically rather than
metaphysically.
Furthermore, the corollary of this proposition clearly supports this nonmetaphysical reading of Spinoza’s meaning: “whatever follows formally from the
infinite nature of God all this follows from the idea of God with the same order and the
same connection, as an object of thought in God.” Here he makes a distinction between
that which follows “formally” from the nature of God and the notion that there is “an
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I, Axiom 4: “The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of the

cause.”
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object” of thought in God. This further suggests that Spinoza is speaking about the
certainty of our epistemic engagement with naturata. This is even more obvious from his
later statement in this same scholium: “a circle existing in Nature and the idea of the
existing circle – which is also in God – are one and the same thing. . . . we find one and
the same order, or one and the same connection of causes – that is the same things
following one another.” Clearly, Spinoza is thinking of the intelligibility of Natura
naturata that exists as all of the particular Modes of God.89 When he argues that ideas
and actually existing things are the same in order, etc, he is describing formal or essential
existence (of every, and each, thing) as present and knowable in the very act of that
thing’s existing. What we are able to know is the way things really are; a thing can be
known for what the thing actually is and even God or Nature can be truly known.
In order to indicate how this knowability relates to conatus we shall have to
consider further an important point of Spinoza’s epistemology, namely what I shall call
the “being-about” nature of all ideas. It is the very nature of an idea to be about
something; in other words they are intentional. And that suggests, in Spinoza’s view, that
we must posit some reality beyond the idea itself about which the idea is an idea. Recall
that Spinoza argues that our mind’s have as their true object our bodies as they are
affected (acted upon) by other things (this from II, P 13). He thinks that this claim stands
on the merits of the previous proposition (12). There Spinoza contends for the ‘being-
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To this point a reading such as Curley’s is appropriate regarding the sameness of ideas and
extended things. However, his epistemological reading need not be strictly applicable across the board
regarding Spinoza’s doctrine. The doctrine of conatus can account for what is epistemic and what is
metaphysical in Spinoza’s treatment of ideas and objects or minds and bodies, if it is understood rightly.
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about’ nature of all ideas. When he expostulates in the proof of P 12 he is arguing the
intentional nature of ideas.
Whatever happens in the object of any idea, knowledge thereof is necessarily in
God [II, P 9, Cor] in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of that
object; that is [II, P 11] in so far as he constitutes the mind of something. So
whatever happens in the object of the idea constitutes the human mind,
knowledge thereof is necessarily in God in so far as he constitutes the nature of
the human mind. . . .90
That he is positing the intentional nature of ideas is clearly seen by Spinoza’s use of the
term “object” in proofs 9, 12, and 13 as he adduces proofs to establish his claim that
“nothing can happen in [a human] body without its being perceived by the mind [of that
body].” In each of these proofs the focus of his argument is that there is something
beyond the idea itself, about which the idea is an idea.91
In Axiom 1 of P 13, Spinoza states an explicit conclusion regarding the “beingabout” nature of ideas that helps us tie what has been exposited above with his doctrine of
conatus as essence, or what we might call conatic essence.

“All the ways in which a

body is affected by another body follow from the nature of the affected body together
with the nature of the body affecting it, so that one and the same body may move in
various ways in accordance with the various natures of the bodies causing its motion; and
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My emphasis.
Spinoza in II P 10, sch, Spinoza is, I think, critiquing the empiricism of the early modern variety
which would tend to deny the “being-about” nature of ideas. Of course, he puts his argument in terms of
the divine nature, but he thinks he has already established that thought and extension are one in the One
Substance and in each and every aspect of reality. Hence he criticizes those who are confused in that “the
things that are called objects of sense they have taken as prior to everything. Hence it has come about that
in considering natural phenomena, they have completely disregarded the divine nature. And when
thereafter they turned to the contemplation of the divine nature, they could find no place in their thinking
for those fiction on which they had built their natural science, since these fictions were of no avail in
attaining knowledge of the divine nature. So little wonder they have contradicted themselves on all sides.”
Spinoza metaphysic demands that all ideas have an intentional quality that points beyond themselves and
even beyond the objects about which they are ideas, when one considers the objects of our ideas in the light
of the whole of reality in which we experience them and know them as objects of our ideas.
91
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on the other, different bodies may be caused to move in different ways by one and the
same body.” Part of the implication of this axiom is that extended things affect the
human body out of their own natures and that they do so in relation to the specific nature
of the human body. By the general use of the term natura in this axiom and in other
places, Spinoza is simply referencing the “essence” of the distinct things. Hence, he
utilizes this axiom in the proof of proposition 16 where he argues that our ideas about
extended modes involves qua ideas the nature or essence of the body that is “external” to
our own bodies. Of course, he insists that the ideas we have will be ideas that are specific
to the ways that a human body can be acted upon by another extended entity (out of its
essence). But, that claim does not imply that our knowledge would be lacking about the
way reality is “in itself,” because there is, for Spinoza, no reality that does not involved
each and every other aspect of reality. Thus, our knowledge of things as acting upon us
is known through our own natures, but that knowledge is real and true knowledge,
because the things are acting upon our nature out of their natures. What must be secured,
he thought, was that we understand the oneness of Substance rightly.92
We can return to the consideration of conatus, then, and conclude that in
Spinoza’s philosophical view, the conatus of a thing is what makes it knowable to us,
since the conatus is the essence of a thing. So, parallelism is, indeed, a good
epistemological doctrine, but it fails as a metaphysical account of the relationship
between mind and body. As we look further at his metaphysical analysis, we can begin
to see that the very thing that makes something knowable to us – its conatus acting upon
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Also, recall that Spinoza believes something similar to Aquinas’s convictions about the human
body. Spinoza thought of the human body as the most capable of acting and being acted upon.
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us – is the principle that also instantiates the entity from the very beginning of its
existence. We see this developed in Spinoza’s treatment of the nature of bodies in II P
13. As was noted in chapter one of this dissertation, it is instructive that Spinoza
develops this analysis as a part of his discussion of the nature of the human mind.
Especially in his consideration of the nature of “composite bodies,” i.e., those that are
made up of many different components, Spinoza has to have conceived of some principle
that would so organize them. Even as Modes of Extension, they are not qua Extension
particular Modes. While not being substantial in existence, the individuality of the
Modes can only be individual because each of them has an essence of its own. Given that
it has been demonstrated that essence and conatus are synonymous in Spinoza’s thinking,
the latter concept, although not introduced until much later, is at work here. Here he
argues that complex entities or bodies remain identical to themselves so long as the
appropriate relation of motion and rest is preserved as a feature of the existence of this
complexly organized Mode.93
When a number of bodies of the same of different magnitude form close contact
with one another through the pressure of other bodies upon them, or if they are
moving at the same or different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvarying
relation of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be united with
one another and all together to form one body or individual thing, which is
distinguished from other things through this union of bodies [II, P 13, lemma 2,
def.].
The idea here is focused on preservation of an unvarying relation of comovement. However, one can ask how this preservation of co-movement might be
accounted for in a Spinozistic metaphysics. Della Rocca, following Matson and Bennett
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Agreeing with Shirley’s rendering of this definition, Della Rocca’s believes that the translation
of ut in this passage is most properly rendered “so as to,” suggesting a tendency, rather than a state.
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suggests that the technical denomination “proportion of motion and rest” can be most
adequately understood as “placeholder” for a concept that Spinoza “had not worked out,
perhaps because it might involve a detailed anatomical and physiological theory of
organisms which he knew was not yet available.”94
This seems to me to be essentially correct, so far as it goes. But, once we recall
Spinoza’s doctrine that all things have an inherent striving -- its conatic essence – that is
part of their existence then a new insight can be gained into how Spinoza might have
envisioned the nature of this (to use Della Rocca’s description) “frustratingly sketchy”
characterization of the inherent oneness of a complex being’s existence. Spinoza would
have to have known that, by his metaphysics, some principle would have to be posited to
account for modal identity of a complex body over time. His particular monism requires
that something other than the infinite, eternal, essence of account for this modal identity.
He is clear and consistent throughout his depiction of how all things exist in the one
Substance. Substance per se does not cause each individual Mode to exist. Rather, each
Mode is the effect of some previous modal state of affairs.95 We should assume that he
might have had such a necessary principle in mind – each thing’s conatic essence.96
If Spinoza really means his definition of essence to be taken seriously, then the
claim that “there pertains to the essence of a thing that which, when granted, the thing is
94

Della Rocca, 33.
Jonas’ observations mentioned in chapter one support this reading: “The continuity of
determinateness (of a things identity) throughout such interactions (a continuity, therefore, not excluding
change) bespeaks the self-affirming ‘conatus’ by which a mode tends to persevere in existence, and which
is identical with its essence. Thus it is the form of determinateness, and the conatus evidenced by the
survival of that Form in a causal history, i.e., in relation to co-existing things, that defines an individual.”
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For another reading of the import of the doctrine of conatus and its connection with Spinoza’s
views of identity and diachronous indentity see Della Rocca, “Spinoza’s Metaphysical Psychology,” The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett ([New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 192 –
266.
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necessarily posited,” must be read all the way back to the very beginning of the
instantiation of that thing’s existence. There is, in other words, an ordering arrangement
that is granted to the complex body that is something other qua ordering arrangement
than the bodies (or one might say matter) that is so ordered. This ordering arrangement is
the way a complex organized body is determined to be. In fact, in the seventh definition
of Book II, Spinoza precisely defines res singulares (individual/ particular things) as
having determinate existence. And by determinate he means us to understand that each
particular entity that exists has a particular way that it is to be.97 ”All things,” Spinoza
says in the proof of proposition 29 in the first book, “are determined from the necessity of
the divine nature not only to exist but also to exist and to act in a definite way. Spinoza
utilizes this argument in I, P 29 as a proof that there is no contingency in the universe, but
the further implication of his argument is that all things do have a kind of necessary
teleological ordering.98
This ordering is the essence of a thing that instantiates its concrete existence. And
that essence is, as we have shown above, the things conatus that accounts for and is the
activity of its striving to be what it is, maintain itself in its existence, and to flourish as
itself. So, when a thing exists and acts in the “definite” way that the divine nature has
determined it to exist and to act, one could translate this to mean (without doing violence
to Spinoza’s ontology) that the thing is acting in the “defined” way. To be defined is to
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have a particular form of existence. The idea of things having a “definition,” or even a
form, fits nicely with Spinoza’s own epistemological views (mentioned above) regarding
the way that the concept of essence functions to be the source of that which makes things
intelligible. However, the idea of having a definition/form need not involve the very unSpinozistic concept of God as a conscious actor or ‘definer.’ Recognizing the crucial role
that conatic essence plays in Spinoza’s metaphysics, we can affirm -- against
interpretations such as Bennett’s -- that teleology is actuality not foreign to Spinoza’s
metaphysical frame of mind.99 In Spinoza’s view, a thing’s concrete existence is defined
for it by the conatic essence that grants it particularized existence; and in this granting of
specific existence an orientation toward certain ends within the world is part of the
thing’s existence. This conatic essence also makes the existent entity to be a particular
kind of entity in relationship to all others that act upon it out of their various essences.
Perhaps the parallels between Aquinas’s hylomorphism and Spinoza’s ideas of
conatic essence are apparent, but let us sketch these briefly. First, the role of conatus as
the essence of a thing which grants it a particular kind of existence and an orientation to
strive for preservation functions in the same way that the concept “form” does in
Aquinas’s metaphysics. Secondly, the idea that this essence must be something other
than the bodies or matter that are given a defined existence by this essence echoes
Aquinas’s contention that form is itself distinguishable from the matter in which it is
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expressed. Spinoza’s intention would seem to necessitate that this difference is a real
distinction, even if one were to argue that conatus must be conceived of as, in some
sense, a part of the infinite mode of motion and rest.100 The principle of motion and rest
would be, at least arguably, a feature of extension that is not, itself, material, but would
not be conceivable apart from the Attribute of extension. That would make it an infinite
Mode of extension, without, itself being extended. But even more to the point, Spinoza
does not say simply that motion and rest account for the diachronous and enduring
identity of any particular body. Rather, it is the preservation of the proportion of motion
and rest that is necessary for identity to be maintained. Therefore, the case can be made
for interpreting conatus as the organizing principle that is not material, but is the source
of the information that establishes the proportion of motion and rest that keeps an entity
in existence essentially. Continuing this same focus on the relationship of conatus to
material existence, a third comparison is in order. For both Spinoza and Aquinas, there is
an insistence that the form/conatus of an entity cannot be conceived of as actually
existing apart from the entity to which that form/conatus grants a particular kind of
existence. In other words, for neither Aquinas nor Spinoza can an formal essence be
thought of as being, strictly speaking, a particular thing prior to the coming-to-be of the
entity that exists through the influence of that essence. Finally, it is the form/conatus that
causes the entity to act in the world toward certain ends and by certain powers. The
exertion of the entity toward its own ends is the essence of the entity at work in the
world. Human experience of a particular entity acting out of its essence is the foundation
100
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of our acquaintance of the things that are acting. In other words, we know things for
what they are, because their forms or conatic essences present themselves to us as
intelligible in the activity of the entities upon our bodies.
Mind and body unity = identity
The analysis of conatus that has been presented to this point brings us to the
crucial issue of mind and body identity in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Della Rocca has noted
the import that this concept plays in Spinoza’s understanding of individuality: According
to this doctrine, each thing – complex physical individuals, complex mental individuals,
and also non-complex things, if there are any – by its very nature strives or tends to
persist in existence.” 101 He does not, however, see the instantiating role that conatus
plays in Spinoza’s thought in relationship to the individuality of the particular complex
entity. What I mean is he does not take sufficient note that the specific existence of the
thing as a particular kind of entity is granted to it by the presence of a conatic essence that
makes it to be what it is. Because he does not see this aspect of Spinoza’s doctrine of
conatus, Della Rocca, like many others, views Spinoza’s mind-body identity doctrine in
terms of parallelism. Noting that Spinoza describes the mind in terms that highlights its
particular conatus – “the most important element of our mind is the conatus to affirm the
existence of our body”102 – Della Rocca suggests that this entails that “the property of
affirming the existence of the body is a feature of the mental collection that the mental

101

Della Rocca, 35 f.
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collection tends to preserve, just as the proportion of motion and rest is a feature of the
physical collection that the physical collection tends to preserve.103
As we demonstrated above “parallelism”, if it functions at all in Spinoza’s
philosophy works predominantly as an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical
scheme. Della Rocca’s parallelist account of the relationship between the conatus of the
body and the conatus of the mind leaves unanswered a very crucial question: Why
should there be such a mapping? I do not see how it can be coherently argued that the
mind and body are one on the basis of parallelism. Even Della Rocca ultimately
concludes, after much analysis of the way Spinoza presents mind-body identity, that the
explanatory barrier erected by Spinoza between thought and extension denies the great
Rationalist his claim of mind-body identity. Hence, Della Rocca places Spinoza in “the
illustrious company of those who have failed to solve the mind-body problem.”104
Perhaps the reason the Della Rocca’s account of Spinoza produces failure is that
parallelism itself is a wrong metaphysical starting point that must treat not just ideas and
the objects of those ideas as parallel, but must also treat the conatic essence that enables a
particular body to persist as something distinct from that which would enable the mind
that is associated with that body to persist. Della Rocca’s work on Spinoza is creative
and insightful. It is among the best of the recent works on his thought. However, once
one has embraced the parallelism reading of Spinoza, the hopes of arguing for numeric
identity, in Spinoza’s system, seem to me hopelessly flawed.
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Bennett’s analysis is, perhaps, closer to the real issue in Spinoza’s mind-body
theory, and has captured the important distinction between the ordinary modes of thought
and extension versus the fundamental modes that are capable of combining with both
Attributes. However, my reading is distinguished from his in the following ways. There
is, indeed, something more fundamental than “ordinary” modes (bodies and minds) that is
involved in the identity relation in question. However, Bennett’s way of formulating the
issue, as I described it above, is in terms of a differentia that is added to the Attributes.
This idea of something being added to the attributes leaves us with the difficult question
of what such a property or principle might be. Also, Bennett cannot account for how his
notion “differentia” could fit into Spinoza’s metaphysics. But, his basic intuition is
correct, I believe, that the ascription of identity must be regarded as being related to some
more fundamental “thing” other than mind or body.
The reading I am offering allows the advantage that comes from positing mindbody identity in some more fundamental entity, but it can account for the existence of
this, more basic, res in Spinoza’s own terms. The “ordinary” Modes, we can say, consist
in or express the nature of this more fundamental “mode.” Of course, the idea of
“consisting in” does not really fit Bennett’s way of putting the issue. But, given the role
that the idea of essence and conatus play together in Spinoza’s thought, this is a better
Spinozistic way of putting it. Not only do I gain the advantages of Bennett’s approach to
identity as being in something more fundamental, but I am able to relocate the discussion
to a more “dynamic” level, with respect to which we might regard Bennett’s so-called
“fundamental modes” precisely as things that exist as a result of the organizing and
animating “form” or essence of an organism. The “ordinary” modes of body and mind
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being, on my interpretation, not the result of some differentia added to the Attributes, but
rather the necessary ways that the fundamental entity must express its existence because
thought and extension are both irreducible aspects of Reality. Hence, mind and body are
one and the same being qua essential res that is expressed in two modes of the Attributes
(ways of being). The expression of the conatus that is striving must occur (at least to our
minds) through the Attributes of thought and extension. This way of reading Spinoza,
therefore, perceives how the double aspect theory fits Spinoza and it points to an
interesting affinity with Aquinas.
If Spinoza was attending to a more fundamental and dynamic metaphysical
question--one which harkens back to Aquinas’s hylomorphism--it is worth considering
whether or not Spinoza’s metaphysics even has a mind-body problem (in the Cartesian
form) that Della Rocca says he cannot solve. Instead of concerning himself with the
mind-body relationship, his analysis seeks to point to the simultaneity involved in
mental-physical acts; and the concept of conatus helps us see how a living entity can be
minded as a material creature in the first place. Spinoza is interested in the question of
mind and body as a feature of living human beings. The conatus that makes a human
being alive qua human being is a singular conatus, not a mapped pair that parallel one
another. But this single conatic essence is productive of both physical results and mental
activity. Such a co-inhering relationship is fundamental to his view of natura naturata,
where all things are animate, albeit in different degrees. The little phrase, “albeit in
different degrees,” cannot be over emphasized. What Spinoza’s metaphysics wants to
recover is the reality of life as a part of the world of matter itself; a view which was
obscured by the dominant interest, I contend, in physics and mathematics that emerged
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during the late Renaissance and early modern period. (Descartes, because of his
exceptional prowess in many fields, is the quintessential representative.)
Spinoza, like Aquinas before him (and Aristotle in the ancient world) was
attempting to posit that life is itself an essential feature of the world should figure into our
metaphysical account of things, if an adequate account of reality is to be given that does
not embrace a too-quickly appropriated materialist reductionism. In regard to human
beings, therefore, mindedness or thought (or rationality to utilize the medieval term) is
considered to be the essential existence that human life takes. At least one scholar has
seen this central feature of Spinoza’s thought. Jonas has rightly observed that, in contrast
to Spinoza, the dominant philosophical/scientific point of view in the early modern
period was to see the material world in mechanistic terms. He argues that Spinoza’s
doctrine of the “organism” as defined (or given determinate existence) by a conatic
essence salvaged what was lost in philosophical Cartesianism, i.e. the reality of life in the
world.
Because he sees Spinoza’s metaphysics as being interested in what makes the
living existence of particular entities possible, Jonas says of Spinoza’s argument’s about
the origins of the mind: “From proposition XI [of Book II] onward, Spinoza deals with
the soul-body problem, and in that context makes certain statements concerning the type
of body that corresponds to a soul or mind, and the type of identity that pertains to it.”105
While Jonas is clear that Spinoza’s treatise is entitled Ethics because it is concerned to
provide an metaphysical underpinning for morality and the human quest for meaning, he
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is correct in his acknowledgement that Spinoza’s way of analyzing the existence of
entities “enabled him to account for features of organic existence far beyond what
Cartesian dualism and mechanism could accommodate.”106 This is most true about
Spinoza’s approach to the question of the relationship between mind and body.
As Aquinas before him, Spinoza envisioned the issue of mind and body as a
different issue from the Cartesian problem of how a mind could be related to a body from
which it is absolutely different substantially. His doctrine of the oneness of Substance
and his identification of the Attributes of thought and extension as really different (as
expressions of the one Substance) but not distinct ontologically are the evidence that he
wanted to affirm that thought and extension, as well as mind and body, are irreplaceable
and irreducible descriptions of our experience in the world and of ourselves.107 In
Spinoza’s system the mind is an irreducible feature of an entity that also has “being
physical” as another irreducible feature. Parallelism grants this, of course, but now we
have an explanation of how this “mapping” might occur. It is an essentially hylomorphic
view of things.
Consider how Spinoza’s doctrine of conatic essence works to enable us to take a
different approach to the mind-body “problem.” The solution to the mind-body
relationship cannot be solved, in Spinoza’s system, by referring to the nature of
Substance, because the essence of Substance qua Substance is (with regard to our present
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question) to exist infinitely expressing infinite Attributes, especially thought and
extension. While the Modes of Substance are really existent, just as Substance is,
Substance is not individual strictly speaking (except in that the Divine Mind knows itself
and that there is the “face of the whole Universe). But individual things (res singulares)
are, obviously, individual. But individuals cannot exist as bare particulars, since the
essence of the Substance upon which res singulares depend for existence and in which
they must exist and by which they are explained (ultimately) is to exist (in our experience
of Substance) as the Modes thought and extension. So, the individuals in their conatusorganized existence only exist as mind and body, but they are, ultimately, neither one nor
the other, but irreducibly both.
The hinge of his argument is II, P 13, where he discusses at length the nature of
the body, is to make it more readily apparent to us how the human mind is united to the
body. That union is not the union of different Modes whose union is necessarily parallel
because of the nature of Substance. Rather, the union is due to the conatic essence that
makes a body qua complex living organism capable of having a mind like the human
mind. Not every entity is so organized; and the subtly of the human body makes it more
apt to be acted upon and to act so as to be minded in a unique and penultimate manner.
On the basis of this kind of analysis of the conatic complexity of the human being is
Spinoza able to say:
. . . the mind and the body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the
attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. Hence it comes about
that the order or linking of things is one, whether Nature be conceived under this
or that attribute, and consequently the order of the active and passive states of our
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body is simultaneous in Nature with the order of active and passive states of the
mind.108
In his comments in the scholium, Spinoza says that that the scholium of II, P 7 is
the foundation for the claims of this proposition – the mind and body do not have any
causal determination over one another. He then says in his additional comments on this
proposition that we can understand this lack of causal relation “more clearly from that
scholium. Here he interprets II, P 7, sch to mean that “mind and body are one and the
same thing. . .” It is interesting that in that scholium his actual argument does not
mention mind or body. Rather, he there speaks of a Mode of extension and the idea of
that Mode as one and the same thing, expressed in two ways (modus). I have argued
above that this statement is the basis for Spinoza’s epistemological parallelism and not
for his metaphysical view of the relationship between mind and body. But it is clear that
in the context of III, P 2, sch that he applies this language about “Modes,” which I have
argued is an epistemological construct, to the metaphysical issue of the mind and the
body. Spinoza’s willingness to translate his rhetoric about modes of extension and the
ideas of those modes into body-mind language does not do damage to my interpretation.
Neither my claim that the focus of II, P 7 is epistemology nor my emphasis on conatus as
the source of mind-body identity in Spinoza’s metaphysics is undercut.
Spinoza, on my interpretation, utilizes the statements in II, P 1 and III, P 2 in way
that implies a similarity but not synonymity. He can do this, because he does not need to
think of “mind” (specifically) as a referring term strictly speaking. On my reading of
Spinoza, the mind could be in its essence the bounded set of all ideas that have come to
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exist qua the experiences and understanding and insights of a particular organic
individual. These “ideas” as a bounded set would be the result, not of the body per se,
but would instead be understood as the thought engaged in (actively) by the organic
individual’s living existence as a minded body that is acting and being acted upon.109
Neither does his metaphysical description take “body” to be a referring term in the most
precise ontological sense. The body exists, in a Spinozistic view, as an aspect of the “one
and the same thing” that Spinoza insists is “expressed” in two ways (the Latin term is
modis which is a form of the word modus). This expressed “thing” is the organism that
has a body and it not the body is the actual existent thing. Because the organism qua the
organized and defined res is the locus of the relevant essence, the body is, like the mind,
simply a Mode whereby the existence of the organism in the one Substance is
“expressed.”110
This brings us to another important point, regarding the conatus that is the
organization-granting, existence-enabling power of a thing’s being. Just as the conatus
organizes the body to be “apt” for the mind, the same conatus has the power to make the
human “mind” that is, the idea of the body “apt” for that body. But we might ask why
the conatus is not itself conceived of as the thing that is doubly aspected. If this is the
case, then conatus is no more analogous to form or rational soul than it is to the body.
The reply is that the concept of conatus has some ambiguity in Spinoza’s metaphysics.
The conatus, when we are thinking of the total entity that is organized and expressed in
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the two ordinary modes of body and mind, must be considered relative to the way we are
considering the organism’s life. If we are thinking of the thing that exists and is striving
to maintain that existence qua simultaneously minded and extended, then there is a sense
in which conatus names a single and unified yet doubly-aspected striving But conatus
has a more metaphysically fundamental meaning, which is also its most “essential”
meaning. This necessitates that we qualify what we mean by it being doubly-aspected.
In this meaning, the conatus of which we have just spoken and that strives to be itself is
dependent upon a more basic conatus. The striving entity exists only because it has an
informing and organizing essence in which sense it exists. This essence (which I have
argued is identified with the conatus in the metaphysically fundamental sense I am now
suggesting) is not a particular thing, but is an informing principle. What I mean is that, in
this sense, conatus is considered to be the “formal cause” of the entity that strives in two
aspects of its existence, but does so as a single existent essence. If the conatus is
identifiable with the essence that “can be granted” or “annulled” [2def2], then we can say
that Spinoza was, at least, assuming that the organizational essence or form (conatus) that
enables the complexity of the body to have a greater perfection and to be apt to have
associated with it an “idea of that body” is the very same organizing form that grants to
the organism a mind that is appropriate to the “more perfect” body with which it exists as
one thing. In this sense, then, the conatus considered as the “form” of the living
organism is not doubly-aspected, but productive of the duality that is expressed.
On this reading of Spinoza’s metaphysics, conatus is very much like the rational
soul qua form, as Aquinas uses the concept. In Aquinas’s view the rational soul is not a
form that merely gives a particular organization to the body. It also instantiates the
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existence of a particular kind of mind that will be apt for the body that is so organized.
The body does not produce the mind, but the mind of a human is the only intelligence
that is meant for union with a body, unlike the Divine Mind or “angelic” minds. The
rational soul in Aquinas’s view is the essence of a human being qua human body and
mind, because rationality and biology (animality) are essential to the definition of a
human being. So, the essence of man is not the form or the soul, but both “aspects” that
are ultimately involved in a person’s existence as a living entity. Considering Spinoza in
this light, we can say that the Modes – mind and body, made mutually apt each for the
other. This, at least, suggests a strong congruity with Aquinas’s basic conception of the
component metaphysical principles that are involved in the existence of a compound
being like a human being. Spinoza’s Modes then can be seen as analogous to the “acts of
being” employed in Aquinas’s description of his particular hylomorphic view of mind
and body. As “acts” of being, the body and mind are, for Aquinas, objectively real and
not merely subjective descriptions. The same is true for Spinoza. But where Aquinas’s
speaks of “acts” (which would imply too much intention), Spinoza chooses to talk about
Modes that express the necessary being of the one infinite Substance.
“Body” and “mind” name Spinozistic (and Thomistic) properties of existence
which the human being must exist as. These are the modal expressions of the Attributes
of Substance – extension and thought. And only the Modes of these Attributes present
Substance to the human understanding. Hence, the interpretation of mind-body identity
being offered here does not ignore Spinoza’s insistence that what exists are Substance
and Modes. The Modes of extension and thought are not reduced to mere nominal
descriptions that get applied to the organism. They are, rather, the only ways that the
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organism’s life can be expressed, because being extended and being minded are both
fundamental features of Reality. And the same conatus that makes the body capable of
being “minded” in a more perfect way also instantiates the very mind that is “apt” to have
as its “object” the greater perfection that is the human body. Therefore, the emphatic
focus that Aquinas’s hylomorphism places on human beings as essentially knowing
bodies (rational animals)--whose knowing cannot be reduced to any mere material, but
whose biological description and whose physical existence is necessary essentially-Spinoza recaptures in his post-Cartesian language.
Mind and body interaction
However, the interpretation being offered must address the issue of Spinoza’s
rejection of mind and body interaction. Margaret Gullan-Whur has commented on the
historical context in which Spinoza expressed, what she calls his “cryptic” view of mind
and body. She informs us further that the doctrine which is utilized by contemporary
Spinoza scholarship, “parallelism,” had evolved in the context of the theological
controversies that surrounded Descartes philosophy. And she rightly notes that the
doctrine of “occasionalism” was closely related to the idea of parallelism at that time, at
least by the leading theological defender of Descartes, Geulincx.111 But, Spinoza, as
Gullan-Whur acknowledges, was no occasionalist. But neither was he a materialist,
although his statements in the Short Treatise, which Gullan-Whur points us to, had
appeared to make the mind “logically and causally dependent on the body. The essence
of the soul consists only in the being of an idea . . . arising from the essence of an object
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which in fact exists in Nature.”112 But he removes the possibility reading him as a
materialist in Ethics when he posits the explanatory barrier between the mind and the
body. We are left in Spinoza studies, Gullan-Whur concludes, with the realization that an
unresolved tension exists in his “doctrine of mind between identity and anatomy.”
Here and there in Ethics Spinoza seems to suggest that and body are just two
ways of seeing one thing. The thinking substance and the extended substance are
one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute,
now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one
and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. But this explanation will not do,
since Spinoza would also insist in Ethics that extension and thought express two
diverse and incompatible causal powers. The causal force within modes of
extension was motion and rest, he claimed, whereas modes of thought, ideas,
were empowered only by implication and inference. The power of the mind is
intelligence itself. Neither power, he stated, could operate on modes of the other
attribute. The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot
determine the body to motion. How, then, could mind and body be identical?113
Gullan-Whur’s observations identify the core of the problem that any
interpretation must face. To get at addressing it we start by asking what Spinoza intends
by his description of the body as “the object of the idea constituting the human mind is
the body” [II, P 13]. If Spinoza thinks that the “idea” that is the mind is not caused by the
body’s affections, and if he also thinks that bodily movements cannot be caused by the
mind, then what does Spinoza mean, then, when he calls body the object of the mind. If a
materialist explanation of “mind” is ruled out by the explanatory-causal barrier of Ethics,
then “object” must mean something other than the intension it is granted in much of
current metaphysical discussion. Even though he states that “a definite mode of
extension actually existing, and nothing else” is “object” of the mind, the term “object”
cannot simply mean “thing that exists” or “value of a bound variable.” Were that the
112
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case, then we would have a mode of thought being explained by a mode of extension, for
qua object (as a bound physical variable) the body would be, in some way, the “content”
that is the mind. Hence, we owe it to ourselves to see if there is not some better way to
interpret Spinoza’s meaning.
Spinoza utilizes “object” (obiectum) ambiguously, just as he does conatus. He
speaks, for instance, in Definition 4 of the second part of Ethics about an “adequate idea”
in itself without consideration of the idea’s “relation to its object.” Here, “object” seems
to imply a kind of thing-like status, which would sit well with a representationalist
interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology.114 In the corollary of proposition 9 Spinoza
also uses “object” in a way that seems to suggest that it is referring to some kind of
“value of a bound variable”: “Whatsoever happens in the individual object of any idea,
knowledge of it is in God only in so far as he has the idea of that object.”115 Later in his
consideration of “the nature and origin of the mind” Spinoza uses obiectum in a way that
seems to move away from the concept of a bound-variable. In II, P 12 Spinoza says that
the happenings “in the object of the idea constituting the human mind is bound to be
perceived by the human mind . . . . That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting the
human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body without its being perceived by
the mind.” In this instance, obiectum appears to be something other than the bound
variable of which the idea is a representation or upon which the idea is dependent for its
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existence as an idea. Instead, the body considered as the obiectum of the ideae is
described as something that events or states of affairs can occur in. Such a way of
utilizing the term object is misleading, if Spinoza is simply utilizing the concept in a way
that is consistent with contemporary metaphysical usage.
It seems obvious to me that Spinoza’s concept of the body as the “object” of the
idea that constitutes the essence of the human mind is not best conceived of in
representationalist terms. Rather, the description of the body as the object of the idea of
the mind, when one thinks in terms of conatic essence as the organization giving
principle of human life, can be understood clearly as Spinoza’s way of saying that the
body (its affections or happenings) is the focus of the mind’s activity. This does not
mean, however, that the body’s events cause the ideas to exist. The body as the “object”
of the idea that constitutes the mind could be thought of as that which engages a
particular power of an organism. That power, however, is not caused, per se, by that
“object.” Even Spinoza’s argument that “if there were another object of the mind apart
from the body, since nothing exists from which some effect does not follow, there would
necessarily have to be in our mind the idea of some effect of it,” can be understood in the
terms I am suggesting. To have the body as its object is for the mind to be oriented
toward a particular mode of extension as the focus of the mind’s activity. This concept
does not imply causation of the modal act of thought that is at work in the activity of the
mind, because Spinoza will not allow us to defy the causal barrier between thought and
extension. Just as Aquinas could say that the proper object of the human intellect is the
understanding of material nature (and not think that material nature caused the
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understanding), so Spinoza seems to conceive of the body as the proper object of the
mind.
This way of stating Spinoza’s position is quite consistent with his claim that the
idea(s) that constitute the essence of the mind are the “affections of the body.” The body
acts and is acted upon in the context of the world of extension and this interaction, as we
saw above, involves the conatic essences of things acting out of their essences upon the
body. The interaction of extended things that act out of the powers that their essences
grant them means that in the world of extension a real engagement of essences is
involved. The body so affected in its essence by this interaction of essences is the object
of the mind. As things act out of their essences upon the body, they produce affections in
the body. These acts of “essences” produce affections or modifications of the body that;
and the ideas of these acts are the thought of or consciously experienced nature of the
essences. This constitutes the essence of the mind. And as a mode of thought the mind is
just the organism’s being aware because its conatus makes this possible in the organism
by its essence giving presence. 116
Such a state of affairs would be the result of the conatic essence that subtly and
complexly organizes the body (P 13) to be the most apt to act and be acted upon and a
mind to be apt to perceive and understand the acts. Spinoza can, then, assume in his
argument that the mind exercises it powers only in relation to the body, but the body does
not cause the thoughts of the mind. The activities of the organism are “one and the same”
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But whereas the Thomistic conception of the relationship between a power and its proper
object was often described in terms of the power as passive until its object affected it, Spinoza’s view
would have been that the mind is active in relation to the body’s affections.
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activity because the conatus establishes the activity in the organism that is expressed in
both ordinary modes of existence. The life of the organism, therefore, explains how
thought and extension can be “one and the same thing.” Of course, if the organism is the
relevant focus of the identity, then (as Bennett wished to show) we could have identity
without denying the explanatory (or even causal) boundary that Spinoza erects.
In a similar way, the non-causal role of mind in relation to the motion of the body
can be secured by this same focus on conatic essence. It is axiomatic in Spinoza studies
that he wanted to deny the will or desire or conscious deliberation as features of human
existence that could account for the actions of the body. He was, as many have pointed
out, unimpressed with Descartes concept of mental-physical interaction, not just the
“pineal gland” explanation, but the general hypothesis. (Leibniz’s doctrine of
harmonization between the mental and physical left him just as unenthused.) But by
emphasizing the role of conatus in Spinoza’s thought we can account for his doctrine of
oneness and his doctrine of non-causal relations between mind and body. The body qua
mode of extension produces its own movement qua physical action through the operation
of the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. In the proof of III, P 2 he asserts this in
seventeenth century terms: “Now the motion-and-rest of a body must arise from another
body, which again has been determined to motion or rest by anoter body, and without
exception whatever arises in a body must have arisen from God in so far as he is
considered as affected by a mode of Extension. . .” Utilizing the example of
“sleepwalkers” as an illustration of bodily actions that are not volitional, or truly
conscious in the ordinary sense, to portray the body’s purely physical powers, Spinoza
argues vigorously in terms of real experience that the mind cannot be thought of as a
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single power that superintends the motion and rest of the body. However, the true intent
of Spinoza’s arguments against the mind as the mover or captain of the body is seen in
the scholium of III, P 2 when he concludes:
Now surely all these considerations [regarding how the acts we consider to be free
acts of the mind moving the body to action] go to show clearly that mental
decision on the one hand, and the appetite and physical state of the body on the
other hand, are simultaneous in nature; or rather, they are one and the same thing
which, when considered under the attribute of Thought and explicated through
Thought, we call decision, and when considered under the attribute of Extension
and deduced from the laws of motion-and-rest, we call a physical state.
Spinoza’s argument is against a kind of Cartesian and late scholastic view of the
mind’s relationship to the body in which the mind is something that attends the body or
perhaps (to risk anachronism) supervenes upon it.117 His concerns, however, are fully
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While not addressing mind body interaction directly, Justin Skirry argues convincingly, in his
essay on Descartes’ metaphysical views on the relationship between mind and body, that Descartes
essentially followed a Scotistic scholastic line of thinking. “Although Descartes argues that bodies, in the
general sense, are constituted by extension, he also maintains that species of bodies are determined by the
configuration and motion of their parts. This doctrine of “configuration and motion of parts” serves the
same purpose as the doctrine of substantial forms with regards to entirely physical things. But the main
difference between the two is that Descartes’ doctrine does not employ final causes. Recall that substantial
forms organize matter for the purpose of being a species of thing. “If Descartes did hold a fundamentally
scholastic theory of mind-body union, then is it more Thomistic or Scotistic? Since intellect and will are the
only faculties of the mind, it does not have the faculty for organizing matter for being a human body. So, if
Descartes’ theory is scholastic, it must be most in line with some version of the Scotistic theory. . . .
“The purpose of a human body endowed with only the form of corporeity is union with the soul.
Hence, the organization of matter into a human body is an effect that is explained by the final cause or
purpose of being disposed for union. But, on Descartes’ account, the explanatory order would be reversed:
a human body’s disposition for union is an effect resulting from the configuration and motion of parts. So,
even though Descartes does not have recourse to substantial forms, he still has recourse to the configuration
of matter and to the dispositions to which it gives rise, including “all the dispositions required to preserve
that union” (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). Hence, on this account, Descartes gets what he needs, namely,
Descartes gets a body properly configured for potential union with the mind, but without recourse to the
scholastic notion of substantial forms with their final causal component.
“Another feature of this basically Scotistic position is that the soul and the body were considered
incomplete substances themselves, while their union results in one, complete substance. Surely Descartes
maintains that mind and body are two substances but in what sense, if any, can they be considered
incomplete? Descartes answers this question in the Fourth Replies. He argues that a substance may be
complete insofar as it is a substance but incomplete insofar as it is referred to some other substance together
with which it forms yet some third substance. This can be applied to mind and body as follows: the mind
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addressable, and his doctrine made less cryptic, by reference to conatic essence that
grants a particular kind of life to human beings, i.e. being minded in the highest and most
apt sense, because they are “bodied” in the most complex and “apt” sense. So, Spinoza’s
contention that “mental decision” is simultaneous in its existence qua mode of thought
with “the appetite” qua mode of extension is understandable as on my interpretation as
mental and physical actions of a single organism, determined and formed by its conatic
essence to be capable of physical states that involve simultaneously mental awareness
and the capacity for further reflection and understanding of those very physical states.
Hence, the mind qua a power does not cause the body to move toward food that is
desired, nor does the physical desire for food explain the nature of conscious awareness
of food or the mind’s “decision.”118 Rather, Spinoza can say that these acts are “one and
the same thing” that can be explicated adequately and thoroughly from the perspective of
either Attribute of Substance. The one-and-the-same-thing that can be so explicated can
be explicated in this way, because the ways that the entity being explicated exists is
precisely in the Modes of mind and body. But those Modes are both the thing being
explicated in distinct real categories of thought and existence. Spinoza’s perspective,

insofar as it is a thinking thing is a complete substance, while the body insofar as it is an extended thing is a
complete substance, but each taken individually is only an incomplete human being.” James Fieser,
“Descartes: The Mind Body Distinction,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http//.www.iep.utm.
edu/d/descmind.htm. Hosted by the University of Tennessee at Martin,
118
As a critique of Cartesianism, Jonas has observed that Spinoza’s doctrine addressed a central
failing of the mechanistic view of the extended world. ” . . . the main fault, even the absurdity, of the
[Cartesian doctrine of mechanism and its attendant dualism] lay in denying organic reality its principal and
most obvious characteristic, namely, that it exhibits in each individual instance a striving of its own for
existence and fulfillment, or the fact of life’s willing itself. In other words, the banishment of the old
concept of appetition from the conceptual scheme of the new physics, joined to the rationalistic spiritualism
of the new theory of consciousness, deprived the realm of life its status in the scheme of things.” Jonas,
259 – 261.
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here, is not far from Aquinas’s argument that it is not the mind that knows or the body
that lifts, but the person who does both.
Spinoza was intent on avoiding not just a Cartesian metaphysical dualism, but
even a methodological dualism that could treat the difference between mind and body as
a difference of existence. That kind of methodological dualism quickly becomes (or at
least can) quasi-metaphysical; and then problems such as interaction and causal relations
begin to plague the philosophical quest. Of course, materialism or idealism solve the
dilemma by simply discounting some significant philosophical distinctions, thereby
failing to capture human life empirically. By emphasizing the conatic oneness of the
organism that exists essentially (and necessarily) as Modes that are really distinct qua
“ways” that Reality itself is, Spinoza thinks he has corrected the problems of early
modern philosophy that had to opt for some choice between Cartesian-scholastic dualism,
or Hobbesian materialism on the one hand and Leibniz’s idealism on the other.
What Spinoza wanted to do regarding the phenomena of human existence is in
large measure compatible with (and therefore made more comprehensible by) Aquinas’s
hylomorphism. He refused to think of the mind as some entity or power that tacks an
additional level or reality onto the biological/physical life that humans share with all
other creatures. Rather, he offers, as the Books three and four of Ethics clearly reflect, a
view of human existence as a unity, one which is always just as ideational as it is
material. His concept of conatic essence was the key that allowed him to state in postCartesian terms the insights about the irreducible doubly-aspected unity of human living
that Aquinas’s theory offered in a much earlier time. The idea of conatus, as I have
interpreted it, while not developed explicitly in Spinoza’s doctrine, is certainly present in
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his system; and it gives us a reason to think that the so-called dual-aspect theory is not
only a good description of Spinoza’s own views, but arguably true, as well.
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Chapter 6
Hylomorphism and Immortality
The preceding presentation has suggested ways that Spinoza can be interpreted as
holding a doctrine regarding mind and body that has significant parallels to Aquinas’s
hylomorphism. They both posited Thought as an ontologically basic attribute of Reality,
even if in different schematic constructs. However, their conviction that Thought should
be so understood is important for understanding two further propositions in their thought:
(1) the idea that a human being has a “composite” existence and (2) the immortality of
the mind/soul. Looking at these two questions in this chapter, we will be able to provide
an explanation of how their respective doctrines of immortality relate to their more basic
metaphysical scheme. This is important, since the concept of the soul’s/mind’s
immortality in both philosophers’ doctrines has been criticized by commentators.1
In this concluding chapter, therefore, I want to suggest how we should frame the
logic that undergirds the claim that they make for the activity of thought as not dependent
upon anything that is material or extended. Exploring their logic in this regard, I will
show why it is arguably true that Spinoza’s concept of conatus implies a view of human
nature that is comparable to Aquinas’s idea that humans are, as are all things,

1

In Spinoza’s case see H. H Joachim, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1901), 290 ff. Cf. Feuer, 224 and Bennett, 357f. Both Joachim and Feuer claim that
Spinoza’s affirmation of personal immortality cannot be reconciled with the focus of Spinoza’s
metaphysics. Bennett attempts to provide a reading of Spinoza that allows Spinoza’s own system to
embrace this claim, but in Bennett’s view Spinoza’s doctrine is not just false but a “seemingly unmotivated
disaster” (357). Regarding Aquinas’s view Anthony Kenny’s treatment of his doctrine seems to capture the
essence of many of the main arguments against him. Considering Aquinas's conception of the
immateriality of the intellectual soul, Kenny wonders how Aquinas could possibly have thought that the
soul, being a form, could exist without matter. Kenny thinks that this would only be possible for his nonphilosophical, religious beliefs. Hence, in his view, Aquinas shows "a disconcerting disdain for
distinctions between abstract and concrete" (138).
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“composite” beings. I offer this for two reasons: (1) because I have not quite yet argued
for this designation explicitly; and (2) some might think Spinoza’s monism could not
allow this. Following that demonstration, I then will indicate how their particular
doctrines of immortality, while quite different from one another, actually do emerge from
their various philosophical systems, and are not embarrassing additions or dangling
propositions that do not fit with their basic metaphysical schemes. We can show how
the doctrine of conatus shapes Spinoza’s doctrine of the immortality of the mind; and we
can do the same, as well, for Aquinas regarding the way that his doctrine of form works
in his doctrine of incorruptibility.
Once this last piece of the interpretive puzzle is in place, the final section of this
concluding chapter will point in a sketchy and preliminary way to some important
insights that can be gleaned from the kind of hylomorphic understanding of human
existence that is offered here with regard to Spinoza and Aquinas. I will suggest some
ways that their insights can be helpful in shaping the focus of contemporary debates
about mind and body relations. While this last section will be, as I have already
indicated, only suggestive, I offer it in the hope that the interpretive work of this
dissertation might assist us in discovering a fruitful conceptual starting point for the
continuing quest to explore the metaphysical nature of the mind-body relationship.
The “composite” individual and conatus/form
Aquinas’s definition of human beings as “rational animals” captures the hylomorphism
that defines how he and Spinoza (at least in an analogous way) conceived the dynamic
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basic “principles” that make a human being unique.2 While all things, in Spinoza’s view,
express in some way the Attribute of Thought, even Spinoza allows that there is a distinct
“way” or expression of that Attribute in human beings. Hence, we can say that for him
even as with Aquinas, when we consider ourselves in terms of our capacity for
rationality, human persons participate (in Aquinas’s terminology) or express (in
Spinoza’s) the fundamental Attribute of Thought. The argument of this dissertation has
not been that Spinoza and Aquinas are compatible on every level of their metaphysical
doctrine, but that they can be read in a complementary manner, in that Spinoza’s view’s
(when applied specifically to the human being – which was ultimately what he was after
in Ethics) can be seen to have an affinity with Aquinas’s hylomorphism.
As an individual, each human person has what Aquinas calls the “form” of
rationality or the “rational soul.” This soul makes the human body to be apt for a “mind,”
even as it makes that mind apt for having a particular body as the locus of its activity.3 It
must be understood here that “the form of rationality,” for Aquinas, is not the same thing
as the act of rationality that a human being exercises when he is having thoughts or
experiencing something. The “form” that Aquinas names “rational soul” is, rather, best
understood as analogous to the set of information that a specific person’s particular (and
unique) genes provide. The rational soul, so far as Aquinas is concerned, grants a species
appropriate shape and function to each human person. It does this in relation to the
2

The term “principle” is a basic Thomist concept. Spinoza speaks of Attributes of Substance,
rather than principles because he wanted to press for substance-monism. However, when one reflects on
the way that the Attributes work in individual modes and in complex organisms (see chapter five) the
analogy between Thomas’ “principles” and Spinoza’s “Attributes” emerges. In both cases, the respective
concepts serve to point to what is responsible for (causes in the Aristotelian sense) the existence of ordinary
particulars.
3
Aquinas’s contention was that human minds are the lowest form of intellectual substances, which
means that he thought intellect was a part of reality quite apart from the existence of human minds.
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material body that is formed by the “form,” thereby producing a unique individual. The
rational soul does not, therefore, ipso facto give a person a “mind,” but at most gives
“aptness” for a mind. The distinction between the “mind” and “body” entails nothing
more than that “mind” is an aspect of the existence of an entity that exists as unified on a
more fundamental level. This is the meaning of the distinction discussed in chapter four.4
Spinoza, as I have interpreted him, views conatus in an analogous way. Understood as
the essence of an individual organism that organizes its specific and unified “striving,”
the conatus of a complexly organized human body is the self-same “form” that
establishes a mind as the mental aspect of the organism’s “striving.”
To say that in Spinoza’s view a conatus “organizes” the individual’s striving
might seem to suggest that the striving, apart from the conatus, is something like
“matter.” That reading of my interpretation, however, misses the essential point that I
argued in the previous chapter. Conatus in Spinoza’s metaphysics is a term that he uses
explicitly to refer to the act of “striving” to remain in active existence. However, it is my
contention that one needs to see conatus as having an ambiguous meaning in Spinoza.
On the one hand it is, as was observed in the previous chapter, the act of “striving” when
one thinks in terms of the ordinary modes of thought and extension exerting the drive to
maintain their individual existences. However, the ordinary modes, which are in fact
distinct aspects of a more fundamental unity, only “strive” to maintain their existences
because there is a more fundamental finite and particular entity that exists as the
“ground” of which body and mind are but aspects. In terms of this more fundamental

4

See 152 – 165 above.
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entity, which in reference to human beings we can name “person,” there is an essence
that is so intimately related to conatus in the first sense that we are justified in referring to
it as conatus as well. It is in this second sense, then that conatus can be conceived of as
an organizing form.
While it could be argued that, if the matter-form approach applies to Spinoza at
all, we should say that the conatus is simply the individual’s multiplicity of striving that
is precisely in some way also a single striving, this would not do justice to the question
regarding how this individual can in the first place be established in existence so as to be
capable of striving as an individual. Spinoza not only needs something like Aquinas’s
notion of form, but actually relies upon it. This striving individual in Spinoza’s thought
is granted extended existence and mental existence by the self-same essence. And since,
as was demonstrated in chapter five,5 Spinoza describes the conatus as “the actual
essence of [any] thing” it is clear that conatus does indeed have an ambiguous meaning
in Spinoza’s metaphysics, signifying both the activity of “striving” on the part of
individuals possessed of both a mental and a physical side and an essence that accounts
for the acts of striving [mental-striving and physical-striving] that present themselves as
dual aspects of any such “thing” (res) in the first place. For this reason, neither the body
nor the mind can be reduced to the other or explained by the other, in Spinoza’s view;
and a very similar explanation follows for why the reductionist approach does not work
for Aquinas. Both mind and body are irreducible and primary aspects of human

5

Above 239f.
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existence, because a single form or conatus, as a kind of metaphysical “entity” is, in some
sense, prior to the being that expresses both aspects in an equal and integrated way.
When we see the important role that the idea of conatus as form plays in
Spinoza’s thought, we not only can appreciate the way that his and Aquinas’s view are
compatible, but we can begin to understand why both philosophers view the body as the
“object” of particular cognitive acts that are the mind’s activity. As was demonstrated in
chapter four,6 for Aquinas just as for Spinoza, the mind’s knowledge of the world cannot
be separated from the body’s interaction with the world of things that that act upon the
human person qua bodily. And so, in this action the “body” is affected by the things that
impact it out of their own essences, and hence the “mind” can know those essences as
objects of understanding. In other words, the “mind” does not have its own particular
realm (Descartes) or level of reality (in the supervenient sense) that is radically distinct
from the bodily life. For neither Spinoza nor Aquinas, however, does this physical
interaction produce or cause the knowledge in question, because the activity of mind is
not caused by anything bodily. One might say that, at least in the case of cognitive acts
that are not purely intellectual, Aquinas’s conceives of the body as also the “medium” of
those acts in a way that might not so clearly fit Spinoza’s view. However, if one looks
closely at their descriptions this objection falls aside. For instance, Spinoza is clear that
the aptness for thought and “perception of many things simultaneously” by a mind is in
direct proportion to the “aptness of the body [that is the object of that mind] to act and be
acted upon simultaneously in many ways” [II, P 13, sch].

6

Above 163f.
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The key questions in regard to this statement are two: First, why would Spinoza
argue that the aptness for thought is directly tied to the aptness of the body, unless he
accepts something like Aquinas’s view that the body is involved in the process of a
person knowing, even though it does not explain what the act of knowing (perceiving and
conceiving) is itself nor cause the act of intellection to take place? Second, what does
Spinoza mean when he describes the body as the “object of the idea constituting the
human mind”? As was argued in chapter five7 the term ‘object’ in Spinoza’s usage
ascribes an intentionality to thought, and for him to call the body the “object” of the idea
that constitutes the human mind suggests that he utilizes the term “object” in this context
in a way that is compatible with Aquinas’s usage. This way of using the term implies
that the body is that to which the mind is properly oriented as the medium through which
engagement with the world occurs and the world that is engaged is the physical world in
which things act upon one another (as was stated above) out of their particular essences.
Such a way of viewing the matter does not, however, require us to think of the body’s
interaction as causing the thought qua Thought. Rather, we are merely observing that in
Spinoza’s view there is a single entity that is both bodily (and engaged in interaction with
the world of extended things and mental (and engaged in “conceiving” ideas about that
world, as well as ideas about the ideas).
On this view of the human person as a fundamental unitary thing, - in some way
more fundamental than what we think of as an ordinary human being, possessed of both a
mental and a physical “side” – one might say with regard to the relationship between the

7

Above 265f.
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mind and the body, precisely as such “sides” of a human being, that the body is where the
mind is “located” in natura naturata. (By contrast, we might then think of conatus as
“organizing form” as in some way at least more fundamentally a “part” of natura
naturans.) The activity of thinking, however, is not explainable by reference to the
material stuff of the body or the physical laws governing the material world itself.
Conversely, the same holds regarding the “explanation” of the body. In the case of both
philosophers, to conceive of the body as the “location” of the mind’s acts does not allow
us to consider the mind to be the “cause” of any of the body’s movements, when
speaking in the strictest sense. Such movements qua physical activity require a physical
or material explanation in the strict sense of causation. This way of posing the issue is
explicit in Spinoza and implicit in Aquinas’s acceptance of the idea that “locomotion”
and “growth,” and even the capacity to “sense,” are powers granted to physical organisms
by the non-rational parts of the soul. Because of this way of conceiving the powers of the
soul, and of seeing the rational soul as subsuming in itself all the non-rational powers,
without negating their essence as non-rational powers, Aquinas was able to contend that
it is the person who is formed by the rational soul qua form that is the source of his own
action and movement. The body moves itself in the strictest sense, but the person can act
with intent and desire or choice. Hence, for Aquinas, when one reaches out to pick
something that he wants or needs, it is not the rational part of the soul acting upon the
body to move it. Rather, it is the person qua rational animal that is moving with a
rational purpose.
As was demonstrated in chapter four, Aquinas does not think of the mind or the
“rational part of the soul” as acting at all, in the strictest sense, because the rational soul
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is the form of a human being’s existence. It is the human being that is physically rational
in his existence and rationally physical in his acts. Hence, on one level, the problem of
mind-body interaction (at least the Cartesian version) never enters the picture. Similarly,
for Spinoza the same follows, because the mind is not strictly speaking a thing (res) that
could act upon the body, nor vice versa. They are both modal aspects of the more
fundamental “one and the same thing” that exists because of the conatus-form which
defines it and organizes its life qua organism to be both extended in a certain complex
way and apt for thought in a way that is complementary to and in direct proportion to the
complexity of the organized body.
Hence, the mind is not the “cause” of physical acts, strictly speaking. It could
not, in neither Spinoza’s nor Aquinas’s estimation, be a cause, since “mind” does not
name a substantive entity, but only an aspect of the rational-physical being that is a
human person. Hence, in the strictest sense, it is not correct, by Spinoza’s and Aquinas’s
lights, to think of “interaction” going on between mind and body. This way of thinking
does not fit them, because in their hylomorphic view it is more appropriate to think of the
self-same organism as what is both acting qua body and knowing qua mind. This is the
import, I think, of Spinoza’s description of mind and body as “one and the same thing.”
In the same way, Aquinas posits the human person as a singular entity that is defined as a
“rational animal.” So, no real explanation of the specific and distinct acts in which each
of these aspects (body and mind) of human life engages us is required in order to account
for “interaction” between discrete entities or substances or sets of properties, if by such
properties one envisions some kind of dualism of existence.

280

This does not mean that ”the mind” is the cause of nothing for Aquinas or for
Spinoza, but only that the mind is not a substantive entity that itself engages in causation.
In the most precise sense, therefore, we would not even want to speak about human
beings as having a rational “side” or “part” and a non-mental physical “side” or “part” to
their existence. Rather, we must say, to utilize Aquinas’s terminology, it is the person
who wills or desires or chooses and the same person who moves to achieve the intent or
goals that he or she has. This is not the same thing as saying that a mental desire or
thought or volition “causes” the movement of the arm that reaches for the light switch in
order to enable the person to see. We may not, by this way of construing the question,
have an explanation for how our rationality or our thought can be causally efficacious
with respect to the physical side. But at least we have disposed of the problematic
Cartesian way of construing the question. Instead we can say that the form of rationality
-- the human anima for Aquinas or the “conatic form” for Spinoza (to coin a phrase that
is at most implicitly Spinozistic) -- establishes in its organizational and orienting
influence (or at most “causes” in the Aristotelian sense of the formal cause) the existence
of an organism (rational animal) that can be rational in its physical existence and physical
in its rational acts.
As I have shown in chapter five, Spinoza, as much as Aquinas, must have in view
something that is the “source” of the organizational information that enables the
particularized existence of a single human individual to be what and who he (or she) is in
actual existence. Their contention was that the form (Aquinas) or conatus (Spinoza)
should be thought of as being this “something” that is ultimately a more fundamental
principle of any single entity that is both physical in nature (for Spinoza, “extended”) and
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a thinking being. Body and mind both express the informing principle that is this
conatus/form. In both their points of view, each individual entity that moves and acts in
the physical world qua a physical organism (animal) is identical with itself when we
consider it under the aspect of Thought, because that physical entity being described
engages in thought, not as a mind, but as a “rational animal” or minded physical
organism. Thus both Aquinas and Spinoza were convinced that the mind and the body
must be understood as dual-aspects of a single entity whose existence must be accounted
for in hylomorphic terms, that is, in terms of a concrete individual life that is “organized”
by something more fundamental than whatever “sides” or distinctions are discriminable
within its existence qua individual.
My contention that Spinoza did indeed have a view of human existence that is
congruent with Thomas’s idea of “composite” being in this sense is probably not, even
yet, as clear as it should be. Of course, Aquinas’s doctrine of compositeness is quite
obvious, for he describes form and matter jointly as the “principles” involved in the
existence of a human being (and all other things). For Aquinas, “form” was different
from matter in that matter was pure potentiality while form is actuality. His is a clearcut, but nuanced Aristotelianism.8 But Spinoza’s understanding was not, I contend, far
from this. “Compositeness,” in just the same sense, was arguably his general
understanding of the nature of things as well. And here again, and most crucially, I am
not merely referring to Spinoza’s insistence that all things have both mind and body as an
essential part or side of their existence. The “composite” nature must be pushed back

8

See Chapter Three for a discussion of Aquinas’s development of Aristotle’s thought
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farther than the Modes that merely “express” substance. That is precisely why, as I have
been contending, Spinoza made a distinction between the essence of a thing that grants it
existence and the actual existence of the thing as an individual Mode (no matter how
many “sides” there might be to it). As was seen in chapter five, the conatus is this
essence. But even at that, how close is this really to the sort of doctrine of compositeness
that is Aquinas’s? The answer is to be found, I think, by more closely considering his
doctrine of conatus in the light of the relationship that he says exists between Thought
and Extension as Attributes.
To provide this demonstration, we must first look to Spinoza’s account of how
individual physical identity is instantiated. In II, P 13, he provides an extensive
philosophical explanation by way of lemmas, proofs, axioms, and definitions.
Throughout, Spinoza returns to a concept that he calls “the relation of motion and rest”9
as inherently involved in the enduring physical identity (EPI) of complex things, i.e.
those physical individuals that are made up of many (at least relatively) simple bodies.
Every EPI is a Mode of extension and no Mode of extension can “explain” itself by itself,
only the extended Substance can explain the existence of the Mode. While the
“extended” Substance is the ontological ground for all physical existence, however, when
the property of being extended is considered strictly in relation to the Attribute of
Extension, we cannot account for the particularity of the extended Modes. This is
because “being extended” qua Attribute is not any particular thing.

The Attribute of

Extension is a necessary presupposition, of course, to account for extended things qua

9

My emphasis
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extended in exactly the same way that Thought is necessary to account for “ideas,” and
thus anything “mental.” But we need to remember Spinoza’s claim that Substance and its
Modes are all that exist (I, P 28, pr.). Extension is only real in the extended Modes of
Substance that express this Attribute of Substance in a concrete way. In Spinoza’s
system, therefore, something must explain the nature of the Modes as they exist as
particular instantiations of extension, besides the mere fact of their extendedness.10
The “relation” of motion and rest necessary for the EPI of a complex individual is
not itself an extended thing, even though it involves extended things, for such a relation is
something that both requires extended things but also supercedes being extended insofar
as it is something that the complex individual has or “stands in.” This means that
something (that Spinoza did not define for us, but I have argued is closely associated with
the conatus) that could be involved with the Attribute of extension, and therefore in its
Modes, but which would not precisely be a part of the physical world qua extended (not
even in the sense of being a physical law, or the totality of physical laws) 11 would need

10

Presumably the explanation of these things would be in the so-called “infinite modes” of
Substance. Curley is correct, however, when he says, “In the Ethics proper, Spinoza tells us precious little
about these modes, and he does not have much more to say in other works. But we do learn in the
correspondence . . . that motion and rest is an immediate infinite mode in the attribute of extension, and that
the body of the whole universe is a mediate mode, presumably in the attribute of extension” [Curley, 35].
11
Bennett offers a different interpretation. He argues that Spinoza had to conceive of the
Attributes and their Modes as being the “repositories of all causal laws.” This means, in Bennett’s view,
that Spinoza’s concept of “motion and rest is not just a system of description and classification but
somehow embodies the whole of physics. The laws of physics are supposed to be part of the ‘extension’
package – and the extended world must obey them. . .” [Bennett, 111]. Bennett’s reading suggests of
course only that “motion and rest” is an undeveloped concept that is supposed to capture the whole of
physics and all its laws of motion and order. Even with that, however, one can still argue that, with those
laws in place (and assuming that motion-and-rest does serve as the kind of placeholder that Bennett thinks
it does), a relation of motion and rest, while involving the laws of physics, would not be precisely one of
the “laws” that are involved in motion and rest; unless one is willing to make such a contingent thing as a
“relation’ a physical law. Cf. Bertrand Russell’s argument that “relations” are something that “subsist”
over and above physical reality and are, therefore, real qua subsistents (“The Problem of Universals,”
Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 101f.)
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to be the source of the relation of motion and rest that must be maintained if EPI is to be
maintained by a complex individual. Spinoza speaks of the maintenance of this relation
in Lemmas 4 – 7, but for our purposes we may consider only Lemmas 4, 5, and 6:
(Lemma 4) If from a body, or an individual thing composed of a number of
bodies, certain bodies are separated, and at the same time a like number of other
bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual thing will retain its
nature as before, without any change in its form. [This Lemma is dealing with the
replacement of component parts of an entity, such as the replacement of cells and
tissues that a growing and aging body experiences.]
(Lemma 5) If the parts of an individual thing become greater or smaller, but so
proportionately that they all preserve the same mutual relation of motion-and-rest
as before, the individual thing will likewise retain its own nature as before without
any change in its form. [This Lemma is defining how an individual thing is the
same from its earliest and most immature phases (think small sprout) all the way
through its life as fully mature thing (think great oak).]
(Lemma 6) If certain bodies composing an individual thing are made to change
the existing direction of their motion, but in such a way that they can continue
their motion and keep the same mutual relation as before, the individual thing will
likewise preserve its own nature without any change of form. [Here the focus
seems to be on movement and change of place within the oneness of Substance.]
In each of these subsidiary propositions, Spinoza asserts that the “form” of the
thing is not changed. The use of this term “form” does not necessarily mean that Spinoza
was thinking in any kind of hylomorphic sense of compositeness. We do not want to
proceed in a rapid and anachronistic fashion; but neither should we rule it out, given that
his idea of a “relation” of motion and rest would entail something other than the
properties involved in being extended. Spinoza was not simply making a bald assertion
about the nature of things when he described the concept of “motion and rest” and the
idea that a relation of motion and rest had to be maintained for EPI to continue.
Everything in his system has a cause or explanation, even if we only know it
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inadequately.12 A thing that strives to maintain the relation of motion and rest, and
whose identity is maintained even as the constituent elements (physically, at least) of its
existence change, has this very striving as the essential feature of its bodily existence. In
other words, the striving is not something that begins after it is formed, for Spinoza. In
Lemma 4 – 6 of proposition 13 of Book II, Spinoza seems to use the concept of a thing’s
nature (which is retained across time) as synonymous to the idea of its form.

The form

of a thing in these Lemmas cannot simply name the shape that is maintained, for in
Lemma 5 Spinoza insists that even a change of shape does not change the form of the
entity that results from the relation of motion and rest being established. The striving to
retain its form is, I suggest, the conatus that makes itself manifest in (and is in some way
therefore more fundamental than the physical and mental strivings of the individual as an
individual Mode.13

The change of bodies (Lemma 4), the change in size of the

constituent bodies (Lemma 5), and the change in place or direction (Lemma 6) all involve
something other than the bodies that are involved in the process of so changing, growing,
or moving. In other words, something other than the physical organism itself must
account for EPI. What Spinoza says in the proof of Lemma 6 applies to the nature of EPI
with regard to all changes of bodies that constitute a complex individual: “by hypothesis,
the individual thing retains all that we, in defining it, asserted as constituting its form.”14

12

Cf. Chapter five for citation of Della Rocca’s claim that “motion and rest” is a placeholder for a
perspective that Spinoza had not fully worked out.
13
In Spinoza’s case, however, we must be sure to note that the conatus qua form would function
only to bring about the relationship of the balance or proportion of motion and rest at any point in time the
result of the proportion or balance at the preceding point in time, plus the facts about the surrounding
bodies, plus the physical laws. This would not, however, deny that an individual entity does not have its
own particular conatus/form, but only that in a Spinozistic system the way that this functions would have to
be in the nature of a Mode of Substance.
14
My emphasis
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It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the form of a thing and the thing that is
so formed were distinct concepts for Spinoza, even if they are not distinct existentially.
(This is also the Thomistic way of discussing the relationship of a form and the entity that
is formed.) As I demonstrated in chapter five, conatus is the “essence” of a thing for
Spinoza. He calls the conatus in the proof of proposition 7 of Book III “nothing but the
given, or actual, essence of the thing.” Conatus -- as it was shown in the preceding
chapter – ought to be understood to be the implicit source or perhaps cause of the relevant
relation of motion-and-rest, in a Spinozistic metaphysics, because the conatus is in the
act of striving the “essence” of the thing’s being.15 If we add to this conclusion the
arguments of chapter 5, namely that a single conatus accounts for the identity of the
organism and hence involves both the body that strives and the mind that both
accompanies that body and strives in itself, we have good reason to read Spinoza as at
least implicitly assuming in his metaphysics something analogous to the Thomistic
concept of form.
15

Alan Donagan, “Spinoza’s Proof of Immortality,” Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed.
Majorie Grene (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973), 254 – 255. Donagan argues, contra the kind of
interpretation I am offering, that Spinoza rejected the distinction of form and matter in its Thomistic form.
However, Donagan does not explain why this is so. He asserts it. But his point seems to be (1) that
Spinoza held that all essences are individual and (2) that the scholastic notion thought that each individual
shared a common essence (humanity) with all others and (3) that as an actual “essence or conatus” each
individual man is identical with his actual essence. Donagan thinks that this rules out the possibility of
affinity between Spinoza and Aquinas’s distinction, discussed in chapter three of this dissertation, between
essentia ut totum and essentia ut pars. However, as was shown earlier for Aquinas Socrates’s essence qua
Socrates is indeed identical to him. That does not mean, however, that he did not share a common defining
property with, say, Plato. Neither, it seems to me, would Spinoza have denied this, although he does not
argue for it and in at least on part of the Ethics denies the concept of universals. But that denial was an
objection not, I think, to a Thomistic notion of universals as real but only objectively real as knowledge. In
fact, Spinoza speaks in the introduction of Book IV of “human nature” in such a way that he has some
affinity to Aquinas’s conception of universals as real in the intellect: “For since we desire to form the idea
of a man which we may look to as a model of human nature, we shall find it helpful to keep these terms
[good and bad] in the sense I have indicated. So in what follows I shall mean by ‘good’ that which we
certainly know to be the means of our approaching nearer to the model of human nature that we set before
ourselves. . . . Again, we shall say that men are more perfect or less perfect in so far as they are nearer to or
further from this model.” Donagan’s comments are not, then, a defeat of my interpretation.
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All that is left, then, is to show how “compositeness” is involved Spinozistically
in the existence of each thing. It seems reasonable to assume, given that the Attribute of
Extension does not explain the particularity of each of its Modes as instances of
extendedness, that some kind of “organizational information” is required to instantiate the
relevant relation of motion-and-rest that maintains the EPI (as well as the enduring
mental identity) of an entity. Each living entity exists and continues to exist, according to
Spinoza, only on the basis of the relevant relation.

Perhaps, then, we could say that the

organizing and form-giving nature of conatus, in the case of human life and identity and
a corresponding single body-mind entity, is something akin to the information that is
involved in the DNA “code” of each person.16 But how does this analysis get us any
closer to seeing Spinoza as being amenable to a description of human existence as in the
relevant sense composite? Seeing conatus in terms of information analogous to the DNA
code suggests, I contend, that we must conceive of the conatus, as the essence, of an
organism as something that bridges the Spinozistic gap between Thought and Extension
Conatus is for Spinoza something analogous to form in Aquinas’s metaphysics The
conatus as the organizing principle is also the orienting drive that preserves the physical
identity of the organism, as it equally preserves the “corresponding” mental identity, and
vice versa. Thus, the sense in which conatus establishes the orientation and concrete
manner of an organism’s existence is precisely like the form that Aquinas discusses,
namely it brings, as I have already said, a particular form (shape, function, orientation,
powers) of life to the organism. Just as the rational soul is “form-giving” to the body (and

16

See above 71-75 for the discussion of DNA as “information” that is analogous to “form.”
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therefore the form of the body) in Aquinas’s metaphysics, so Spinoza’s “conatus” is
form-giving. And as the rational soul is the formal cause of both the human body and
mind, so Spinoza’s conatus can equally be deemed “mental” and “physical” (or at least
equally “participating” in Thought and Extension). Further, the conatus itself involves a
unified striving that unifies all of the multiplicity of an individual thing’s strivings, which
is also the way that the rational soul functions in Aquinas’s understanding of the
relationship between form and matter in a human being’s essence. Just like form, then,
conatus is comparable to the “information” that the DNA code brings to the arrangement
and function of a living being’s life.
To continue the comparison with Aquinas’s doctrine of compositeness, we can
observe that, for Spinoza, the conatic information underlying an organism does not exist
in the strictest sense of the word (just as the “rational soul” does not exist in Aquinas’s
metaphysics, even though it subsists and is real in some sense.) The organizing
information that is the conatus is not any sort of “thing” within the thing informed by it,
but simply the very act of informing itself, whereby there comes to be a particular
organism. This informing act results in a body of a certain type that is apt for a mind
(understood as the mental awareness of the organism that is bodily and mental) of a
certain type. Correspondingly, it establishes the possibility of a certain type of mind, apt
for a body of a certain type. The point here is that the informing action does not simply
produce an organism whose body is simply the “body-side” of a more fundamental
something that already does have a “mind-side.” “Mind” is for Spinoza, as I have
attempted to demonstrate in the earlier chapters, less like a Cartesian mind than this way
of looking at it would suggest. Rather, “mind” must be for him a term that refers to the
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capacity (as it does for Aquinas) for purely intellectual cognizance and judgment. Of
course, the term ‘mind’ can also refer, in Spinoza, to the whole of the “ideas” that
constitute the “idea”-side of the being in question. But even here, this does not suggest
that the mind should be thought of in thing-like terms, even if it is qualified as being only
a modal “thing.” The mind entails all kinds of intellectual awareness, for Spinoza, which
is why he is insistent that there are three kinds of knowledge, but only two of those are
“adequate” as ways of true knowing (or knowing the truth of things.)
Spinoza would not be reserved about Aquinas’s insistence that it is not the mind
that knows, but the person; and this person who knows is “one and the same thing”
whether considered via the Mode mind or the Mode body. This one and the same thing
exists as mind and body in unity of identity, because an organizing principle has given
rise both materially and mentally to a being whose physical existence is the home of
rationality and whose mental existence is the form of its physical life. So the conatus, in
the same way as Thomistic “form,” only truly exists in union with the matter that it
makes into a particular Mode of extension in union with the particular mind that is
instantiated as a different and mental aspect of the organism thereby living as a result of
that fact.
Since the idea of form is closely associated in medieval philosophy with the
concept of “idea,” some might cry foul at this point, objecting to the fact that this way of
conceiving of the relationship between conatus and extension violates the explanatory or
the causal barrier that Spinoza interposes between the Attributes of Thought and
Extension. However, I think this is not the case, because on my reading what is being
explained is not the extended nature of the organism’s existence qua extended but the
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organism’s existence as a “thing” that has extendedness as one of its aspects. Similarly,
the conatus does not determine the physical laws that operate to organize (relatively)
simple extended Mode(s) into a complex extended entity. Rather, it acts only through
those physical laws to establish and maintain a certain particular relation of motion and
rest, sufficient for the existence of such an entity. This way of viewing the matter is, if
not essentially then very much analogously, similar to Thomas’s hylomorphic doctrine
that form and matter both explain (or cause) the existence of the thing, even though each
of them is a “cause” that is qua cause independent of the other.17 The formal cause does
not explain the material cause qua “cause”, nor vice versa. But together they explain
(and cause) the existence of the primary being whose existence is being analyzed. And
yet too, on the other hand, there remains an important respect in which, , in the strictest
sense, it is the formal causes that “gives existence” to things.18 This is the essence of the
doctrine of “compositeness,” in which both principles (physical laws and non-physical
“information”) are involved in the existence of a living human being.
In their focus on form and/or conatus, Aquinas and Spinoza are interested, in their
distinct ways, in the phenomenon of “life” in the world. They both are interested in
describing and analyzing the nature of living human beings in the fullness of their

17

The Aristotelian distinction between the formal cause and the material cause implies a strong
distinction, not a weak one. The distinction is just as strong as the distinction between the formal and the
efficient cause. Hence, Spinoza’s distinction between causes in which there is Thought and Extension and
also the efficient causation of God at work in the infinity of Modes fits into an Aristotelian model, minus
final causality in the universal sense. But even Spinoza’s definition of God’s acts as necessary can pose a
certain kind of final causation, just not volitional, which I take it is what Spinoza really wanted to deny
about God anyway.
18
This concept that form grants particular existence Aquinas employed to show that qua
individuals all men could not be, contra Averroes, possessed of one intellect as the form of all. The rational
soul makes existent a knowing person as an individual primary rational being who can participate in the act
of knowing that participates in God’s own Being.
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existence and experience in the world. Neither the scholastic Catholic nor the
excommunicated Jewish rationalist thought that life could be treated as a supervenient
property that is present in a world that is itself, in the most ultimate sense -- lifeless. For
Spinoza the fact that Thought, as much as Extension, was a fundamental Attribute of
Reality, meant that Life was everywhere. Although not in the same degree, he could
conceive of all things as being “animated” (or alive) [II, P 13, sch].19 In a parallel way by
Aquinas’s lights -- while the concept of all things being animate or of pan-psychism was
alien to him -- life is a fundamental feature of the universe, because all things participate
in God’s Being and “life is properly attributed to God” in the highest sense.20 The
physical (extended) organism, therefore – and not simply an abstractly considered
physical “side” of that organism.- is conceived of, by both philosophers, as being alive
essentially and not simply in some supervening sense that can be reduced down to
nothing other than the electro-chemical properties of particles of matter. As living
beings, human persons are single entities of a composite nature; hence “one and the same
thing” whether described in terms of body or “mind”.

19

It seems quite clear to me that for Spinoza the notion that all things are animated would have to
entail for him more than the mere claim that all things are “minded.” The reasons are two-fold: first, is his
insistence that the Attributes of Substance are Extension and Thought and all the Modes that express those
Attributes are Modes of one or the other. For him to have a third category, “Life” would suggest that being
alive would be another Mode of existence. Hence, being animate entails being minded and extended,
because all things are minded and extended and alive. Further, Spinoza was moving away, it seems to me,
from the mechanistic view of “life” as merely aspects of extension because life is a biological, and
therefore, extended thing (in some sense). He along with Aquinas saw life as a feature of reality that could
not be reduced to either the physical functions of biological entities (simply) or made into a level of reality
that is “tacked-on” to the otherwise bare and lifeless universe. Life for both is something of an ontological
ground of being, not an emergent property.
20
Aquinas discusses this in Summa I a, Q 18 a 3, reply. His basic argument is that life is about
self-movement or determination and that God is, by essence, the only truly self determining or moving
being. Furthermore, in article 4 of the same question Aquinas argues: “In God intellect, the thing
understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is
the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as
things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself” (My emphasis).

292

Their unwavering focus upon the co-inhering unity of mind and body in living
human beings, however, did allow for a kind of duality of activity without positing a
dualism of existence. Aquinas and Spinoza both argued that the act of knowing that there
is a physical world with strict laws and properties and knowing that one is a part of that
world is an activity that is completely distinct from the physical world that is known.
Hence, neither in Spinozism nor Thomism can one ever do away with descriptions of
either mentality or physicality. But that duality is only a semantic duality in one sense,
necessary to account for the phenomenological properties we encounter in our own lives.
For both of them there is only one Reality that contains the physical world and the act(s)
of understanding that world. In this one and the same world, however, being-extended
and being-thought are fundamental properties for which an account must be given. On
the level of the individual person, this means that each person is doubly-aspected. But
the life that is lived is a single existence in which the person who lives physically in
extended Reality is also the person who simultaneously knows the physical (and mental)
Reality in which he is alive and acting. But again, there is no ontological dualism – as
there was for Descartes -- in the final analysis, for although mind is not the body that is
known and body is not mind that knows, the individual is irreducibly both. Perhaps then,
Aquinas and Spinoza could help us begin to see that there may not really be a mind-body
“problem” so much as there is a wrong focus on the whole issue of the mind-body
relationship.
The lingering question of immortality
There remains for both Spinoza and Aquinas a lingering problem in their
metaphysical analyses of the relationship between mind and body. The problem is this:
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how to account for their similar insistence on the capacity of the mind or soul to maintain
existence even after the death of the body. To this problem we will now turn, not to
defend their substantive claims philosophically at this point, but to see how such claims
might be made to fit into the context of the rest of their metaphysical schemes. We will
begin with Spinoza.
Spinoza’s view of eternality and immortality
Curley sets the stage well for our considerations regarding Spinoza’s doctrine of
the immortality of the mind when he admits, “. . . in spite of many years of study, I still
do not feel that I understand this part of the Ethics at all adequately. I feel the freedom to
confess that, of course, because I also believe that no one else understands it adequately
either.”21 The problems that Spinoza’s statements raise when he insists that the mind has
an eternal part and is, thereby, immortal in some sense have been discussed by many
commentators. Many, if not most, of them have decided that his case for this proposition
is hopelessly flawed.22 The purported embarrassing issue is, namely, his insistence that
“the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with the body, but something of it
remains, which is eternal ” (V, P 23). Perhaps the particular problems that face a
Spinozistic claim that the “mind” survives the body’s death are obvious, but a very brief
mention of them will nonetheless help us see what is required if one is going to make his
doctrine internally consistent, if indeed that is possible.
1. The mind and the body are one and the same thing.

21

Curley, 84.
In this Bennett is the most forceful recent commentator. Bennett, 537 f. Calling it an
“unmotivated disaster,” Bennett says that he only deals with the doctrine at all, because “a little can be
learned from firmly grasping what is wrong with the core of it.”
22
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2. The essence of the mind is to be the idea of a really existing body.
3. The striving of the mind to maintain itself in existence is the same as the
body’s striving, because the mind and body are “one and the same thing.”
4. Spinoza’s metaphysics entails that in both infinite and eternal Attributes –
thought and extension – the Modes of Substance exist in some kind of
simultaneity, so how could he allow for the eternity of the mind but not the
body?
Given these four points of Spinozism, is there any way to account for what
motivated Spinoza’s claim for immortality? Alan Donagan’s work represents one
attempt to allow Spinoza’s doctrine to make sense on his own terms. He argues that the
key to understanding why Spinoza thought he could propose this eternality is rooted in
two aspects of his thought: (1) the parallel identity of the “order of ideas and the order of
things,” and (2) that there can be “actual ideas of the formal essences of non-existent
things”23 in Spinoza’s doctrine of mind. He argues that Spinoza held in the Ethics (on the
basis of the proof of I, P 11) that not only actual essences are contained in the infinite and
eternal Mode of the Attribute of Thought, also essences that are merely “possible.”
These later essences, because they are not actual – but only possible -- are within the
parameters of Thought, even though they are not so as Modes, or at least as finite Modes:
Spinoza saw, if [the above description about possible essences] is true then the
very theorem that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of things, entails that what, in the attribute of thought, corresponds to a
mere possibility in the attribute of extension, must be more than a mere possibility
[in the attribute of thought] . . . Such actual ideas of the formal essences of
nonexistent individuals, since they cannot be finite modes of thought, must form
part of an infinite mode of it, a mode which Spinoza referred to as ”Dei infinita
idea.” This infinite mode of thought must contain, inter alia, an actual idea of the
formal essence of every individual body, existent or nonexistent. . .

23

My emphasis.

295

Once it has been grasped that the identity of the order of ideas and the order of
things not only does not forbid that there should be actual ideas of the formal
essences of nonexistent things, but on the contrary demands it, Spinoza’s proof of
immortality is simple. When a living human body is destroyed, the corresponding
mind, as nonderivative idea of that body actually existing, perishes with it; for
they are the same finite mode in two distinct attributes. However, that mind, as
actual essence, had as a part the idea of the formal essence of that body. And the
idea of that formal essence belongs to God sub specie aeternitatis . . . . Therefore,
the part of a man’s mind which consists in the idea of the formal essence of his
body must be eternal: it must have pre-existed his body, and cannot be destroyed
with it. Q.E.D.24
Donagan’s interpretation represents what Bennett calls an “asymmetrical”
explanation for Spinoza’s doctrine, which is the kind that Bennett provides and believes
is all that is Spinozistically warranted.25 Bennett argues that Spinoza’s suppositions in
Book V rule out any possibility of interpreting his doctrine of immortality as an
outgrowth of his otherwise symmetrical account of the “parallelism” between the mind
and body.26 I take it that Bennett sees this as a fatal misstep on Spinoza’s part. It is not
my purpose to analyze Donagan’s interpretation or to take up Bennett’s characterization
of it as the product of an “asymmetrical” procedure. Rather, I present Donagan’s
description at this point because it provides us a sympathetic reading of Spinoza’s
doctrine that is helpful as a background for the alternative reading I want to provide. In

24

Donagan, 254 – 255.
Bennett, 361. He contends that Spinoza’s doctrine is based on the following line of reasoning.
“Take a necessary truth about the body, not (a) the corresponding truth about the mind, and then redescribe
it as (b) a thought in the mind. The upshot is that you have got a single item which is at once (a) eternal
and (b) contained in the mind. Q.e.d.”
26
Ibid, 158 – 159. “What Spinoza says is asymmetrical: ‘the human mind cannot be absolutely
destroyed with the human body, but something of it remains which is eternal.’ It has been contended that
he has merely underexpressed his position, and would not have minded adding that if the mind is eternal
then so is the body; but that is too weak to rescue the symmetrical account. If the appearance of asymmetry
is to be explained as a mere result of understatement, then Spinoza must be willing to say: ‘The human
body is not absolutely destroyed with the human mind, but something of it remains which is eternal’, and,
indeed, ‘The human body is not absolutely destroyed with the human body, but. . . etc.’. No one has been
willing to cram those sentences into his mouth.”
25
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the interpretation I offer, I do not think that the question whether or not Spinoza needs a
symmetrical or an asymmetrical account to justify his proposition of immortality comes
into play in quite the same way that it does in Donagan’s (or Bennett’s). However, it
does seem to me that, in the sense of my interpretation, there is a way to argue for a more
symmetrical account of Spinoza’s metaphysics of immortality, even though Spinoza’s
own formulation of it in the final part of the Ethics seems prima facie to imply an
asymmetrical relationship between body and mind.
Donagan’s commentary is built on the presupposition that the idea of the formal
essences of things provides the true basis of Spinoza’s doctrine. Thus Donagan argues
that a mind that is the “idea” of a particular body has? the idea of the formal essence of
that body as a part of itself that had existed even prior to the actual existence of either
that body or that mind. This is because, qua the idea of the formal essence of the body in
question, and not simply of the body as an actually existing individual, this “idea”
belongs to God sub specie aeternitatis. In other words, as Donagan argues, the idea of
the formal essence of the body is eternal. Therefore, at least the corresponding part of
any actually existing person’s mind is eternal.
While I think that Donagan is on the right track, in his attempts to show that
Spinoza’s doctrine of the immortality or eternity of the mind is not incoherent within his
system of thought, I would like to explore a different way of approaching the problem. In
fact, the doctrine of conatus and the singularity of identity that I have contended is the
basis of mind-body identity is a better starting point to help us read him as maintaining
even more consistency in his ontological commitments.
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In Spinoza’s thought the essence of the body is not that of an independent entity
that exists in isolation from all other things. This denial of independent existence is the
import of his insistence that a Mode of extension is a modification of Substance. He
insists that the extended Substance is not divisible (as was shown in the previous
chapter). Hence, any individual extended thing is not truly separate from the rest of
extended Reality. This proposition is the foundation upon which he builds his argument
in Book IV, where he critiques the strength of human emotions wrongly conceived and
the bondage that inadequate ideas can entail for a person.27 In IV, P 2, for instance, he
asserts that each individual person is “passive in so far as we are a part of Nature which
cannot be conceived independently of other parts.” From this premise, Spinoza proposes
in IV, P 4, that “it is impossible for a man not to be a part of Nature [God or Substance]
and not to undergo changes other than those which can be understood solely through his
own nature and of which he is the adequate cause.” However, since every entity actively
strives (by its conatus) out of its own particular essence (conatus), we often, insofar as
we are such striving entities, fail to understand the inherent necessity of our own acts in
relationship to all other things.
According to Spinoza’s thinking, because of our inadequate ideas about our lives
in Nature, we wrongly understand our own particularity. As we live out of our
particularity and our own conatus (drive to maintain our existence), the ways that we
experience things that negatively impact us bodily (or mentally) are inadequately
understood, because we do not see our lives as part of the infinite and necessary essence

27

Note also: it is part of his argument in Book II that we can only have inadequate ideas of

particulars.
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of God or Nature. This inadequate understanding, in turn, provides a false foundation for
our emotional life. As a result, we create categories of good and evil about the nature of
things in the world, all the while not realizing that this way of thinking is confused and
inadequate. Nothing is good or evil, he says, in itself but is only relatively good or evil as
it acts favorably on or in opposition to the interests of other Modes. The entire system of
Modes, however, has no room for good and evil in its description Failing to see the
necessity of all things, and not seeing how our individual striving is part of the whole of
all things, we live, Spinoza argues, in a kind of self-imposed limit upon our own virtue,
beatitude – our very existence.
This line of thought is the focus of propositions 28 through 35 in Book IV. I offer
Spinoza’s reasoning here in a paraphrased form. Propositions 1 – 5 that I list below are
all based on three previously established doctrines from Books I - III: (a) the oneness of
Substance and its Attributes and Modes, (b) the identity of mind and body, and (c) the
nature of our striving as individual essences/Modes. First, then, knowing God as
absolutely infinite being is the highest good of the human mind (P 28). Then Spinoza
proceeds:

(1) Good and evil are evaluations given to things based on whether or not the
thing has (a) some common element with us that increases our activity out of
our nature or (b) some contradictory element that diminishes or checks our
power to act out of our nature. (P 29 – P 31)
(2) Our capacity to be acted upon and the passive emotions that can attend this
capacity is what accounts for our “difference” in nature and causes us to
believe we are, in our strivings, contrary to one another. (P 32 – P 34)
(3) However, reason that sees beyond the passive (and inadequate) emotions can
enable us to see that our acts and all others’ acts are merely the acts of our
natures. Hence we will see that only we seek what all other things seek; and
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reason will compel us to embrace this fact of the unity of striving that marks
the universe in some fundamental sense, and consciously embrace that all
things together are seeking the good. (P 35)
(4) Because we are all part of the eternal and infinite essence of God as
individual Modes of God, the highest virtue of those who act according to
their own conatus is “common to all men and can be possessed equally by all
men in so far as they are of the same nature.” (P 36)
Spinoza wants his readers to understand their own lives and the nature of all
things as all being Modes of the same Reality. If one takes his line of reasoning about the
“commonness” of human endeavor in seeking happiness and fulfillment out of one’s own
nature, and then brings into the discussion Spinoza’s claims about the third kind of
knowledge (which he had introduced in II, P 40), we can, I think, begin to see how he
understood the mind’s immortality, or at least its possession of an eternal part. In Book II
(P 40, sch 2) the third kind of knowledge – intuition – “proceeds from an adequate idea of
the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence
of things.”28 Now it is obvious that an adequate knowledge of the “essence of things”
would involve understanding them as all being Modes of a single Substance, since
“intuition” proceeds from the adequate understanding of the Attributes to an adequate
knowledge of “the essence of things.” Therefore, fully adequate knowledge perceives all
things as related to one another via the Substance that is the ground or the source of all
things. Furthermore, by proposition 44 of the same book, “it is not in the nature of reason
to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.” This understanding of the necessity of
all things, then, must be a part of the “third kind of knowledge” and by it each thing that
exists is known to be a necessary Mode of God or Substance.

28

My emphasis
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The “basic principles of reason” allow us, Spinoza argues, to explain and
understand things in the light of that which is “common to all things” (which Spinoza
thought he had demonstrated in Book I and the first 43 propositions of Book II), i.e. that
all things are simply affections of the one Substance. True reason will not, therefore,
provide any analysis or explication of things that views the particular essences of those
things in isolation from Nature itself, because they are known to be simply modifications
of God’s own being. Anything that is truly known, he tells us in the second corollary of
proposition 4 in Book II, therefore, cannot be conceived only in temporal terms, but “in
the light of eternity. This kind of knowledge is the greatest power of the mind, in
Spinoza’s judgment, and qua the most adequate and truest knowledge, it is the true
fulfillment of the mind’s own particular conatus.
The third kind of knowledge proceeds from the adequate idea of certain of God’s
attributes to adequate knowledge of the essence of things [see its definition in
Sch. 2 Pr. 40 II], and the more we understand things in this way, the more we
understand God. Therefore, the highest virtue of the mind, that is [by definition 8
of Book IV] its power or nature, or its highest conatus, is to understand things by
this third kind of knowledge. (V, P 25, pr).29
By this “intuition” a person understands that all things are essentially one in God
and necessary and inherently linked to one another. As the mind understands the essence
of all individual things in this way, there is a crucial state of affairs being represented in
this act of intuition: “Whatever the mind understands under a form of eternity it does not
understand from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body [which
is the object of the mind], but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body

29

My emphasis
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under a form of eternity” [V, P 29].30 In other words, the body which is known is in its
very essence a Mode of extension. Therefore, the true essence the body is to be
necessarily one part of the infinity of extended Modes that has qua particular essence a
particular function in the whole chain of extended causes and effects. This is at least part
of what it would mean for the body to be “understood” under a form of eternity. By
“intuition” then, mind can so conceive of the body in this adequate and true way. In fact,
according to Spinoza, this way of understanding the body qua the “object” of the mind is
the very nature of reason: “it is the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of
eternity.”31 Hence, when it is realized through the “emendation of the intellect” that our
truest knowledge of our lives and all of Reality is achieved only when we conceive things
under the form of eternity (and one could add infinity), and thereby the unity of all can be
perceived, then the mind has achieved not only the greatest state of awareness that is
made possible by its very own nature, but it is actually being (in the most ultimate sense)
what it truly is. Such knowledge is the highest expression of its particular conatus.
By positing this kind of knowledge as the “highest” form of understanding,
Spinoza is pointing toward an epistemology that does not negate the body as the “object”
of the mind, but only transcends both the mind and the body when the latter is conceived
in terms of its status as object of the former qua sensory or imaginative rather than
30

Ibid.
This epistemological claim seems to me to be related to Spinoza’s insistence that there is only
one Substance and that Substance is infinite and necessary. Having so defined Substance, then the nature
of reason, since he thinks we can have adequate ideas of Substance, would be to understand Substance (and
its Modes, etc) as infinite and necessary. Of course, an infinity of time would be eternity, if Spinoza is
thinking in Aristotelian terms, rather than Platonic. And “necessity” is also a term that has connotations
that could be related to eternity. So, to say that it is the nature of reason to understand things under the
form of eternity is just to say that the human mind can recognize the truth about God and all things. See,
Donagan for an interpretation of Spinoza’s views of eternity as Aristotelian, 242. Cf. H. H. Joachim for a
view that Spinoza’s notions are Platonic, Ethics of Spinoza, 298.
31
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“intuitive” awareness. He says of intuition, “The third kind of knowledge depends on the
mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal” (V, P 31). Intriguingly, Spinoza
insists in the proof of this proposition that “the mind conceives nothing under a form of
eternity except in so far as it conceives the essence of its body under a form of eternity,
that is, except so far as the mind is eternal.”32 I take this to mean that Spinoza believes
that the truest form of self-knowledge of which an individual is capable is to understand
the essential nature of the body (and, correlatively, of the mind) as I described it in the
previous paragraph, i.e. to understand it as part of the great whole of Nature. Here we get
to the heart of the matter regarding how Spinoza views of the immortality of the mind.
His reasoning is “symmetrical.” Spinoza would say that the truest intuition that one can
have of oneself is the awareness that one is a particular individual as an existent thing
(res), but as such not independent from the one Substance. This immediate grasp is not
just something that the mind is potentially capable of attaining. Rather, it is, in some
way, “knowledge” that the mind must already have as part of its essence. This follows
from Spinoza’s doctrine that there is no such thing as “potential” intellect, but only
“active intellect.” We see this when we consider what is going on in the scholium of
proposition 31 of Book I. There he “speaks of the intellect in act” not because he grants
“there can be any intellect in potentiality.” In fact he is careful to deny this very thing so
that he not be interpreted as embracing something like the medieval notion of potential
intellect. Instead he is confining himself, in this instance, to this way of expressing the
issue, merely because he wants to “avoid any confusion to what we perceive with utmost

32

My emphasis
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clarity, to wit, the very act of understanding.” Spinoza, in fact, denies the medieval
theory that the mind can be activated to knowledge. Rather, for Spinoza ideas are
necessarily present in us, either adequately or inadequately. However, the third kind of
knowledge of which one attains “understanding” (as he describes it) is a kind of
ontological essence that makes the mind what it is. And yet until our intellect is
improved by the measures he points us toward in Ethics, an individual will be in some
sense non-cognizant of this essential nature. Once one has attained the knowledge of the
third kind, then the organism, or shall we say person, knows herself under the aspect of
eternity, in the sense I have been explicating, she, therefore, knows herself rightly. She
can see herself as a part of the whole of things, and yet with her own interests and ends
and purposes, which can be harmonized with all other things in the ontological unity of
all things as expressions of the one Substance.
The more that one understands his ultimate relatedness to all things in the one
Substance, the more he is made capable of truly knowing his own particular existence .
In knowing his own existence truly he is, Spinoza contends, becoming conscious of his
life for what it really is. This enables the person who knows through “intuition” to take
pleasure in all things that are understood through this way of truest knowledge. Spinoza
is thinking here, I believe, that as the person comes to realize that his own existence is not
substantially distinct from all other things, he can embrace a new (and for Spinoza) more
“blessed” sense of his own significance. Here we find the reason that Spinoza never
speaks, to use Bennett’s characterization, “of having a good eternal part of the mind, but
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rather of having a large one.”33 Because he comes to see that he is but a Mode of
Substance, the person, in Spinoza’s mind, begins to know himself in far “larger” terms
than could ever have been possible so long as he was focused on the mere sensory
awareness and passive emotions that accompanied his false beliefs about his place in the
world.34
This “enlarging” of the mind with respect a mind understood as the mere idea of
the body qua actually existing, can be considered to be the person’s realization of the
meaning or significance of her own body “under the form of eternity.” This means, then,
that a “large” mind is actually developed as the conscious part of the mind’s essence qua
“idea” of the body comes to realize that the very body of which it is an idea is itself
intricately united to all things in God or Nature. Hence, the mind’s essence as the “idea
of the body” is not merely the “idea of an actually existing thing, and nothing else,” as
Spinoza puts it in Book II, in the sense that the mind’s object of reference is only the
individual extended Mode qua individual. And in proposition 11 of Book II, Spinoza in
fact actually says only that the body is the first thing (primum) that constitutes the actual
being of the human This means that the actually existing body is, at least in some sense,
the most basic object of the idea that constitutes the mind’s essence. In his translation of
this passage, Shirley sticks in “basically” to do the job of primum. However, this may
obscure the deep intention behind Spinoza’s qualification, namely, that true knowledge of
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Bennett, 359.
It is clear that Spinoza thinks that one must achieve this kind of knowledge by realizing its truth.
He insists in Book II that the mind exercises no real judgment over ideas, it can only be presented with true
ideas and when it sees them rightly will then know them as true and these ideas, then, will become the basis
of what we call, although Spinoza does not use the word, “beliefs.”
34
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the individuality of the body as the object of the mind knows this same body in a quite
different way: not as an “actual being” but rather,, in its very essence, a part of the
eternal and necessarily infinite nature of God. And in so knowing, the mind in question
is then a part of the eternal mind of God. Thus Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the
mind is rooted in his doctrine of the Oneness of Substance and its Modes. This is what
the entirety of the Ethics labors to demonstrate.
By intuition, then, one becomes aware of this, and this awareness means that the
mind’s domain is expanded. The mind discovers its eternal nature insofar as it properly
conceives the object toward which it is “basically” oriented. No longer understanding
this body as an individual entity who is acted upon by and acts upon an alien “other,” the
body is now understood to be one with all other extended things. Hence, the mind,
because it is “one and the same thing” as the body, namely the living organism that is
simultaneously minded and embodied by the conatus that grants specificity to the
organism, comes to understand the existence of which it is a part as one aspect of the
whole of Natura naturata. And, of course, Spinoza’s concept that natura naturata is a
manifestation of Natura naturans means that the understanding that is thus in the mind of
the organism is able to see that the eternal nature of God is involved in its own being. So,
the eternal part of the mind is that which is, from the very beginning of the duration of
the organism, oriented toward the essence of the body under the aspect of eternity. This
part, by the conscious use of reason by the truly reflective and understanding person,
comes to be perceived to be the real nature of the person. Seeing that the life he has been
living is qua mind essentially united to all other things, in the sense of the body’s eternal
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essence being one with all other extended Modes of Substance, the person discovers his
truest identity. Hence, beatitude follows.
It is not so much the case, then, that the mind survives the death of the particular
body, in Spinoza’s way of seeing this issue. Rather, the mind that is immortal is the mind
that “in the light of eternity” has realized the person’s awareness of his union with all
things. Because that union is his essence, he really does not cease to exist, because qua
extended Mode his existence was always only an “affection” of extended Substance.
This realization means the mind is made “large” enough to embrace this identity. This
explains the sense in which the mind can be eternal for Spinoza.
But what of personal identity in this doctrine of immortality? Is this a
philosophical doctrine that has no real existential import for the interests of individuals?
The answer to that, for Spinoza, must lie in how one understands the idea of one’s own
“history” qua the “one and the same thing that is expressed in two ways.” Spinoza would
argue, I think, that even the contingent history of an individual is part of the eternality of
Substance. Here, Donagan argues in a way that corresponds to my own thinking about
this matter:
We must remember that Spinoza did not think that our sense of self-identity, even
in this life, depends on memory. A man knows his own identity to the extent that
the primary constituent of his mind, his idea of his own body, is adequate. And,
however inadequate it is, that idea is individual.
We can go further. A man’s idea of the essence of his body changes during his
life, and in that change there is loss as well as gain. However, God’s idea of that
essence, inasmuch as God constitutes the essence of that man’s mind, is eternal
and cannot change; hence it cannot be the idea which that man has of it at any
given moment during his life. Can it be anything but the ordered totality of those
ideas? If it cannot, it is reasonable to infer that Spinoza conceived the eternal
self-knowledge of each man as being complete in a way in which his durational
self-knowledge cannot be; for it is an idea of his body’s essence through his
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whole life. Yet that idea not only need not be a memory-image, it cannot be,
because it cannot correspond to physical traces in the brain.
Eternal self-knowledge, while more complete than any durational self-knowledge,
can contain no element that is not present in durational self-knowledge. . . That is
why Spinoza thought it all-important to attain wisdom in this life. No wisdom
and no virtue that a man attains in this life will be taken away from him; but
neither will anything that he does not attain be added to him.35
The difference between my interpretation and Donagan’s is just this. I believe
that I can account for the process Spinoza allowed was involved in the immortality of the
mind. Donagan’s emphasis misses this. What I offer is a view of conatus as the
organism’s form that establishes the individual entity -- and the various Modes in which
its existence is expressed -- as ultimately part of the whole of Nature and of God. And
my interpretation accounts for how Spinoza’s doctrine of eternity of the mind, at least in
his own terms, does not necessarily transgress his doctrine that thought and extension
always go together, and that a mind must always “accompany” a body in unity. On my
interpretation, Spinoza simply believed that if one understands the nature of things, then
the mind that understands the true nature of its body is the mental aspect of a human
being who has intuited in a true and adequate way his unity with all things. This selfawareness, then, is part of the Mind of God, one could say. And as an individual
realization of the nature of things it must always exist. The cessation of the body’s
duration is, therefore, a change qua Mode of extension into a different modification of the
extended Substance. The mind that was associated with the body while is strove to
maintain itself in existence is the mind that now knows that (and in a sense “all along”
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had this knowledge within itself) the body’s existence and its striving were ultimately one
with Nature and all other things.
Aquinas’s views on incorruptibility and resurrection
Aquinas’s views on the question of post-mortem survival have some significant
and intractable differences from Spinoza’s. For instance, Aquinas speaks of the survival
of the soul and not the mind. And Spinoza does not utilize the language of “subsistence”
to describe the reality of the rational principle.36 But the most significant point of
divergence is that Aquinas’s doctrine of the nature of the soul’s survival is not one about
eternality or immortality. He focuses, instead, upon the issue of the soul’s
“incorruptibility” and upon the Christian doctrine of the “resurrection of the body,” as the
way to understand the nature of the soul’s inherent ability to survive the cessation of life
in the body.
When Aquinas argues for the proposition that the rational soul survives the death
of the body because its essence is incorruptible, he builds his demonstration on the
foundational premise that “understanding” is an act that is so unique in the universe that
it cannot be accounted for unless the rational soul is incorruptible. As the highest act that
the soul brings to the life of the person, understanding must be conceived of as incapable
of demise for three interrelated reasons. 37 First and most foundational of all, is the
premise that the act of understanding is, by its very nature, absolutely different and,
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However, by Donagan’s interpretation, one could argue that the presence of the formal essence of the
body as the eternal part of the mind that is present “in” the mind from the very beginning could be a type of
“subsistence.”
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The following analysis is a summary of Aquinas’s thought based on his arguments in Summa
Contra Gentiles mainly, supplemented by his arguments in Summa Theologiae I a, Q 75 & Q 89. The form
of reference will, therefore, be to refer to the former as CG and the later merely by the standard reference
that has been utilized in this dissertation, listing section, question, article, etc.
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therefore, qualitatively distinct from any physical property (I a, Q 75, a 2 reply). As
such, it cannot be accounted for by reference to any physical state of affairs. He says,
“the principle of understanding . . . has its own activity in which body takes no intrinsic
part.” Furthermore, since Aquinas believes that any specific act must be explained by
reference to something that can be the agent of that act, he says in reference to the
“principle of understanding: “Nothing can act of itself unless it subsists in its own right.
For only [that which] actually exists acts, and its manner of acting follows its manner of
being.” So, Aquinas argues that understanding is not identifiable with any physical
property strictly speaking.
Second in the triad of reasons he gives for his views about the incorruptibility of
the rational soul, Aquinas posits a premise that is very much like Spinoza’s view of
conatus of the mind that seeks permanence. Aquinas argues that “man naturally craves
after permanent continuance” (CG II, Q 79). Such a statement is more than a mere
psychological assessment on his part. Rather, the argument he offers is founded on his
belief that no “natural” condition can go unfulfilled unless something contrary to the
natural orientation is introduced as a barrier to its telos. Aquinas thinks that being
rational or having understanding is a principle of existence that is part of the ontological
ground of existence. That is, for Aquinas, the mind of God, because it is one with the
Divine essence in which all things participate, grants to the world not only intelligibility
but the act of knowing it as intelligible. His claim that human beings are but the lowest
type of rational beings in Reality points us to his view that humans actually participate in
God’s rationality, although not in a univocal sense, but merely equivocally. Thus, any act
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of understanding is, in some sense, to be identified with the foundational principle of
God’s own essence qua Divine Mind that has permanence.
“Understanding” is, in Aquinas’s view, a grasp of the truth about Reality. All
things have an inner orientation to continue in existence and to flourish in their natures,
but the nature of the human intellect is a special case, he contends. “While existence is
desired by all, man by his understanding apprehends existence, not in the present moment
only, as dumb animals do, but [understands the act of existence of things] absolutely.”
Because the act of understanding participates in God’s own Being in an equivocal yet real
way, a way that includes the absolute nature of existence itself, then a true intellectual
grasp of Reality cannot be conceived of as simply being the product of our own ideas or
mental constructs. When Aquinas speaks of our knowledge of things, he is very
emphatic that the human mind not only knows in a sensory way, but knows “existence”
absolutely. One the one hand, what Aquinas means by this is that when we know some
thing to be what it is, we know first of all that it is, in some sense. This is more than a
kind of theory of intentionality regarding ideas. It suggests that the first thing that we
encounter in our knowing is the concreteness of a thing that exists. Only by way of
reflection and abstraction do we come to know, according to Aquinas, what a thing is.
On the other hand, by this argument Aquinas means us to think of essences as being
radically dependent upon existence.38 However, the fact of the existence of contingent
beings requires, Aquinas argues, some prior principle to explain the fact of their finite,
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specific existence. Every existent thing’s existence, therefore, is explained, in Aquinas’s
view, by the doctrine of participation (which was discussed in chapter three).
When one applies this notion of existence as participation in God’s own being to
the act of knowing itself, then we are able to see how Aquinas conceives of knowledge as
itself a participation in that which has permanence. When we know both that a thing
exists as well as knowing what it is that exists, the very existence of such knowledge is
only comprehensible as an act that participates in the divine knowledge that God has of
things. Hence, the act of knowing is, itself, a part of God’s own essence, even if a
particular finite act is only equivocally an act that participates in God’s action. The
existent realities that are known only exist via participation in God’s act of Being, and the
act of knowing those existent realities also “exists” only as participative acts. On the
basis of this idea of our dependence upon and participation in God’s act of Being
Aquinas asserts that “[Since man can know the truth about things], man attains to
permanence on the part of his soul, whereby he apprehends existence absolute and for all
time.”39 The capacity to understand existence itself entails, in Aquinas’s analysis, that
the rational soul must share in something of the absoluteness of existence; and that
absoluteness of existence is rooted in the very essence of God, in which (as we saw
earlier) the soul participates. If the rational soul is in its essence something that partakes
of existence in some absolute way, then it cannot, Aquinas reasons, be corruptible and its
39

This way of casting his argument assumes what was argued above, i.e. that Thought is a
fundamental aspect of Reality or Nature. Of course, an empiricist like Hume could argue that
consciousness is indeed a fundamental aspect of Reality, but deny that this entails that knowing the truth
about the way things really are is an attendant fundamental aspect of reality, as well. However, here we are
onto a question of such import that we cannot, in the present context, defend Thomas’s (or Spinoza’s)
epistemological doctrine. However, it could be noted that an empiricist doctrine misses the deep
intentionality involved in ideas and that ideas are always ideas about something. This, at least, allows for
the possibility that our ideas are “in touch” or place us “in touch” with the world in itself.
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natural striving (craving) is not to be thwarted. To this extent, then, “permanence” is an
intrinsic property of the anima intellectiva in a human being’s particular acts of
understanding.
Related to this perspective is the third in Aquinas’s triad of reasons for the
incorruptibility of the soul. It asserts that the non-existence or cessation in existence of
any thing, be it a primary substance or a subsistent principle, can only result from a
contrary state of affairs that would exclude the existence of that thing. His position about
the cessation of existence being caused by something external is consonant with
Spinoza’s Proposition Four in the third Book of the Ethics.40 But Aquinas applies this
principle to the soul explicitly. In the Summa, Aquinas expresses this proposition as
follows: “There can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul, for it receives in the
manner of its own being, and there one thing does not push out another. There even our
ideas of contraries are not themselves contrary, since one habit of knowledge holds them
together in relationship.41 Since there is no contrary state (nor could there be) that the
soul could undergo qua principle of understanding, there is no external contrary that
could explain how the act of understanding that the rational soul brings to the human
being’s existence might cease to exist. Hence, the soul, lacking any contrary state of
affairs that could negate its existence, will continue in existence.
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“No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause. Proof: This proposition is self-evident,
for the definition of anything affirms, and does not negate, the thing’s essence: that is, it posits, and does
not annul, the thing’s essence. So as long as we are attending only to the thing itself, and not to external
causes, we can find nothing in it which can destroy it.”
41
Habitus, which means for Aquinas something like a condition of activity that is either given or
acquired through practice. This condition of acting is an exercise of agency that enables a faculty to orient
itself to its proper object in a better manner.(more appropriate way, or a way more adequate to what it truly
is).
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Unlike other forms, whose essence is only to inform matter, and therefore cannot
be thought of as having its own esse in any sense, the rational soul is possessed of a
power or property (understanding and reason) that is distinct from its relationship to the
matter that it informs. Unlike other forms that cease to exist when the material object
that is formed disintegrates, the highest and most proper power of the rational soul is not
in any way dependent upon the material object it forms. Hence, qua form, the rational
soul must be understood as subsisting apart from the matter it informs, because its
specific and proper essence is to be the cause of knowledge in the rational animal – a
human person.
That act of being, in which it [the soul] itself subsists, the soul communicates to
the physical matter; this matter and the intellectual soul form a unity such that the
act of being of the compound whole is the soul’s act of being. This does not
happen in other forms which are non-subsistent. And for the reason the human
soul continues in its act of being when the body is destroyed, whereas other souls
do not [I a, Q 76, a 1, ad 5].42
The human soul informs a material organism that is essentially rational. Hence, Aquinas,
as has been stated several times in this dissertation, sees reason or understanding as the
form of the rational animal. Having the capacity for mind is the definition of human life.
This human soul is what Aquinas calls an “actuality,” however. It grants this capacity
because of the informing organization it grants to the body, but nothing besides the soul’s
own act of being (apart from the participation in the Being of God) accounts for the
existence of the soul-form qua informing principle:
“. . . whatever belongs to a thing per se cannot be separated from it. And to form
as actuality being belongs per se. Matter acquires actual existence precisely as
acquiring a form, and its ceasing to be comes from its losing a form. But for a
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My emphasis
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form to be separated from itself is impossible. So, too, for a subsisting form to
cease to be.” (I a, Q 75, a 6, reply).
But the act of having true knowledge cannot, in Aquinas’s view (or Spinoza’s for
that matter), be an act that is, in the final analysis, something that depends upon a
physical process. He sees a logic to the world in the very fact that it is intelligible. He
thinks of ideas as having an intentionality to them that implies a reference beyond their
own existence qua ideas. This intelligibility and intentionality is the result, he argues, of
the world being a reality that participates ontologically in God’s own act of Being; and
since God’s act of Being is one with God’s mind, therefore, true knowledge allows the
knower to be in touch with, at least epistemologically, that which is eternal and
incorruptible. The capacity to do this could not be, in Aquinas’s mind, a merely physical
act, or even an epiphenomenal act that is dependent upon a set of material conditions. In
contemporary terms, we can express what there was (and is) about materialistic
explanations of the intellect that Aquinas found problematic. He argues that in the act of
understanding something we come to understand a feature of the thing known by forming
what we might call a “concept.” Such concepts are, for Aquinas, the human intellect’s
engagement with universals. There is a process that takes place, Aquinas argues,
whereby through a process of reasoning (the active intellect), a person abstracts from the
particulars of experience. However, the knowledge that the active intellect attains is
always “knower-specific,” that is, the active intellect of each person knows by a unique
act of understanding. Aquinas would not allow his readers to think of the active intellect
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in each individual person as the same intellect at work, even if each person’s intellect
does participates in the divine mind.43
Since each individual person is essentially an entity that is rational and biological,
the knowledge that each person achieves is the product of the engagement of the whole
person. However, any ideas that we have about reality, and especially true knowledge,
cannot be accounted for or described in physicalist terms. There is something about the
act of knowing that is inherently non-physical. Understanding is, he argues, must be
conceived of as resulting from and “act of being” that is non-material from the start, in
which nothing physical. He describes this in the Summa.
“The principle of the act of understanding, which is called the soul of man, must
of necessity be some kind of incorporeal and subsistent principle. For it is
obvious that man’s understanding enables him to know the natures of all bodily
things. But, what can in this way take in things must have nothing of their nature
in its own, for the form that was in it by nature would obstruct the knowledge of
anything else . . . . if the intellectual principle had in it the physical nature of any
bodily thing, it would be unable to know all bodies . . . The principle of
understanding, therefore, which is called mind or intellect, has its own activity in
which body takes no intrinsic part.
Read in contemporary terms, we can, I think, extrapolate an interpretation of how
Aquinas’s argument could engage current discussion about the nature of acts of
cognition. He is saying that it is impossible to conceive of how understanding could be
attained if we try to attribute it to be the “by-product” of any kind of physical process.
Physical processes qualify as “the physical nature of any bodily thing.” As such they
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This finely sliced reasoning is what separates Aquinas from Avicenna on the question of
whether or not there is one mind that is at work in all people. Aquinas believes that human knowing
participates in God’s power of knowing, but each person has his own power of knowing, but it is a
participated power. Here again, I see a parallel with Spinoza’s insistence in Book II that all Modes of
Thought are Modes of God qua Thinking Substance, but the things that are “in the mind of God” in these
Modes of Thought are not there under consideration of God qua Substance, but are, rather, in God insofar
as these finite Modes of Thought are particular and limited by that particularity.

316

have a deterministic nature; what he calls “the physical nature of [a] bodily thing.” But
he wants to argue that knowledge is really rational insight, as he understands it. Hence, if
it is thought of as depending upon any physical process, it must be conceived of as an an
act that operates according to physical laws or properties. Since the dominant view of the
workings of the physical universe in modern science are deterministic, then, Thomas
would argue, we have lost any reason for thinking of our understanding as being an
activity that is engaged in logical analysis and having a claim to truthfulness. Rather,
since such acts would be deterministically produced by physical laws, they would be
nothing more than physical events. They can be granted no status as rational insight or
“knowledge,” at least insofar as we traditionally want to refer to knowledge as realizing
something that is true.44 On the physicalist view, according to Aquinas, the “judgments”
or “thoughts” cannot be regarded as either true or false. If all that is involved in what we
call knowledge is a physical process (brain function, considered as purely physical
interactions) that operates on the basis of strict or even non-strict causal laws, then we
must redefine radically what we mean by knowledge. “Thought” is not, on this
materialistic view, a process that we could judge or define according to any principles of
logic. Therefore, it can be judged neither true or false.
If understanding is supposed to be exclusively and reductively a function of the
brain’s electro-chemical activity, then it is being supposed that, at least in principle, some
of the brain’s electro-chemical activity might be “true.” However, it would not be
question-begging to suggest that if such a bald assertion is the case, then some view must
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See above in chapter four, 179, n 73.
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be offered as to what it is for an electro-chemical process to be true. That view itself
must be able to stand up in the face of what we ordinarily mean by a judgment being true.
Without this we find ourselves in an incoherent position. In any case, for Aquinas at
least, but as it also seems to me more generally, all our discourse from science to ordinary
language operates on the assumption that “being true” - even where the supposed truths
in question are supposed to be truths about physical processes taking place in brains - is
not definable in terms of physical processes taking place in brains. The rational
processes of the mind can arguably be regarded as rooted in something other than
physical laws and in fact as rooted in part of that (the very form) which structures the
brain so as to be amenable to rational processes in the first place.45 This is, at least, the
way I believe that Aquinas would pose the matter in contemporary terms.
This ambiguity of the term ‘soul’ is what informs Aquinas’s contention that while
the rational soul does subsist apart from the body qua informing principle, it nonetheless
cannot be said, as the form of the human body, to exist in the most precise sense.
Primary beings or substances are what really exist most fundamentally. However, as the
information that gives form to an individual human being/substance, the soul must have
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If one were to suggest that a computer functions on strict laws of physics in a deterministic
fashion to arrive at truthfulness, therefore the critique being suggested fails, one could observe that a
computer does nothing apart from a “software” program that establishes the principles upon which the
computer will function. Hence, we can ask, perhaps, how the programming interfaces with the hardware,
but we cannot deny that the program establishes the possibilities of operation for the computer. And the
program plus the software is only an extension of the rationality of its designers and those who use them.
As Hasker says, “it is no more an independent source of rational thought than a television sent is an
independent source of news and entertainment” (Hasker, 49). This would strongly suggest that the
materialistic model, which is implicitly rejected in Aquinas’s doctrine of the intellectual soul as
“something” that performs non-physical operations, still does not account for insight qua insight.
Something else must account for how we can speak of our thoughts as rational, unless we want to give up
altogether the idea that we actually do think. It is this something that Aquinas is describing in his doctrine
of the anima intellective.
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some kind of reality. If the “soul” of an individual is analogous to information upon
which the concrete, and not just possible, existence of the individual is dependent (as
would seem to be the case, as well, with the relation between the encoded information of
DNA and individual existence) then that information is, at least, something. It is not an
entity in the strictest sense of the word. But it does have a reality that is not dependent
upon the embodied being that is given form and function by this information. So, at the
very least, the information that grants form (the soul) is logically prior. By the doctrine
of participation Aquinas believed that this informing soul is real even prior to the
existence of the rational animal, because to be the essence of something qua form is to be
closely associated (as it was in Aristotle and Plato) with the concept of an eternally
subsisting idea. (Of course, to be eternally subsisting does not entail the Spinozistic
notion of necessary existence, for Aquinas.) However, Aquinas, because of his doctrine
of God as the Pure Act of Being in which all other things exist by participation, can posit
that the rational soul qua form has existence not just in the mind of God as an eternally
subsistent “idea,” but as an expression of an essence which God knows not only as a
possible existent, but as an actuality. This is what Aquinas means when he says that the
rational soul “subsists.” Qua information that gives specific organization to certain
“designated matter,”46 the form is real and does not depend for its reality upon the
particular entity that is so informed and organized.
In this sense, then, Aquinas will say that the rational soul is a subsistent reality,
i.e., while it does not exist as a particular “thing,” it is nonetheless real in and of itself qua

46

Cf. chapter 3

319

organizing or informing principle. Indeed, the idea of the human soul-form qua
information implies, by Aquinas’s logic, that this form itself participates in the inherent
intelligibility of the universe. Thomistically speaking, the intelligibility of the material
universe (i.e. Thought) requires that another complementary principle exist as well -what we could call the principle of knowing-the-intelligible (i.e. Thinking). Both of these
are part of the same Reality that exists apart from and potentially in the rational soul
when it acts through the body that it informs. However, the rational soul alone brings to
the entity that is formed by it a capacity for the act of knowing-the-intelligible. And as
we have said, he contends that this act is not in any way a physical act, even if it involves
an essentially physical being and that being’s physical make up.
. . . we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal
matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power
and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another
operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the
nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the
elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the
sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and
noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that
it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever.
This power is called the intellect. (I a, Q 76, a 1, reply)
Aquinas’s way of expressing the nature of the soul in the above passage brings us
to the second sense in which the concept of the rational soul as the form of the human
being operates in Aquinas’s metaphysics. Strictly speaking, the power called “intellect”
that he mentions above is in the soul, but is not a power that the soul exercises qua form.
Rather, intellect, in this sense, is only a principle that the soul qua form produces in the
entity it informs. In other words, it is not an act of understanding or even a power that the
soul could perform “before” its inherence in matter. It is analogous to the part of the
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genetic information of DNA that organizes a human body so as to be apt for rational
thought. In the Summa (I a, Q 79, a 1, ad 1) Aquinas is clear that intellect or the act of
understanding is a power of the soul and not its essence. By “power” we must
understand Aquinas to mean -- if we are going to make sense of his other statements
about soul-body union -- it is a power that the rational soul brings to the person’s
existence as a bodily organism. Because it is capable of producing this kind of effect in a
human being, the soul is sometimes referred to as the intellect by Aquinas. But this is
merely a kind of short-hand designation, utilized because the intellect marks the “highest
power” that the rational soul can produce in a human person.
Because the rational soul is the source that enables understanding/rationality -- the
capacity for discursive thought -- in a human being, Aquinas argues that the nature of this
kind of soul is “incorruptible.” As the source of the act of understanding, this soul will in
some sense continue to exist, even when the body ceases to live, because it in some sense
subsisted prior to the existence of the body that it formed into a particular human person
on this occasion. Just as the material stuff of the body existed prior to being that body,
the organizational information that shaped the body is in some way also antecedent.
For Aquinas, these principles not only reflect the way that God has created the
world, but they also reflect that the nature of the Creation in question must participate in
his own Being as Creator.47 The soul thus makes intellect possible as an aspect of the
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Recall that Aquinas is insistent that in God there is no distinction between essence and existence
and that God is utterly simple. So, God’s act of knowing, act of creating, act of willing, act of being
knowable are, in some way, all one and the same in God, while being rightly differentiated by our
intellects. There is not a conflation going on in Aquinas’s mind here, rather a belief that qua unbounded
and eternal God is beyond any full comprehension by the human mind, while being, nonetheless, knowable
and predicable. This is because of the doctrine of the analogy of Being that Aquinas insists upon.
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human person in Aquinas’s metaphysical scheme, insofar as it is itself a participation in
the active intellect that is a feature of the universe’s own existence.48 Such rationality is
the highest power that, qua organizing information, the rational soul brings to human
beings. In I a, Q 79, reply, Aquinas offers the following:
For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect
always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and
perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in
intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in
part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain
amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding;
both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things
which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must
needs be some higher intellect by which the soul is helped to understand.
Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher
intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by
experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their
particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action
belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as
we have said above of the passive intellect. Therefore the power which is the
principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle
(De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something
received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the
soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the
separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is
the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (90, 3; I-II, 3, 7).
Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps.
4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.
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In the following quote Aquinas’s argument is not only to prove that the intellect participates in
God’s own being qua intellect, but to insist, against the Averrorists, that each human soul has in it its own
particular and specific act of participation in the active intellect, not a kind of general kind of partaking of
it. Hence, he says: “no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein;
as we have said above of the passive intellect (76, 1). Therefore the power which is the principle of this
action must be something in the soul.” One will have to recall, however, Aquinas’s insistence that God is
his own essence and his own existence in order to understand how Aquinas argues that nothing else can be
a part of God’s essence. God is Being and the act of being is God’s essence philosophically stated, but
only one act of Being can be the source of all things who do not have existence as a part of the definition of
their essence. This is the basis of Aquinas’s views about transcendence.
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While it is the case, for Aquinas, that the soul is possessed of a “power” which is
the power to enable rationality and understanding in those beings informed by this form,
and furthermore the case that the intellective acts of which the beings are capable are not
“caused” by or emergent from bodily states, we must note that neither is the power of the
soul self-explanatory or self-instantiating. The rational soul’s existence in the first place
is only possible because, as an individuated act of understanding, it participates in God’s
own Being. The life of a human being, therefore, qua “rational animal,” participates in
God’s Being, and in the act of understanding it is a type of analogue of God’s own
knowing. (Of course, for Aquinas, “participation” is a concept that can be applied either
univocally or analogously.) In the Summa I a, Q 18, a 4, ad 1, where he is answering the
question of whether all things are “in” God, he says:
In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in
which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not
distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine
essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that
things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.
Each individual act of being that we call “knowledge” or “understanding” exists
as an analogue to God’s act of Being. This implies that, for Aquinas, the activity of
knowing is to be understood (as it was later by Spinoza) as a principle (or an Attribute,
Spinozistically speaking) that is part of Reality per se. Hence, the form of knowing, if it
informs something so as to make it a true knower, must subsist in itself apart from doing
so. This is because moments of individual knowledge exist as such only because they
participate in the intellectual activity of God’s power of knowing; this is the way that a

323

human being qua knower (but not as a physical entity) participates in God’s act of
Being.49
The incorruptibility of the rational soul is, as Aquinas sees it, ultimately not,
strictly speaking, incorruptibility of the rational soul qua form, although the
“information” that is the forma intellectiva brought by that form is qua information not
corruptible, because it is utterly non-material. (It is no more corruptible than the
information 2 + 2 = 4.) Rather, the rational soul’s activity in the life of a person who
exercises the non-corporeal act of understanding or knowing is what Aquinas wants to
demonstrate is capable of “permanence” apart from the body. But what Aquinas the
philosopher had to account for, within the confines of his own metaphysics, was how the
person who is, by definition, a “rational animal” could exercise the power of
understanding, if indeed it is conceivable, apart from being embodied. Without such an
explanation, then his theological belief that there is “personal” survival past bodily life is
philosophically untenable. He puts the arguments against the possibility of such survival
in strong terms in objections 1 – 3 in I a, Q 89, a 1:
The first point [against the idea that the rational soul could continue to exercise
knowledge after death]:
1. It would seem that the separated soul cannot understand anything at all. For
Aristotle says that the intellectual apprehension is destroyed through the
decay of some inward part. But all the inward parts of man are destroyed in
death. Therefore understanding itself is also destroyed.
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It would be an interesting area of inquiry for a theistic philosopher to consider how the concept
of God’s omniscience relates to the question of individual knowledge If God exists and is in fact
omniscient, then God would have to know not only what I know, but would have to know it, in some sense,
as I know it and would have to know it as adequate or inadequate and know every person’s perspective and
every possible person’s perspective, as well as having sub specie aeternitatis a knowledge of the whole and
more than the whole.
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2. In death the senses and the imagination are totally destroyed . . . . Therefore
the soul, after death, understands nothing
3. Again, if the separated soul understands anything, it must do so by means of
species. But it does not understand by means of innate species [in the mind],
since it is, from the beginning, like a writing tablet on which as yet nothing is
written [Aristotle, De anima III, 4. 429b29. Nor yet by species it abstracts
from things because it has no organs of sense and imagination by means of
which species are abstracted from things. Nor, again, by species previously
abstracted and retained in the soul, for in this case the soul of a child would
understand nothing after death. Nor, finally, by species which come from
God, for this would not be the natural knowledge we are talking about, but a
gift of grace. Therefore the soul, when separated from the body understands
nothing.
Understanding Aquinas’s response to such objections requires us to consider a
few issues that relate to his view of the human person and the capacity for thought and
self-consciousness that is essential to a human being’s activity qua rational animal. First
is his insistence that the state of separation that his metaphysics allows for is praeter
naturam, i.e. it is outside the nature of the human soul -- one might even call it unnatural.
He describes the state of human existence he envisions: “To understand by turning to
sense images is as natural to the soul as being joined to the body, whereas to be separated
from the body is off-beat for its nature [praeter naturam], and so likewise is
understanding without turning to sense images. The soul is joined to the body in order to
be and act in accordance with its nature” (I a, Q 89, a 1, reply). This entails that, for
Aquinas, the rational soul, when considered as separated from the body, cannot be
thought of in the most precise or fullest sense as a human person. Since the essence of a
human being involves, as we established in chapter four, both matter and soul, the
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survival that Aquinas describes is truly praeter naturam.50 As if this were not a large
enough hurdle, however, Aquinas must also, by his own definition, explain how, since it
is the person who knows and not the soul, the soul can survives the demise of the bodily
aspect of the person precisely as any sort of knower.
In order to demonstrate that these difficulties need not be insuperable, Aquinas
offers an analogy:
The nature of a light body does not change, whether it is in in its proper place
(which is natural to it) or whether it is outside its proper place (which is besides
its nature). Thus to the soul according to its mode of being when united with the
body belongs a mode of understanding which turns to the sense images found in
corporeal organs, whereas when separated from the body its mode of
understanding, as in other immaterial substances, is to turn to things that are
purely intelligible.
Such an analogy, based as it is on the medieval physics of his time, is perhaps not
very helpful for us at face value, even if Aquinas and some of his readers at the time
found it persuasive. But perhaps we can decipher his meaning. He is trying to describe
the true nature of the soul as a cause of the acts of understanding and reasoning that takes
place in the human knower. The nature of the rational soul qua informing principle is to
produce in a human being just this kind of activity. So the soul’s nature, when we think
of its subsistence as an informing intellectual principle, is to “communicate” to the
human person the power to know. I take it that he means by this that the information the
soul “communicates” to the matter of the body results in a physical being capable of acts
of rationality that are distinct from the physical properties that make him a biological
creature. This activity of “informing” is the soul’s true nature. Because the soul qua
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See above, 166f, especially note 57.
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informing principle establishes in the biological being the power to know, the being,
insofar as we are speaking of the power to know, evinces a participation in the
fundamental intelligibility of the universe that is produced by God’s own act of knowing.
Even though the human intellect is the “lowest of all intellectual substances,” as Aquinas
puts it, its “power of intelligence comes from the influence of divine light.” The person
who knows, through the power that the rational soul makes possible out of its essence,
therefore, participates (analogously, not univocally) in God’s knowing.51
The nature of our way of knowing as human beings is that of discursive
knowledge that develops from sensory engagement with the world and abstraction from
particulars in coming to understand the nature of Reality. The soul, subsequent to the
formation of the human person qua knowing agent when the soul informs matter,
becomes something that is an entity in itself, whereas the soul “prior” to giving actual
form to a living entity must be, Aquinas argues, information. A person now in the
“union” of soul and informed body is considered to have become something over and
above the soul qua form that has enabled the existence of a being capable of acts of
rational insight. In the human person, the rational soul takes on a new meaning logically
and a new existence ontologically. The exercise of the potential for consciousness and
rationality was, prior to the union of the soul and the body, only an inherent in the
informing nature of the soul, as was therefore only a possibility for an entity informed by
the anima intellectiva. Now in the union, however, this potential becomes a real property
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Again this distinction that Aquinas makes between participation analogously and univocally has a
possible parallel in Spinoza. He insists that qua Modes of Thought, the ideas that a Mode has is in God,
not insofar as God is thought of in his essence, but only insofar as that Mode is a finite Mode of Thought,
hence partaking of Substance for its existence, but distinct from Substance as an individual and finite and
limited instance of Thought.
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of the human person. The rational soul qua form has communicated its “highest power”
(the potential for rationality) to the human person. Because this highest power defines
the particular kind of soul that informs a human being, then the term “soul” can begin to
function in ordinary language as a quasi synonym for the person who understands and
learns. But a person is more than the soul, not less. The equivocality of this usage of the
term “soul” is rooted in the fact that it is actually the person, produced when the soul
“communicates” its essence to the matter of the body, who is most precisely said to know
(as well as to act.) But the soul is the source of this possibility. Hence, in Aquinas’s
view, the knowing person is what the soul becomes. Personal experiences and insights
into the nature of the world and into the existence of God become part of the soul’s
nature, because the soul’s informing potential is now active.
He argues, as was discussed above, that the intellect which the soul makes
possible in the human person is, following the concrete existence of a human being that
results from the soul-body union, absolutely immaterial in its essence. If that is the case,
then (as he puts it in I a Q 89, a 5, reply):
But just as acts of the intellect are principally and formally seated in the intellect
itself, but materially and in the manner of a disposition in the lower faculties
[capacity for sensory awareness], so also must the same be said of habitual
dispositions [our acquired understanding and rational processes]. Therefore as to
man’s present knowledge, the part that is in the lower faculties will not remain in
the separated soul, but what is in the intellect will necessarily remain. For as
Aristotle says, a form [the rational soul] can be destroyed in two ways, first, in
itself, when it is destroyed by its contrary, e.g., heat by cold; second incidentally,
that is, by the destruction of its subject. Now it is obvious that demonstrative
knowledge in the human intellect cannot be destroyed by the destruction of its
subject, because, as shown before [I a, Q 75, a 6], the intellect is immortal. . . .
Aquinas here expresses what was described in the discussion preceding the above
quote. The rational soul gives rise to an entity who, being capable of knowledge,
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acquires understanding and insight that once acquired become part of the essence of the
person’s intellect. Because this soul must be understood to have a subsistence of its own
that is logically prior to the person’s actual existence, Aquinas contends that the
subsequent thoughts, experiences, and insights that become a part of the soul-enabled
person continue to exist. This is because, as intellectual acts, they have become part of
the essence of an immaterial, and therefore incorruptible, principle that itself participates
in the very intelligibility of the universe that is rooted in God’s own act of knowing.
Thus the particularity of each human being does not cease to exist, he thinks, even though
the “separated soul” is not strictly speaking the full person. Cessation of existence is,
Aquinas thinks, impossible because even the particularity of perspective that each person
qua intellect attains and entertains is part of the knowledge that is maintained in the
eternal intellect of God. And since the soul qua form participated in God’s own Being
qua understanding, and since God’s power of Thought is an inherent aspect of the
universe, then personal knowledge, and even personal identity, become part of the
universe of knowledge. So, the perspectival knowledge, the character that is shaped in
the acquisition of that knowledge and holds it, and which has become a part of the soul in
concrete existence, cannot be lost, because the perspectival knowledge though acquired
in relation to the body never depended upon the body.
As I indicated at the beginning of this section, Aquinas did not so much attempt to
argue philosophically for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Rather, his focus
was upon the closely related, but distinct, notion of its incorruptibility. His focus was
upon incorruptibility, rather than immortality, due to the role he played as a Christian
theologian. As a philosopher he did not argue for immortality, becase as a theologian he
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embraced and argumentatively supported the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.52
He thought of this doctrine as not, unlike his argument for the incorruptibility of the soul,
open to philosophical demonstration per se. (Or as he would put it, it was not open to
“natural philosophy.”) It is, rather, an article of faith. So I will not go to great lengths
discussing it for our purposes. However, it should be noted that he thought this doctrine
was completely consistent with his demonstration of the soul’s incorruptibility and his
demonstration that the rational soul is the form of the body.
We can also note that in the supplement to the Summa’s tertia pars, he contends
that the issue of how personal identity is maintained, if there is a resurrection, implies
that a “new” body is going to be part of continuing personal identity. Seizing the
authority of Aristotle in III supp. Q 80 a 1, reply, Thomas argues that the soul in relation
to the body is not only the formal cause of the body’s existence but is, as well, the
efficient cause of its existence.53 He argues, in good Aristotelian fashion, from the
example of a craftsman or artist, and describes the soul as analogous to the “art” by
which an artifact or masterpiece is made. Just as everything that appears in the work of
art is contained implicitly (but without explicit expression) in the “art” that guides the
artist, so it is the case with the soul in relation to the body. Whatever was in the body
prior to its death was (and is) contained, in a way, implicitly in the soul. What follows
then is that, at the resurrection, the body will not rise again except according to the
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This doctrine is most clearly spelled out in the Bible in I Corinthians chapter fifteen. The
doctrine of an intermediate state of the soul “awaiting” resurrection is one that Aquinas inherited from
Christian teaching and it is found throughout the New Testament. For a good treatment of these ideas, see
John Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989).
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Aquinas references Aristotle in De Anima ii, 4.
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relation it bears to the rational soul, whose existence has been maintained in the Being of
God qua an immaterial intellective principle that participates in God’s Being qua
intellect. Since the rational soul, in this state of union with God, has been “perfected,” it
follows that any person who by faith has been in union with God, must rise again
perfected. This is because, as Aquinas puts it, he is thereby repaired in order that he may
obtain his ultimate perfection.54
It is not my intention to defend this position, any more than I have wanted to
“defend” Spinoza’s or Aquinas’s positions on immortality or incorruptibility. Rather, my
intention has been to show, in relation to his belief in the resurrection, what I wanted to
show in my presentation of both Spinoza’s and Aquinas’s views of the mind and soul,
namely, that this doctrine is, at least, reconcilable with the larger scheme of his
metaphysics. And in the final analysis, perhaps a coherence theory of truthfulness is the
best we can ask of any system, given the way that competing presuppositions establish
for each of us distinct starting points that lead to (sometimes radically) divergent
philosophical commitments.
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In the Summa III Supp, Q 79, a 2, Aquinas deals with the question of whether or not the selfsame man will rise again. His argument there merely insists that it must be the self-same man that rises,
but does not provide an argument for how this could be the case. It could well be that my reading of him as
holding that all that is true of the person in life becomes part of the rational soul that is incorruptible could
have provided him with the “explanation” that he would need. If the experiences and the history of the
person are part of the “knowledge” that is maintained in the sum of all knowable things in God’s intellect,
and the soul continues to be a kind of information, even in the post-mortem condition of separation from
the body, then once united with matter again, not only does the “same” body appear, but the same person,
because the informing soul is not distinct from the history of the person that it originally informed and will
(according to Aquinas) inform again. I do not think that this way of stating the matter will convince those
who are not predisposed to believe in the resurrection. Indeed, it probably could not, nor should (if faith is
the issue). But, it might, at least, tie up for a Thomist a dangling existential issue regarding personal
identity missing in Aquinas’s treatment in the Summa.
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Implications for contemporary philosophy of Mind
The premise of this dissertation has been that Spinoza and Aquinas held theories
about the relationship between mind and body that are quite similar in very important
ways. That is what I have been endeavoring to unpack in the preceding chapters, even as
I have argued less directly that their perspective(s) are coherent and should be taken
seriously, not just for comparative studies in the history of philosophy, but as potential
dialogue partners in contemporary discussions of this perennially difficult issue. Spinoza
and Aquinas should not be considered members, to borrow Della Rocca’s description of
Spinoza, of “the illustrious company of those who have failed to solve the mind-body
problem.”55 I think, instead, that Spinoza, as well as Aquinas, actually avoid the mindbody problem in its typical form, because they push the issue back to an even more
fundamental point of philosophical exploration – the very nature of the soul as a form or
conatus. So, in the closing few pages of this dissertation I want to suggest some helpful
ways in which we might perhaps draw upon their metaphysical conclusions to develop a
different angle of vision for analyzing the very nature of the “problem.”
Hillary Putnam’s claim that contemporary philosophy of mind is
“methodologically Cartesian” strikes me as essentially on target. I say this because
present-day approaches to the knowledge of ourselves as human beings (or so it seems to
me) tend to divide the discussants into two distinct epistemological camps. One the one
hand, the natural sciences attempt to describe human existence empirically and, therefore,
purely in terms of physical laws. On the other hand, philosophy of mind analyzes the
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“mind” nonempirically and philosophically. In such an epistemological perspective we
are left with a kind of antinomy that, all attempts to dissuade aside, still views the
relationship between the human being as described by science and the “mind” as
analyzed philosophically as a problem to be solved. Further exacerbating the
contemporary dialogue, I think, is the quite evident tendency to assume that the
epistemological approach of science is what is to establish the notion of what is
ontologically “natural” in the first place. This, of course, then suggests that any attempt
to posit some principle that is not an empirically analyzable property is illicitly importing
something “non-natural,” or even worse “super-natural.”
What we are left with, I think, is a methodological dualism that does not envelop
the whole of human life empirically, for either we have to see our existence as utterly
mysterious or we have to deny what is most immediately obvious to us in our own lived
experience, i.e. that we actually do live “minded” single lives that are just as truly
“mental,” in some non-material sense, as they are physical. Perhaps we might need to
deny, someday, that our day-to-day experiences of having insight, being motivated, or
making a decision, or even experiencing love, are nothing in themselves. But until we
do, we should not! Unless we are willing to exclude these experiences, which seem to be
intrinsic properties of some aspect of our actual lives qua human, from the category of
real things, then we must learn how to analyze them carefully as real. But, in taking
seriously their existence as aspects of reality, and not simply something that is
epiphenomenal, we need to avoid, as well, any theory that fails to account for the
phenomenon that is becoming more and more obvious in brain research, namely, that our
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mental states are attendant, in some parallel fashion, upon changes in electro-chemical
structure and synaptic function.
What must be avoided is the temptation to think that we are only left with one of
two disparate conclusions. We need not, in the first instance, think of “mind” as some
property that tacks an additional level of reality onto the organic existence we share with
animals. The problem that this “tacking-on” way of conceiving the nature mind in
relation to body is that having a “mind” or being rational is not something that is overand-above the biological life that we live. Human life is an organic life. Hence, it
includes in its very form the activity of thought and reasoning and understanding. This
should also suggest that the proposal is not that we extend some sort of Cartesian dualism
to our view of animal life. It may in fact be closer to the truth to recognize some of the
truth motivating the various types of reductive physicalism/materialism that have been
proposed in recent years. Unlike Cartesian dualism, they insist upon the unity of human
life, i.e. that whatever we are in our life as minds and bodies, we must be “one and the
same thing.”
However, it is equally crucial, in recognizing some validity in reductionist
tendencies, to resist a second temptation, namely, to go too far in precisely that direction.
Theories of reductionism, while rightly insisting on the unity of human life, have too
uncritically assumed that the methods of empirical “natural” science and the theories that
grow out of them must be the only licit methodology for our endeavors to understand the
nature of human life qua mental. Thereby, reductionism has put itself in an
epistemological posture from which it must ignore the overwhelming empirical evidence
that each of us has in our own personal experience, namely, that our cognitive activity in
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an integral part of our life as consciously aware beings. That is, reductivist tendencies
seem to me to divorce cognitive processes from the processes by which we are actually
immediately aware of the act of reasoning or understanding in which we engage. And
for those who accept reductionism who are willing to abandon altogether the explicit
sense in which our cognitive activity involves our immediate awareness of that activity, it
seems to me that, as was argued above, their materialistic determinism in any case of
itself rules out the possibility that cognitive activities embody truth, including, therefore,
the cognitive activities expressed in their own doctrines.
These approaches lack any principle, so far as I can see, which would provide a
unified way of analyzing human experience or thinking about the way that our actual
existence is lived. Such unity is the very thing provided by the hylomorphic perspective
that I have outlined in Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s metaphysics. If contemporary
philosophy would recover the “natural” principle of form as the organizing code that coinheres in the material “stuff” of the universe, insofar as human life is instantiated in the
universe, a new and fruitful way of envisioning mind-body relations could be developed.
In the area of biological studies, much is made of the DNA code that establishes all basic
body functions in organic life, from building proteins out of amino acids to regulating the
timing and expression of various processes involved with development and growth. This
code determines, at least at the level of biological existence, it seems, every specific of
our individual lives, qua human, e.g. that we have opposable thumbs, that our jaw
muscles are lax, that our cranium capacity is larger to accommodate a large brain, the
way that this brain works, and everything else. Every physical structure of our life is in
any case in some way dependent upon it. Yet this “code” is basically information; and
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qua information it is not something physical. It is analogous to a message or instructions
“communicated” (as Aquinas might say) to the physical stuff that thereby becomes our
body in its organized life as a particular member of a particular species. Logically,
however, the “information” of the code could be communicated in any number of ways,
as can all information. And yet, this information inheres in every part of our physical
existence, without losing its nature of being information, to make us conscious-reasoning
beings.
Two things are striking here. First, it is intriguing that this basic premise of
modern biology has possible antecedents in the kind of hylomorphism that I have been
describing in relation to Aquinas and Spinoza. But, second, it is equally intriguing that
contemporary philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have not explored deeply
enough what seems to me to be a very forceful principle at work and an important
consideration. What I have in mind is the implications that might accompany the
(arguably evident) nature of DNA as “information.” Perhaps what I take to be the
significance of DNA may go beyond what contemporary materialists see as its
significance. As was argued in chapter two, however, the kind of hylomorphism that this
dissertation attempts to explicate as part of Aquinas’s and Spinoza’s metaphysical
projects, can allow us to embrace a better understanding of the nature of DNA
information. In at least a weak sense, one cannot really appreciate the significance of
DNA without becoming a dualist. But the dualism would not be of the Cartesian or
Platonic variety (or Augustinian in its Christian theological form). It would be the kind
of “dualism” that one finds in Aquinas and Spinoza, where there is only one concrete
reality that we engage in knowing and being a part of (Spinoza’s Natura naturata and
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Aquinas’s being as participation in Being). By this kind of dualism, one would expect
that physicalists would be able to regard DNA as containing and communicating
“information,” but also regard it in a way that is explicable in physicalist terms. The
information is not, strictly speaking, something over and above the material entities,
because it exists in them. However, the information is not, itself, physical. But if it is
not, strictly speaking, physical then how are we to regard it? It is obvious to my mind, at
least, that because it is precisely information, something that is Thought-like must be
regarded as a basic principle at work in the universe, and not merely a supervenient
property. Aquinas and Spinoza, in their insistence upon the role that form or conatus
plays in establishing the bodily and mental life of a living human person, are old
witnesses to the momentousness that this discovery has for the way we think about the
mind-body relationship.
In realizing this significance, Aquinas and Spinoza felt compelled to describe
Thought as a fundamental feature of Reality, rather than a supervenient property. In this,
as well as their notions of form/conatus, we are offered another conceptual lens through
which we might view the foundation of mind and body “identity.” DNA is arguably a
type of information that is analogous in modern terms to the older concept form/conatus.
Spinoza and Aquinas would argue that the arguably obvious nature of DNA as a
conveyor of information requires us to embrace, in our descriptions of the universe, the
idea that Thought qua Attribute (to put it in Spinoza’s terms) or Rationality qua
participation in God’s act of Being (à la Aquinas) is a fundamental aspect of such
encoded information. This “code” communicates instructions to amino acids and to all
other physical parts of the organism that will not exist without that information. Hence,
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the existent organism in its concrete reality is arguably unintelligible apart from that
information. And again, if the information can be conceived of as in some sense
preceding the organism, , then it seems to me that we might have before us at least an
interesting philosophical question that could be explored in another dissertation. Perhaps
some might be wary of positing Thought as a fundamental Attribute upon which the
encoded or informing nature of DNA is logically dependent for intelligibility, because
they fear the posing of such an Attribute would imply a “Thinker” as the source of such
Thought; and it could be that this has too much potential theistic baggage. I am not
making the case here that Thought, much less a “Thinker,” must be posited. Rather, I am
suggesting that by looking at DNA in the light of hylomorphism we might discover a
philosophically interesting, and possibly true, way of analyzing the universe and the
living organisms that populate it.

To what extent the notion of Thought needs to be

brought in for that purpose may remain to be discussed. But one should not rule out the
idea from start simply because he wants to avoid bringing God into the discussioin.56
What is most instructive in this basic Thomistic-Spinozistic insight for presentday philosophy of mind is their premise that Thought, along with and perhaps co-inherent
with the laws of physics, can be (and perhaps must be) understood as ontologically
ultimate. Recovering this concept, we might actually find a better starting point for our
contemporary mind-body discussions. And those who find it incoherent would have to
show why it is; but I think that they would be begging the question by simply assuming
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However, philosophy ought to be interested in whether or not some concept of “God” is valid.
And if other of our logical concepts required that concept, then such is the conclusion that an honest
philosophy would have to embrace. It is, however, far beyond the purview of this dissertation to examine
that.
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what Kim has described as “ontological physicalism.” This “new” way forward,
however, shows how to avoid thinking about the nature of mind in the universe and in
human experience as tacking another level of reality upon an otherwise lifeless and
thoughtless world. Instead, it allows us to see that our own experience of ourselves as
“one and the same thing,” regardless of which of the dual aspects of our lives by which
we might regard ourselves in any given analysis, does not pose the Mind-body problem.
Rather, it manifests for us the irreducible complexity of our existence as beings that
participate in a universe that is equally dependent upon Thought and Extension as
ontological fundaments.57
Colin McGinn, quoted in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, has argued
that in philosophy of mind “the question must arise as to whether human minds are
closed with respect to certain true explanatory theories [about the connection between
mind and body].”58 McGinn’s argument is persuasive in its focus, but it could be asked, I
think, whether or not the problem is not what we are considering in the analysis of mindbody relations, but the presuppositions that we bring to the issue. Kim claims that the
presupposition of our current approach to the question establishes an undesirable choice.
It is assumed, he argues, that if the ontological priority of the physical is not presumed,
then one must allow “that there are things in the space-time world other than physical
57

While I cannot discuss this here, such a philosophical perspective as that represented in my
interpretation of Aquinas could, I think, be embraced by theistic philosophers, especially if they are
Christians. To argue that the soul qua form is “natural” to the world and that all of the natural world
“participates” in the Being of God, need not entail that one give up religious beliefs that are traditionally
established in doctrines such as “transcendence” and “immortality.” Rather, it simply would entail that
they embrace a richer notion of what the “physical world” and the “natural world” are. God could always
be “beyond” our world’s ontology and the “soul” could be nonetheless seen as immortal in the metaphysics
offered here. But, the kind of Augustinian/Cartesian dualism that has marked much of Christian reflection
might have to go.
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things, like Cartesian souls, or at least that some things in the world have certain
properties that are independent of their physical nature.”59 However, could it not simply
be that the “physical” world itself has infused into it certain non-physical features that
entail non-physical properties, e.g. the information conveyed by the double helix
molecule that makes up the physical structure of DNA? This information is not, as I have
already argued, a physical property, but it is a part of the world of nature. The mystery of
the “Cartesian soul” need not be invoked, but the presence of a Thomistic “form” or a
Spinozistic conatus might very well need to be recognized.
As it seems to me, at least, acceptance of the point of view common to such
otherwise diverse thinkers as Spinoza and Aquinas, offers the prospect of new insights
into the way that mind and body “interact.” And even if McGinn is actually correct that
our minds have a conceptual barrier – one analogous to the perceptual barrier that makes
us unable to see certain aspects of the electromagnetic spectrum – standing in the way of
our attempts to comprehend the relationship between ourselves qua biological and
ourselves qua conscious-thinking beings, we might, at least, gain a better grasp of why
that is the case. It could very well be, as it seems to me, that the limits that we in fact
face are not the result of our lacking the cognitive apparatus requisite for conceiving of
the relationship. They may, at least to a large extent, be the result of our embrace of a
false perspective on the question. It could well be the case that, as the hylomorphism of
Aquinas and Spinoza suggest, we need to push back the categories of the relationship
between mind and body to the earlier question of what it really takes for an organism
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such as a human being to be endowed with rationality. It is not question-begging to
suggest that the kind of moderate dualism that one finds in Aquinas and Spinoza in this
respect can serve us well. But for that to happen, we would have to abandon the fears
that any kind of dualism at all leads us to what Kim describes as conceiving “that there
are things in the space-time world other than physical things, like Cartesian souls, or at
least that some things in the world have certain properties that are independent of their
physical nature.”
Admittedly, what I have put forth in this regard is just an intimation of the way in
which the “hylomorphism” that we have been considering by way of Spinoza and
Aquinas might in fact become a dialogue partner in this discussion of present-day
concern. But by recovering the idea that there could indeed be a form that gives
organization to a body, so as to make it apt for a mind, and thereby equally makes
possible a mind that is apt for the body, we might perhaps begin to look with newly
opened eyes to the mystery of human origins and of the DNA code itself. And in
regarding the latter as a bearer of information, in particular, we might find that we are
after all closer to that hylomorphism than might otherwise have been supposed. Perhaps
then we could begin to begin to see that recovering the “soul” is not an impulse of
obsolete or antiquated quaintness. Rather, it might help us to understand more deeply
Wittgenstein’s observations about a human person: “My attitude towards him is an
attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.” For as Wittgenstein
understood, “the human body is the best picture of the human soul.”60 And qua conatic
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans., G. E. M. Anscombe, (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1957), II.iv.178.
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form the soul is, as well, the best account of the mind’s presence in the “one and the same
thing.”
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